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ABSTRACT
Inter-firm collaboration has become increasingly important in the global economy.
Firms rely on collaborations to access new resources, new technology, skills, latest
market information, new markets and knowledge, to increase innovation, to reduce
costs, and to overcome government policy barriers. Given the importance of business
collaboration, it is not surprising that the topic has been extensively researched in
both economics and business studies even though the term “collaboration” has not
generally not used consistently in the literature. The empirical research has primarily
focused on inter-firm collaborations in developed countries and involving large
firms. There are many differences between developed countries and developing
countries, which may influence the types, motives and results from inter-firm
collaborations.

A major objective of this thesis is to identify the key determinants of successful
inter-firm collaborations in the telecommunications industry in Australia and China.
To provide more reliable results, both qualitative and quantitative research methods
are adopted in this thesis as complementary methodologies. The qualitative analysis
is based on information from 31 face-to-face interviews conducted in China and
Australia between 2008 and 2009. The quantitative method is an ordered probit
estimation using data collected from an online survey conducted in 2009 with 339
valid responses. Findings from the thesis show that firms prefer peer or larger sized
partners to achieve a higher performance in their collaborations. Trust,
communication and firm size play significant positive roles in successful inter-firm
collaborations. It was also found that previous experience plays a less of important
role, and that cultural similarity plays a significant negative role in inter-firm
collaborations in China and Australia. China and Australia are different in terms of
level of development and market size. To collaborate with Chinese partners it is
better to target bringing more profits or increasing their market influence. However,
to collaborate with Australian partners it is better to target cost saving. The results
also suggest that studies of business collaboration should take into account the
cultural background, regulations and industry characteristics in each country.
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as remote payment and on-site payment, which provides
customers with functions such as recharging, payment
and enquiries through RFID, WWW, SMS/MMS, etc.
Mobile TV is expected to drive margins and 3G
penetration for carriers. Popular forms of mobile TV are
expected to be news clips, sport highlights, music video
clips and ‘mobisodes’ (shows specially made for mobile
handsets).
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of China
Term used to denote the real-time integration of text
with still images and graphics, video and sound
Multi Layer Perception is a method used in computing
intelligence to train the system
A Naïve Bayes classifier is a simple probabilistic
classifier based on applying Bayes' theorem
Artificial neural networks are composed of
interconnecting artificial neurons to mimic the properties
of biological neurons
Portability An arrangement that allows subscribers of a
telecommunications service to change carriers without
having to change their number.
A method of transmitting messages by subdividing them
into short packets containing the data and a destination
address. Each is passed from source to destination
through intermediate nodes which direct each packet
onwards, not necessarily by the same route. The packets
are reassembled into the original message at the
receiving end.
Personal Communication Services
In contrast to postpaid contracts, prepaid communication
services are services for which credit has been purchased
in advance with no fixed-term contract obligations.
Polyphonic ring tones vary in specification from phone
to phone, but all polyphonic phones support the playing
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Postpaid

Premium Services
PTT

Real (or true) Tones
RF
Roaming

SMS
Spam
Spectrum
SWOT
TDD modulation

TDMA
TIO

UMTS

Value added services

Virtual Private Network

VMNOS
VOIP
VDSL

of more than one note together, so a ring tone is
generally more musical.
Subscriber that has a contract for the use of airtime. The
client has no need of activating airtime, it is done so
immediately.
A carriage service or a content service using a number
with a prefix starting with ‘190’ in Australia.
Push to Talk (PPT) offers consumers the ability to talk
to another individual or group without having to make
additional calls.
Ring tones that are an extract from patented music.
Radio Frequency
Roaming allows customers to use their mobile phones
on other networks (other than the one for which they
currently pay). Roaming can be national wide or
international.
Short Message Service (SMS) enables mobile phones to
send and receive text messages.
Unsolicited marketing e-mail and SMS messages to
mobile phones.
The bandwidth of a communications system, expressed
in terms of the frequencies it can carry.
Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
Time Division Duplexing, a broadband transmission
method where the sending and receiving channels use
the same frequency but at different times.
Time division multiple access.
The Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) is
a free and independent service for residential customers
and small business in Australia that can help them
resolve complaints about phone and internet problems.
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, thirdgeneration
international
mobile
communication
standard.
Services provided over a public or private network
which, in some way add value to the basic carriage
services (such as storing and forwarding messages).
A software defined network offered by telephone
carriers for voice and data communications among
multiple sites. The network provides the appearance of a
private network, except that it makes use of the public
switched network rather than physically dedicated leased
lines.
Virtual Mobile Network Operators
Voice over Internet Protocol, technology used to make
telephone calls via the Internet.
Very high bit rate Digital Subscriber Line, a new
technology used to transmit exceptionally high data rates
(5 Mbit/s upstream, 50 Mbit/s downstream).
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W-CDMA

Wallpaper
WAP
Wholesale

WLAN

Wi-Fi
Wi-MAX

WOS
WTO

Wideband Code Division Multiple Access, a technology
for wideband digital radio communications of internet,
multimedia, video and other capacity-demanding
applications.
Wallpaper is the background of the mobile phone
display.
Wireless Application Protocol, a service for mobile
internet access
The business of selling services to third parties who in
turn sell them to their own end users either directly or
after further processing.
Wireless Local Area Network, wireless networks for
mobile Internet access. The network can also connect
multiple computers to each other or to a central
information system, a printer, or a scanner.
Wireless Fidelity, based on 2.5G technology
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, a
telecommunications technology aimed at providing
wireless data over long distances in a variety of ways,
from point-to-point links to full mobile cellular type
access. It is based on the IEEE 802.16 standard.
Wholly owned subsidiary
The World Trade Organization (WTO) deals with the
global rules of trade between nations. Its main function
is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and
freely as possible.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1

Introduction

This study investigates the issues of the types, motives, benefits, risks and key
determinants of successful inter-firm collaborations in the Chinese and Australian
mobile telecommunication markets. Inter-firm collaboration has become increasingly
important in the global economy (Lavie, 2007). Firms rely on collaborations to
access new resources, new technology, skills, latest market information, new markets
and knowledge, to increase innovation, to reduce costs, and to overcome government
policy barriers. Since 1990 the number of global strategic alliances has grown by
more than 25% annually (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995). Inter-firm collaborations between
competing firms and firms from different cultural backgrounds increased
dramatically in recent years (Vilana and Monroy, 2010).

As more firms adopt a collaboration strategy, it adds pressure on non-collaborating
firms that are being increasingly subject to global competition (Wilson, 2007). As
Lank (2006, p.1) indicated ‘no organisation is an island’ now. The problem of how to
select a good partner, supplier, or customer is a crucial challenge for most firms. It is
even more important for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to plan and
adopt collaboration strategies to survive fierce global competition (Lee, 2007).

The study of inter-firm collaboration has attracted researchers from a number of
disciplines including economics, management, and business studies. Transaction cost
theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1971; 1979; 1985; 2005), the resource based view
(Demsetz, 1973; Rumelt, 1984; Das and Teng, 1998; Barney, 2001), and many other
management and business theories have contributed significantly to a better
understanding of this area (Porter, 1980; Kay, 1993; Hart, 1995; Kale, 1999;
Harrison, 2004; Porter, 2007).

Diverse terms have been used in the management, business, and economics literature
to describe inter-firm collaboration, for example alliances, cooperation, coordination,
coalition or partnership. On the other hand, most models of collaboration have
adopted tangible profits or benefits (Contractor and Lorange, 1998 ) as the major
outcomes from this activity, ignoring some important intangible benefits (e.g.
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enhanced relationships with government agencies or extended business networks).
Therefore, by reviewing different definitions and terms used in the literature, this
study defines inter-firm collaboration to be “inter-firm activities that are aimed at
generating tangible and/or intangible benefits for each firm involved”.

Most of the existing studies focus only on firms from developed countries or/and
only on large firms (Link and Bauer, 1989; Lavie, 2007). Less attention has been
devoted to a comparative study between emerging and developed economies (Kuada,
2002). In addition, most of the existing literature has focused on very general or
traditional (e.g. agriculture or manufacturing) industries (Anderson and Narus, 1990;
Krogt et al., 2007; Mazzola et al., 2008). As inter-firm collaboration involves very
dynamic and complex activity, an interesting and important issue is the identification
of how such collaboration is changing in new and emerging industries such as the
mobile telecommunication industry. In addition, is there any difference in the
characteristics of inter-firm collaboration in different countries? Intangible benefits
(e.g. Guan Xi) play a vital role in Chinese inter-firm collaboration (Lu et al., 2006;
Su et al., 2009; Jia and Rutherford, 2010). However, these benefits play a moderate
role in western countries. Thus, there is a need for further and more detailed studies
that examine inter-firm collaboration from a comparative industry and country
perspective.

To fill this research gap, this thesis analyses and compares the existing literature with
the aim of developing a general model of inter-firm collaboration. It provides an
empirical analysis of collaboration in the mobile telecommunication industry in
China and Australia. It will also identify key determinants of successful inter-firm
collaboration in Australia and China by means of both qualitative and quantitative
methods.
1.2

Contributions and significance

Most empirical research on inter-firm collaboration has focused on the U.S., Japan,
and a small number of European countries (e.g. Hamel et al., 1989; Hagedoorn,
1993; Gulati, 1995a; Hagedoorn, 1995b; Kale, 1999; Hagedoorn and Duysters,
2002), with little research having been conducted for most developing countries
(Beamish, 1985; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998; Narteh, 2008) and Australia (More
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and McGrath, 1999; Lohrke et al., 2006; Zhang and Harvie, 2010a). Some studies
have omitted the majority of micro and small firms by using only annual reports and
stock market reports.

The emergence of wireless and mobile networks has accelerated global
communication and inter-firm collaboration (Fitzek and Katz, 2006). New business
opportunities and markets require new business models and collaborating strategies.
However, there is a lack of studies on inter-firm collaborations in new and globally
oriented industries. Previous collaboration types and models may not be applicable
for these newly developed industries and in an environment of global competition. A
continued study on inter-firm relationships is essential to develop a robust
understanding of business strategy (Singh and Mitchell, 2005).

To address the gap in the existing literature regarding developing countries and new
industries, this study will first conduct an empirical analysis of the Chinese and
Australian mobile telecommunication markets and identify the major differences
between them. In addition, this thesis will explore and highlight the key ingredients
for successful collaboration in different countries. This thesis will also contribute to a
better understanding of the importance and role of each factor in the outcomes and
performance of collaboration.

With rich information obtained from specific interviews and robust data analysis
from a quantitative survey, the results of this thesis will shed light on how to improve
inter-firm collaboration, build a trusting relationship between firms, enhance
collaboration performance and reduce collaboration barriers in local and global
markets.
1.3

Research questions and methodologies

The aim of this thesis is to identify the collaborating types, benefits, risks, and factors
that influence the final success rate or performance of collaboration in the Australian
and Chinese mobile markets. It also identifies key determinants for successful interfirm collaboration in broader business areas across these countries. Therefore, this
thesis focuses on two primary research questions:
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Q1: What are the major types, benefits, and risks arising from inter-firm
collaboration in the Australian and Chinese mobile telecommunication markets?

Q2: What are the key determinates of successful inter-firm collaboration in
China and Australia and do these differ?

To provide more reliable results for the questions above both qualitative and
quantitative research methods are adopted as complementary methodologies in this
study. A qualitative case study is used to identify the characteristics of the mobile
telecommunication markets in China and Australia and answer the first primary
research question. The quantitative study is designed to examine the key
determinants and measures the importance of these upon the final success rate of
inter-firm collaborations and answer the second primary research question.

The first primary research question is answered by industry analysis and qualitative
case studies conducted in both Australia and China. The aim of the first research
question is to identify the major characteristics of inter-firm collaboration in the
Chinese and Australian mobile markets and find whether these results are different
from previous empirical studies in other traditional industries. The results are
expected to give evidence of the significance of this study. The second primary
research question is answered by means of a quantitative study. To examine the
research results in a broader context, the quantitative study is designed to cover more
industries (e.g. manufacturing and services industries). A collaborating model is
adopted and modified from previous literature. Five key determinants of a successful
inter-firm collaboration identified from the literature are: trust, communication,
cultural similarity, firm size and experience. The contribution of each of these
determinants is examined in the hypotheses proposed in chapter 4. The identified
determinants have been examined separately for their influence and relationship with
the performance and final success rate of inter-firm collaborations by using
hypotheses tests.

Data are collected separately for the qualitative and quantitative studies. Face to face
interviews are conducted in both Australia and China for the qualitative study. The
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selected interviewees are CEOs or senior managers who have a good understand of
the firm’s business partners and its collaborating strategies in the selected mobile
telecommunication firms. The interview questions cover business information,
collaborating information, partner information and suggestions. Qualitative research
in this thesis provides industry evidence and rich information on inter-firm
collaboration such as previous collaboration problems and solutions.

To examine the research results of the qualitative study in broader business areas, the
quantitative study extends the research range to include other industries. The
quantitative data are collected through an online survey system and saved in a
database automatically. An econometric analysis is carried as the main tool in the
quantitative analysis. The complementary research involving qualitative and
quantitative methods is expected to provide more reliable results for this thesis
(Newman and Benz, 1998).

1.4

Structure of thesis

The thesis is divided into eight chapters, which are now briefly outlined. The first
chapter is the introduction of the research, which includes the background of this
study, its contribution and significance, research questions and methodologies,
structure of the thesis and expected results.

The second chapter discusses definitions and previews theories used in the inter-firm
collaboration literature. It reviews different definitions and terms used in previous
literature and compares advantages and limitations of each definition. It also reviews
the development and contribution of primary economic, management, and business
theories on inter-firm collaboration. It compares the advantages and disadvantages of
transaction cost theory, the behavioural theory of the firm, property rights theory,
agency theory and the resource based theory in analysing inter-firm collaboration. It
also explains the major theories adopted in this thesis.

The third chapter focuses on the literature relating to specific problems such as major
motives, types, benefits, risks, and determinants of inter-firm collaboration.

It

reviews the literature from economic, management and business theoretical and
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empirical studies and summarises the results. The differences between developed
countries and developing countries are also discussed in this chapter. The general
collaboration motives, types, benefits, risks and determinants from existing literature
guide the design of the questionnaires to be used in both the qualitative and
quantitative parts of the thesis.

Chapter four focuses upon the research methodologies used in this study. It shows
how this research has been conducted, what research methodologies have been
adopted, and how the research questions, hypotheses, and questionnaire have been
designed. To achieve a better and more reliable analysis on inter-firm collaboration,
both qualitative face-to face interviews and quantitative research methods are
conducted (Kendall, 2008). There is a lack of comparative study on developed and
emerging economies (Kuada, 2002; Narteh, 2008). There are even fewer empirical
firm level studies focused on Australia and China as most of these studies focused on
macroeconomic trade and international relationships (Sheng and Song, 2008). This
thesis compares the differences and characteristics of the Australian and Chinese
mobile telecommunication industries and the inter-firm collaboration in both
countries through both qualitative interviews and a quantitative analysis. The
comparative results are expected to fill a gap and shed light on future research in
comparative studies. The questionnaires are designed to relate to the research
questions and hypotheses of this study.

Chapter five analyses the history, development, and economic contribution of the
global telecommunication industry1. With the development of a new generation of
telecommunication technologies, the market requirement, services and business
model have changed rapidly. The types of collaboration in this industry have also
varied over time. Telecom firms are separated into three groups in this thesis: mobile
device providers, operators and service providers, and content providers and
technical providers. The characteristics of representative firms for each group are
examined in this chapter. The different strategies and collaborating cases for these
firms are also analysed in this chapter.
1

Chapter five introduced the global telecommunication market and the reason why this industry is
studied in this thesis. The following chapters six and seven studied the characteristics of the Chinese
and Australian market and answered why these two markets are studied in the thesis.
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Chapter six analyses the history, development, industry structure, and economic
contribution of the Chinese mobile telecommunication market, and discusses the
results of the Chinese qualitative case study. In this chapter, the Chinese market is
separated into four groups: (1) hardware producers, (2) operators, (3) service
providers, and (4) content and technical providers. Then, the major firms from each
group are analysed. Finally, the typical collaborating types, major benefits from
inter-firm collaboration, main barriers for local and global collaboration, and most
important factors for successful collaboration in the Chinese mobile sector are
discussed.

Chapter seven analyses the history, development, industry structure, and economic
contribution of the Australian mobile telecommunication market, and discusses the
results of the Australian qualitative case study. In this chapter the Australian market
is separated into four groups: (1) hardware producers, (2) carrier service providers
and service providers (CSP/SP), (3) retailers, and (4) content and technical providers.
Each group and their representatives are analysed. Finally, the results of the
Australian case study are discussed. Differences between the Australian and Chinese
telecommunication markets are summarised at the end of this chapter.

Chapter eight presents the quantitative analysis, which discusses the process, results,
and implications of the quantitative study. First, all the variables are tested for
validity and reliability. It attempts to answer the second primary research question.
An ordered probit analysis is adopted to test the hypotheses. The reliability and
validity of the data are discussed in the data analysis section. The expected sign of
the coefficients and hypotheses are tested in this chapter. The importance of each
factor in inter-firm collaboration and their implications are discussed. At the end of
this chapter, two different computer technologies are discussed as complementary
methods to that of econometrics in the study of inter-firm collaboration. The
possibility of using computer intelligence in inter-firm collaboration is discussed.

Chapter 9 summarises the major results and main findings of this thesis. It highlights
the contribution of this thesis to the literature and further research on inter-firm
7

collaboration. The limitations of this research and potential future research are also
discussed in this chapter. It also outlines how business managers, industry
associations, and policy makers could benefit from this research.

1.5

Summary

This chapter provides a general introduction to the main focus of this thesis. It
highlights the significant contribution of this thesis to inter-firm collaboration and
cross national studies. It also outlines the research objectives and research questions
focused upon in this thesis.

Both qualitative and quantitative research methods are used to answer the primary
research questions. Data are to be collected from both China and Australia to meet
the existing gap in the literature. The mobile telecommunication market is selected as
a typical new dynamic sector to verify the key ingredients for successful
collaboration in the qualitative study. These qualitative results are then further
examined and extended to other industries through quantitative studies of both
Australia and China.

The expected outcome is to provide insights into actions needed to enhance interfirm and international collaboration in the global marketplace. The implications of
this thesis will shed light on business collaborating strategies for individual firms,
industry assistance and support by industry associations, and policy making for
government agencies.

In the next chapter the definition of inter-firm collaboration used in this thesis is
discussed. The development of theories related to inter-firm collaboration are
reviewed and compared. The theories adopted in this thesis are also discussed before
research questions are proposed.
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2 DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES OF COLLABORATION
2.1

Introduction

In recent years the process of globalisation and development of telecommunication
technology has fostered an increase in various types of local and international interfirm collaboration. Cooperation and competition are mutually applied in the business
world. However, cooperation has been increasingly considered superior to
competition both for individuals and firms (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). This
development derives from both intellectual and social concerns (Faulkner and Rond,
2000).

Many researchers have studied inter-firm collaboration from different perspectives.
However, it is surprising to find how diversely the term has been defined and used by
researchers in the literature (e.g. cooperation, coordination, partnership, alliance, and
coalition). Not surprisingly, therefore, the outcomes from previous research have
resulted in diverse outcomes and implications. The links and differences between
these definitions will be further discussed in the following section. By reviewing
different definitions and terms used in the literature, inter-firm collaboration as used
in this study is clearly defined.

Researchers have attempted to study the motives, forms, benefits, and performance
of collaboration. Collaboration among firms can be fruitfully examined from a wide
range of theoretical perspectives. These include transaction cost theory (Coase,
1937), agency theory (Berle and Means, 1932), network theory (Eccles and Crane,
1987), behavioural theories (Barnard, 1938), property rights theory (Barzel, 1989),
economic empirical studies (Heidl, 2010), strategic management positioning and
resource based complementary perspectives (Heidl, 2010), dynamic capabilities
theory (Winter and Zollo, 1999), real option theory and institutional theories (Bellon
and Niosi, 2001). These theories cover most questions related to the existence of
firms, motives and incentives for inter-firm collaboration and the dynamics of interfirm collaboration. However, each theory focuses on only one or some types of interfirm collaboration. Therefore, this thesis will adopt a combination of several key
theories (two major economic theories - transaction cost theory and the resource
based view, and some management and business theories) and conduct a literature
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review based on these theories. The relationship, difference, and contribution to
inter-firm collaboration from each of these theories will be discussed further in this
chapter.
2.2

Broad discussion

The word cooperate derives from the Latin words co- and operate, which means
working together (Fitzek and Katz, 2006). Gray (1985) defined collaboration as a
pooling of resources (e.g. capital, labour, knowledge) by two or more partners2. To
Gray (1989, p. 6), collaboration is based on the simple adages that ‘two heads are
better than one’ and ‘each needs the others to advance their individual interests’.
However, researchers have defined and used the term very differently in the
economic and business literature (Kogut, 1988; Williamson, 1991; Burgers et al.,
1993; Culpan, 1993; Hagedoorn, 1993; Parkhe, 1993b; Osborn et al., 1998; Austin,
2000). Intangible benefits (mostly non-financial) play a more important role in interfirm collaboration in developing countries (Kuada, 2002; Jia and Rutherford, 2010).
To clearly define collaboration for this study, it is important to analysis the basics of
inter-firm collaboration and the differences between all these terms.
2.2.1

Terms and variety of definitions

Terms such as governance, hybrid, joint venture, coalition, franchises, collusion,
hierarchy, vertical integration, and business agreements are widely used in the
studies that relate to inter-firm collaboration. Which of these is collaboration? Which
belongs to collaboration, and what are the differences? To answer these questions it
is necessary to have an overview of collaboration and all of these definitions. Figure
2.1 summarises the different terms utilised and their relationship to each other which
will be reviewed in more detail below. The big circle with collaboration shows the
border of inter-firm collaborations, which is located between market contracts and
hierarchies (Williamson, 2002). Firm A may have collaborators, such as merger firm
B, partner firm C, joint venture or angel capital firm D, franchisor firm E, competitor
firm F, supplier firm G, customer or service provider firm H and potential partner
firm I, which is in the business network. The terms (e.g. cooperation, alliances and

2

According to Gary (1985) a partner is an individual or firm that makes a financial contribution to a
project.
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partnership) used in the literature are based upon different relationships as described
further below.

As shown in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1, the different terms (a-j) are used in very
different types of business relationships. Some of them (e.g. cooperation,
coordination, coalition, partnership, and hybrids - in the biggest circle) are referred to
as examples of inter-firm collaboration in the literature. These kinds of relationships
include most types of business transactions with different partners (suppliers, service
providers, competitors, partners and other firms in existing business networks). Some
of them (e.g. strategic alliances, joint activities, hierarchies, franchises, training,
know-how licensing, governance, and service agreements) are used in one or several
special collaborating types. Others (e.g. collusion and market contracts) are used
differently from collaboration but may be transferred into inter-firm collaboration if
the business environment changed. Each of these terms (a-j) will now be discussed in
more detail.
Figure 2.1 Collaboration terms and their relationship
Weak
Market Contracts (j)

relationship

Service agreements, training,
know-how, franchising, joint
R&D (h)

Collaboration
Cooperation and reciprocity (a)
Strategic alliance (b)
Coordination (c)
Coalition/ Partnership (d)
Hybrids (f)
Governance (e)
Collusion (i)

Hierarchies (g)
Strong
Source: Summarised from literature
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Table 2-1 Different terms representing different relationships
Study
Terms used in the
Partners and their differences
Firm
literature related to
inter-firm collaboration
a, b, c, d, e, f, g
Merger B (Acquisitions from the same or
different field)
a, b, c, d, f, h
Partner C (Co-founder or joint partners)
b, d, e, f, g, h, i, j
Joint Venture D (Venture or angel capital firm)
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, j
Franchisor E (e.g. McDonalds or 7-11)
a, b, d, h, i, j
Competitor F (Usually in the same industry)
Firm A
a, b, c, d, e, h, i, j
Supplier G (Raw material or half product
providers)
a, b, c, d, e, h, i, j
Service/ Customer H (Refers here to business
only)
h
Potential
partner
in
network
(future
collaborators)
a. Cooperation and reciprocity
Cooperation is one of the terms widely used in the literature when discussing
collaboration. It is a term widely used in not only economics and business studies
(Blair, 1976; Parkhe, 1993a), but also in managerial and sociology studies (Fitzek
and Katz, 2006). Cooperation is also regarded as an effective way to avoid
competition (Roos, 1994). However, it can bring problems such as collusion (i),
which are illegal in most countries. Cooperation is the original form of inter-firm
collaboration but it usually also refers to a broader range of cooperating activities
between individuals and departments and not only firms. Many researchers have
linked cooperation with reciprocity as one of the motives or benefits from inter-firm
collaboration (Blair, 1976; Withered, 1980; Parkhe, 1993a, b; Kashlak et al., 1998).
However, reciprocity is usually linked with political decisions from government or
industry associations (Bendor, 1987; Kogut, 1989). The motives and benefits from
inter-firm collaboration will be discussed further in the next chapter.

b. Strategic alliances
Inter-firm collaboration is also referred to as a strategic alliance in the literature
(James, 1985; Borys and Jemison, 1989; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Park and Russo,
1996; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Osborn et al., 1998; Kuada, 2002). Lewis (1990)
defined a strategic alliance as a collaborative relationship between firms which
generates more profits than solely by means of a market transaction. Porter (1990)
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and Hagedoorn (1993) linked the definition of alliance with long-term transactions.
A strategic alliance involves sharing: goals, mutual benefits, co-production,
technology, or services (Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Gulati, 1995a). The definitions
are very similar to inter-firm collaboration. Many empirical studies have also focused
upon business strategic alliances (Lorange and Roos, 1992; Yoshino and Rangan,
1995; Gulati, 1995a, 1998; Park, 1996; Osborn et al., 1998; Kuada, 2002). The term
strategic alliance is used to describe a partnership or inter-firm collaboration in some
literature (Doz and Hamel, 1998). However, when referring to business strategic
alliances, it usually involves large or multinational firms, eliminating most micro and
small sized firms (which may have no formal business strategies) from the study.
This is an important gap in most empirical studies.

c. Coordination
Coordination is another term used to describe collaboration. For example, inter-firm
coordination is a term used by Buckley and Casson (1988). They defined inter-firm
coordination as an increase in the profits of some firms that is achieved without a
reduction in the profits of others. They argue that coordination is not always good for
every firm in the market. A successful coordination may reduce profits for nonparticipating firms and a failed coordination may bring losses for participating firms.
Both of which may generate a deadweight loss3 (DWL). One of their contributions is
separating the definition of inter-firm coordination from extra-firm coordination
(firms on the one hand and households on the other) and intra-firm coordination
(different people working together). However, their research focused mostly on
tangible profits, which exclude some important factors (intangible benefits and
incentives) from inter-firm collaboration. Therefore, coordination is used in the same
way as cooperation and collaboration in the literature (Van de Ven and Walker,
1984; Buckley and Casson, 1988; Currall and Judge, 1995; Grandori, 1995).

d. Coalition and partnership
Coalitions and partnerships are terms used in some literature to describe inter-firm
collaboration. For example, Porter and Fuller (1986) believe that coalitions are also
3

A deadweight loss (DWL) is a net reduction in social welfare. When the total gain to society is less
than it was before, a deadweight loss is generated. It is also referred to as a social loss, welfare loss,
and efficiency loss.
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the same as collaborations and partnerships. In the sense that more than one firm
shares responsibilities, a partnership is also regarded as a collaboration (Hagedoorn
and Schakenraad, 1994; Hagedoorn, 2006). However, some researchers have
indicated that it is complicated and difficult to manage these relationships
(Perlmutter and Hennan, 1986; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Chung et al., 2000). Both
coalitions and partnerships are regarded as inter-firm collaboration, although a
coalition and partnership usually only focus on certain types of inter-firm
collaboration based on a deeper trust relationship; for example a joint venture.

e. Governance
Commons (1932; 1950) used the term governance to describe a form of partnership
and alliance, which was then adopted in the early literature to describe inter-firm
collaboration (Macneil, 1978; Williamson, 1979; 1988). Governance is distinct from
markets or hierarchies, including supervision activities between partners4 (Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998). It brings profits by reducing transaction costs and
enhancing efficiency when human resources and knowledge are transferred through
governance activities (North, 1990; Dyer, 1996b). Many researchers have studied
viable types of governance (Smith, 1776; Barnard, 1938; Hayek, 1945; Arrow and
Debrew, 1954; Williamson, 1979; Dixit, 1996). However, governance is usually
focused on issues within firms or on some special collaborating types (e.g. franchises
and joint ventures) that need supervision (Macneil, 1978; Heide and John, 1992) and
therefore only involves some types of inter-firm collaboration.

f. Hybrids
Williamson (1991; 1996; 2002) used the term hybrid to capture a broad group of
inter-firm arrangements located between the market and hierarchy. Some researchers
indicate that non-equity inter-firm collaborations are contractual hybrids and equity
joint ventures are quasi-hierarchical business structures (Narula, 2001; Contractor
and Lorange, 2002). Therefore, hybrids include most types of inter-firm
collaborations. However, joint ventures and franchises, which are also important
types of inter-firm collaboration, may be excluded from this definition. It also

4

Williamson (2005) defined hierarchy as unified ownership, which is related to vertical integration
and adaptation.
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excludes some informal collaboration types, which are very common between micro
and small firms, such as information sharing through informal discussions.

g. Hierarchies
Williamson (2005) defined hierarchy as being unified ownership, which is related to
vertical integration and adaptation. Hierarchies are believed to be the most efficient
in conducting transactions involving high uncertainties and which usually require
additional investments (Williamson, 1975; 1985). Some researchers believe that
hierarchies are associated with higher transaction costs than market transactions
because of greater asset specificity (Barnard, 1938; Monteverde and Teece, 1982;
Walker and Weber, 1984; Pisano, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Dyer, 1997).
Therefore, hierarchies seem to be different from inter-firm collaboration. However,
any kind of hierarchy (e.g. vertical integration or acquisition) is associated with
greater collaborating activities (e.g. information exchange, training, know-how
licensing, or management services). In some cases, inter-firm collaboration can also
be transformed into hierarchies when both collaborating firms find that the
opportunity cost of conducting inter-firm collaboration is higher than integration. On
the other hand, when the opportunity cost of integration is higher than inter-firm
collaboration, a joint venture firm founded by both parent firms will be established
(e.g. Sony-Ericsson).

h. Joint activities and other forms of collaboration
Franchises (Friedlander and Gurney, 1981), strategic networks and network
organisations (Eccles and Crane, 1987; Jarillo, 1988; Lincoln, 1990; Powell, 1990)
and research consortia (Ouchi and Bolton, 1988) are also forms of collaboration.
Besides franchising, joint R&D, joint ventures, joint products, market sharing,
training, know-how licensing, management and market service agreements are also
different forms of collaboration (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Contractor and Lorange,
1988). All of these forms will be discussed further in the next chapter. These
concepts partly or fully belong to collaboration, because they are composed of
different inter-firm transactions and coordination for ex ante5 negotiation, a period of

5

Ex ante refers to the state of the world before it is known.

15

implementation, and ex post co-supervision. Sometimes, long-term contracts or
continuous agreements also need such transactions.

i. Collusion
Collusion is defined by OECD (2003) as “strategic collaboration among suppliers
and anti-competitive behaviour…” Collusion is a kind of collaboration but has
overall negative welfare effects (generates a dead weight loss) in the market.
Collusion may cause a loss of total social welfare when both producer surplus and
consumer surplus decrease (Landsburg, 2005). Therefore, it is usually illegal in most
countries under antitrust or competition laws (OECD, 2003). Not all collaborations
among firms are collusions, and in the real world most of them are not. Collusion is
related to another significant area of research but is not the focus of this thesis. Interfirm collaboration does not always improve social welfare either. A failed
collaboration sometimes also threatens the survival of a firm. As Buckley and Casson
(1988) argue, even for success collaborations, non-participating firms may lose as a
result and a deadweight loss is then generated.

j. Contracts
Contracts are important for long-term collaboration where there are high
uncertainties. Many researchers have studied the reasons, processes, contributions
and limitations of contracts in inter-firm collaboration (Gundlach and Achrol, 1993;
Arrighetti et al., 1997; Harrison, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Jennejohn, 2008). However,
others argue that contracts contribute little to inter-firm collaboration and they could
be enhanced by adding informal safeguards, such as trust (Heide and John, 1990;
1992; Das and Teng, 1998; Achrol, 1999; Harrison, 2004). Some researchers believe
that formal contracts may signal distrust between the partners aimed at encouraging
opportunistic behaviour6 (Macaulay, 1963; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Fehr and
Gachter, 2000). Therefore, some researchers propose the use of formal contracts and
relational governance as complements (Deakin et al., 1994; Lane and Bachmann,
1995; Arrighetti et al., 1997; Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997; Poppo and Zenger,
2002; Harrison, 2004; Jennejohn, 2008).

6

There is no perfect contract and the partner is expected to make use of the ambiguous terms if the
trust level is low during collaboration.
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Contracts and hierarchy need a lot of previous collaborating activities (e.g. regular
meetings, information exchange, co-research or management services) if they are to
be successful (Jennejohn, 2008). In these cases, contracts and hierarchy may have
interface with inter-firm collaboration. They can also transform from and into interfirm collaboration with time and environmental changes. For example, when a firm
needs to buy raw materials, it first negotiates with all potential suppliers (in meetings
or emails). As a result, they may sign a one-time buy contract (contract) or long-term
supplying agreement (collaboration). These two could be transferred into each other
with an increasing or decreasing trust level or environmental changes.

Terms

Table 2-2 A summary of different terms related to collaboration
Characteristics
Focus

Cooperation

Original form of collaboration; involving more than one party;
also used in managerial and sociology studies;

Strategic
Alliance
Coordination

Involves long-term transactions; sharing goals; mutual benefits;
co-development
Used for business collaborations, organisational collaborations
and individual collaborations. They are separated into interfirm, intra-firm, and extra-firm coordination
Shared responsibilities in complicated and difficult
relationships
Distinct from markets and hierarchies; emerge from values and
agreed-upon processes
Located between markets and hierarchies

Coalition/
Partnership
Governance
Hybrids
Hierarchies

Joint
activities
and other
forms
Collusion
Contracts

Usually used as structured collaboration with supervision
relationships. It is regarded as efficient transactions with
uncertain outcomes and higher transaction costs
Franchising, joint R&D, joint venture, joint products, market
share, training, know-how licensing, management agreements

Secret agreements target on market power and usually cause
DWL
Formal collaborations with written documents and rules

Involves a
broader range of
activities
Large firm focus
Tangible benefit
focus
Involves deeper
trust relationships
Supervising
relationship focus
Formal
collaborations
Unified
ownership
Different forms of
collaboration

Illegal in most
countries
Market
transactions

Table 2.2 summarises all the terms and definitions used in the literature relating to
collaboration. Their contribution, limitations and relationship with collaboration as
defined in this thesis are also compared in Table 2.2. Collaboration, in this way,
exists at every stage in the development of a firm. It can be an informal oral
agreement, documented contract, or information exchange via trust. Every activity of
the company, manager, or employee may influence the process or performance of
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collaboration. A clear definition of collaboration can help us understand better what
enterprises do with each other, and thus facilitate finding the real determinants of
successful collaboration.
2.2.2

Definition of collaboration as used in this thesis

Previous literature has defined collaboration as a transaction between two or more
parties to achieve mutual benefits. However, most researchers have focused only on
the tangible benefits brought by inter-firm collaboration (Contractor and Lorange,
1988; Park, 1996; Gulati, 1998; Kuada, 2002). Tangible benefits are the benefits that
can be foreseen or predicted before collaboration commences. These benefits have
received considerable attention in the literature and include financial benefits,
technical benefits, information and market benefits and product benefits. However,
some intangible assets of a firm play an important role in both initiating and
achieving beneficial outcomes from a inter-firm collaboration, such as trust (Becerra
et al., 2008; Beckett and Jones, 2010; Burgess and Jones, 2010), reputation (Lavie,
2007; Husted and Michailova, 2009; Swaminathan, 2009), and other information
(Elg, 2007; Papadopoulos et al., 2008). An increase in the level of trust during
collaboration is an important outcome for a current collaboration as well as for future
collaboration (Adler, 2001; Lohrke et al., 2006). Intangible benefits such as trust
generate future benefits that cannot be measured at the current stage. Although
intangible benefits have a high degree of uncertainty it is sometimes one of the most
important incentives for collaboration, especially in some developing countries such
as China (Keane, 2009; Jia and Rutherford, 2010). Therefore, intangible benefits,
such as an enhanced relationship with government agencies or extended business
networks into new markets, are also included in this thesis.

In addition, previous empirical studies have only focused on large and multinational
firms by studying special types of collaboration (e.g. joint ventures), using the
databases of big firms only, or adopting only financial returns on investment (ROI)
as indicators of collaboration performance (Anderson, 1990; Wolf, 1995; Indro and
Richards, 2007). The majority of firms, micro and small firms, have not received
enough attention in the previous literature (Lee, 2007; O'Dwyer and Carson, 2011).
Some informal collaborating types, such as oral agreements and information sharing,
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are also excluded from existing studies. However, these activities are very important
forms of collaboration between micro and small firms (Jaouen and Gundolf, 2007).
This thesis will expand the traditional definition of collaboration to cover all formal
and informal collaboration types, and will be discussed separately in a later chapter.
Therefore, inter-firm collaboration is defined in this thesis as “inter-firm activities
that are aimed at generating tangible and/or intangible benefits for each firm
involved”. All formal and informal inter-firm activities, therefore, are included in
this definition. Both tangible and intangible benefits are also included in this
definition. Each firm involved in this collaboration is expected to benefit. With this
clear definition, this thesis will study some basic questions such as why do firms
collaborate? What are the key determinants of successful collaboration? How does
this vary across developed and developing countries? How does it vary by firm size?
Before answering these research questions it is important to review previous theories
and related literature in the study of inter-firm collaboration.

2.3

Major theories

The major theories related to inter-firm collaboration are: transaction cost theory,
behavioural theory, agency theory, property rights theory, the resource based view,
dynamic capabilities theory, the knowledge based view, and network perspective.
Many researchers, from economics, managerial, and business studies, then
contributed to the study of inter-firm collaboration from different perspectives. While
this is not an exhaustive list of the diverse theories on inter-firm collaboration, it does
include the important ones. There is no clear distinguish between economic studies
and business studies and some of them have blurring boundaries.
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Figure 2.2 Theories in economics and business studies

Behavioural Theory

Transaction Cost Theory

Agency Theory

Dynamic
Property Rights Theory

Resource Based View

Knowledge
Based View

Capabilities Theory

Network
Perspective

From Figure 2.2 it can be seen that transaction cost theory and the resource based
view are very important theoretical contributions in the framework, linking many
other theories. Transaction cost theory is one of the most important theories in the
study of firms and provides the basis for many theories in business and management
studies. Focused on the real costs of firms’ operations and transactions, it explains
the incentives for inter-firm collaboration as well as why firms exist. The resource
based view, on the other hand, provides the foundation for recent or contemporary
collaboration studies. It focuses on scarce resources that are inimitable or cannot be
substituted to sustain and increase a firm’s development and collaboration.
Transaction cost theory has contributed to the resource combination issue7 in the
resource based view (Teece, 1982). Many other theories have contributed
significantly to the development of the resource based view and made it a core
framework in the network of these theories as shown in Figure 2.2. Papadopoulos et
al. (2008) argued that transaction cost theory best explains “alliances in high
asymmetry and low heterogeneity situations8” and the resource based view is “most
appropriate for high heterogeneity and low asymmetry alliances” 9. Both these
theories have contributed to the development of many other theories and studies,
some of which are discussed below.
7

Firms exist as they can organize resources more efficiently than others.
Equity collaboration types such as equity joint ventures.
9
Non-equity cooperation in exploration, research and co-production
8

20

Behavioural theory and agency theory, which share the same assumptions on
bounded rationality10 and opportunism11 as transaction cost theory, also play an
important role in collaborating studies. Although these latter theories are focused on
different aspects of business activities, they are influenced by and also contribute
greatly to transaction cost theory. Behavioural theory focuses on the effective
operation of the decision making process. Behavioural theory and the resource based
view both focus on the competitive advantages of a firm (Schoemaker, 1990).
Agency theory recognises the important principal agent relationship and
distinguishes between the roles of business owners and managers. Property rights
theory, on the other hand, focuses more on ownership, distribution and bargaining.
Property rights make resources economically valuable by structure the ownership
based on how the assignment of property rights will affect the surplus value
generated (Mahoney, 1995) and the resource based view evaluates the contribution
of property rights as a type of resource for firms (Libecap, 1989). Finally, agency
theory has also influenced thinking on the deployment of resources and firm
capabilities (Castanias and Helfat, 1991).

The resource based view has also contributed to the development of many other
business and management theories. Generated from the resource based view, the
knowledge based view of the firm also provides promising insights to extend our
understanding of cooperation capabilities (Porter, 1990). The network approach,
which is also developed from the resource based view, is “concerned with
understanding and explaining the dynamics of developing, maintaining, and
terminating inter-organisational exchange relationships” (Harrison, 2004). Compared
with the resource based view, these theories focus more on different aspects (such as
the personalities of the entrepreneurs, managerial structures of medium or large sized
firms, legal related aspects or special resources) of a firm and its collaboration with
other firms. Table 2.3 summarises the contributions and limitations of the major
theories.

10

Bounded rationality means the limited capacity and rationality of human beings to solve complex
problems (Simon, 1982).
11
Opportunism is self interest seeking behaviour with guile (Williamson, 1975).
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Table 2-3 Summary of differences between the major theories of collaboration
Contributions to
Limitations,
Major contributors
the literature
focus and
difference
Transaction
Cost Theory

Studies the basic
transactions of firms,
and answers the
question “Make or
buy?”

Behavioural
Theory

Emphasises the role of
firm goals in inter-firm
collaboration and
focuses on the
supplier-customer
relationship
Studies the ex ante
incentives of
collaboration, focuses
on incomplete
contracting and
efficient operation
Applied neoclassical
theory to industry
cases and identified the
role of property rights
Focuses on the
advantages, which are
basic for collaboration

Agency
Theory

Property
Rights
Theory
Resource
Based View

Focuses on
transaction with a
single partner;
ignores the process of
collaboration and role
of trust
Focuses on the
decision making
process, prices, and
outputs, which are
mostly determined
within the firm
Focuses only on the
principal and agent
relationship, does not
explain some
managerial problems

Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1971;
Arrow, 1974; 1975; 1979;
Agarwal, 1992; Bellon and Niosi,
2001; Rao, 2003; 2005;
Papadopoulos et al., 2008

Focuses on special
types of resources of
a firm, ignores some
intangible assets
Does not adequately
account for alliance
formation; phrases
are used loosely (e.g.
partnership)

Barzel, 1989; Libecap, 1989;
Eggertsson, 1990; North, 1990;
Hart, 1995; Hagedoorn et al., 2005;
Teece, 2005
Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1972;
Demsetz, 1973; Rumelt, 1984;
Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991;
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,
1996; Das and Teng, 1998; Barney,
2001
Zander and Kogut, 1995; Conner
and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996;
Kale, 1999; Cricelli and Grimaldi,
2009; Marsh, 2010
Eccles and Crane, 1987;
Hakansson and Snehota, 1995;
Hakansson and Johanson, 1998;
Harrison, 2004; Lu et al., 2006;
Swaminathan, 2009
Teece, 1994; Langlois and
Robertson, 1995; Foss, 1997;
Winter and Zollo, 1999; Nelson
and Winter, 2002

Knowledge
Based View

Extends understanding
of cooperation
capabilities

Focuses on special
types of collaboration

Network
Perspective

Explains the dynamics
of developing,
maintaining, and
terminating inter-firm
relationships
Studies the new
modern capabilities of
firms and the influence
of new technology

Does not adequately
account for alliance
performance and
results

Dynamic
Capabilities
Theory

Focuses on the
accumulation of rent
in business operation

Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1947;
March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and
March, 1963; Simon, 1982;
Schoemaker, 1990; Aulakh et al.,
1996; Bazerman, 2006
Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Arrow, 1985;
Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985;
Levinthal, 1988; Castanias and
Helfat, 1991

As shown in Table 2.3, many managerial and business theories have contributed to
the research and study of inter-firm collaboration. Most of the managerial and
business theories contributed significantly to the empirical studies. They analysed
and examined different aspects and types of business collaboration in industries and
case studies. Transaction cost theory captures many of the elements present in other
theories (such as bounded rationality of behavioural theory and opportunism of
agency theory and property rights). On the other hand, the resource based view
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captures different aspects of resources (such as network capabilities from the
network perspective, human capital of the knowledge based view and agency theory
or intellectual property of property rights theory) that firms need for inter-firm
collaborations. As shown in Figure 2.2, these two economic theories are core theories
that have contributed to the development of all the other theories. The two core
theories have also contributed significantly to the modelling and development of
theoretical frameworks of inter-firm collaboration. To construct the basic model of
key determinants for successful inter-firm collaboration for this thesis, this chapter
draws on these two basic economic theories: transaction cost theory and the resource
based view. However, not all aspects of the other theories are captured by transaction
cost theory and the resource based view. To capture the missing factors (such as the
characteristics of entrepreneurs and the role of the contact person in business
collaborations), managerial and business theories are adopted in the next chapter to
study the different types, motives, benefits and risks of inter-firm collaboration to
answer the first primary research question.

Beside these theories and studies, game theory is also a common tool usually used in
analysing the conflicts and results of collaborating (Zagare, 1984; Faulkner and
Rond, 2000). However, game theory focuses more on the decision making process,
ignoring environmental change and the role of trust during collaboration. Game
theory, therefore, cannot describe the situation and results of collaboration. Some
researchers find that it is only suitable in analysing long-term or repeated games
(Heide and Miner, 1992; Gulati, 1995a). It is limited by many assumptions and
cannot be applied in some real world cases (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Gulati et al.,
1994). Therefore, game theory is not adopted in this thesis.

Transaction cost theory and the resource based view are the original and basic
theoretical studies, most relevant and referenced works, and most discussed topics in
inter-firm studies. The two theories and their major contributors will be discussed in
the following section. To study the basic perspective of inter-firm collaboration, this
thesis will focus on the transaction cost theory and the resource based view. Some
empirical studies from strategic management will also be reviewed as supplementary
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to these theories (Faulkner and Rond, 2000) in the next chapter to study the motives,
types, and risks from inter-firm collaboration.
2.3.1

Transaction cost theory

One of the most important and basic economic theories of inter-firm relationships is
transaction cost theory. Transaction costs are “those costs incurred in arranging,
managing, and monitoring transactions across markets” (Rindfleisch and Heide,
1997, p. 31). Coase (1937) originated the concept of transaction costs. His paper
“The Nature of the firm” sheds light on a firm’s existence and behaviour. Coase
(1988) also emphasized the important role of transaction costs in empirical studies.
Arrow (1969; 1974; 1985) broadened the category of transaction costs and
highlighted the importance of rationality in business operations and collaboration.
Transaction cost theory “regards the basic choice in organizing economic
transactions as being between affecting transactions through market exchange and
internalising them within a single firm, where they are governed by hierarchical
relationships embedded in organisation structure (Faulkner and Rond, 2000, p.7).”
Poppo and Zenger (2002) and Harrison (2004) regard transaction cost economics
(TCE) as the common framework for understanding governance arrangements.
Williamson then opened another area of study on inter-firm collaboration, which
contributed greatly to this study and is discussed further below.

Williamson (1975) highlighted the important influence of opportunism and bounded
rationality on inter-firm collaboration. Williamson (1985) further decomposed
transaction costs into search costs (the costs of gathering information on potential
partners); contracting costs (costs associated with negotiating and writing an
agreement); monitoring costs (costs associated with monitoring the agreement); and
enforcement costs (costs associated with ex post bargaining and sanctioning). He
categorised inter-firm transactions into competition (market transaction), governance
(internal transaction), planning (contract), and promise (collaboration). Williamson
(1991) noted that hybrid structures (e.g. licensing and franchising) are useful
alternatives to both internal control and market control. However, Williamson has
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been criticised for ignoring the role of power in markets and hierarchy (Francis et al.,
1983 ).

Transaction cost theory is also criticised as it ignores many factors important to interfirm collaboration (Powell, 1990; Doz and Prahalad, 1991; Gulati, 1998; Bellon and
Niosi, 2001). Researchers argued that it ignores the cost savings and new processes
from repeated collaboration and prior communications (Dyer, 1997; Nickerson and
Silverman, 1997), relational aspects over time (Parkhe, 1993b), and the role of trust
(Boisot and Child, 1988; Hill, 1990; Dyer, 1997; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Zajac
and Olsen (1993) argued that transaction costs focused on single-party cost
minimisation while alliances are inherently dyadic exchanges and are concerned also
with joint value maximisation.

Therefore, the important contributions of the resource based view on exploring other
types of collaboration, the dynamics of business transactions, and the key roles of
trust become good supplements to transaction cost theory.
2.3.2

Resource based view

Although generated from the discipline of economics, the resource based view has
also greatly contributed to the study of strategic management. Many researchers from
economic studies (Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1972; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt,
1984) and business and management studies (Foss, 1997; Tallman, 2000; Teece,
2000) have conducted research on the resource based view and contributed many
profound results to this theory such as identifying the important role of trust in interfirm collaboration. This contributed to closing the gaps in transaction cost theory.

Both approaches have contributed significantly to the theoretical and industrial study
of firms. They also provide complimentary studies on inter-firm collaboration. To
further study inter-firm collaboration, it is important to link the resource-based view
with transaction cost theory.

Wernerfelt (1984) first focused on the importance of differences in resources. Barney
(1991) focused on the specialised resources and assets possessed by different firms
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and developed the resource-based framework for strategic expectations. He argued
that a firm may gain expected advantages by analysing information about the assets it
already controls. The resource based view contributed to inter-firm collaboration by
distinguishing between tangible and intangible resources (Barney, 2001). Rumelt
(1984) argues that profits are derived from ex ante uncertainty. Therefore,
uncertainties are good to inter-firm collaboration. Resource based theories have
examined the formation of collaboration (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976) and shed light
on the dynamics of collaboration (Rumelt, 1991; Das and Teng, 1998; Heidl, 2010).
Tallman (2000) linked the resource-based view with transaction cost theory and
argued collaboration provides firms with complementary capabilities. These works
greatly contributed to the development of the resource-based view and inter-firm
collaboration.

However, the resource based view has also received criticism. Gulati (1995a) argued
that the resource based view does not adequately account for alliance formation.
Dyer and Singh (1998) also argued that according to the resource based view an
individual firm should attempt to protect rather than share knowledge. On the other
hand some phrases such as resources (Barney, 1986), capabilities (Teece, 1994) and
competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) are used loosely and are exchangeable in
Resource Based studies (Kale, 1999).

Existing empirical studies on the transaction cost and the resource based view are
inadequate for a study of collaboration as most of them are focused on intra-firm
transactions and resources (Gulati, 1995a). Therefore, some literature from
management and business studies will also be reviewed as a supplement to these two
theories in chapter three to study the characteristics of inter-firm collaboration.
2.4

Conclusions and approach adopted in this thesis

With the process of globalisation and the development of information and
telecommunication technologies, inter-firm collaboration both intra-state and
globally has attracted increased attention. However, a diversity of terms has been
used by researchers in the literature. To describe the phenomenon, this chapter has
discussed the links and differences between all these different definitions and then
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clearly identified the definition of inter-firm collaboration to be adopted in this
thesis.

Inter-firm collaboration, as defined in this chapter, broadens the neoclassical notion
of collaboration to cover both tangible and intangible benefits for the firms involved
and highlights the important role of trust in collaborating relationships. It also opened
the study to include micro and small firms, which have been ignored in most
previous empirical studies.

Among the many theories that have been developed and studied in inter-firm
collaboration, transaction cost theory and the resource based view are the two most
important theories, which are closely tied with all the other theories. Transaction cost
theory is the original and basic theory dealing with firms and enterprises. The
resource-based theory, however, has been widely used in recent research and is
closely linked with many management and business studies. This thesis will focus on
transaction cost theory and the resource-based view. They will assist in better
understanding in detail the motives and benefits of collaboration.

To address some of the research gaps outlined above, this thesis attempts to
categorise the basic motives, benefits, types, risks, and key determinants for interfirm collaboration from the previous literature. The next chapter will address these
concepts by analysing some empirical studies from the economic, management and
business literature.
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1

Introduction

Inter-firm collaboration has become a common feature of the international economy
(Beamish and Delios, 1997; Adobor, 2006b) and the driver of value creation (Doz
and Hamel, 1998). Firms as well as nations have become more interested in
collaboration to encourage business synergy, innovation, and economic development
(Ireland et al., 2002; OECD, 2004; Papadopoulos et al., 2008). Chapter two analysed
the basic transaction cost theory, resource based view, and some management
theories that are related to inter-firm collaboration. These theories helped in
understanding inter-firm collaboration. Each of them has its own advantages and
disadvantages in studying inter-firm collaboration as discussed in chapter two.

Inter-firm collaboration has been described as a dynamic cycle of actions and
reactions between the firms involved (Lui and Ngo, 2005; Adobor, 2006b). It varies
dramatically among industries in terms of types, risks and benefits coming from
collaboration (Dussauge and Garrette, 1995; Elg, 2007; Krogt et al., 2007; Mazzola
et al., 2008), and the telecommunication industry has its special characteristics in
terms of collaboration (e.g. access to expensive equipment) (Hagedoorn, 1993).
Firms’ capabilities, core businesses, or even the uses of some terms are quite
different in different industries. Critical issues are how to select the “right”
collaborator and how to make inter-firm collaboration successful. The answers to
these are not straightforward or simple, but identifying the key characteristics of
successful collaborations is a major objective of this thesis.

The objective of this chapter is to link the transaction cost theory and the resource
based view with some empirical literature to address questions such as: Why do
firms collaborate? How do firms collaborate? And what are the key determinants for
a successful collaboration? This thesis will also examine previous results for one of
the most dynamic industries – the mobile telecommunications sector in Australia and
China.
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3.2

Inter-firm collaboration – key questions

As shown in Figure 3.1 the questions related to inter-firm collaboration are
categorised into three stages: start, process, and result stages. The initial step focuses
on the incentives for inter-firm collaboration, selection of business partner, and
information exchange. During collaboration, firms need to choose the collaboration
type, communicate with each other, build on trust relationships, and solve problems
to increase collaboration performance or the final success rate. At the end each firm
involved is expected to get tangible or intangible benefits and accumulate experience
and knowledge, which will be used in the next round of collaboration with the same
or other partners as an effect of learning by doing.
Figure 3.1 Stages and components of inter-firm collaboration

Process
Question: How do firms
collaborate?
. Choose collaborating types
. Communicate
. Build trust relationships
. Increase performance
. Address risks and concerns

Start
Question: Why do firms
collaborate?
. Incentives for collaboration
. Choose business partner
. Get information

Inter-firm
collaboration

Result
Question: What are the key
determinants for successful
collaboration?
. Tangible benefits
. Intangible benefits
. Accumulate experience

Source: Author

Therefore, to answer the previous questions, it is important to first review the
literature on a firm’s incentive for collaboration, the benefits from collaboration, the
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types of inter-firm collaboration, the risks from collaboration, and the performances
or outcomes from collaboration. Some literature or empirical work contributes
significantly to answering these questions. However, some may provide conflicting
results, which will be compared and discussed in this chapter.
3.2.1

Why do firms collaborate?

Coase (1937) answered the question “Why do firms exist?” by using transactions
cost. However, many researchers argued that transaction cost theory itself is not
sufficient to answer the question “Why do firms collaborate?” as many important
factors in inter-firm collaboration are ignored (Powell, 1990; Doz and Prahalad,
1991; Gulati, 1998; Bellon and Niosi, 2001). Therefore, to answer this question it is
necessary to analyse the reasons or motives for inter-firm collaboration. Motives are
the ex ante concepts about why firms look for collaborators. They may be caused by
different external or internal reasons and vary dramatically in different countries.

Rapid economic growth has increased international interactions and inter-firm
collaboration. On the other hand rapid information and communication technology
change has reduced communication costs, a factor which has limited inter-firm
collaboration in the past. The development and spread of knowledge and its
importance for innovation competitiveness on economic development and growth
has helped emphasise to managers the opportunity cost12 they are facing without
engaging in collaboration. Gulati et al (1994) and Nooteboom et al (1997) highlight
the importance of incentives to collaboration. Some researchers have separated the
incentives for collaboration into market oriented (Hagedoorn, 1993; Elg, 2007) and
technology oriented (Park and Russo, 1996; Parker, 2000). Market oriented
incentives (e.g. entering a new market) usually have a stronger expression in
traditional industries (e.g. agriculture and manufacturing) and technology oriented
(e.g. access to new technology) usually have a stronger expression in hightechnology industries (e.g. telecommunication).

12

Opportunity cost here is the cost in terms of lost profits by maintaining existing practices and not
collaborating.

30

There are many empirical studies that focus on the special incentives for
collaboration such as: political economy (Berg and Zald, 1978), institutional
environment (Hall et al., 1977; Hamel et al., 1986), learning or knowledge sharing
(Kogut, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1993), reduced product life cycles (Mariotti and Ricotta,
1986; Allee and Taug, 2006), improve services and quality (Harrigan, 1985a; 1988)
and technological gain (Parker, 2000). To provide a better understanding of the
motives for inter-firm collaboration, Table 3.1 summarises the major motives
highlighted in the literature.

Motives

Table 3-1 Motives for inter-firm collaboration
Literature

1. Rapid economic and
technological change

2. Globalisation and
increasing firm
interdependence

3. Overcome trade or
investment barriers

4. Increasing
uncertainties and
competitive pressures

5. New products and
new markets

6. Access financial
resources
7. Access to lower cost
or skilled labour
8. Increase firm
competitiveness
9. Learning new skills
and knowledge
transfer

Berg and Zald, 1978; Porter, 1985; Harrigan, 1985a; Auster, 1987;
Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Ring and Van de Ven,
1992; Burgers et al., 1993; Hagedoorn, 1993; Gulati, 1998; Kale, 1999;
Parker, 2000; Allee and Taug, 2006; Adobor, 2006b; Zacharia et al., 2011
Richardson, 1972; Williamson, 1983; Harrigan, 1985a; Teece, 1986;
Harrigan, 1988; Womack, 1988; Mowery, 1988b; Hamel, 1991;
Williamson, 1991; Heide and Miner, 1992; Gulati, 1995a; Chen, 1996;
Park, 1996; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998;
Kale, 1999; Tallman, 2000; Harrison, 2004; Lui and Ngo, 2005; Singh and
Mitchell, 2005; Vilana and Monroy, 2010
Devlin and Bleakley, 1988; Parkhe, 1993b; Park, 1996; Austin, 2000;
Kuada, 2002; Gomez and Hsiao, 2004; Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004; Kuada
and Sorensen, 2005; Lu et al., 2006; Adobor, 2006b; Luechaikajohnpan,
2008
Harrigan, 1985a; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Auster, 1987; Contractor and
Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Pisano, 1989;
Williamson, 1991; Hagedoorn, 1993; Gulati, 1995a; Park, 1996;
Nooteboom et al., 1997; Gulati, 1998; Krogt et al., 2007; Richards and
Yang, 2007; Cricelli and Grimaldi, 2009
Harrigan, 1985a; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Child, 1987; Contractor and
Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Andersen and
Sorensen, 1999; Krogt et al., 2007; Mazzola et al., 2008; Vilana and
Monroy, 2010
Harrigan, 1985a; Auster, 1987; Harrigan, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1993; Ring
and Van de Ven, 1994; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997;
Kuada and Sorensen, 2005; Krogt et al., 2007
Hallberg, 2000; Krogt et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007; Schneider, 2007;
Keane, 2009
Rumelt, 1984; Lewis, 1990; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Hartono, 2004;
Krogt et al., 2007
Harrigan, 1985a; Pisano et al., 1988; Hamel, 1991; Teece, 1992;
Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell et al., 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale, 1999;
Ireland et al., 2002; Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004; Kuada and Sorensen,
2005; Lin et al., 2011

Source: Author’s compilation

These include both external social dynamic causes and their consequences (e.g. rapid
economic and technological change) and internal incentives caused by those external
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dynamics (e.g. lowering cost; accessing new markets; and knowledge transfer). Each
of these reasons and incentives are now discussed in more detail.

1. External dynamics: Rapid economic and technological change
Over the past few decades the world has experienced dramatic economic and
technology changes. Therefore, some researchers have argued that rapid business
environmental changes (Allee and Taug, 2006), new opportunities (Vilana and
Monroy, 2010), and increased complexity of new technologies (Bidault and Salgado,
2001) are the most important reasons for inter-firm collaboration. New technology
and products have also strengthened the motive for collaboration (Kent, 1991).
Technological change also: reduces communication costs (Brakman and Garretsen,
2005); enhances product performance; and increases interrelationships among
industries (Porter, 1985). Therefore, firms can more easily find partners that have
complementary technology or resources. A climate of collaboration and value adding
from this is then formed (Das and Teng, 1998).

2. External dynamics: Globalisation and firm interdependence
The rapid change of the global economy and technology has pushed the process of
globalisation and increased firm interdependence. Original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) now shift their production into global markets and increase global inter-firm
collaboration (Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004; Vilana and Monroy, 2010). Each firm has
its competitive advantage in producing its products according to Coase (1937), which
makes collaboration more attractive with globalization. Therefore, some researchers
have argued that globalisation, internationalisation, and entering into foreign markets
or production networks have been motives to drive firms into collaboration
(Harrigan, 1988; Osborn et al., 1998; Kale, 1999; Adobor, 2006b).

On the other hand, almost all firms now rely on some resources or technologies from
others (Lin et al., 2009; Heidl, 2010). These interdependences increase the
requirement for inter-firm collaboration (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Park, 1996; Lui and
Ngo, 2005). Some researchers agree that firms are more likely to collaborate if they
are interdependent or have different resources (Chen, 1996; Harrison, 2004; Lee,
2007). As Tallman (2000, p.97) said “Collaboration provides the firm with access to
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complementary capabilities which provide a potential for synergy in building
competencies”. Chen (1996) agrees that firms with similar resources are likely to
have similar strategic capabilities and competitive vulnerabilities. However, Gulati
(1998) argues that interdependency itself is not adequate to form inter-firm
collaboration. Therefore, some researchers focus on environment changes and
dynamics, which force firms into collaboration (Adobor, 2006b; Zacharia et al.,
2011).

3. External dynamics: Overcoming government-mandated trade or investment
barriers
To participate in the global market firms have to overcome government-mandated
trade or investment barriers, produce new products to fit different requirements from
different countries, access different markets and information, adopt new technology,
and access financial resources. These incentives have increased inter-firm
collaboration locally and globally (Dyer and Singh, 1998).

Although free trade is regarded as the best solution to maximise world output and
resource allocation efficiency, restrictions and regulations on international trade and
investment are still common in most countries (Salvatore, 2005). Governments have
increased their presence in business operations in order to protect domestic markets
(Park, 1996). Therefore, firms have to collaborate to bypass local political barriers
(Devlin and Bleakley, 1988; Parkhe, 1993b; Austin, 2000; Kuada and Sorensen,
2005) and meet government requirements for local ownership (Stopford and Wells,
1972; Datta, 1988; Kuada, 2002). However, Luechaikajohnpan (2008) found that
increased trade costs discourage collaboration, while reduced trade barriers
encourages licensing. As more countries have adopted “open” policies on trade and
investment (OECD, 2004), this factor has become less important. However, regional
industry protection still exists, which “forces” firms into alliances13 (Whitford and
Zeitlin, 2004; Stimson et al., 2006; Adobor, 2006b).

4. External dynamics: Increasing uncertainties and competitive pressures
13

For example, the Chinese telecommunication operator’s licenses were only released to local firms
or joint ventured firms (dominated by Chinese firms). Therefore, the foreign firms have to collaborate
with local firms to enter the Chinese market.
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Another consequence of rapid economic and technology change is increasing
uncertainties and competitive pressures. Transactions cost economists highlight the
important role of behavioural uncertainties (Pisano et al., 1988; Oxley, 1997; Gulati,
1998; Richards and Yang, 2007), environmental uncertainties (Kogut and Singh,
1988), and sales uncertainties (Postan, 1952) in inter-firm collaborations. A firm’s
competitive situation no longer depends solely on itself (Harrigan, 1988; Hamel et
al., 1989; Ohmae, 1989; Park, 1996). Firms have to collaborate to improve their
strategic position and competitiveness (Porter and Fuller, 1986; Kogut, 1988),
particularly in the collaboration of innovative, value adding, and knowledge
transferring activities (Das and Teng, 1998; Cricelli and Grimaldi, 2009).

As a consequence, firms have to cooperate to access new knowledge or
complementary technology (Freeman and Soete, 1990; Tuchi, 1995; Krogt et al.,
2007), monitor the evolution of new technologies (Hagedoorn, 2006), decrease
product life cycles (Park, 1996; Allee and Taug, 2006; Zacharia et al., 2011),
improve services and quality (Harrigan, 1985a; 1988), and monitor environmental
changes and opportunities (Hagedoorn, 2006). Collaboration then becomes a better
solution for firms to survive competition and grow faster (Lee et al., 2003b; Cricelli
and Grimaldi, 2009; O'Dwyer and Carson, 2011).

5. Internal incentives: Access new markets and developing new products
Different environments and cultures also provide different opportunities and risks.
Firms need to consider the investment barriers, legal framework, intellectual property
protection, tax structures, local regulations, labour costs, cultural difference, and
infrastructure difference before considering entering a new market. From
collaboration they can avoid some mistakes and learn from their partners (Contractor
and Lorange, 1988; Kuada and Sorensen, 2005; Krogt et al., 2007). Collaboration, in
this case, brings not only access to a new market, but also invaluable experience and
skills.

People have more diverse and dynamic preferences nowadays, which increases the
requirement for different products (Child, 1987; Powell, 1990; Park, 1996; Mazzola
et al., 2008; Vilana and Monroy, 2010). Firms have to develop new products to suit
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different customer groups. Australia is an immigration country with many
immigrants from different countries and cultures. Their cultures and living styles
have brought new requirements into Australia. Their different needs and the
connections with their original countries has also increased international inter-firm
collaboration (Kuada, 2002). As an immigration nation, the Australian market shows
great variety in the needs for different goods and services.

6. Internal incentives: Accessing financial resources
Lack of access to finance may be a serious cause of other problems, including lack of
access to human resources; information; new markets; new technologies; effective
R&D; exports; training; and so on (OECD, 2000). Financial problems impact upon
most firms. Firms need large amounts of funds to grow as well as start-up (Hallberg,
2000; Kuada and Sorensen, 2005; Krogt et al., 2007). Lack of access to finance also
pushes firms to seek collaborative venture capital and angel investors (Freeman and
Soete, 1990). Some researchers argue that firms have motives to collaborate to share
the costs of R&D and spread risk (Hagedoorn, 1993; Richards and Yang, 2007;
Husted and Michailova, 2009; Heidl, 2010).

7. Internal incentives: Access to lower cost or skilled labour
Labour is one of the most important factors in production and human capital plays a
more important role in recent literature (Ferguson et al., 2005; Vilana and Monroy,
2010). Labour costs even account for nearly eighty per cent of total costs in some
businesses (Schneider, 2007). Skilled labour is recognized as an important resource
in the resource based view (Barney, 1991; Jiang and Tao, 2010). Outsourcing
companies with lower cost human resources (usually in developing countries) or
relatively more skilled employees (usually in developed countries) have a
comparative advantage in the global market (Beamish, 1985; Kuada, 2002). Many
outsourcing firms in developing countries attract partners from developed countries
as they have much lower labour cost (Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004; Li et al., 2007;
Mazzola et al., 2008; Keane, 2009). On the other hand, many outsourcing firms in
developed countries also attract partners from developing countries as they have
skilled labour. Unskilled labour is important in developing countries with low wages
where production costs are mostly made up of wage costs. At a more advanced stage
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in the production process knowledge and skilled workers become more important
(developed economy). Collaboration usually generates synergy effects, which allow
firms to share skilled labour as well as other resources (Krogt et al., 2007).
Therefore, the differences in labour cost and skilled labour between developed and
developing countries also increase global inter-firm collaboration.

8. Internal incentives: Increase firm competitiveness
As Rumelt (1984, p.557-8) indicated, a firm’s competitiveness is “a bundle of unique
resources and relationships, and that the task of general management is to adjust and
renew these resources and relationships as time, competition, and change erode their
value”. Global competitiveness has become more important as an indicator of a
firm’s capability, especially for multinational firms. With the development of
globalisation, firms have to improve their global competitiveness to survive the
fierce global competition. Hence the movement towards production network forms of
value adding.

To increase their global competitiveness, large firms usually target increasing their
market share, market power14, and productivity (Lewis, 1990; Lorange and Roos,
1992; Krogt et al., 2007). Furthermore, collaboration requires fewer resources and
shorter time and less risk (Lorange and Roos, 1992), which will also increase firm
competitiveness both locally and globally (Hartono, 2004). On the other hand,
competitiveness is also related to some intangible benefits, such as expanding
business networks, enhancing relationships with government (especially important in
China), and accessing new markets (Su et al., 2009; Jia and Rutherford, 2010).

9. Internal incentives: Learn new skills and knowledge transfer
Some researchers have suggested that many firms collaborate to learn new skills or
acquire tacit knowledge (Nooteboom, 2004; Narteh, 2008; Jones and Burgess, 2010;
Lin et al., 2011). Today knowledge sharing is important to be “innovative” and
“value adding” in organisational innovation (Freeman and Soete, 1990; Cricelli and
Grimaldi, 2009). Collaborating partners, sometimes, are also one of the most

14

Market power or monopoly power is the ability of a firm to affect market prices through its actions
(Landsburg, 2005).
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important sources of new ideas and information (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Whitford
and Zeitlin, 2004). The ability to learn is also important in inter-firm knowledge
transfer (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Khamseh and Jolly, 2008; Zacharia et al.,
2011). Large firms usually have R&D labs to develop new products. However, most
small and medium-sized firms do not have sufficient financial support to do so.
Collaboration is a faster and more convenient way for them to acquire useful
technologies and skills (Ireland et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2011).

From the above literature it can be seen that the motives for inter-firm collaboration
are very dynamic and show great variety in different countries and industries. A
critical issue is to identify whether the benefits or outcomes from inter-firm
collaboration are the same as those factors which motivated the collaboration. The
benefits derived from inter-firm collaboration could be very different from what was
expected at the beginning (Bidault and Salgado, 2001). These benefits will be
discussed further in the next section.
3.2.2

Outcomes or performance from inter-firm collaboration

Most theoretical and empirical research on inter-firm collaboration has focused on
the motives and formation of collaboration. However, less attention has been given
to the real benefits brought by collaboration (Gulati, 1998; Kale, 1999; Gulati and
Zajac, 2000). Some researchers have argued that the performance from an alliance
has received less attention because it is hard to measure (Berg et al., 1982; Anderson
and Narus, 1990; Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Baird and Lyles, 1993; Saxton, 1997).
However, firms are believed to get many benefits from collaboration (Burt, 1983;
Williamson, 1991; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Zacharia et al., 2011). These benefits
include reducing total costs, producing new products, expanding business networks
or entering the global market, and these will now be discussed further in this section.

On the other hand inter-firm collaboration usually generates a combination of
different tangible and intangible benefits (Su et al., 2009). The intangible benefits
can be non-financial future returns such as: increased relationships with potential
partners, increased business industry reputation or increased relationship with
government departments (Lu et al., 2006). These intangible benefits play more
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important roles in inter-firm collaboration in emerging economies (e.g. China).
Therefore, some researchers indicate that inter-firm collaboration contributes to
different aspects of the development of a firm and brings both anticipated and
unanticipated benefits for the firms involved (Arora and Gambardella, 1990;
Freeman and Soete, 1990; Oliver, 1990; Baum et al., 2000). Although uncertainties
were regarded as a negative factor for business development in the early literature
(Williamson, 1975; Adobor, 2005), they may generate unanticipated benefits for
business. However, these uncertainties could also generate favourable benefits for
inter-firm collaboration (MacCrimmon et al., 1986; Reus and Rotting, 2009). A
summary of the literature on the benefits of collaboration are listed in Table 3.2 and
are discussed further below.

Benefits

Table 3-2 Benefits from inter-firm collaboration
Literature

1. Assistance with
basic R&D, reduction
of innovation time, and
access to new
technologies
2. Lower costs

3. Increase market
share
4. Increase market
influence and power
5. Increase
productivity,
profitability, and
product quality
6. Obtain information
and access new
markets

Rumelt, 1984; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Gray, 1989; Barney, 1991;
Nelson, 1991; Williamson, 1991; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Wernerfelt,
1995; Allen and Jarman, 1999; Kay, 1999; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002;
Hagedoorn et al., 2003; Nooteboom, 2004; Teece, 2005; Richards and Yang,
2007; Cricelli and Grimaldi, 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Zacharia et al., 2011
Williamson, 1985; Ghoshal, 1987; Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Levinthal
and Fichman, 1988; Ahuja, 1996; Dyer, 1996a; Allen and Jarman, 1999;
Kale, 1999; Austin, 2000; Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004; Kuada and Sorensen,
2005; Lin et al., 2011; Zacharia et al., 2011
Contractor and Lorange, 1988; McGee and Dowling, 1992; Kay, 1993;
Kurokawa, 1994; Kale, 1999; Elg, 2007
Pate, 1969; Berg and Friedman, 1981; Berg et al., 1982; Harrigan, 1985a;
Mytelka and Delapierre, 1987; Chesnais, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Link and
Bauer, 1989; Hagedoorn, 1995b; Gulati, 1998; Elg, 2007
Weiss, 1971; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Berg et al., 1982; Burt, 1983;
Williamson, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Perry, 1989; Blodgett,
1992; Kay, 1993; Parkhe, 1993b; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994;
Mitchell, 1994; Dyer, 1996a; Dyer, 1997; Kale, 1999; Whitford and Zeitlin,
2004; Singh and Mitchell, 2005; Zacharia et al., 2011
Granovetter, 1985; Freeman and Soete, 1990; Williamson, 1991; Ayres and
Gertner, 1992; Williamson, 1996; Andersen and Strandskov, 1998; Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Allen and Jarman, 1999; Kay, 1999; Al-Rasheed and AlQwasmeh, 2003; Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004; Allee and Taug, 2006;
Zacharia et al., 2011

Source: Author’s compilation

1. Assistance with basic R&D, reduction of innovation time, and access to
new technologies
Innovation, research and development are very important to firms, especially to
telecommunication firms. However, research and innovation may take a long period
of time and require substantial funding. Furthermore, lags and delays are typical
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features of R&D activity (Williamson, 1991; Kay, 1999). Cricelli and Grimaldi
(2009) argue that knowledge-based inter-firm collaboration can bypass many
limitations on traditional collaboration and benefit all firms involved. Therefore,
inter-firm collaboration can generate mutual benefits for basic R&D, innovation, and
technological complementarities (Nooteboom, 2004; Richards and Yang, 2007; Lin
et al., 2011; Zacharia et al., 2011).

With the development of new technologies, it is hard for one company to control all
technology on its own (Lin et al., 2011). Some researchers have found that many
firms collaborate to access new technologies or skills (Rumelt, 1984; Cohen and
Levinthal, 1989; Barney, 1991; Nelson, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1995). These
collaborations help to reduce the risk and cost involved in emerging technology
investments, reducing the time needed to apply new technologies, gaining exposure
to new ideas, gaining recognition and employee satisfaction, developing
collaborative business team relationships, creating new businesses and business
opportunities, accelerating technology adoption, protecting intellectual property
rights and leveraging collaborative research and development costs (Allen and
Jarman, 1999; Hagedoorn et al., 2003; Nooteboom, 2004; Teece, 2005; Lin et al.,
2011; Zacharia et al., 2011).

2. Lower production and management costs
Collaborations can lower the production and management costs of firms, thus
lowering their total cost (Williamson, 1985; Kogut, 1988; Kuada and Sorensen,
2005; Lin et al., 2011; Zacharia et al., 2011). Collaborations help eliminate
duplicative costs and excess capacity through shared facilities, information, services,
or activities (Austin, 2000; Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004). Firms can also access scarce
resources, improve efficiency, and broaden services through collaboration, which
lead to further cost reduction. Lower cost also increases the competitiveness of the
company as a result of inter-firm collaboration.

3. Increase market share
Big companies often focus on strategies to increase their global market share.
Collaboration is one of the most efficient ways to achieve this goal (Contractor and
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Lorange, 1988; Kay, 1993; Elg, 2007). Market share can be measured using a
number of very different methods. For example, the number of customers, annual
productivity, exported quantity during a certain period, or sales within a certain
market (McGee and Dowling, 1992; Kurokawa, 1994; Kale, 1999). These different
measurements have produced different research outcomes. However, increasing
market share is usually one of the important benefits brought about by collaboration
(Elg, 2007).

4. Increase market influence and power
Market power means “the ability to influence prices and persistently enjoy higher
profits than those enjoyed by rivals lacking market power” (OECD, 2003).
Landsburg (2005) defined market power (monopoly power) as the ability of a firm to
affect market prices through its actions. For example, patenting is a source of monopoly
power. Market influence is defined as “the ability to raise prices above the

competitive level in that market for a non-transitory period without losing sales to
such a degree as to make this unprofitable. (OECD, 2003)” Some researchers have
argued that firms can enhance their market power by forming a collaboration (Berg
et al., 1982; Chesnais, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Link and Bauer, 1989; Elg, 2007).
However, significant market power can arise from cartels15. Although cartels are
forbidden in most countries and are not stable relationships, high profits still drive
firms into cartels (Landsburg, 2005). Cartels harm competitive market rules and
generate a dead-weight loss (DWL). To distinguish and protect good collaboration is
a tough task for both developing and developed countries.

5. Increase productivity, profitability and product quality
Productivity is “the ability of a firm to produce output within a certain period of
time” (Powell, 1990). Profitability measures the ability of a firm to generate profit
and returns to its owners or shareholders. Sales levels are regarded as a key
performance indicator because higher sales can lead to higher profitability, although
not profit maximisation (Weiss, 1971; Mitchell, 1994; Singh and Mitchell, 2005).
Product and service quality, on the other hand, have received more and more

15

A cartel is a group of firms engaged in collusion (Landsburg, 2005).
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attention in global industries. OECD (2003) used profitability and quality of service
as indicators of the behaviour of sellers and consumer benefits.

Collaboration is believed to have a positive effect on increasing product and service
quality and reducing defect rates (Dyer, 1996a; Kale, 1999; Zacharia et al., 2011).
Some researchers argue that collaboration can help to increase productivity,
profitability, and product quality for each participant by reducing input costs
(purchasing with lower price for group buy or through different channels provided by
collaborators) and exchanging resources (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Harrigan,
1985a; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004).

6. Obtain information and access new markets
Information is “easily codifiable knowledge that can be transmitted without loss of
integrity” (Dyer and Singh, 1998, p.665). Information is an intangible asset for firms.
Information is an intangible asset and is important to all businesses (Allee and Taug,
2006). The sharing of information brings more opportunities for firms. Collaboration,
on the other hand, helps to reveal information, transfer tacit technologies, and
guarantee performance (Kogut, 1988; Park, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Al-Rasheed
and Al-Qwasmeh, 2003; Zacharia et al., 2011).

Similarly, to access a new market or expand business networks, firms need to
understand the different culture, customs and regulations of that market, which may
be very costly. However, with an experienced trade partner, it is possible to achieve
the goal quickly with lower cost (Allen and Jarman, 1999; Kuada and Sorensen,
2005). Therefore, collaborating firms can make more profits, while firms that do not
collaborate may be driven out of the current market (Freeman and Soete, 1990) or be
unable to enter a new market.

As a result, an increasing number of firms see collaboration as an important business
strategy. The number of inter-firm collaborations has increased dramatically during
the last decade, greatly increasing the process of globalisation. However, different
firms have very different types of collaborations. It also varies from different
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industries and countries. To answer the question “How do firms collaborate”, it is
important to study the different types of inter-firm collaboration first.

3.2.3

Structure or types of inter-firm collaboration in general

It is generally agreed that inter-firm collaboration is important and sometimes vital to
the development and growth of a firm (Adobor, 2006b; Zacharia et al., 2011).
However, the types of inter-firm collaboration show a great variety (Contractor and
Lorange, 1988). As the process of globalisation expands and multinational
enterprises develop further, the various types of inter-firm collaboration has changed
dramatically (Williamson, 1975; O'Dwyer and Carson, 2011).

Many researchers have studied various types of inter-firm collaboration (Kale, 1999;
Marsh, 2010) and separated them into different categories (Auster, 1987; Buckley
and Casson, 1988; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1993; Gulati, 1995a).
Some researchers have argued that the types of inter-firm collaboration (e.g. R&D
collaboration, joint ventures, or co-production) play an important role in the interfirm collaboration, which may influence the expected outcomes and efforts from
each participating firm in this collaboration (Mariti and Smiley, 1983; Ghemawat et
al., 1986; Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Oster, 1992; Dyer and Singh, 1998).

The major types of collaboration in this thesis has been adopted from Pfeffer and
Nowak (1976) and the later contribution of Contractor and Lorange (1988). The
collaborating types are shown in Table 3.3 and discussed in detail below.
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Types
1. Technical training/
start-up assistance
agreements
2. Production/
assembly/ buyback
agreements
3. Patent licensing

4. Franchising
5. Know-how licensing

6. Management/
marketing service
agreement
7. Non-equity
cooperation in
exploration, research,
and co-production

8. Equity joint venture

Table 3-3 Types of inter-firm collaboration
Literature
Buckley and Casson, 1988; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Auster, 1992;
Hagedoorn, 1993; Osborn et al., 1998; Harrison, 2004; Teece, 2008
Buckley and Casson, 1988; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hagedoorn,
1995a; Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004; Vilana and Monroy, 2010
Porter, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Foray and Freeman, 1993;
Hagedoorn et al., 2003; Teece, 2005; Krogt et al., 2007; Luechaikajohnpan,
2008; Lin et al., 2011
Klein, 1980; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hadfield, 1990; Williamson,
1991; Williamson and Winter, 1993
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Park
and Ungson, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale, 1999; Hartono, 2004;
Augier and Teece, 2006; Teece, 2008; Lin et al., 2011
Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Li et al., 2007; Mazzola et al., 2008; Lin et
al., 2011
Williamson, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Killing,
1988; Mowery, 1988a; Hagedoorn, 1990; Williamson, 1991; Lorange and
Roos, 1992; Hagedoorn, 1993; Wolf, 1995; Hagedoorn, 1995a; Hagedoorn,
1996; Park and Ungson, 1997; Gulati, 1998; Hagedoorn et al., 2003;
Hagedoorn et al., 2005; Krogt et al., 2007; Richards and Yang, 2007; Das
and Rahman, 2009; Husted and Michailova, 2009; Lin et al., 2011
Harrigan, 1985a; 1985b; Porter, 1987; Contractor and Lorange, 1988;
Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1989; Lewis, 1990; Osborn and
Baughn, 1990; Geringer, 1991; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Hagedoorn, 1993;
Parkhe, 1993a; Gulati, 1995a; Osborn et al., 1998; Krogt et al., 2007;
Richards and Yang, 2007; Mazzola et al., 2008; Das and Rahman, 2009

Source: Author’s compilation

1. Technical training/start-up assistance agreement
Collaboration involving technical training or start-up agreements is formed when one
firm has an advanced technology that the other firm may need. The firm with the
more advanced technology provides technical training for the other one. Technical
training and start-up assistance agreements are usually of a short duration (Contractor
and Lorange, 1988), but they may provide long-term benefits from knowledge
sharing or learning by doing in some cases (Osborn et al., 1998). Therefore, technical
training and assistance can bring both short-term and long-term benefits for the
trainee company.

A technical training agreement is often associated with the motives of skills learning
and knowledge transferring and is common in technology intensive industries, such
as the telecommunication industry. Firms in these industries use alliances to develop
new products or processes and build reciprocal networks jointly (Contractor and
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Lorange, 1988; Auster, 1992; Hagedoorn, 1993). The company supplying the
technology and training is typically compensated with a lump-sum service fee
(Contractor and Lorange, 1988). A good case for technical training cooperation is in
relation to outsourcing companies and their partners (Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004). To
achieve close group work and management, the training may include working
process, software usage, hardware training, product function, problem solving,
business email writing, inter-departmental team work, document formatting, system
analysis, company structure and responsibility.

On the other hand, start-up assistance includes not only technical training, but also
management instructions, financial and asset investment (Harrison, 2004).
Management instruction and investment are sometimes the most urgent needs for
new start-ups and play an important role in the early period of a firm. Transfer of
knowledge may be impossible in the absence of people transfer. In some instances
the transfer can be affected through a one-time contract providing for a consulting
team to assist in the start-up (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Oviatt and McDougall,
1994; Teece, 2008).

2. Production, assembly, or buyback agreements
Production, assembly, or buyback agreements usually exist between firms in a
customer-supplier relationship. These customer-supplier relationships include comaker relationships, co-production contracts, and R&D research contracts
(Hagedoorn, 1995a; Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004; Vilana and Monroy, 2010). With
such agreements the principal form of compensation for both partners is the mark-up
on the goods supplied16. The extent of inter-firm dependence is very low between
such firms (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).

A production or assembly agreement is likely to happen between firms with different
competitive advantages. Each firm will focus on the production or assembly where it
has lower cost or better quality, thus decreasing the total cost and price of the final
products. Cooperation between these firms brings clear profits if successful.

16

Markup is the increase in the price of goods to create a profit margin for a business.
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Buyback agreements are usually between supplier and customer firms. The supplier
firm (e.g. mobile phone producer) will provide the intermediate products or final
products to the customer firm (e.g. mobile phone retailers). Normally, both firms
have already had a long period of collaboration or a deep trust relationship (Whitford
and Zeitlin, 2004). The supplier firm agrees to buy back the surplus products from a
customer firm to avoid any unexpected risks in their sales and production (Buckley
and Casson, 1988).

3. Patent licensing
Patents not only encourage investment in innovation but also allow firms to
specialise in what they are good at (Teece, 2005). Patent licensing involves a onetime transfer of the invention, artifact or a new technology as a patent (Hagedoorn et
al., 2003). However, it often targets a long-term collaboration relationship and is also
based on trust (Porter, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Krogt et al., 2007). A
good example of patent licensing is joint patenting (Hagedoorn et al., 2003). Joint
patenting refers to the situation where two or more patent-holders hold property
rights at the same time. Joint patenting expresses a mutual trust relationship between
separate companies. At the firm level, patents will continue to be employed along
with other traditional strategies of appropriation such as lead time and trademarks
(Foray and Freeman, 1993). A recent study by Luechaikajohnpan (2008) found that
fixed fee arrangements are not often used in international licensing. Lin et al (2011)
also found IP sharing is usually adopted in high technology industries and
contributes positively to new product development.

4. Franchises
Franchising is a right granted (by the franchisor) to a business or individual (the
franchisee) to do business in a certain location or territory (IFA, 2008). It requires
not only a franchising contract but also support and managerial services such as
organising, training, merchandising and management (Klein, 1980; Hadfield, 1990;
Williamson, 1991).

The interdependence between the partners is greater with a franchise than for other
collaborating types, because of delivery, quality control, and transfer-pricing issues
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associated with the supply of materials, as well as due to the global brand recognition
in franchising (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Williamson and Winter, 1993).

With the increasing depth of collaboration in franchising, the firms may have special
rights in accessing the resources of the partner firm. For example, the firm can grant
free restriction or less limitation, price discounts, selling or distribution of its goods
or services in a certain area to its partner (Franchising Forum, 2008). However,
franchising collaborations usually exist in the food and services sectors, where the
technology and equipment are easier to copy or transfer.

5. Know-how licensing
Know-how licensing assumes a closer degree of continuing assistance and
organisational links between firms (Hartono, 2004). It is not simply a matter of
transferring patent rights or providing start-up training. It involves extended links
between two firms and ongoing interaction on technical or administrative issues (Lin
et al., 2011). Know-how often involves knowledge that is difficult to imitate and
transfer, because it is tacit, “sticky”, complex, and difficult to codify (Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Payment in these cases will typically be in the
form of a lump-sum fee plus running royalties (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).

Contractor (1983) found that most know-how licensing involves the transfer of
proprietary (unpatented) information. The free exchange and learning of the new
technology helps both firms and keeps them on the edge of new technology, which
maintains their competitive position (Teece, 2008; Lin et al., 2011).

However, some researchers argue that know-how licensing is more vulnerable than
other forms of collaboration, because the transfer of technology normally leads to
asymmetric possession of information, and there are significant costs associated with
such a transfer (Teece, 1986; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Park and Ungson, 1997; Kale,
1999; Augier and Teece, 2006). Therefore, the transferring firm must have an
incentive to transfer knowledge. The success of know-how transfer also depends on
whether personnel from the two firms have correct and suitable communications
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(Daft and Lengl, 1986; Marsden, 1990; Badaraco, 1991; Dyer and Singh, 1998;
Krogt et al., 2007).

6. Management/marketing service agreement
A management/marketing service agreement, like know-how licensing, assumes a
closer degree of continuing assistance and organisational links. The extent of interorganisational dependence is relatively high for these agreements (Contractor and
Lorange, 1988). It involves deep cooperation on the production process or
organisational structure.

A management agreement requires different levels of management skill on the nature
of the working process. A software outsourcing company is a good example
(Whitford and Zeitlin, 2004; Li et al., 2007; Mazzola et al., 2008; Vilana and
Monroy, 2010). Some projects need special support and supervision. To keep
confidential data, technology, and the business working process safe, the outsourced
company sometimes supervises the project directly or provides consulting services.
The collaborators also benefit by sharing market information and avoiding some
policy barriers in developing countries (Zhang et al., 2009).

Although not many studies have focused on management and marketing service
agreements in the literature, it is a very important collaboration type in real world
collaborating cases. It is usually accompanied by other collaborating types.

7. Non-equity cooperative agreements in exploration, research partnership,
development/ co-production
Non-equity based collaborations developed rapidly from the late 1980s (Hagedoorn,
1996; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Das and Rahman, 2009). To Williamson
(1985), non-equity partnerships are ‘pure hybrid forms’. These collaborations
frequently happen between large and small firms and often consist of technology
transfer (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Krogt et al., 2007; Husted and Michailova,
2009). They vary in their organisational management, control mechanisms,
compensation systems, and goals (Park and Ungson, 1997). Typical forms of non-
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equity collaboration include co-innovation, joint R&D, software sourcing, and coproduction (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).

Technology collaboration usually involves long-term collaboration between
companies (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). The reasons for certain collaborations
include operational considerations, cost minimising, and long-term strategic
perspectives for business positions.

Some researchers have found that joint R&D is usually the reason for inter-firm
collaboration in high technology industries (Mowery, 1988a; Mytelka, 1991;
Lorange and Roos, 1992; Hagedoorn et al., 2005; Richards and Yang, 2007). An
R&D joint venture refers to the combination of the economic interest of at least two
distinct companies in a jointly owned organisation (Hagedoorn et al., 2003). Profits
and losses are often shared on the basis of share of investments (Hagedoorn et al.,
2003; Hagedoorn et al., 2005; Husted and Michailova, 2009), such as human
resources, technologies, and equipment (Krogt et al., 2007).

8. Equity joint venture
Equity joint ventures (EJV) or joint ventures (JV) are new ventures created and
controlled by two or more parent companies (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Gulati, 1995a).
“The contracts for the equity joint ventures indicate a common ownership structure
(shareholdings) and income, profits and losses are allocated accordingly”
(Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007, p.352). Some researchers have argued that such equity
sharing will align the motivation of the partners, creating mutual interests, which
reduces transaction costs, market inefficiency, and the possibilities for opportunistic
behaviour (Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Yip, 1992; Bleeke and Ernst, 1993; Slocum
and Lei, 1993; Oxley, 1997). In recent years, international joint ventures have
become a prevalent mode of entry into the global market (Harrigan, 1985b; Park and
Ungson, 1997; Lee et al., 2003b; Richards and Yang, 2007; Mazzola et al., 2008).

However, other researchers have argued that joint ventures are sometimes risky and
not stable (Porter, 1987; Root, 1988; Blodgett, 1992; Parkhe, 1993a), which is
consistent with a high rate of failure (Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 1988), involuntary loss
48

of potential revenue (i.e., economic rents), uncompensated transfers of technology
(Levine and Byrne, 1986), and operational problems (Lee et al., 2003b),
disagreements, and anxieties over the loss of proprietary information (GomesCasseres, 1987; Das and Rahman, 2009).

Previous literature on joint ventures have focused on administrative issues of control
(Geringer and Hebert, 1991), the actions of the general manager (Geringer, 1991),
and the division of ownership shares (Killing, 1983; Osborn et al., 1998). There is a
legitimate rationale for a more mature, long-term, win-win emphasis (Lewis, 1990;
Lorange and Roos, 1992).

If collaboration can bring such significant tangible and intangible benefits, why are
firms so cautious in selecting partners and joining collaborations? The reason is that
there are some risks associated with all types of collaboration, which may threaten
the development and even survival of the collaborating firms (Garvis, 2000).
Therefore, to understand better the concerns and risks for inter-firm collaboration,
the literature on risk in relation to collaborations is reviewed.
3.2.4

Risks in collaboration

Collaboration brings not only good results but also possible losses to noncollaborating firms (Gulati et al., 1994). On the other hand, an unsuccessful
collaboration may also bring high risks to the firms involved (Harrigan, 1988; Kuada
and Sorensen, 2005; Krogt et al., 2007). Financial and time costs also increase with
collaboration, which bring more risks (Augier and Teece, 2006). Other potential
costs from collaboration include asymmetric information, negligence of partner’s
activities, and irresponsibility (Kuada and Sorensen, 2005). All kinds of
collaborations face relational and performance risks (Singh and Mitchell, 2005;
Krogt et al., 2007).

Many researchers have studied risk in the context of inter-firm collaboration. Some
of them have focused on different forms of risk (Hamel et al., 1989; Williamson,
1991; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Singh and Mitchell, 2005;
Krogt et al., 2007). Others have studied the main causes of risk (Lewis, 1990; Roos,
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1994; Parker, 2000). Risk influences not only the success of collaboration, but also
the success of a firm itself. Managers usually weight the potential risks heavier than
it should be (Singh and Mitchell, 2005) and therefore attempt to avoid them.
Table 3-4 Risks facing inter-firm collaboration
Risks
Literature
Internal
Risks

1. Lack of trust

2. Technical
complexity and
uncertainty

External
Risks

3. Benefit
distribution
4. Societallevel dynamics
5. Historical &
cultural
barriers
6. Government
constraints

Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Hamel et al., 1989; Kogut, 1989; Lewis,
1990; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Gulati, 1995a; Casson, 1995b;
Nooteboom et al., 1997; Kay, 1999; Parker, 2000; Kuada and
Sorensen, 2005; Singh and Mitchell, 2005; Williamson, 2005;
Nooteboom, 2010
Coase, 1937; Axelrod, 1984; Teece, 1986; Anderson and Tushman,
1990; Auster, 1992; Heide and Miner, 1992; Hagedoorn, 1993;
Williamson, 1996; Osborn et al., 1998; Hagedoorn et al., 2005;
Khamseh and Jolly, 2008
Devlin and Bleakley, 1988; Ohmae, 1989; Heide and Miner, 1992;
Parker, 2000; Krogt et al., 2007; Das and Rahman, 2009
Olkkonen et al., 2000; Landsburg, 2005; Krogt et al., 2007; Richards
and Yang, 2007; Das and Rahman, 2009; Jia and Rutherford, 2010
Lange, 1938; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Casson, 1995a; Kuada,
2002; Kuada and Sorensen, 2005; Das and Rahman, 2009; Jia and
Rutherford, 2010; Vilana and Monroy, 2010
Kuada, 2002; Nie and Zeng, 2003; Hagedoorn et al., 2005; Kuada and
Sorensen, 2005; Qiu, 2005; Luechaikajohnpan, 2008; Keane, 2009

Source: Author’s compilation

As shown in Table 3.4, risk in inter-firm collaboration can be categorised as: internal
risk (e.g. lack of trust, technical complexity and uncertainty, and benefit distribution)
and external risk (e.g. societal-level dynamics; historical and cultural barriers;
government constraints). Each of these forms of risk will be discussed further below.

1. Internal risk: Lack of trust
Most researchers agree that trust is the basic element of inter-firm collaboration
(McMaster and Sawkins, 1996; Olkkonen et al., 2000; Woolthuis et al., 2010).
Collaboration usually requires a deeper trust relationship to ensure that both
collaborators do what they have promised to do (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Casson,
1995b; Kay, 1999). However, trust is a broad concept. There are a number of legal
definitions of trust. Trust in this thesis refers to firm level trust only. The factors
related to firm-level trust will be discussed further in Section 3.4.1.

Lack of trust is the major risk facing most inter-firm collaboration. Some researchers
have focused on these problems in their empirical studies and argued the causes for
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this problem include: misallocation of resources; reluctance to give up autonomy;
skill and knowledge leakage; the problem of spillovers; different opinions on
management and processes, and opportunistic behaviour (Ohmae, 1989; Gulati,
1995a; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Parker, 2000; Williamson, 2005; Brunetto and Rod,
2007). To build and maintain trust requires a great amount of time, effort, and
financial support (Lewis, 1990; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Singh and Mitchell, 2005).
Therefore, to keep a good trust relationship with each other, a simple and useful
method is to maintain effective communication during collaboration.

2. Internal risk: Technical complexity and uncertainty
Collaboration in industries with rapid technology changes, such as the
telecommunication industry, is very common. Firm may find it hard to understand
and make good use of the technology provided by its partner. Furthermore, there is
no certainty that the new particular technology will bring with it certain profits.
Technology change and complexity (Auster, 1992; Osborn et al., 1998; Khamseh
and Jolly, 2008), technological discontinuities (Anderson and Tushman, 1990),
commercial complementarities and commercial inseparabilities (Teece, 1986) add
uncertainty to inter-firm collaboration. Therefore, the profits generated by the new
technology are not clear in the short-run. Even in technically stable industries, there
may still be considerable uncertainty in forming an alliance across national
boundaries (Williamson, 1991; Osborn et al., 1998). Therefore, unexpected
disturbances may place considerable strain on inter-firm collaboration and lead to
disappointing profits (Williamson, 1991; Hagedoorn et al., 2005).
Just like “buy or make” decisions by producers (Walker and Weber, 1984), high
technology companies need to decide what technologies are in their best interest to
buy, and what they should develop by themselves. Uncertainty associated with high
technology very often destabilizes the equilibrium of the firm (Coase, 1937). If there
is uncertainty, it is generally more difficult to sustain cooperative outcomes
(Axelrod, 1984). Through collaboration, firms can lower their developing costs as
well as sharing the risks.

3. Internal risk: Benefit distribution
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Another element that makes collaboration inherently risky is benefit distribution
(Heide and Miner, 1992; Das and Rahman, 2009). Most collaborating agreements
have clearly defined benefit distribution before commencing the collaboration.
However, problems occur when new unexpected profits or losses are generated
through collaboration. Performance ambiguity occurs when it is hard for a player to
evaluate the outcomes or products received from another party. The influence of this
risk is not as serious as others, but it threatens trust and future collaboration between
collaborators.

Firms collaborate because of the benefits received from such activities. The global
market is a dynamic one. There are numerous potential changes every day. To
remain in the market, some firms may need a cautious long-run strategy and an
ability to control real-time risk (Krogt et al., 2007; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2007).
Therefore, an agreed benefit distribution is important to the result of inter-firm
collaboration (Devlin and Bleakley, 1988; Ohmae, 1989; Parker, 2000; Das and
Rahman, 2009).

4. External risk: Societal-level dynamics
Societal-level dynamics refer to complex processes of interactions between
heterogeneous agents in society that often produces unpredictable outcomes (Durlauf
and Yong, 2001). Societal-level dynamics can come from many causes: a change of
government policy, of the legal system, or exchange rate of the country in which the
business is conducted; global financial crisis; flow of skilled employees; and new
material or technology development. It also increases the relational risks for mergers
or collaborating firms (Krogt et al., 2007; Richards and Yang, 2007; Das and
Rahman, 2009; Jia and Rutherford, 2010). The risk of societal-level (e.g. economic,
business continuity) dynamics is hard to predict and avoid.

Although hard to predict the influence of societal-level dynamics can be reduced by
defining substitute strategies to control risks. Collaboration can not only provide
real-time information and news (Olkkonen et al., 2000), but also immediate
assistance when one collaborator experiences difficulties (e.g. during the global
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financial crisis). The support and trust built during these difficult times may lead to
success of the business afterward.

5. External risk: Historical and cultural barriers
Risk may be associated with a firm’s historical (e.g., previous owner or manager’s
experiences) and cultural barriers (Kuada, 2002; Das and Rahman, 2009; Jia and
Rutherford, 2010). Risk can cause misunderstanding, wasting of time and resources
and a loss of profit. The problem may cause an unstable business environment, which
may also cause a sharp decline in private investment from the parent firms
(Contractor and Lorange, 1988). However, less attention has been devoted to these
issues in the literature.

Cultural differences between different countries affect the negotiation process and
outcomes of inter-firm collaborations (Eiteman, 1990; Jia and Rutherford, 2010;
Vilana and Monroy, 2010). Different cultures may have very different views on
communication, trust, and business profits (Kuada, 2002). Vilana and Monroy (2010)
argue that the similarities of firm culture also influenced the performance of interfirm collaboration. Therefore, it is important to identify differences in cross cultural
inter-firm collaboration.

When deciding to collaborate, firms should assess their anticipated ease of working
with the other partner; possible language difficulties, cultural differences, style
incompatibilities, differences in values and norms, and the presence of a sufficiently
strong ‘mentor’ who will help the collaboration (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). As
each firm has its own special situation, history and cultural background, there is no
single solution for every firm.

6. External risk: Government constraints
Government constraints are the most common barriers in the telecommunications
market (Keane, 2009). Most countries have state-imposed constraints in their local
telecommunications markets that have generated market power. For example, the
Chinese telecom markets are dominated by several big firms. China Mobile, China
Telecom, China Netcom and China Unicom occupied 98.6 per cent of the Chinese
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telecom market in 2002 (Qiu, 2005). There are high entrance barriers for other
competitors (Kuada, 2002; Nie and Zeng, 2003; Kuada and Sorensen, 2005;
Luechaikajohnpan, 2008). “Too much regulation can distort market performance
while too little regulation exposes new entrants and consumers to risks of abuse by a
firm with market power” (OECD, 2003, p.28). Firms sometimes collaborate with
other local firms to bypass special government constraints. On the other hand,
bureaucratization is also a political barrier to inter-firm collaboration (Lange, 1938).

A different intellectual property protection level is another problem that threatens
international inter-firm collaboration. With less secure protection, firms are reluctant
to transfer their technology and knowledge (Lin et al., 2011). Technological changes
sometimes have adverse effects on the performance of international collaboration.
With less intellectual property rights protection in the current environment, firms
tend to choose equity-based R&D joint ventures rather than contractual partnerships
(Hagedoorn et al., 2005).

Besides these risks, collaboration also faces many other risks in specific
circumstances. These risks should be analysed in different cases. One of the biggest
risks for inter-firm collaboration is cross-national inter-firm collaboration, which
usually has a higher failure rate. However, most of the previous literature has focused
on collaboration in the U.S., Japan, or some developed countries in Europe. Less
attention has been put on developing countries (e.g. Hamel et al., 1989; Hagedoorn,
1993; Gulati, 1995a; Hagedoorn, 1995b; Kale, 1999; Hagedoorn and Duysters,
2002). Therefore, to study differences in the Australian and Chinese markets, it is
also important to review the literature on developing countries.

3.3
3.3.1

Collaboration in developing countries
Differences between developed and developing countries

As defined by the World Bank, low-income (USD 1,025 or less in terms of GNI per
capita) and middle-income (USD 1,026 – 4,035 in terms of GNI per capita)
economies are developing countries. The upper-middle and high income (USD 4,036
or more in terms of GNI per capita) economies are developed countries (World
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Bank, 2012). The differences between developing countries and developed countries
also influence the pattern and characteristics of inter-firm collaborations in different
countries. With the development of new technology and globalisation, the “distance”
between these firms has decreased. And the motives, types and benefits of inter-firm
collaboration in both developing and developed countries have become similar.
However, some special characteristics of collaboration in developing countries
should be noticed.

The first difference is the role of government (Kuada, 2002). Governments usually
play a more important role in developing countries, which significantly influences a
firm’s strategies and development. In some industries, government policies exert a
significant influence on business performance and orientation (Keane, 2009). As a
consequence, the relationship with government is an important indicator of a firm’s
competitiveness in some developing countries (Lu et al., 2006).

The second difference between developing and developed countries is in terms of
competitive resources, which affects the major types of collaboration by firms. Most
multinational firms have established R&D centres in developing countries (Zhang
and Dodgson, 2007) to access lower-cost labour resources. Firms in developing
countries also seek collaborating partners in high-tech developed countries.
Therefore, inter-firm collaborations are usually between larger firms from developed
countries and smaller firms from developing countries (Narteh, 2008).

The third difference between developed and developing countries is the different
stages of development in policy and law. For example, intellectual property
protection problems in developing countries are often mentioned by multinational
firms (Indro and Richards, 2007), and this is expected to be a barrier for inter-firm
collaboration between firms from developed and developing countries. Without a
shared socioeconomic history, “one firm may attempt to impose its system on the
other” (Osborn et al., 1998).

Finally, managers from developing and developed countries have different
propensities towards risk. Kuada (2002) found Ghanaian partners perceived their
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Danish partners as risk-averse17. It can be argued that firms from developing
countries are more willing to take risks. Different cultures may have different
attitudes to trust (Park and Ungson, 1997; Kuada and Sorensen, 2005; Vilana and
Monroy, 2010). Trust is believed to play a more important role in business dealings
in East Asia (Boisot and Child, 1988). China is a good example of a developing
country (Boisot and Child, 1999). The high growth rate of China in recent years has
attracted considerable attention in the world. Therefore, many researchers now focus
on the Chinese economy and the causes of its high growth rate.

3.3.2

Australia and China

The existing literature review does not sufficiently study the cultural differences
between Australia and China. Australia, as an immigration nation, has a large
proportion of migrants in its population. They have very different culture
backgrounds, birthplaces, religions and languages. From the latest 2011 Census data,
over a quarter of the Australian population was born overseas and the source of
migration has changed from Europe to Asia and other countries (ABS, 2012). The
special mixed cultural background benefited Australian business in global inter-firm
collaboration as they have more language skills, have better understanding of
different cultures and religions and have more experience of cross-culture
communications.

China is a fast developing country with the world’s biggest population, making it the
biggest market in terms of population and human resource base in the world. Another
notable characteristic of China is its high GDP growth rate. Chinese GDP increased
at an average annual rate of 9.7 from 1978 to 1997 (Harvie, 2000; Garnaut et al.,
2001; Wu, 2001), and reached 40 trillion Yuan (about 6 trillion AUD) in 2010
(NBSC, 2012). Many researchers have studied the fast development of China (Boisot
and Child, 1988; Eiteman, 1990; Boisot and Child, 1999; Lee et al., 2003a; Chen and
Shih, 2005; Zhang and Dodgson, 2007). To improve market share; bypass policy
barriers; access the Chinese domestic market; or access low-cost R&D resources,

17

Risk-averse people always preferring the least risky among baskets with the same expected value (Landsburg,
2005).
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many foreign firms collaborate or invest in China (Chen and Shih, 2005; Li et al.,
2007; Karim, 2009).

China has a very special cultural legacy which has implications for the way in which
business is conducted, for example a preference for personal relationships and
connections (Boisot and Child, 1999; Vipraio and Pauluzzo, 2007; Lau and
Rowlinson, 2009; Jia and Rutherford, 2010). Gomez and Hsiao (2004) defined the
Guan Xi18 network as one of the most enduring and definitive features of Chinese
business culture. Lu et al (2006) indicated that the Chinese practice of Guan Xi plays
an elaborate and important role in supply chains in China. Inter-firm collaboration in
China focuses more on building relationships with the government and state-owned
firms, which brings more intangible future benefits for collaborators. Hofstede
(1980) found that work-related values vary between China and the West. Although
many researchers argue that cultural differences brought negative effects on interfirm collaboration, Jia and Rutherford (2010) found that the cultural differences
between China and the West can mitigate the relational risk in some supply chain
relationships. A case study is needed to study the Chinese market (Boisot and Child,
1999; Zhang and Dodgson, 2007).
3.3.3

Collaboration between developing and developed countries

Most empirical studies have focused on developed countries and especially Japanese,
U.S. and European firms (Ouchi, 1980; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hamel et al., 1989;
Shane, 1994; Gulati, 1995a; Hagedoorn, 1995b; Park and Ungson, 1997; Osborn et
al., 1998; Kale, 1999; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). Collaboration between
developed and developing country firms has not received much discussion in the
literature (Kuada, 2002).

New waves of innovation and technology are driving forces in Western economies,
but the low cost and highly skilled workforce in East Asia have become mainstream
players in the knowledge game (Allee and Taug, 2006). Firms from developing
countries are likely to possess high learning intent when collaborating with firms

18

Guan Xi, personal and business relationship in China, is one of the major dynamics in Chinese
society (Lu et al., 2006).
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from developed countries (Lee et al., 2003a; Li et al., 2007; Zhang and Dodgson,
2007; Narteh, 2008; Jia and Rutherford, 2010).

From collaboration, firms can lower costs or achieve higher profits. However,
experience in developed countries may be less useful when applied to that of
developing countries, and vice versa (Lane and Beamish, 1990; Kuada, 2002; Lee et
al., 2003a). The effect of cultural distance is also significant for international joint
ventures (Barkema et al., 1997; Kuada, 2002). International differences in
intellectual property rights protection is another issue for firms when they collaborate
with others (Harrigan, 1985a; Dixit, 2004; Williamson, 2005).

This thesis focuses on the study of both developed and developing countries through
real industry cases and tries to answer the question “What are the key determinants
for successful inter-firm collaboration?” To answer this question, it is important to
review the major factors from previous literature and empirical studies first.

3.4

Key determinants to successful collaboration

Early researchers paid much attention to the governance of collaboration
(Nooteboom et al., 1997) and little has been done to identify the factors that
influence the success and failure of such ventures. This is a remarkable omission in
the literature (Barkema et al., 1997; Saxton, 1997; Kale, 1999). Some researchers
have found that inter-firm collaboration has experienced a very high failure rate in
their empirical studies (Levine and Byrne, 1986; Buono and Bowditch, 1989;
Chowdhury, 1992; Bleeke and Ernst, 1993; Hill and Hellriegel, 1994; Dyer and
Singh, 1998). However, there is still no consensus among researchers on the factors
that may determine the success or failure rate of inter-firm collaborations.

To study the key determinants of successful inter-firm collaboration, the primary task
is to determine a “successful” collaboration. The direct and indirect means that
scholars use to estimate the effect of individual alliances on firm performances can
be separated into two categories (Gulati and Zajac, 2000). The first method used by
Koh and Venkatraman (1991), Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) and Anand and
Khanna (1997) is event-study analysis on the stock market effects of alliance
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announcements. However, the majority of small and medium sized private firms are
left out of the model. For some firms in special industries (e.g. aerospace and
defence), stock market data is also usually unavailable (Dussauge and Garrette,
1995).

The second method was used by Baum and Oliver (1991; 1992), and Mitchell and
Singh (1996) to examine the relationship between firms in alliances and the
likelihood of their survival. Some researchers use survival, termination or duration of
the alliance as an indicator of success or failure (Beamish, 1985; Harrigan, 1986;
Kogut, 1988; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Blodgett, 1992; Uzzi, 1997; Singh and
Mitchell, 2005). However, it is not appropriate to equate the failure of an alliance
with alliance termination (Dussauge and Garrette, 1995; Saxton, 1997; Gulati, 1998;
Kale, 1999). Many inter-firm collaborations terminate when the parent firms decide
to do so (Gomes-Casseres, 1987; Kogut, 1991). This is also supported by empirical
studies conducted by Gulati (1998), Kale (1999), and Saxton (1997).

The reason why there is no single formula for evaluating success is that it is hard to
measure (Anderson, 1990). The criterion may be very different for each industry and
even for each firm (Dussauge and Garrette, 1995; Gulati, 1998). Managerial
researchers assign performance in terms of overall satisfaction as another method
used to study alliance results (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Mohr and Spekman, 1994;
Tuchi, 1995; Hebert and Beamish, 1997; Inkpen, 1997; Kale, 1999). However, they
are criticised as being not reliable as objective measurements (Dussauge and
Garrette, 1995). Therefore, success will be measured by using both objective
performance and subjective methods as supplementary to each other in this thesis.
Garvis (2000) built a model of business outcomes based upon trust, entrepreneurial
collaboration, firm age, firm size, collaborative experience, and entrepreneurial
orientation. He suggested that researchers should use both objective measures and
subjective measures to evaluate the outcomes of inter-firm collaboration. He also
found that risk as one factor of entrepreneurial collaboration, makes a negative
contribution to the performance of collaboration. These will be adopted in this thesis.
However, he used both firm age and experience in his model. It could be argued that
firm age and experience are closely correlated.
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What, therefore, are the core ingredients of a successful inter-firm collaboration?
Some researchers believe that partially shared ownership (Kale, 1999; Parker, 2000),
useful information (Datta, 1988; Kuada, 2002), effective communication (Parker,
2000; Stallkamp, 2005), similar firm size and processes (Barley et al., 1992; Gulati,
1998), building trust (Kogut, 1991; Parker, 2000), taking a long-term viewpoint
(Lorange and Roos, 1992), product diversity (Gulati, 1998), systematic partner
search (Kuada, 2002), or continuity of interface personnel (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991;
Kay, 1993) are the important predictors of successful inter-firm collaboration. These
elements are very important to collaboration in real world cases. However, each of
them alone is not sufficient for successful inter-firm collaboration. The most
important determinants of successful collaborations are summarised in Table 3.5.
Table 3-5 Key determinants of inter-firm collaboration
Key
Literature
determinants
1. Trust

2. Size and
process

3.
Communication

4. Experience
and histories

5. Culture
similarity

Hall et al., 1977; Laumann et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985; Zucker, 1986; Itami
and Roehl, 1987; Boisot and Child, 1988; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988;
Williamson, 1988; Powell, 1990; Fichman and Levinthal, 1991; Larson, 1992;
Barney and Hansen, 1994; Borch, 1994; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Ring and Van de
Ven, 1994; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Gulati, 1995b; Cummings and
Bromiley, 1996; Park and Ungson, 1997; Ragatz et al., 1997; Walker et al., 1997;
Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997; Blois, 1998; Das and Teng, 1998; Dyer and Singh, 1998;
Gulati, 1998; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998; Jones and George, 1998; Zaheer et
al., 1998; Kale, 1999; Garvis, 2000; Lewis, 2000; Parker, 2000; Adler, 2001;
Bellon and Niosi, 2001; Kuada, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Harrison, 2004;
Hartono, 2004; Nooteboom, 2004; Adobor, 2005; Lui and Ngo, 2005; Howells,
2006; Adobor, 2006a; 2006b; Elg, 2007; Becerra et al., 2008; Papadopoulos et al.,
2008; Husted and Michailova, 2009; Lau and Rowlinson, 2009; Nooteboom, 2010;
Zacharia et al., 2011
Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974; Berg et al., 1982; Porter, 1987; Westney, 1988;
Mowery, 1988a; Lane and Beamish, 1990; Burgers et al., 1993; Gulati, 1995a;
Gulati, 1995b; Oxley, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997; Garvis, 2000; Singh and
Mitchell, 2005; Felzensztein and Gimmon, 2007
Axelrod, 1984; Daft and Lengl, 1986; Anderson and Narus, 1990; Clegg, 1990;
Badaraco, 1991; Heide and Miner, 1992; Kay, 1993; Nyberg, 1997; Park and
Ungson, 1997; Olkkonen et al., 2000; Parker, 2000; Kuada, 2002; Reinig, 2003;
Elg, 2007; Wilson, 2007; Keane, 2009; Zacharia et al., 2011
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Harrigan, 1985a; Harrigan, 1986; Amburgey and Miner,
1992; Fiol and Huff, 1992; Kogut et al., 1992; Gulati, 1995a; Park and Ungson,
1997; Saxton, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Garvis,
2000; Kuada, 2002; Hagedoorn et al., 2003; Harrison, 2004; Singh and Mitchell,
2005; Zacharia et al., 2011
Buckley and Casson, 1976; Ouchi, 1980; Tung, 1984; Anderson and Gatignon,
1986; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hamel et al., 1989; Lane and Beamish, 1990;
Parkhe, 1991; Child et al., 1992; Shane, 1994; Dyer, 1996b; Dyer, 1997; Park and
Ungson, 1997; Parker, 2000; Kim and Park, 2002; Kuada, 2002; Taylor and
Osland, 2003; Harrison, 2004; Felzensztein and Gimmon, 2007; Das and Rahman,
2009; Reus and Rotting, 2009; Vilana and Monroy, 2010

Source: Author’s compilation
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Figure 3.2 shows the framework and relationships between these factors. Each of
these factors will be discussed further below.
Figure 3.2 Framework of key determinants for successful inter-firm
collaboration
Trust

Trust, risk, similar goals,
structure, processes,
networks, information
share, contact person

Culture,
language,
religion,
technology

+

+

Outcome/ performance of
inter-firm collaboration

+
+

+
Culture similarity

3.4.1

Communication

Experience

Firm size

Trust

Trust is mentioned by many researchers (from economics, psychology, sociology,
and cognitive science) as one of the most important elements to a successful
collaboration (Williamson, 1985; Kay, 1993; Gulati, 1998; Lewis, 2000; Parker,
2000; Kuada, 2002; Lui and Ngo, 2005; Narteh, 2008). Trust is an expression of
confidence in inter-firm collaboration. Empirical studies on inter-firm collaboration
have also shown that the process and performance of collaboration is closely
associated with the establishment of trust (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Heide and
John, 1990; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Saxton, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998; Poppo and
Zenger, 2002). Trust can benefit inter-firm collaboration and vertical integration by
increasing efficiency and reducing cost (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Park and
Ungson, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale, 1999; Nooteboom, 2004). It also reduces
uncertainty and conflicts (Hill, 1990; Zaheer et al., 1998). Trust is developed through
collaboration and communication (Ragatz et al., 1997; Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997;
Parker, 2000). It is an invisible asset (Itami and Roehl, 1987), which makes future
cooperation easier to implement (Nooteboom et al., 1997).

Trust is related to interpersonal trust (Zaheer et al., 1998; Adobor, 2006a; Lau and
Rowlinson, 2009), behavioural intention (Cummings and Bromiley, 1996; Hartono,
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2004), similarity of firms’ structures and backgrounds (Powell, 1990; Fukuyama,
1995; Chen, 1996; Gulati, 1998; Lui and Ngo, 2005), information sharing (Parker,
2000; Elg, 2007; Papadopoulos et al., 2008), and similar goals (Blois, 1998; Bellon
and Niosi, 2001; Zacharia et al., 2011). Furthermore, trust is highly correlated with
network positions (Harrison, 2004), reputation levels (Hartono, 2004; Lui and Ngo,
2005; Husted and Michailova, 2009), and the risk / uncertainty level (Ring and Van
de Ven, 1992; Adobor, 2005) during the inter-firm collaboration. Therefore, these
factors will be used as components of the overall trust level in this study.

Many researchers have studied the effect of trust in inter-firm collaborations
(Granovetter, 1985; Borch, 1994; Brunetto and Rod, 2007). However, trust building
may require substantial time (Dyer and Singh, 1998), which is hard for most SME
managers (Brunetto and Rod, 2007). Although trust itself is not sufficient as a basis
for collaboration (Williamson, 1988), it is very important for inter-firm collaboration
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Nooteboom et al., 1997).

Building and maintaining partnerships requires significant costs (Larson, 1992;
Gulati, 1995a). Therefore, the quality of inter-firm collaboration is more important
than quantity (Uzzi, 1997; Parker, 2000). Risk is also influenced by the trust level in
inter-firm collaboration (Adobor, 2005). On the other hand, the better the
interpersonal communication between firms the greater will be the relationship
developed (Ring and Van de Ven, 1989; 1994; Hagedoorn, 2006).

One important factor for trust that has been omitted in the literature is the contact
person (so called gatekeeper in the managerial literature and third party in some
recent business studies). In a review of more than 150 papers on alliances by Ireland
et al (2002) the important role of the contact person or third party is not mentioned. It
has not received enough attention until recently (Nooteboom, 2004; Howells, 2006;
Husted and Michailova, 2009; Lau and Rowlinson, 2009; Zacharia et al., 2011).
Adobor (2006a) found that personal relationships are more important in the initial
phase of an alliance. However, the third party could be an employee or an individual
that has no financial relationship with any firm involved. This is found to be
important in China where “Guan Xi” plays an especially important role (Gomez and
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Hsiao, 2004; Lu et al., 2006). As this thesis also includes small and micro firms in
the empirical study, the contact person is used to replace the “third party” in the
questions.
3.4.2

Firm size

Most researchers define the size of a firm in terms of a firm’s assets, sales, revenue,
turnover, or average worldwide employee number and conducted empirical research
based on this definition (Harrigan, 1988; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Park and
Ungson, 1997; Kale, 1999; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Singh and Mitchell,
2005). However, the definition of firm size is different in each country and even in
different industries. For example, the definition of firm size in Australia is different
in the agriculture and service sectors (ABS, 2012). Although both Australia and
China define firm size on the basis of number of employees, in general the defined
number is still different for small sized enterprises (see also Chapters 6 and 7).

Data collected by prior empirical research is mostly based on a research data base or
a firm’s annual report, which are only available for most big and international firms
in developed countries. Such studies consequently exclude developing countries and
most small and medium sized enterprises. The size of a company may affect its
capability, scope, process, structure, regulations, behaviour, and decision making.
Large firms are more likely to possess more specialized assets, business networks,
patents and skilled labour (Teece, 1986).

Some researchers have found that firm size or size difference between collaborating
firms play an important role in the partnership formation process and collaborating
behaviour. It also affected the performance and success of collaboration (Chandler,
1962; Rumelt, 1974; Berg et al., 1982; Porter, 1987; Shan and Hamilton, 1991;
Burgers et al., 1993). Some researchers believe that the formation of inter-firm
collaboration increases with the size of a company because of the broader basis for
potential collaboration, lower barriers to entry, higher network density, lower costs,
and internationalization (Burt, 1983; Ghemawat et al., 1986; Duysters and
Hagedoorn, 1995; Hagedoorn, 1995b; Dussauge et al., 2000). Some have argued that
different sized firms are more likely to form alliances (Gulati, 1995a; Saxton, 1997).
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However, other researchers have argued that firm size does little to contribute to the
performance of inter-firm collaboration (Oxley, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997).
Felzensztein and Gimmon (2007) argued that small firms are even more active in
building inter-firm collaboration. These conflicting results may be due to different
datasets. It can be argued that the key determinants could vary between different
countries, industries, and sample groups.
3.4.3

Communication

Communication is “the sharing of meaningful and timely information between firms”
(Parker, 2000). As more corporations expand globally and more employees work
from diverse sites, maintaining real-time communications becomes more important
to inter-firm collaboration (Elg, 2007; Wilson, 2007; Zacharia et al., 2011). Poor
communication can increase the cost of transferring skills and technologies (Park and
Ungson, 1997) and result in misunderstanding. Greater frequency of communication
between partners can affect not only the success of collaboration, but also the
performance of firms entering into them (Kay, 1993; Indro and Richards, 2007;
Keane, 2009; Zacharia et al., 2011).

Most empirical work shows that communication influences the trust relationship,
network stability, risk reduction, and is vital for inter-firm collaboration (Olkkonen et
al., 2000; Reinig, 2003; Elg, 2007; Zacharia et al., 2011). Communications are
through formal business negotiations or industry forums (Nyberg and Strandvik,
1999; Keane, 2009), telephone discussions (Nyberg, 1997), informal conversations
and through e-mail or fax (Olkkonen et al., 2000; Reinig, 2003). However, there is
no clear definition on the frequency and types of proper communication (Parker,
2000).
On the other hand communication processes “encompass not only expressions via
language, but also a wide range of symbolic expressions” (Kuada, 2002).
Furthermore, different cultures or managers have different preferences in terms of
communication (Sharma, 1998; Kuada, 2002). To improve communication with
collaborators firms must invest enough time, resources, and suitable personnel as

64

well as having the willingness to build long-term relationships with their partners
(Zacharia et al., 2011).
3.4.4

Experience and history

Some researchers have found that the success of inter-firm collaboration is due to a
large extent to a firm’s previous experience and history (Harrigan, 1986; Parkhe,
1993b; Saxton, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kay, 1999; Hagedoorn et al., 2003).
The more experience a company has in formal alliances, the more opportunities there
are for further linkages (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), to enter into future
partnerships (Harrison, 2004; Zacharia et al., 2011) and to avoid pitfalls.

Empirical work has also supported that past success yields greater success in present
and future inter-firm collaboration (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Nelson and Winter,
1982; Amburgey and Miner, 1992; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Zacharia et al., 2011).
Repeat collaboration between firms occurs frequently and increases trust between
partners (Gulati, 1995a). The experience and history of firms with their collaborators
influences the formation, performance and success of new collaborations. Some
interviewees in this study also supported this argument.
International joint venture experience has been found to increase a firms’ propensity
to set up new ventures (Madhok, 1997), to improve their understanding of this
vehicle (Lyles, 1987), to enhance the performance of the investing firms (Mitchell et
al., 1994) and to increase the longevity19 of the venture itself (Barkema et al., 1997).
However, the influence of prior experience will vanish over a period of time as the
new collaborating types and trust relationships are developed during collaboration
(Saxton, 1997; Winter and Zollo, 1999). Furthermore, Kay (1999) argued that past
experience of a specific kind will only lead to success of the same type but will not
contribute to other types of collaboration. On the other hand, Harrigan (1985a) and
Weick (1979) found that past collaboration may also limit the firm’s ability to adapt
and grow as previous failure experience may increase their assessment for new
collaboration risks, and therefore, have a negative influence on new collaboration.

19

Longevity was defined as the number of years a venture persisted (Barkema et al., 1997).
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Each partner is unique and, in most cases, managers do not have enough time to
become familiar with the partner before collaboration (Yelle, 1979). Therefore, the
results are full of positive or negative uncertainties. A risk averse strategy may avoid
future risks but also limit the potential development on new inter-firm collaboration
or business development.
3.4.5

Cultural difference and distance

Cultural difference and distance brings more risk to inter-firm collaboration (Das and
Rahman, 2009; Vilana and Monroy, 2010). National differences may affect the legal,
political and social environments of firms (Ronen and Shenkar, 1985). However,
nationality alone cannot fully capture cultural values (Park and Ungson, 1997).
Vilana and Monroy (2010) argue that collaborators with similar firm cultures reach
high assessments of satisfaction, learning, and collaboration efficiency. However, in
some empirical studies (Kim and Park, 2002; Reus and Rotting, 2009) cultural
similarity showed a weak negative effect on collaboration performance or value
creation.

Some researchers have argued that culture is a complex phenomenon composed of
different beliefs, values, and norms, which are difficult to measure (Luostarinen,
1980; Barkema et al., 1996; Taylor and Osland, 2003; Narteh, 2008). It affects
managerial behaviour and moderates the relationships between partners (Parkhe,
1991; Hofstede, 1994). Park and Ungson (1997) measured cultural distance using
four dimensions: cultural difference, language difference, religion difference, and
different technology levels, which will also be adopted in this thesis. The results
from some empirical studies have shown that cultural difference between partners
significantly affects the process and result of inter-firm collaboration (Vachani, 1991;
Woodcock and Geringer, 1991; Dyer, 1997; Kuada, 2002; Felzensztein and
Gimmon, 2007).

Although some cultures are complementary, differences between cultures may still
increase the uncertainties and problems in international or cross-regional
collaboration (Hofstede, 1980; Park and Ungson, 1997; Felzensztein and Gimmon,
2007). However, the degrees of cultural distance may be mitigated over time as
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foreign partners continue to work together in telecom provision (Kashlak et al.,
1998).

This thesis will focus on this gap and study real cases of inter-firm collaboration for
both Australia and China. The study will assist in better understanding the cultural
difference between Australia and China, as well as between developed and
developing countries.
3.5

Conclusions

Collaboration is not only a way to generate more profits but is also a vital strategy
for most firms to withstand the fierce competition associated with growth of new
technology and globalisation. More and more firms now realize the importance of
inter-firm collaboration.
“Why do firms collaborate?” “How do firms collaborate?” and “What are the key
determinants for successful collaboration?” To answer these questions this chapter
reviewed the literature from economics, management and business empirical works
on incentives, types, risks, benefits, and key determinants of inter-firm collaboration.

The previous literature on collaborating benefits focused on tangible benefits, such as
helping with basic R&D (research and development), accessing new and
complementary technologies, reducing innovation time, lowering costs, increasing
market share, increasing market influence and power, increasing productivity,
profitability and product quality, and increasing firm competitiveness. The focus of
this thesis is on the study of both the Australian and Chinese markets. Also included
are some intangible benefits, such as accessing non-closure information, expanding
business networks, enhancing relationships with government, accessing new markets.

On the other hand, most empirical work has focused on one or two collaborating
types in one transaction. However, firms usually adopt combined types of
collaboration with one partner or with different firms. Inter-firm collaborations are
more complex in the real world. Therefore, the forms of collaboration identified in
this thesis are multiple combinations of technical training, production agreement,
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patent licensing, franchising, know-how licensing, management service, non-equity
agreement and equity joint venture.

To study inter-firm collaboration, another important concern is the risks and barriers
for inter-firm collaboration. This chapter has also reviewed the major internal risks
(e.g. lack of trust, technical complexity and uncertainty, and benefit distribution) and
external risks (e.g. societal-level dynamics; historical and cultural barriers;
government constraints).

There is a lack of research about the primary determinants of successful
collaboration. This chapter has reviewed the collaboration literature and categorised
the most important factors: trust, firm size, communication, previous experience, and
culture similarity. Some highly correlated factors are put into these categories.

Another gap in the previous literature is that most studies have focused only on big
U.S., European, and Japanese firms. However, most developing countries and small
firms have not received systematic investigation in the literature. This thesis tries to
address the gap by studying both the Australian and Chinese markets, and collecting
data from all firm sizes.

In the following Chapter four the research methodology and proposed major research
questions that are related to collaborating motives, types, benefits, risks, and key
determinants for inter-firm collaboration will be explained. The results obtained from
this chapter will assist in providing better solutions for future inter-firm collaboration
in global markets.
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4 METHODOLOGY
4.1

Introduction

The previous two chapters reviewed the literature and empirical work on inter-firm
collaboration, and structured the framework of key determinants for successful
collaborations. This chapter will propose the major research questions and
hypotheses to be focused upon in this study. The previous literature suggests that
both qualitative and quantitative studies are important methods. However, there has
been a fierce debate around which one is superior since the early 1980s (Newman
and Benz, 1998). After reviewing the literature and comparing the advantages and
criticisms of each of them, this chapter explains the importance of using both
qualitative and quantitative research methods in this study to verify the major
collaborating types, benefits, and risks in cross-national industrial cases. It also
examines the key determinants of successful inter-firm collaboration in different
countries.

The research process and design, including sample selection, data collection, and
methods of data analysis, are discussed further in later sections of this chapter.
Following the research process the design of the questionnaire is discussed.
Measurements of the key determinants of successful collaboration as described in
chapter three and the linkages between these measurements and designed questions
in the questionnaires are also discussed.
4.2

Primary research questions

As discussed in chapter three, there are many collaborating types, motives, benefits,
and risks identified in the literature. However, a critical issue is whether these
categories suit all industries and all countries, or have new types of collaboration
emerged due to new technological advances or global industry changes. It can be
argued that firms in different countries may have different resources, policy support,
business environments and cultural backgrounds. Therefore, they may face different
problems when undertaking local and international inter-firm collaborations. Special
attention should also be paid to different countries and industries that have their own
characteristics. Therefore, by focusing on one of the most dynamic markets - mobile
telecommunication market, this thesis will verify the previous literature and
empirical results on inter-firm collaborations in both Australia and China. The
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primary purpose of this thesis is to find the major types of collaboration and the
benefits and risks associated with inter-firm collaboration in the Australian and
Chinese mobile telecommunication markets.

The first primary research question addressed in this thesis is:

Primary Question 1: What are the major types of collaboration, benefits and
risks associated with inter-firm collaboration in the Australian and Chinese mobile
telecommunication markets?

To answer this research question, and based on previous research on the
telecommunications market, some sub-questions are relevant.
 Question 1: Is cultural difference still important when firms choose business
collaborators in the telecommunications market?

transaction cost theory claimed that it is easier for firms to form strategic alliances
with partners that have comparative advantages in producing different products or
parts (Williamson and Winter, 1993). This view is also supported by some
management research (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Lewis, 1990). The resource
based view also argues that firms with complementary resources usually collaborate
to reduce costs. Therefore, it is assumed that firms select business partners based
upon their different resources or capabilities. In other words, the more the other firm
is different from the searching firm the more likely it will become its partner.

However, in the mobile telecommunication market, firms usually have higher
communicating technologies (e.g. video conferences). Do cultural or distance
problems still matter in this industry? Have the new technologies solved the old
problems in global inter-firm collaborations?
 Question 2: Does size matter when firms choose business collaborators?
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Does firm size influence the selection of a business partner? As discussed in chapter
3, results from the literature and empirical studies are not consistent. Some believe
that the formation of inter-firm collaboration is closely related with firm size. Larger
firms usually have more resources, experience, and better skills in collaboration.
However, others argue that the contribution of firm size to alliance formation is very
limited (Oxley, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997). However, there are many examples
of successful inter-firm collaboration between small and large firms (Gulati, 1995a).
Large firms may collaborate in order to obtain specialized capabilities or learn from
their partners (Khanna et al., 1998; Dussauge et al., 2000), rather than achieve
immediate sales (Singh and Mitchell, 2005).

To examine whether firm size influences the selection of business partners in the
Australian and Chinese mobile telecommunication market, this question is proposed
and designed for inclusion in the qualitative interviews. The results from this will
provide useful implications for further studies.
 Question 3: Do firms prefer deep and long-term collaboration relationships?

Long-term collaboration can help reduce costs, build trust among the collaborating
firms and increase learning by doing (Porter, 1990; Hagedoorn, 1993; Gulati, 1995a;
Harrison, 2004). On the other hand, the building of a trusting relationship in a current
collaboration will help firms form new collaboration projects or expand collaborating
types (Harrison, 2004). In the resource based view firms need less resources and
therefore reduce costs, by repeating or extending current collaborations with their
partners rather than starting a new one (Gulati, 1995a).

Therefore, firms may prefer long-term collaboration relationships in inter-firm
collaboration. This question will be examined via interview questions.
 Question 4: Do collaborating types (such as training and franchising in chapter
3) in the previous literature suit fast developing and dynamic industries such as
the mobile telecommunication industry?
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The mobile telecommunication market has its own characteristics, compared with
traditional manufacturing or services industries. Most telecom firms rely heavily on
new technologies and intellectual property rights (such as patents). Such firms need
to catch up with rapid technological change and increase their global
competitiveness.

Therefore, previous collaborating types may not be applicable in this market. In other
words, new types of inter-firm collaboration may emerge in this market as new
technologies, market requirements, and business models change very rapidly.
 Question 5: What are the main benefits from inter-firm collaboration in the
mobile telecommunication market?

Unlike most traditional manufacturing sectors, entry fees (licence fees or cost of
networks and base stations) are relatively high in the mobile telecommunication
market (Allee and Taug, 2006; Access Economics, 2010). As a fast developing and
dynamic industry, technology and innovation are vital to telecommunication firms
and business cycles are usually shorter for these firms (Access Economics, 2010).
These characteristics have influenced the main benefits for this industry.

On the other hand, profits are usually generated from operators (carriage service
provider) and/or device providers due to total subscribers and number of services,
and then transferred to service providers, content providers, and technical providers.
As discussed in chapter five, the structure of this industry is quite different from
other industries. Therefore, the major collaborating benefits may be different from
other industries.
 Question 6: What are the major risks towards local inter-firm collaboration in the
Australian and Chinese mobile telecommunication markets?

Cooperation with other firms carries with it a number of concerns, especially for
small and medium sized enterprises. As discussed in chapter 3, obstacles to interfirm collaboration include technology adoption, financial problems, policy
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restrictions, and lack of trust. However, due to the special characteristics of the
mobile telecommunication market, the firms in this industry may face other risks
when considering inter-firm collaboration.

As a fast developing and technically oriented industry, telecommunication relies
heavily on new technology and innovation. Technology complexity may be an
obstacle for most telecom firms. Nevertheless, government mandated barriers are
common features for the telecommunication market in most countries, either by
policy constraints (such as licenses) or adoption of different standards. To overcome
these barriers firms sometimes have to collaborate to reach another market. However,
policy change or government constraints also bring high risks to inter-firm
collaboration in this market.
 Question 7: What are the major obstacles for international telecommunication
collaboration in Australia and China?

For international collaboration, the relationship is more volatile. When considering
entering the global market the obstacles towards inter-firm collaboration are quite
different in different countries due to different culture, different international
situation, and different policy constraints. Therefore, it can be argued that firms in
different countries may have very different concerns when considering global interfirm collaboration. Therefore, the obstacles for international collaboration are
separated from local collaborating risks as identified in previous chapters. They will
be examined in the context of the Australian and Chinese mobile telecommunication
market.

The purpose of the first primary research question is to verify the previous literature
and empirical research results in the context of both the Australian and Chinese
mobile telecommunication market. The mobile telecommunication sector is a
relatively new and dynamic industry (compared with traditional industries such as
agriculture or mining). However, this sector is important in the sense of increasing
living standards and increasing the efficiency of all the other industries (Access
Economic, 2008). Therefore, the qualitative study of this thesis focuses on the inter73

firm collaborations in this sector. Part of the research interview also examines the
key determinants for successful inter-firm collaboration, which will be examined in a
wider range of industries.

The second primary research question is:

Primary Question 2: What are the key determinants of successful inter-firm
collaboration?

There are many factors that affect the outcome or performance of inter-firm
collaboration. It is important to find out what are the key determinants for successful
collaboration to increase the performance of inter-firm collaboration, as well as
reduce risks. This thesis will empirically test for the important factors in successful
inter-firm collaboration through industry case studies and examine them in a broader
business context. To answer this research question, and based on the literature on
inter-firm collaboration, seven hypotheses are proposed:
 Hypothesis 1: Trust plays a vital role in inter-firm collaboration and has a
positive influence on the performance of inter-firm collaboration.

As discussed in chapter three, trust is vital for inter-firm collaboration (Ring and Van
de Ven, 1994; Gulati, 1995b). Trust is affected by many factors in collaboration, for
example, openness on information, quality of communication, similar experience of
both firms, and even the first impression of the contact person. Although difficult to
be measured, trust is expected to play a major and positive role in inter-firm
collaboration.
 Hypothesis 2: Similar experiences (e.g. same type or with the same partner) have
a positive relationship with the results of inter-firm collaboration.

As in chapter three, some researchers argue that previous collaboration experiences
exert a positive influence on current collaboration. It increased the trust level (Gulati,
1995b), understanding (Lyles, 1987), and, therefore, the performance (Mitchell et al.,
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1994) of the current inter-firm collaboration. However, some researchers have found
that previous experiences even have a negative influence on new collaboration
because of the limited time20 of managers and the uniqueness of the partners (Yelle,
1979; Kuada, 2002; Singh and Mitchell, 2005). Previous experience is expected to
have a positive relationship with the results of inter-firm collaboration in this thesis.
This hypothesis will be examined in chapter eight.
 Hypothesis 3: Effective communication plays an important role in inter-firm
collaboration and has a positive relationship with the performance of inter-firm
collaboration.

Communication is important not only for inter-firm collaboration, but also for the
performance of any firm (Zacharia et al., 2011). It is highlighted in most
management and business literature (Olkkonen et al., 2000; Reinig, 2003; Elg, 2007;
Zacharia et al., 2011). As discussed in chapter three, there are different types of
communication during inter-firm collaboration, whether via face-to-face or other
technical methods (Nyberg and Strandvik, 1999; Keane, 2009). Timely and
appropriate communications are vital for inter-firm collaboration (Olkkonen et al.,
2000; Reinig, 2003). Insufficient communication can lead to misunderstanding and
failure in inter-firm collaboration. Therefore, it is postulated to have a positive
relationship with the performance and results of inter-firm collaboration (Zacharia et
al., 2011). The quality of communication will be examined by frequency of
communication, understanding of communication, and efficiency of communication,
which will be discussed further in a later section.
 Hypothesis 4: Cultural similarity has a positive effect on the performance and
result of collaboration.

Cultural and language differences may bring misunderstanding and increase both
costs and risks for inter-firm collaboration. Therefore, a similar cultural background
and language may enhance the trust level, quality of communication, and
20

Time is a scarce resource for managers. The higher the position of the manager, the higher are their
opportunity costs for each hour spent on building or maintaining inter-firm collaboration. If they use
the same time in managing production or expanding the market, it may bring more profits for the firm.
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performance of the inter-firm collaboration. Cultural similarity is postulated to have
a positive influence on the performance and result of collaboration.
 Hypothesis 5: Firm size has a positive influence on the outcomes from inter-firm
collaboration.

Size matters when firms select their partners. Collaboration with peer-sized or largersized partners will help the firm to enhance its production process, product quality,
and market position (Burt, 1983; Ghemawat et al., 1986; Duysters and Hagedoorn,
1995; Hagedoorn, 1995b; Dussauge et al., 2000). The structure and working process
of a firm are expected to influence the collaboration performance and results. Large
firms are more likely to possess specialized assets, business networks, patents, and
skilled labour (Teece, 1986). Therefore, the size of firms plays an important role in
the partnership formation process and collaborating behaviour. The size of a firm is
postulated to have a positive influence on inter-firm collaboration. This thesis
adopted the official definition of firm size used in Australia and China.
 Hypothesis 6: Size difference between collaborating firms has a positive
influence on the outcomes from inter-firm collaboration. It can be used to
replace firm size in collaboration model.

Firms with different sizes are more likely to form inter-firm collaboration (Gulati,
1995a; Saxton, 1997). As measured by employment or fixed assets, size difference is
the difference in firm size between collaborating firms, which is also important to the
performance of inter-firm collaboration (Harrigan, 1985a). As this thesis studies the
Australian and Chinese markets, it extends the research on size difference and
develops a new measurement (as discussed later in this chapter) to calculate size
difference between firms. This thesis also explores the alternative of using size
difference to replace size in the collaboration model when the number of studied
countries (as well as definitions for firm size) increases. As size difference is
calculated from the sizes of interviewed firms and its partner, it is expected to be
highly correlated with firm size. Therefore, size difference will be used to replace
firm size in collaboration model.
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 Hypothesis 7: The success rate of inter-firm collaboration may be influenced by
different factors in different countries.

Different countries may have different cultural backgrounds, views on inter-firm
collaboration, ways in which business is conducted, different resources in
collaboration, and very different views on successful outcomes from the inter-firm
collaboration (Kuada, 2002). Therefore, it is expected that inter-firm collaboration is
influenced by different factors in different countries. The data will also be tested
separately because the significance level of each independent variable may be
different in each country.

After having proposed the major research questions and hypotheses, it is now
important to design the research methodologies and process in order to verify and
examine these questions. Therefore, the qualitative and quantitative research methods
to be used are now discussed and compared.
4.3

Methodologies

Research methodology refers to “the procedural framework in which the research is
conducted” (Remenyi et al., 1998). However, any research method has its own
strengths and weaknesses. There is no perfect method (Kale, 1999). Davis and Parker
(1997) argued that the research method should fit the research problems, research
aims and theories.

Quantitative and qualitative methods are the two most frequently used methods in
research. Each of them fits well in some dimensions. In most management and
business studies, a qualitative method is adopted and emphasized. However, in most
economic research a quantitative research method is used as the main method. There
has been increasing debate on which one is superior since the early 1980s. However,
the boundaries between these two methods are not clearly defined in most literature,
and each of them has received criticisms by researchers. Qualitative research and
quantitative research, to some extent, are complimentary to each other. The
advantages and disadvantages of each method will be discussed further below.
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Table 4.1 shows the different dimensions, definitions, and literature on qualitative
research and quantitative research. The advantages and major criticisms of
qualitative and quantitative research methods are also identified in Table 4.1.
Table 4-1 Differences between qualitative and quantitative research methods
Dimensions
Objective/
purpose/ aim

Assumptions
Approach

Data and
source
The process
of analysis

Research role
Advantages

Criticism

Qualitative
Understanding or
developing a theory to
explain what was
experienced
Reality socially constructed
through an individual
A form of ethnography,
better in explaining the
phenomenon; inductive
Detailed descriptions of
situations, events, people…
by interviews or case study
Investigation and observing
the reality (e.g. case study)

Quantitative
Seeking a cause or testing a
theory/ hypothesis to
predict future trends

Literature
Firestone, 1987;
Newman and Benz,
1998

Objective reality apart from
the beliefs of individuals
Experimental designs to
reduce errors; deductive

Firestone, 1987

Immersed in phenomenon
Rich information; better
understanding of any
phenomenon, of which little
is yet known
No confidence in results;
the conclusions are only
hypotheses; cannot be used
to predict future trends

Detached to avoid bias
Provides confidence results
and can be used to measure
relationships and make
predictions
Not “real”, provides less
information; relies too
much on data and may be
misleading

Numerical, measurable data
by survey or financial/
economic reports
Using statistics or
econometric techniques
(e.g. regression and factor
analysis)

Firestone, 1987;
Anderson and Narus,
1990; Kendall, 2008
Patton, 1990; Newman
and Benz, 1998; Kale,
1999
Yin, 1982; Howe and
Eisenhart, 1990;
Richards, 1993;
Strauss and Corbin,
1998
Firestone, 1987
Patton, 1990; Hoepfl,
1997; Newman and
Benz, 1998; Kale,
1999; Anderson, 2008
Yin, 1982; Anderson
and Narus, 1990;
Newman and Benz,
1998; Kendall, 2008

As shown in Table 4.1, both qualitative and quantitative research methods have their
disadvantages and advantages. To provide more reliable results they should not be
put in an either-or selection (Newman and Benz, 1998). Qualitative techniques such
as interviews can gather contextualizing data to help inform prior quantitative
research (Kendall, 2008) and quantitative results can be used to provide better
support for the qualitative results.

Therefore, in this thesis, a qualitative case study is first adopted to verify the
previous literature results in the mobile telecommunication markets and answer the
first primary research question. Comments are also collected through the qualitative
study. The results of the qualitative research are used to design and modify the
research process and questionnaire for the quantitative study. A quantitative analysis
is then designed to examine the hypotheses for the second primary research question.
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The results of the quantitative study and the qualitative research are also used as
complementary evidence to explain and examine each other at the end of this thesis.
As far as data collection is concerned, interviews and an online survey are both
adopted in this thesis. The research process for this study is depicted as in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 Research process flow chart
Literature Review

Start

Industry experience

First contact with some
managers for suggestions

Qualitative study

Design & translate questionnaire

Select interviewed firms

Conduct face-to-face interviews and get advice/suggestions

Results analysis and compose result report

Send reports to participants and get feedback from interviewees

Quantitative study
Design survey for quantitative study

Collect contacts
of survey firms

Conduct online survey for quantitative study

Data collection and analysis

Compose results into thesis and papers

End
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Design and
develop the
online survey
system

As in Figure 4.1 both a qualitative case study and quantitative data analysis are
utilised in this thesis. The qualitative study provides industry evidence for this study,
rich information on inter-firm collaboration and useful suggestions and modification
of the quantitative questionnaire and survey design. The quantitative study examines
the key determinants in chapter three and measures the relationship of these factors
with the final success rate of inter-firm collaborations. These complementary
research methods are expected to provide more reliable results and useful
implications for business managers and government decision makers.
Firstly, some selected managers (from the researcher’s business network) are
contacted before the formal interviews. As the terms used in the previous literature
may not be widely used in the telecommunication market and some norms used in
the telecommunication industry may be different from other industries, the drafted
questionnaire is reviewed by these managers. The translations of these terms into
Chinese are also discussed with the interviewed managers for some possible
misunderstanding or confusion it may have brought. Some questions are dropped or
modified due to their suggestions. The qualitative questionnaire is designed based on
a review of the literature, suggestions from these managers and from industry
participants, and previous industry experience of the researcher.

Secondly, qualitative case studies are conducted in both Australia and China via
face-to-face interviews. The results will be used to verify the literature on inter-firm
collaboration and the theoretical framework presented in chapters two and three. The
probe questions in the last section collect rich information for further research. The
results are used to answer the first primary research question and its related
questions. A results report is sent to all participants after the interviews. Their
feedback and suggestions are then collected to enhance the quantitative study, which
will be discussed further in a later section. The selection of sample firms, design of
the questionnaire, and process of interviews will be discussed further in this chapter.

Thirdly, with the suggestions from the qualitative study, the questionnaire for the
quantitative research is enhanced. It is designed to answer the second research
question. An online survey system based on this questionnaire is developed. A
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broader range of businesses are selected to examine the collaborating framework.
Firms from many industries are selected and invited to attend the online survey. Data
are collected automatically through the designed database. After the data are
collected and translated into examined factors, an ordered probit model is employed
to measure the relationships between the factors and the success rate of inter-firm
collaboration.

All the data for this study are primary data from Australian and Chinese businesses.
After the data are collected and analysed, a final results report is composed and sent
to all interviewees online. Feedback and suggestions are collected for further
research and study.
4.4

Qualitative case study

The literature review in chapter three provided sound background knowledge for the
design of the qualitative case study. A questionnaire is drafted from the previous
literature on inter-firm collaboration. However, it can be argued that these questions
may not suit the mobile telecommunication market as this is a new and dynamic
market. On the other hand, some terms used in the previous literature may not be
appropriate in the telecommunication industry. Therefore, some managers from
mobile telecommunication firms were contacted first to give suggestions on the
design of the questionnaire. Their advice and industry experience also provided
useful knowledge for enhancement of the questionnaire. Some terms and questions
are modified due to their suggestions to make it more related to the
telecommunication industry and easier to be understood by interviewees.

The selection of cases is purposeful, including all different types of firms in terms of
their nationalities, sizes, and industry sectors to provide as much rich information as
possible (Patton, 1990; Perry, 1998). The selection is also largely dependent on the
business network of the researcher to increase the response rates. The design of the
questionnaire, selection of interviewed firms and interview case study is discussed in
detail in the following sections.
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4.4.1

Questionnaire design for interviews

The design of the questionnaire for the qualitative study was based on literature
reviews, industry experience of the researcher, and some prior suggestions from
potential interviewees. To increase the efficiency of the interview, some of the
questions are designed in multiple choice selections. However, each of these
questions are explained and discussed by the interviewer during the interviews.
Appendix-A contains the final version of the questionnaire designed for the
qualitative study.

Part one - General questions

Part one of the questionnaire has five general questions relating to the business
sector, nationality and firm size.


The first question in part one of the questionnaire is designed to identify the
business sector of the interviewed firm according to the telecommunication
market structure in chapter five. The answers to this question are used in the
study of the business collaborating types and benefits generated from
collaboration in this market. Firms in the different sectors are expected to
have more comparative advantages and different resources. The answer to
this question will answer the first question of primary research question one.



The aim of question two is to identify whether the firm is a public or private
firm. This question is proposed by an industry manager in China during the
pilot interview, who indicated that this factor is important for inter-firm
collaboration in China. Firms in the public sector are expected to have more
resources and business networks. This factor is only expected to play an
important role in the Chinese market.



Local, foreign and joint venture companies are identified in the third
question. The aim of this question is to identify the business type.
Multinational firms are expected to have different comparative advantages to
that of local firms. Therefore, the types, benefits, and risks should be different
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for different types of firms. The answer to this question provides evidence for
questions 1 and 7 in primary research question 1.


The fourth question identifies the size of the interviewed company. The
definition of small and medium-sized enterprises is quite different for
Australia and China, which will be discussed further in chapter eight. Firm
size is measured by the number of total employees in the global market.
Therefore, to compare the results for both Australia and China, firm size in
the questionnaire is designated in categorises: less than 5, 5 to 9, 10 to 19, 20
to 49, 50 to 99, 100 to 199, 200 to 499, and 500 or more. The answer
provides evidence for question 2 of the first primary question.



The fifth question is to identify whether the firm has collaborations with other
firms. If the answer is no the collaborating questions in part 2 will be
bypassed.

Part two – Collaboration questions

Some researchers have argued that collaboration could be among multiple players,
which increases the complexity of inter-firm collaboration (Bidault and Salgado,
2001). To study the performance and outcome of each collaboration part two of the
questionnaire is designed as a repeated part for the interviewed firm. Managers are
asked to select one to five collaborating cases from their top five business partners to
answer this part. Therefore, part two collects data based on collaborating cases rather
than firms. The benefit of this design is it increases the study cases for this study and
the managers have flexibilities in their selection of studied cases for this study.

Part two of the questionnaire is designed to get information on inter-firm
collaborations. Interviewed managers are asked to select one or more collaborating
cases (from the top five important collaborations for the firm) and answer part two
for each case. It is aimed at identifying the factors and characters of inter-firm
collaboration. Other factors, such as geography, background, comparative advantage
reasons, are also taken into account in this part.
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The first question identifies the partner’s business sector. It is similar to
question 1 in part one, which will provide evidence for question 1 of the first
primary research question.



The second question identifies the size of the partner firm. This question,
combined with question 2 in part 1, will answer question 2 of the first
primary research question.



The third question identifies the collaborating type, which answers question 4
of the primary research question. Ten multiple choice types are listed in this
question, which are adopted from the literature and reviewed by industry
managers. However, new technology and a new business model may require
new types of collaboration. Therefore, another option is added to collect new
collaborating types in the mobile telecommunication market.



The fourth question identifies the main benefits from inter-firm collaboration.
This question also helps answer question 4 of the primary research question.
Suggested by some managers, motives are combined into collaborating
benefits as some motives are easily confused with benefits in the
telecommunication industry. As a result, twelve questions are designed to
capture: access to new technology, increase in market share, increase in
global competition, increase in profitability, increase in productivity, increase
in product quality, increase in joint R&D, increase in innovation, link with
government schemes and policies, reduce business costs, and/or participate in
the global market. The results from this question will answer question 5 of
the first primary question.



The fifth and sixth questions identify international collaboration and location
of the partner. As discussed in chapter two, transaction costs are expected to
be higher between firms with larger distance differences in location.
However, as most technologies used in the telecommunication industry
reduce the costs of communication and make collaboration easier, the
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influence of location distance on performance of the collaboration will be
verified in this market via this question. As this case study only focuses on
Australia and China, the questionnaire is designed separately for the
Australian and Chinese markets.


Question seven is designed to get the subjective opinion of the interviewee on
the performance and results from this collaboration. Empirical results show
that both subjective and objective assessments are significant in measuring an
alliance’s performance and results (Heide and Miner, 1992; Parkhe, 1993b).
Therefore, both subjective assessments and objective performance are
adopted in this research.

Part three – Main concerns and barriers for local and international
collaboration

The aim of part three is to identify the main concerns and barriers for local and
international collaboration. The result of this question is expected to help in reducing
business barriers for local and international inter-firm collaboration in the Australian
and Chinese mobile telecommunication markets.

Question one and two are designed to identify the risks and barriers from local and
international collaboration. Firms from different countries are expected to have
different concerns or obstacles when engaged in local and international inter-firm
collaboration. To get further information, another option for other specified barriers
are added. Answers to this question answer questions 6 and 7 for the first primary
research question.

Part four - Probe questions and suggestions

The aim of part four is to get richer information on inter-firm collaboration and
prepare for the quantitative study.


The first question is to collect the interviewees’ attitude on key determinants
85

of a successful collaboration. Different interviewees may have different
experience and knowledge on collaboration. Therefore, the answers are
expected to vary due to their own experience. However, the answers provide
empirical evidence for the collaborating framework developed in chapter
three, which will be further examined in chapter eight. The good or bad
experience in collaboration is also asked in this question as supplementary to
the key determinants.


The second question is designed to collect the managers’ opinions and
expectations on government support. The results provide suggestions for
government agencies, policy makers, and industry associations on how to
improve and enhance local and global inter-firm collaboration for their
country, industry or region.



The third question is designed to get suggestions for further research beyond
the scope of the present study. The answers are expected to contribute to
further enhancement of research on inter-firm collaboration.

4.4.2

Selection of sample firms in Australia and China

All the previous empirical studies on inter-firm collaboration have relied upon a
single sample (Osborn et al., 1998). Some were restricted to certain types of alliances
(Geringer, 1991; Park and Ungson, 1997), some concentrated on only developed
countries (Hagedoorn, 1993; Osborn et al., 1998), and some focused only on large
firms (Gulati, 1995a). Some firms are excluded from these studies. Therefore, to
provide more reliable results, this study covers all firm sizes, in both a developing
country (China) and developed country (Australia), and all industry sectors in the
mobile telecommunication market (as in chapter five). Face-to-face interviews were
held for each selected company. The expected interviewee is either the CEO or a
senior manager, who is familiar with the development and collaboration strategy of
the firm.
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The selected companies are taken from three sources: (1) a list of companies
provided by the Australian Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO), (2) a
list of monthly service providers’ ranking list by China Mobile and China Unicom,
and (3) the researcher’s previous contact lists during five years working experience
in the telecommunication industry. The (1) and (2) lists include most of the formal
population of mobile service providers in Australia and China. Because of the
difficulty and high costs of conducting a nationwide interview in Australia and China
(amongst the largest markets in the respective countries), only firms located in
Beijing and around Sydney are selected for convenience and cost saving reasons. The
interviews also support that most of the telecommunication firms have offices in
these cities. Some other firms are selected as backups beside the final selection lists
for interviews.

Australian cases
It is compulsory for all mobile service providers to register as a member of TIO by
ACMA (Australian Communications and Media Authority) (TIO, 2012). There are
three types of service providers on the TIO member list (with and without carrier
license): telephone service providers, Internet service providers, and telephone and
Internet service providers. This research focuses on the mobile telecommunication
market, so sole Internet service providers are excluded from this research. The total
number of listed firms was 710 firms on 18 September 2007, the access date (TIO,
2007).

All the registered information and contact information of these 710 firms are
reviewed. They include 14 telephone service providers with carrier licenses, 289
telephone service providers without carrier licenses, 33 telephone and internet
service providers with carrier licenses, and 367 telephone and internet service
providers without carrier licenses.

Firstly, firms without a website and contact email are excluded from this research.
Therefore, 562 email addresses are collected, which will be reserved for the
quantitative analysis. Secondly, as this research focused on the mobile market, firms
without mobile services are dropped out from the selected list. Therefore, the
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majority of internet telephone card dealers are excluded from the list. Thirdly, only
firms located around Sydney are selected. The selected firms are also balanced to
cover all firm sizes, different nationalities, and different sectors (mobile device
provider, service provider, retailers, and content provider as in chapter seven). In the
end, 19 firms were selected and invited for interviews.

These firms were contacted through three methods. Firstly, all selected firms were
contacted through email (based on the email address registered on the TIO website).
Secondly, some firms are contacted by telephone if they did not reply to the
invitation email within 7 days. Thirdly, firms in the researcher’s business network
were contacted through the contact persons in that company.

Chinese cases
The Chinese firms are selected from China Mobile and China Unicom’s monthly
service providers (SPs) ranking lists, and the business network of the researcher.
Bian (1994) found that Guan Xi (business networks) plays a vital role in China and
Lu et al (2006) found that firms only do business with friends. Therefore, the
selection of Chinese cases in this research greatly relies on the researcher’s business
network to reduce research costs and increase the response rate.

Firstly, 17 companies were selected from the released ranking list and the
researcher’s

business

network.

These

firms

include

carrier

service

providers/operators, service providers and content providers; foreign companies,
Chinese companies and joint venture firms; state-owned and privately-owned firms;
service providers using the China Mobile network, China Unicom network and the
author’s business network; firms with and without international collaboration
experiences; and different sized firms. However, limited by research time and costs,
only firms located in or which had branch offices in Beijing were selected.

These firms were contacted through email, telephone and contact persons. The
research questionnaire for the interview is translated into Chinese and modified to
suit the Chinese mobile telecommunication market as required. Some questions and
terms are also modified due to suggestions from the first contacted managers.
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4.4.3

Interviews

Face-to-face interviews were adopted in both Australia and China. The data
collection was structured into interview questions. The purpose of this phase is to
obtain a general picture of inter-firm collaboration and collect opinions and cases on
inter-firm collaborations. The interviewees include CEOs and senior managers who
have a good knowledge of the firm’s collaboration and development strategies. The
interviews were conducted separately in Beijing, China in late 2008 and Sydney,
Australia in early 2009.

The response rate of the Australian firms was relatively low (under 10 per cent)
compared with the Chinese firms. Only firms contacted through the researcher’s
business network replied and accepted the research invitation. Finally, 7 managers
accepted an interview in Australia. The results are analysed in chapter seven.

On the other hand the Chinese interviewees showed great interest in this study. The
participants also invited their business partners to participate in this research, which
increased the final number of interviews to 24. They also provided some useful
information on inter-firm collaboration and suggestions for further study. The results
will be discussed further in chapter six.

In sum, 31 interviews were conducted in both Australia and China for the qualitative
case study. However, as part two of the questionnaire (collaborating cases with
different partners) is a repeated part for each firm, the actual number of studied cases
is more than the number of interviewed firms. Some managers answered two or three
collaborating cases for their firms. Therefore, the total collaborating cases are 55
from the 31 interviewed firms. The results provided ample, useful and comparable
information for this research and further studies, which will be discussed further in
chapters 6 and 7.
4.4.4

Suggestions and feedback

After the final reports were sent to the interviewed managers, suggestions from the
managers were also collected to enhance the process and questionnaire for the
quantitative survey. Some important advice and changes are discussed below.
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Firstly, due to the advice from some network device providers, the device provider
should be separated into mobile device providers and basic network device
providers. Mobile device providers only provide mobile handsets and products.
However, the basic equipment of the telecommunication market requires a huge
amount of base devices and equipment.

Another suggestion is the inclusion of telecom retailers in the Australian market. As
shown in chapter 7 the Australian telecom components include the hardware sector,
service providers, content providers and retailers. However, retailers are separated
from the telecom market in the Chinese market. Therefore, the business sectors in the
same industry would be very different in different countries. This result also provides
useful information for the quantitative study.

As the quantitative analysis will expand the studied industry into other services and
manufacturing industries that are related to the telecommunication industry, the
business sector question will be removed from the questionnaire as it is designed
from the structure of the mobile telecommunication sector. It would be less useful to
compare different sectors in all different industries.

Secondly, sharing testing devices and presales service were proposed by some
Australian interviewees as two new collaborating types in the telecommunication
industry. However, franchising is not adopted in both the Australian and Chinese
mobile telecommunication markets. With the development of new technology, the
types of collaboration are also changing rapidly. The questionnaire was adapted due
to this suggestion and results will be discussed further in chapter seven.

Thirdly, some interviewees suggested that the results of collaboration are sometimes
hard to be categorised into successful or failed. Therefore, a scaled option is added to
identify the successful level for inter-firm collaboration instead of using a yes/no
selection. The answer will be used to analyse the collaborating model in chapter
eight.
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4.5

Quantitative study

The results from the qualitative study provided valuable information for the study on
performance and results of inter-firm collaboration. However, the selected
interviewed firms are all from the telecommunication industry, which is a very
narrow area in the global market. Can these findings and results be applied to other
industries or broader business areas? What are the secret “ingredients” for successful
collaboration in the general business area? These questions are addressed and
analysed from the quantitative study. The quantitative study will expand upon the
studied industries from the mobile telecommunication market to all the other related
industries (e.g. finance, service and manufacturing industries) to examine the
collaborating model in a more general business area and provide a more reliable
result.
4.5.1

Questionnaire design

Independent variables and their measures

Based on the previous literature review and conceptual framework, key determinants
for successful collaboration are: trust, collaborating experience,

effective

communication, cultural difference, and firm size. The measurement of these
determinants and the method of collecting this data through designed questions are
discussed in the following.


Trust

As discussed in chapter three, trust is vital for inter-firm collaboration. It is regarded
as one of the most important determinants of inter-firm collaboration in the literature
and empirical studies. However, trust is a very complex concept. Individual trust can
be influenced by personal relationships, first impression, experience of each person,
and even one’s favourite colour or style. Trust, as used in this thesis, only refers to
that between firms which affected the selection and performance of inter-firm
collaboration. The questions for trust developed by Cummings and Bromiley (1996)
were widely adopted in the literature. They argued that the word “trust” should not
be used in the questions to measure trust. However, “trust” is used in Chinese also in
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the words of trustworthiness, reputation, reliability level, and others that are related
to trust (Lau and Rowlinson, 2009). Therefore, as this study focuses on the
Australian and Chinese markets, this approach to measuring trust will not be
adopted.

Firm level trust is measured using both objective measures and subjective
assessments from the managers in this thesis as discussed in chapter three. The
objective measures include the firm’s industry background (Question 2.6 as in
appendix B), business networks (Question 1.4 and 2.4), openness of information
(Question 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1), and similarity of the firm and its partners on their
collaborating goals, business structures, and working process (Question 3.1). The
subjective assessments include the reliability level of the contact person (Question
2.5), the industry reputation level of the partner firm (Question 2.6), overall
subjective trust level during this collaboration (Question 3.3), and risk level
(Question 3.4) during the collaborating case. The measuring and weighting of each
of these is discussed further in chapter eight.


Size and size difference

Large firms are more likely to possess more resources (Teece, 1986). Therefore, firm
size and size difference are expected to be key determinants for successful inter-firm
collaboration. Most previous research uses the same definition of firm size for all
studied countries, and uses financial reporting data for firm size. However, the
definition of firm size is very different in different countries.

Firms even categorised into the same size group by the World Bank may have
different access to government support programs, industry associations, human
resources, market information, bank loans, and even pay different tax rates in
different countries. It can be argued that it is not appropriate to adopt the same
definition of firm size in a cross-national study. Focusing on the Australian and
Chinese markets the definition adopted in this thesis is from the official definition of
firm size (for the services, manufacturing and telecommunication sectors due to the
sample range) in both Australia and China.
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On the other hand, most small firms do not produce annual reports and they are
reluctant to give the actual sales amount or turnover. Furthermore, these measures
are significantly influenced by the performance of the inter-firm collaboration. There
is an expected strong interaction between such defined firm size and the performance
of a inter-firm collaboration. As firm size is defined by global employee numbers in
both Australia and China the problem is not an issue in this study. Questions 1.2 and
2.2 in the attached questionnaire B collected the size categories for the surveyed
firms and its partners.


Previous collaborating experience

The results of previous empirical studies found that past experience of a specific kind
can only lead to success of the same type of collaboration (Kale, 1999). On the other
hand, the influence of prior experience will diminish over time (Gulati, 1995a).
Therefore, only the similar experiences (similar to current collaborating type) within
the past 10 year period are collected in this study.

The experience is collected through questions 1.3 and 2.3 for the surveyed firm and
its partners. As this study collected collaborating data from one side of the
partnership21, there is likely to be expected missing data in this question. Therefore,
this question is designed to be used for two variables. If the surveyed firm selected
the “not sure” option in these questions, it will be used to calculate the openness of
information between firms in the trust variable. The more partners’ information the
interviewed firm has, the higher the openness of the information level during this
inter-firm collaboration.


Effective communication

Effective communication is vital to any collaboration, which is supported by most of
the previous literature as discussed in chapters two and three (Zacharia et al., 2011).
Only with effective communication can a firm get good knowledge of its partner,
control potential risk, and increase collaborating performance (Olkkonen et al., 2000;

21

Although many researchers have argued that collaborating studies should be based on information from both
collaborators, it is usually very hard to collect data from both sides in real business cases (Kale, 1999). There are
always tradeoffs between the quantity of cases and data with the quality of data. As the quantitative study needs
more samples to reduce the bias and increase reliability, a one sided study is adopted in this thesis.
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Reinig, 2003; Elg, 2007; Zacharia et al., 2011). In this thesis the quality of
communication is measured by three different assessments: appropriate frequency of
communication, understanding of communication, and satisfactory communicating
efficiency (in question 3.2 of appendix B). This will also help study the different
contribution of these factors to the performance of inter-firm collaborations in
different countries.


Cultural similarity between partners

Cultural similarity influences collaborating performance and results. Prior research
has developed different methods to measure the cultural difference (Park and
Ungson, 1997; Narteh, 2008). However, China is excluded in most of these
categories, which is an obvious omission. As this thesis focuses on Australia and
China, the countries are categorised due to geographic and cultural distance from
China and Australia. On the other hand, as more and more employees work and
study globally, managers gain experiences from different cultures and countries. It
can be argued that the cultural difference should not only be measured by the
registered nation of the firm, but also the cultural background and experiences of the
manager or contact person.

Therefore, culture similarity is measured by both subjective cultural similarity (in
question 3.1) and country difference (examined through a calculation from questions
1.1 and 2.1). The measuring and weighting of culture similarity are discussed further
in chapter eight.

Part four - Measure of collaborating performance and outcomes

It is commonly agreed that the performance of collaboration is hard to measure
(Dussauge and Garrette, 1995; Gulati, 1998). Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish
it from success or failure. It may vary from different managers’ viewpoints. In some
research areas such as in training evaluation or agricultural studies, there are ‘natural’
requirements for ordinal measurement as subjective assessments are important in
evaluating the results (Groot and Brink, 2003; Wes et al., 2005). Hartono (2004)
adopted Ordinary Least Square (OLS) in subjective satisfactory (five point Likert94

type scale questions) analysis. However, it should be argued that the use of OLS
regression is not appropriate in a five level satisfactory regression as the range of the
dependent variable is limited (linear function is unlimited). Therefore, an ordered
probit (OP) model is adopted in this thesis. OP models are widely adopted in
agriculture conjoint analysis, training tracks, and customer satisfaction related
studies. Empirical results, as discussed in chapter three, showed that both subjective
and objective assessments are significant in measuring an alliances’ performance and
results (Parkhe, 1993b; Reinig, 2003; Hartono, 2004). Wes et al. (2005) discussed
the difference between cardinal and ordinal assumptions in agricultural conjoint
analysis. They argued that rank-order and interval rating scales are two commonly
used methods in agriculture studies to collect respondent preferences. The
performance variables are also ordinal in this model. Therefore, an ordered probit
model is adopted.

Furthermore, the outcome of collaboration is measured by both subjective
assessments and objective performance (Parkhe, 1993b) in this thesis as discussed in
chapter three. Part four of the questionnaire in Appendix-B collects data for
collaborating performance and outcomes. Question 4.1 identifies the benefits of the
collaboration via multi-scale items, which will provide objective evidence for the
performance of inter-firm collaboration (access to new technology, improved global
competitiveness, increased market share, cost-saving, assist R&D, increased market
influence, improved profitability, improved productivity, improved product quality,
increased innovation, access to government programs, allow participation in the
global market, and other specific benefits). The designed questions for collaborating
benefits came from the qualitative case study, which are examined by the managers.
Question 4.2 and 4.3 are designed to collect the subjective assessment for the
fulfilling expectation level and final success rate of the inter-firm collaboration
(Reinig, 2003; Hartono, 2004). Both subjective and objective results will be used in
the measurement of the performance for the collaborating model in chapter eight.
4.5.2

Selection of sample firms and data collection

The empirical study results show that the response rate is different in different
countries and may be much higher through business networks than randomly selected
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participants (Lohrke et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2009). Therefore, the quantitative
study is modified and greatly relies on business networks (and extended business
networks). As the quantitative study is designed as an online survey, it breaks the
geographic limitation contained in the qualitative study. Firms from every city or
region in both Australia and China can participate in this survey. This will reduce the
regional bias and industry bias in this research as more industries are included in the
quantitative study22.

All the selected participants are contactable via e-mail, online short messages, and
telephone. Figure 4.2 summarises the selected participants from the different sources.
Figure 4.2 Selected participants in the quantitative study
Australia

China

TIO member lists

Rank lists of China Mobile and China Unicom &
the researcher’s business network

Send invitation to participants

Participants forward invitations

Extended business
networks

Extended
networks

The

selected

Networks of other
service industries

Extended
networks

Extended
networks

participants

are

Networks of other
manufacturing
industries

taken

from

four

Extended
networks

sources:

(1)

Australian

Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) lists, (2) rank lists of China Mobile
and China Unicom, (3) the researcher’s business networks, and (4) extensions of the
22

The firms filling in the online survey are expected to be representative of a wider range of industries
and sectors, which may come from any states or cities.
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researcher’s business networks (e.g. the participants of both the qualitative study and
quantitative study are encouraged to send this survey link to their business partners).
To increase the number of participants, all the collected member lists in (1) and (2)
with a valid email address are invited to participate in this study. Firms from other
related industries (manufacturing and services) are also included in this study.

An online survey system (designed only for the quantitative study of this thesis) was
developed to conduct the survey and collect data for this study. The interviewees
were expected to access the questionnaire through the web link and finish the survey
simply by ticking the options or input in a blank box in the electronic questionnaire.
The results are saved in a database automatically as the interviewee clicks on the
submit button. All the research data is saved and analysed. The results of the
quantitative study help in examining the second primary research question and
hypotheses and provide more reliable results for this research.
4.5.3

Methods and process of the quantitative data analysis

It is important to verify the data before any quantitative study. Therefore, all the
collected variables are tested for validity and reliability. An ordered Probit analysis is
adopted to test the key hypotheses. Then the model is examined for normality,
stability and specification errors. The method and analysis process is discussed in
detail in chapter eight.

Table 4.2 below summarises the research questions, sub-questions/hypotheses,
measuring instruments and question numbers in the designed questionnaires. It also
outlines the relationships of these questions with the collaboration framework
proposed in chapter 3. The questionnaire, designed for a qualitative face-to-face
interview, is used to answer the first primary question and the seven sub-questions
discussed in the previous section of this chapter. The questionnaire designed for the
quantitative online survey is used to answer the second primary research question
and seven hypotheses discussed in the previous section of this chapter. The results
are discussed and analysed in chapters 6, 7 and 8.
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Table 4-2 Research questions and measurement instruments
Major research

Sub-questions or

Measurement

Questionnaire

Relationship

question

hypotheses

instruments

questions

with the
framework

1. What are the

Q1: Culture

major types,

Qualitative

1.1, 1.2, 1.3,

Examine the

face-to-face

2.1, 2.6

previous

interviews

1.4, 2.1

empirical results

benefits and risks

Q2: Firm size

for

Q3: Deep/long

2.3, 2.7, 4.1

in the mobile

telecommunicatio

Q4: Types

2.3

telecommunicati

n inter-firm

Q5: Benefits

2.4

on markets in

collaborations in

Q6: Risks

3.1, 4.2, 4.3

Australia and

China and

Q7: International

2.5, 3.2

China

Quantitative

1.4, 2.4, 2.5,

Examine the

key determinants

online survey

2.6, 3.1, 3.3,

collaboration

of successful

for an ordered

3.4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3

framework/mod

probit

1.3, 2.3, 4.1,

el in chapter 3

collaboration

4.2, 4.3

and test the

model

3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3

difference

1.1, 2.1, 3.1,

between

4.1, 4.2, 4.3

Australia and

H5: Size

1.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3

China.

H6: Size difference

1.2, 2.2, 4.1,

Australia?
2. What are the

inter-firm

H1: Trust

H2: Experience

collaboration?
H3: Communication
H4: Culture

4.2, 4.3
H7: Country

1.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3

difference

4.6

Potential bias in data collection

This thesis included firms of different sizes, and from different sectors, industries,
and countries. However, there are still some biases inherent in the qualitative study.
One important bias in the interview is the cognitive bias (Granovetter, 1985).
“Interviews are subject to the common problem of interviewees’ bias, poor recall,
and poor or inaccurate articulation” (Yin, 1994). The problems are remedied by
explaining some questions in detail during the interviews.

Furthermore, cultural bias (Williamson, 2005) is always inevitable in cross-cultural
studies, which is expected to have an influence on this study. Therefore, the
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questionnaires are designed based on industry experience to suit the different
countries and are also modified and enhanced by the interviewed managers. The bias
is expected to be reduced through these methods. One the other hand, the bias can
also be reduced as the survey population increases. Actually, all of the biases in the
quantitative research are expected to be reduced as the population increases. The
quantitative online survey also broke the geographic and industrial limitations and
further reduced the bias in data collection.
4.7

Conclusions

This chapter discussed the research methodologies adopted in this thesis. Qualitative
research and quantitative research are complementary to each other, although there
has been a fierce debate on which research method is superior. This chapter analyses
the advantages and disadvantages of each of them and adopted both methods in this
study. The process of this study is defined in this chapter. The selection of sample
firms in the qualitative interviews and quantitative study are specific for this study to
answer the first and second primary research questions. The questions designed for
both qualitative and quantitative studies have been discussed in this chapter.

The qualitative research is based on the mobile telecommunication sector, which is
the most dynamic and fastest growing sector of global industries. The characteristics,
market statues, major players, and inter-firm collaboration inside this sector will be
analysed during the qualitative study. The results of the qualitative study will answer
the first primary research question and the related sub-questions. Chapters six and
seven show the results of the qualitative study. However, to understand the
characteristics of the telecommunication industry and inter-firm collaboration in this
industry, it is important to have an overview of the development and structure of the
global telecommunication industry and the major firms in each section. Therefore,
the following chapter five provides an overview of this industry.
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5 TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTER-FIRM COLLABORATIONS
5.1

Introduction

It has long been recognized that there is a close link between the development of a
country's telecommunications capability and its economic growth (Carr, 1989;
Stimson et al., 2006). The percentage of the world’s population covered by a mobile
cellular signal has increased from 61 per cent in 2003 to 90 per cent in 2009, and
nearly 80 per cent of inhabitants were mobile subscribers in 2010 (ITU, 2011).
However, only a small number of studies (Pisano, 1989; More and McGrath, 1999;
Qiu, 2005; Peng, 2007) have focused upon collaborations in the telecommunication
market, which has grown very rapidly and contributed dramatically to economic
growth. As for the mobile telecommunication (wireless) market the number of
research studies on collaborations is even less.

As discussed in previous chapters, this thesis focuses on collaboration in the
telecommunication industry. The previous literature and empirical results will be
examined in the context of the mobile telecommunication market through the use of
cases studies. Therefore, it is important to identify the important direct (to GDP,
employment, and exports) and indirect (to firms’ efficiency, productivity, reputation,
and extension of business networks) contributions of this industry and its major
collaborators.

Focusing upon the big picture of the global mobile telecommunication market, this
chapter will firstly explain the characteristics of the mobile telecommunication
market and its contributions to economic growth in section 5.2. In section 5.3, firms
are separated into three major sectors in this thesis to study inter-firm collaborations
among these sectors. In sections 5.4 to 5.6, cases in each sector are discussed and
compared, providing a better understanding of the different motives, types, benefits
and concerns for inter-firm collaboration in the mobile telecommunication market. In
section 5.7 results for the mobile telecommunication market studies are emphasised.
It also links to the Australian and Chinese mobile markets analysis and collaboration
case studies discussed in chapters 6 and 7.
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5.2

Characteristics of the mobile telecommunication market

Mobile telecommunications are the networks (such as analogue cellular system,
digital cellular systems, mobile broadband systems via modems or satellite systems)
that do not rely on physical connections (ITU, 2011). The telecommunications
mobile industry has evolved rapidly from 1997 to 2012. There were 1.8 billion
wireless handset users globally in 2005 (Vodafone, 2010) and 5.3 billion users by
2011 (Mobithinking, 2011) with growth of around 20% per annum. Wireless network
is a pervasive technology that is changing the way in which people work and play.
The network nature of the mobile telecommunication market require inter-firm
collaboration as each simple service for the end-user involves contributions from
different sectors (as described in Figure 5.1 below).

Another significant characteristic of the mobile telecommunications market is its
direct and indirect contributions to economic growth, employment, and society as a
whole (Access Economics, 2008). Furthermore, advanced telecommunication
technologies and markets also increase local and global inter-firm collaboration (Kim
and Park, 2002), which contributes greatly to the sustainable growth of regional and
national economies. Each of these characteristics will be discussed in more detail
below.
5.2.1

Market structure and government influenced industry

The telecommunications mobile market is a very dynamic market, with rapidly
changing technologies, standards, infrastructure, products, market requirements and
business models. On the other hand, strong market power is an important
characteristic of this industry (in the operators sector) in most countries (Hagedoorn,
1993; Funk and Methe, 2000). One cause of the market power in this market is the
high fixed costs (OECD, 2003). These high costs form an entry barrier to potential
new firms into this market. Another characteristic of the mobile telecommunication
industry is government influence and licences. Funk and Methe (2000) have argued
that the mobile telecommunication industry usually has standards and policies with
strong government influences. For national security reasons the telecommunication
industry is usually protected by government via licences and regulations (OECD,
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2003). Even for the largest companies, market access to particular foreign markets is
only possible through collaboration.

As discussed in chapter three, to reduce the high costs of research and development,
access new technologies, obtain market information, and access the global market,
inter-firm collaboration is vital in this industry. Today, thousands of firms provide
technical support, content, and services support in this market. The types and
quantity of inter-firm collaboration has also changed dramatically with the
development and use of new telecommunication technologies. For example, mcommerce

(mobile

commerce)

has

increased

business

opportunities

and

collaboration opportunities for many industries. All of these factors have led to a
greater need for local and global inter-firm collaboration (More and McGrath, 1999).
5.2.2

Technology-driven industry

Each technology advance has changed global market share as well as promoted new
sectors, products and services in this market. Therefore, to study the contribution of
mobile telecommunication, it is important to study the development of technologies
and the change of services in this market. The development stages are categorised by
5 generations: 1G, 2G, 2.5G, 3G, and 4G. The major characteristics, technology
/protocols, capabilities, and sample of new services in each stage are summarised in
Table 5.1.
Table 5-1 Technological development in the mobile telecommunication market
Generat Major
Major standards Capability
Sample
ions
characters
& protocols
services
1G (1980s
– 1990s)
2G (1990s
– current)

Analog
communication
Digital
communication

2.5G
(1990s –
current)
3G (2000s
– current)

Wideband
&
medium speed
data
Broadband
&
high speed data

AMPS
TDMA, GSM, PDC,
CDMA one, Wi-Fi
802.11b
CDMA one, GPRS,
WiFi 802.11g
CDMA
2000,
WCDMA,
HSDPA,
WiFi 802.11n, WiMax

Simple
communication
Limited
data
services
Medium speed data
transfer
144 Kbps (in car),
384 Kbps
(walking), 2 Mbps
(indoor)
Objective: 1 Gbps

Mobile call
Fax, short
message, social
network
WAP, MMS, file
sharing
Video conference,
streaming video,
application shops

4G
Global roaming 802.16m, LTE,
Future
(future)
& higher speed
developing standards
innovations
Source: Access Economics (2008), ACMA (2007), AMTA (2007), Ashiho (2003), Kumar et al.
(2010).
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The first mobile system was introduced as hexagonal cells in 1947 by engineers at
AT&T and was further developed by Bell Labs during the 1960s (Access Economics,
2007). As shown in Table 5.1, fully automatic cellular networks (1G) were first
introduced in the 1980s (AMTA, 2007). The technology was based on Frequency
Division Multiple Access (FDMA) and only had voice functionality. The first 1G
system was the 1981 Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) system (AMTA, 2007).

The second generation (2G) services provided limited data transfer functionality. It
was usually provided by two networks: Global System for Mobiles (GSM) and Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) (AMTA, 2007). GSM was first introduced in
Europe and was a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) technology. It supports
data, voice, message, and roaming between different networks. CDMA technology is
also a wireless technology using spread spectrum communication. After the 2G
technology there has been the so called 2.5G technology period, which offered
enhanced data services such as Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) and
Multimedia Message Service (MMS). It is regarded as a period between the 2G and
3G technologies (AMTA, 2007).

3G (third-generation networks) technologies offer mobile broadband, music and
video services, and other data-rich services. 3G mobile network technology has been
combined with other innovations, such as Bluetooth (rapid access to Local Area
Networks (LANs) and PCs) and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
(WiMax). The information, communication and entertainment services that can be
provided over 3G networks includes: video calling, video messaging, full-track
music download, games, mobile TV, news and sport, local guides, and mobile
business management. There is also a term ‘3.5G’, which refers to enhanced 3G
services.

The goal of so-called 4G (next-generation cellular wireless access standards)
technology is to support transmission speeds of up to 1 Gbps (Access Economics,
2008). However, such speeds will be able to support some new applications and
services that require high transfer speed. 4G is promoted as being always connected
everywhere and anytime (Fitzek and Katz, 2006).
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The growth of telecommunications not only provides users with a way to
communicate but also brings significant profits for value-adding services based on
wireless communications. The development of 3G and 4G creates new markets in the
telecommunication field. At the end of 2010 there were 940 million 3G subscriptions
(ITU, 2011). One-fifth of mobile subscribers had access to 3G or better services. 3G
networks were available in 143 countries in 2011 and some countries such as
Sweden, Norway, Ukraine and the United States are already moving to 4G
(Mobithinking, 2011).
5.2.3

Nature of inter-firm collaboration

The mobile telecommunication market is a market with opportunities for various
forms of inter-firm collaboration. Figure 5.1 below shows three typical scenarios of
mobile usage, where even a simple phone call involves interaction between various
types of firms, some of which can be considered to be inter-firm collaborations. Each
of these collaborations will be discussed in detail below.
Figure 5.1 Typical scenarios of mobile usage

Source: Author

All the hardware in the three typical scenarios in Figure 5.1 (including the mobile
devices owned by the end-users and base station or fibre lines owned by operators)
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are produced by device producers. Therefore, device providers are involved in all
mobile telecommunication services. They collaborate with operators to provide
device-service packages (post-paid program) to end-users. They also provide longterm device (e.g. base station or server) supply and maintenance services for
different operators. When the customer needs higher level services (e.g. short
message in the second scenario in Figure 5.1) it usually involves services from a
service provider, who provides diversified services to special users. Service
providers usually collaborate with operators to access end-users and share incomes
from operators. Therefore, they have strong collaborating relationships with
operators. If content is downloaded by a customer (e.g. games, ringtone, music or
news), content providers need to provide such content (as described in the third
scenario in Figure 5.1). Content providers have to collaborate with operators or
device providers (e.g. through Apple Store) to access end-users and share income
from them. From the typical scenarios above, each mobile usage involves inter-firm
collaboration from different firms from different sectors. Therefore, there is a natural
requirement for inter-firm collaboration in the mobile telecommunication market.

As discussed in a previous section, new technologies bring new and high quality
services (OECD, 2003) and more opportunities for inter-firm collaboration. The
rapid change of technology has shifted communication services and usages quickly,
generating new business opportunities and collaboration opportunities. For example,
the top telecommunication services have shifted in communications usages due to the
changes from voice and data networks to digital transport of voice, video, and data
signals on the same network. There have been many new protocols generated during
the last decade, which has greatly extended broadband and the mobility of Internet
access by mobile users (WRG, 2006). It is important to identify these usages in
different sectors to discuss the direct and indirect contributions of this industry.
Therefore, the most important mobile services and usages are discussed in Table 5.2.
Some scenarios and examples of these usages are also discussed below.

While the majority usage of mobile devices is still voice communication, people now
use mobile handsets more frequently, taking and sending pictures and videos, surfing
the Internet, listening to music, playing games, watching TV, checking email,
105

managing their schedules, and so on. Nonetheless, a survey of mobile phone users
showed that consumers view the benefits of mobile service provision as saving
money, saving time and providing useful information (Friedman, 2007).
Table 5-2 Mobile usages and services
Mobile usages Mobile Services
Examples
E-commerce

business/work

Financial services (e.g. mobile wallet, stock market),
security (e.g. wireless camera), VOIP (Voice over IP),
mobile e-mail access, mobile search engine, and online
order services.
private life
personal
News, weather, sports information, yellow pages,
(home/free-time)
manager/assistant
advertisements, home manager/assistant, short message
services, multimedia download, and mobile shopping.
entertainment
entertainment
Mobile games, mobile rings, and IPTV (Television
programs through a mobile phone).
vehicular
travel
Travel agent, mobile tourist guide, positioning-related
services.
public
education
News and weather report delivery.
health-care
Health information, in time services and suggestions.
Others
Other services
Voice services, advertisements, surf on Internet, and so
on.
Source: ACMA (2007), AMTA (2007), Fitzek and Katz (2006), and WRG (2006).

Firms have a range of business networks as well as remote workers. E-commerce
helps these firms provide better services to customers, suppliers, and other
collaborators. Remote workers can work at home or anywhere that has Internet
connections. Health care services or applications include transferring medical
imaging to specialists or other doctors. Firms across all sectors rely on collaborative
tools and services (e.g. electronic messaging and online meetings). These activities
greatly reduce the transaction costs of both firms and individuals. They provide not
only direct contributions to GDP and employment growth, but also many indirect
contributions to society as a whole which will be further discussed in the following
section.

Telecommunication services are an important resource for both domestic and
international benefits. In the context of domestic policy objectives, the role of
telecoms is essential to the facilitation of economic development and the enrichment
of people's lives in both developed and developing countries (Peng, 2007). With
telecom prices decreasing, it provides more benefits to customers and generates more
benefits for all participants (Access Economics, 2008). It also contributes to the
development of remote and poor regions. The indirect contributions provided by the
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mobile telecommunication industry has greatly improved business development and
economic growth in Australia (Access Economics, 2010) and China (MII, 2007).
5.2.4

Direct and indirect contributions

The economic contribution of the telecom industry includes macroeconomic and
microeconomic contributions, and indirect impacts on the development of other
industries as well as social welfare.

1. Direct contributions on the macroeconomic scale
On the macroeconomic scale, it has long been recognized that there is a close link
between a country's telecommunications development and its economic development
(Carr, 1989; Access Economics, 2010). The telecommunication industry has also
provided many employment opportunities every year, which distribute the benefits to
individuals and families. The sector has contributed significantly to government tax
revenue. It has also improved imports and exports. In the context of international
trade, telecom services provide key infrastructure for the economic development of
virtually all other sectors (Peng, 2007). The convergence of different technologies
increases the substitution for services. Mobile telecommunications is a close and
effective substitute for traditional fixed telephone services (OECD, 2003). 3G now
provides more possibilities for new services and content for the development of the
mobile market.

2. Direct contributions on the microeconomic scale
On the microeconomic scale, firms use telecommunication technologies to improve
their efficiency, productivity, profitability, and to reach new global markets (Access
Economics, 2010). Information on market news, prices, costs, and customers are
shared by firms and individuals anywhere and anytime. It increases the openness of
information and decreases risks for individual firms.

3. Indirect contributions to economic growth and social welfare
However, the indirect contribution of the mobile telecommunication industry far
outweighs its direct contribution (Access Economics, 2008). Telecommunication
technologies have helped improve the efficiency and productivity of most firms in
other industries, which has indirectly improved economic growth (Access
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Economics, 2010). On the other hand, telecommunication technologies have also
helped information distribution, maintaining relationships, and increasing the
happiness of individuals by communicating regularly with their family and friends.
The fast information transfer in health care, disaster alarm and many other fields
have contributed to community services and welfare. Real-time information transfers
also help reduce crime and solve some environmental problems. As a result, it has
contributed to societal welfare as a whole.

Additionally, compared with other industries, they attract more investors (Nie and
Zeng, 2003). The sector facilitates increased efficiencies, reduced costs, and as a
consequence, increased the productivity of businesses in all other industries (Access
Economics, 2008); increases the mental health of people through more accessible
communications; emergency calls, which saves lives or prevents crimes; and
increased happiness by regular communication with family members in different
countries which is missed in the evaluation of only economic indicators.

Telecommunications contributes directly and indirectly to economic growth (Access
Economics, 2010). Nonetheless, telecommunications has also changed the way
people work and live (Apple, 2010). It increases both local and global inter-firm
collaboration in telecommunications as well as in other industries. The major types
of collaborations between firms in these sectors are discussed in the next section.

5.2.5

Mobile telecommunication market structure

To study inter-firm collaboration in the mobile telecommunication market, firms in
global mobile markets are separated into three groups or sectors: (1) mobile device
providers (DP), (2) operators (CSP) and service providers (SP), and (3) content
providers (CP) and technical providers (TP) in this thesis, as shown in Figure 5.2
below. However, these groups or sectors may vary in different countries due to their
policies, business environment and cultural background.
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Figure
telecommunication
collaborations
Figure5.2
5.2Major
Majorsectors
sectorsininmobile
the mobile
telecommunication
market

Mobile device
providers (DP)

Collaborations
Operators and
Service Providers
(CSP or SP)

Content Providers and
Technical Providers (CP
or TP)

Source: Derived by the author

In Figure 5.2, firms in the mobile market are separated into three sectors. Each sector
plays an important role in the mobile market. There is no typical vertical or
horizontal collaboration in this market as in other traditional manufacturing
industries. Supplier and consumer roles could be changed in different collaborations.
For example, if a customer buys a mobile phone (e.g. iPhone or Nokia N8) first and
then chooses a carrier service provider (e.g. Telstra or China Mobile), services are
inputs for the handset device. On the other hand, if a customer chooses a service
package from a carrier service provider, the mobile phone is then a part of this
package. In this scenario the final package for the customer is composed of inputs
from a carrier service provider, a device provider, content providers, technical
providers, and usually through other service providers. There are many inter-firm
collaborations between these firms. Each of these collaborations adds value to the
final product. The characteristics of each sector and their motives, types, benefits,
and concerns for collaborations with other firms inside or outside its sector are
discussed via real collaboration cases below.

5.3

Device providers (DP)

Device providers, as discussed in the previous scenarios, including mobile device
providers and basic telecom device providers, offer the basic devices (e.g. base
station, mobile phones, and mobile handset devices) to operators and individuals.
Mobile devices are the most important basis of mobile services. Without these
devices, no mobile services could be provided to the final customers. Mobile phone
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providers are used as examples to explain the collaboration scenarios of different
sectors. The biggest mobile phone providers in 2011 were Nokia and Samsung. They
will be discussed further in the following section. The ranking changed dramatically
from 2006 to 2011, and this will be discussed further below.

In 2011 the number of mobile subscribers surpassed 5.3 billion worldwide
(Mobithinking, 2011). The trends in future mobile phones are towards smaller, easier
to control, and more functional devices. As the cost to produce a mobile phone
becomes lower, the more popular will be their global usage. With the rapid
development of new technologies and increased requirements by customers, most
device providers have to collaborate with other firms to improve the technologies of
their hardware and software to keep their competitiveness in the global market. On
the other hand, to reduce costs of production and research, firms have a great
incentive to work with other partners that have a comparative advantage in producing
some parts of the final products.

DPs usually collaborate with content providers to install initial contents inside their
devices. For example, some games, ringtones, and background pictures are sold with
the new mobile phones. DPs also need to develop new technologies by collaborating
with some technical providers (e.g. using matured mobile phone operating systems).
DPs collaborate with carrier service providers or service providers to develop
packages of services for customers. Special services must be combined with other
resource providers, for example Nokia’s online shop (Nokia, 2007), weather forecast
services, or news services. DPs also collaborate with other Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs), which are also DPs, to get access to new technologies or
lower costs as each firm has its own comparative advantages (Whitford and Zeitlin,
2004; Vilana and Monroy, 2010).

Device providers adopt the latest technology provided by technical providers and
cooperate with some famous content providers and service providers to embed their
contents or services into their products to attract more customers. Therefore, DPs
have a great need to collaborate with all other firms to keep their competitiveness
and rank in the global market.
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The characteristics of the collaborations of the major firms in each sector are
discussed and compared in the next section, which will provide a better
understanding of their collaborating trends and strategies. Such data is useful in
identifying the differences of each sector in terms of their motives and perceived
benefits from inter-firm collaboration.

5.3.1

Major global mobile device providers

As this chapter focuses on the global mobile market, this section will mainly discuss
mobile handset (e.g. mobile phone) providers. The biggest mobile handset provider
in terms of mobile device sales to end users in 2011 was Nokia (Gartner, 2011).
Other big mobile phone providers (by ranking) are Samsung, LG, Apple, ZTE,
Research In Motion, HTC, Motorola, Huawei Device, and Sony Ericsson. This
market is a dynamic and competitive one. Ranking and market share have changed
quickly in the last five years. In 2006, the biggest two were Nokia (with a 36%
market share) and Motorola (with a 21.5% market share) (Gartner, 2007). However,
new competitors such as Apple and LG have seen their market shares increase
quickly, pushing the market share of Nokia and Motorola down to 22.8% and 2.4%
respectively (Gartner, 2011).

As shown in Figure 5.3, Nokia occupied 22.8 per cent of the global market in 2011,
which was still the biggest market share. The global share for Samsung was 16.3 per
cent in 2011. Others, such as LG, Apple, ZTE, accounted for the other 60.9 per cent
of the global mobile handset market. With the first iPhone (by Apple Inc.) released in
2007 the market share of iPhone increased dramatically during 2008 - 2010 (Apple,
2010), accounting for 25% of the U.S. smart phone market in 2010. As a result, the
market share (in terms of sales to end users) of Symbian Operating System (mostly
used in Nokia mobile devices) in the global smart phone market has decreased
dramatically from 40.9% in the second quarter of 2010 to 22.1% in the second
quarter of 2011. On the other hand, the market share of the Android operating system
(used in Samsung, Motorola, and HTC mobile devices) in the smart phone market
increased from 17.2% to 43.4% during the same period. Another notable change in
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this market is Motorola. It was the second biggest mobile phone provider with 21.5%
of the total global market share in 2006 (Motorola, 2006). However, its market share
was only 2.4% in 2011. What are the reasons for this significant decreased market
share during these five years, and what implications are there from this for other
firms?

To answer these questions, Nokia and Motorola are selected as the two studied cases
as examples of device providers. Their inter-firm collaborations are expected to show
the trends and motivations for inter-firm collaboration strategies of device providers.
Figure 5.3 Global mobile device market share in Q2, 2011

Global Mobile Device Market Share
in 2Q, 2011
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Research In
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Source: Gartner (2011)

The following sections will discuss the history, development and inter-firm
collaborations of Nokia and Motorola as cases of device providers. These cases
depict the different incentives, types and benefits from inter-firm collaboration for
device providers in the market. Furthermore, the reason for the significant decreasing
market share of Motorola is also discussed.
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5.3.2

Business collaborating case - Nokia

1. Background
Established in 1865 in Finland, Nokia has become the largest mobile handset
provider in the world. Nokia built its first international mobile phone network in
1981, which led to the beginning of the mobile era. However, with technology
changes, Nokia kept on changing its products: the digital telephone switch was
launched in 1982, Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard
opened up in 1991 with Nokia as one of the developers of the system (Sadowski et
al., 2003), Nokia tune was launched in 1994, with the world’s first satellite call made
in 1994, Nokia’s first mobile game – snake was launched in 1997, Internet went
mobile in 1999, Nokia launched its first 3G phone in 2002 and mobile gaming went
multiplayer in 2003 (Nokia, 2007). Nokia has been the top provider of mobile
handsets in the global market since 1998 (Gartner, 2011). Although its market share
decreased dramatically from 2006 to 2011, it is still the top mobile device provider in
the global market.

Beside mobile handsets, Nokia also provides network infrastructure and enterprise
solutions. Collaboration is a key strategy in Nokia's growth path (Nokia, 2011). It
works with research institutions, local government, industry organisations, and other
firms to increase its competitiveness in the global market (Nokia, 2007). Nokia has a
vision to operate in the global market and this also influences its collaboration
strategies. The top 10 markets in term of sales amount for Nokia in 2010 were:
China, India, Germany, Russia, the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom,
Spain, Italy, and Indonesia, together representing 52 per cent of total net sales in
2010 (Nokia, 2011). Nokia also had five manufacturing facilities in China, producing
mobile devices and systems (Nokia, 2010). To keep its leading position in the mobile
device market, Nokia focused on its R&D investment and inter-firm collaboration in
new product and technology R&D, which is also supported by the following
collaboration cases.

2. Current status of R&D
Research and development (R&D) expenses were 13.8% of its net sales in 2010
(Nokia, 2010). However, the cost of R&D is very high with high risks. As discussed
in chapter three, firms in high technology industries (e.g. the telecommunication
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industry) usually collaborate with others to share risk and lower costs (Mowery,
1988a; Mytelka, 1991; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Hagedoorn et al., 2005; Richards
and Yang, 2007). Both Nokia and Nokia Siemens Network (jointly owned by Nokia
and Siemens) had an R&D centre to access the lower cost skilled labour and
collaborators in China on new products and new technologies (Nokia, 2010).

3. Inter-firm collaborations with other firms
Located in Finland, Nokia found that its local production networks in Finland were
not sufficient for its growth and development. Therefore, Nokia had to collaborate
with international partners to lower costs and keep its leading position in innovation
(Sadowski et al., 2003).
Since the mid 1990s, 95 per cent of Nokia’s strategic alliances have been in the
global market. The majority of international alliances are in manufacturing and
technology. However, with changing market share and pressure from new
competitors (e.g. Apple), Nokia has had to seek collaboration with other big
companies that have complementary resources (e.g. operation system from
Microsoft) to keep its leading position in the global market and lower its
development

cost.

Therefore,

global

competition

encouraged

firms

into

collaboration. As the top mobile phone provider in global market, Nokia usually
selects the top firms in other areas (e.g. Microsoft as the top software provider and
China Mobile as a top operator) as their collaborators. These collaborations will be
discussed in detail in the following collaboration cases for Nokia.
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Figure 5.4 Inter-firm collaborations - Nokia
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As shown in Figure 5.4 the majority of Nokia’s international alliances involve large
IT companies and operators in different countries, like Motorola, IBM, Lucent
Technologies, AT&T, 3Com, Intel NTT, Deutsche Telekom, British Telecom
(Quadrant Consortium), France Telecom (Orange), Dutch KPN, Ericsson, Telenor,
Telia, TeleDanmark, Sonera (Telecom Finland), Twitter, You Tube, Facebook,
Google, and Microsoft (Nokia, 2011). These companies are categorized into three
groups for further analysis.

Nokia collaborates with CSPs to provide value added services (e.g. location based
services, maps, mobile advertising and gaming) to end users. For example, Nokia
collaborates with Orange (France Telecom) and T-Mobile on faster and better
customer services. China Mobile, Orange, T-Mobile and AT&T are the number one
operators in their respective national markets. From these cases, Nokia has the vision
to enter the global market through inter-firm collaboration with the leading operators
in different countries. Furthermore, Nokia selected the biggest operator in each
country to increase its market share in each market. The forms of this collaboration
include co-production, management services, and marketing. By combining CSPs’
markets, customers, services and Nokia's strength in device development and
integration, they can extend the way in which their customers use and consume their
mobile handsets.
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Nokia also collaborates with other DPs to provide higher quality and lower cost
devices. This kind of collaboration involves co-production, buy-back agreements,
joint venture, and joint research. A good example of an equity agreement in
manufacturing is Symbian, a joint venture involving Psion, Nokia, Motorola and
Ericsson, established in 1998 (Telecom Worldwire1, 2008). Nokia also established
an equity joint venture (Nokia Siemens Networks) with Siemens (Nokia, 2011). This
kind of agreement covers future network research, new device development,
assembly of current devices, new technology development and other types of coresearch and development. As most DPs are competitors in the global market, these
kinds of collaboration are usually through joint venture or merger to avoid any
potential risk of sensitive information release or skilled labour movement.

Nokia collaborates with other CPs and TPs to provide special services for its
customers, such as Google's search engine and YouTube video. Nokia opened the
OVI store after Apple’s successes with its Apple store (Nokia, 2011), which
provided CPs with another platform for direct sales to customers. On the other hand,
Nokia signed an exclusive agreement with EA games in 2011, which required this
top game developing firm to provide booked mobile games for Nokia’s new products
(Spforum, 2011). This collaboration involves service providers, co-products, and
information share. In 2011, Nokia completely transferred its Symbian software
development and support activities to Accenture (Nokia, 2011) and focused on its
R&D based on Windows phone 7 (an operating system developed by Microsoft). The
results from the Nokia case will be compared with another case – Motorola in the
next section to find common collaboration strategies for device providers.

5.3.3

Business collaborating case – Motorola

1. Background
Established in 1928, Motorola Inc is an American multinational communications
company. Motorola was the second largest mobile phone provider in 2006. It
provides not only mobile devices and wireless communications systems, but services
on mobile devices, such as voice service, text message, image messaging,
multimedia, and other entertainment. Motorola also provides home solutions, such as
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Internet video and voice products (Motorola, 2007). Motorola had sales of US$42.9
billion in 2006. However, its market share has decreased since 2007. It had net losses
from 2007 to 2010 (Motorola, 2010). Its global mobile handset market share
decreased from 21.5% in 2006 to 2.4% in 2011 (Gartner, 2011). These significant
decreases were driven by fierce global competition (from Apple and Samsung) and
the business development and collaboration strategies adopted by Motorola itself.
Motorola Mobility faced great competition from Nokia, Samsung, LG, SonyEricsson, Apple, RIM, and HTC in the mobile phone market. As a consequence, it
drew back from the global market to focus on a limited number of phones for
specific customers or applications in North America (Motorola, 2010). This limited
its development and potential inter-firm collaboration in the global market. Another
reason for this decrease is the significant reduction in its R&D investment.

2. Current status and R&D
The R&D funds of Motorola continuously decreased from $2.4 billion in 2008 to
$1.5 billion (13% of its revenue) in 2010. Investment in R&D is vital for high
technology firms such as mobile telecommunication firms. Therefore, it influences
the competitiveness and market power of firms. On the other hand, high cost R&D is
also associated with high risks. If the R&D strategy fails to meet its expectation, it
also has a negative influence on the development of the firm.

3. Inter-firm collaborations with other firms
Based in the U.S.A., Motorola was the top mobile device provider in the American
market. Working closely with the GSM Association (GSMA), Motorola also
obtained access to many developing markets such as that of India, the Philippines,
Indonesia, China, and Africa. On the other hand, its products are manufactured
primarily in China, Taiwan and Brazil (Motorola, 2010). However, weak intellectual
property rights protection in China and reliability on these developing bases are
regarded as high risk for the future development of Motorola Mobility (Motorola,
2010). The changed market focus strategy of Motorola after the net loss years also
influenced its collaboration strategies. Figure 5.5 shows Motorola’s inter-firm
collaborations with other firms in different sectors.

Figure 5.5 Inter-firm collaborations - Motorola
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Figure 5.5 Inter-firm collaborations - Motorola
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Motorola collaborated with many DPs on information sharing, co-research and
development. One good example is with Huawei Technologies (China) to develop
the UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) and HSDPA (high speed
downlink packet access)/ HSUPA (high speed uplink packet access) infrastructure
equipment. Motorola also collaborates with some original design manufacturer
(ODMs) partners to lower costs on new product design and research (Motorola,
2010). However, these collaborations did not bring positive revenue as expected and
caused losses on investment in 2009 (Motorola, 2010).

Motorola collaborates with many CPs and TPs to provide better and more services,
especially on video technologies, for its customers. For example, Avail Media
collaborated with Motorola to deliver MWAVE (MPEG-4 Wide Area Video
Entertainment). Motorola also offers 'pre-packaged' video hub offices for service
providers (Telecom Worldwire2, 2008). Google and Motorola Mobility announced in
August, 2011 that Google Inc. acquired Motorola Mobility Holdings, Inc. for a total
of US$12.5 billion. This agreement is highlighted by both companies as an important
collaboration for them, which is expected to close in early 2012 (Google, 2011).
However, this acquisition did not bring positive profits as expected.

Motorola has collaborated with many Operators or CSPs on value added services
(e.g. China Unicom and China Mobile). The incentive for this collaboration was
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entering a new market and providing better customer services. As part of the
contract, Motorola will provide servers, network equipment and customized software
(Worldwide Telecom, 2008).

Motorola had similar collaborating strategies with Nokia as a device provider, which
will be further summarized and discussed in the next section. However, the new
strategy focus only on the domestic US market has limited its development and
collaboration opportunities in the global market. This is the major cause of its
continuous decrease in market share. Fierce competition from the global market (e.g.
Apple and Samsung), reduction in R&D investment, and losses on its investment and
collaboration activities have also contributed.

5.3.4

Collaboration strategies for DPs

Both Nokia and Motorola are facing intense global competition (e.g. from Apple and
Samsung). Therefore, they have a strong need to collaborate with other firms to
develop access to new technologies, access other markets, and increase market share.
In other words, fierce competition has increased global collaborations between firms
(e.g. Motorola with Google and Nokia with Microsoft).

DPs are very keen to collaborate with almost all the CSPs in the global market as
they provide very complimentary products (mobile handsets from DPs) and services
(direct customer contact and services from CSPs). CSPs need to attract new
customers through new products from DPs. DPs have to collaborate with CSPs to
access end-users in each market. On the other hand, new services provided through
CSPs and various new products from DPs (e.g. iPhone 4) help attract new customers,
as well as increase the satisfaction levels of current customers of both collaborating
parties. Therefore, this kind of collaboration exists in every mobile service scenario
as discussed in relation to Figure 5.1.

Most of the major DPs have indicated that CPs or mobile developers are key to their
development and future success (Apple, 2011; Nokia, 2011). Therefore, for DPs,
collaboration with CPs and developers are the most important collaborating strategy.
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To attract high quality mobile content developers in the global market, they usually
provide free development tools and environment, free training, and worldwide
awards for best developers. They have different strategies to attract mobile
developers to provide mobile games and applications for their own products. For
example, the Apple store gave more profits for developers and simplified the benefit
distribution model for the CPs (from the previous Operator-SP-CP model) and Nokia
has signed an exclusive agreement with EA games to serve high quality and unique
mobile content to its customers (Apple, 2010; Nokia, 2011). These strategies have
increased both the quality and the quantity of mobile contents for their products and,
as a consequence, increased and maintained their customers.

However, DPs are very cautious in collaborating with other DPs as they have similar
resources and produce similar products. When market or product information is
released to a potential competitor, it will give them more chance to win the
competition in the market by developing superior products. Therefore, some firms
have a strict non disclosure agreement (NDA) with all its partners (e.g. Motorola) to
avoid such problems. The most common collaboration between DPs is joint ventures.
For example, Sony-Ericsson is a joint venture company invested in by Sony and
Ericsson. Nokia Siemens Networks was invested in by Nokia and Siemens. These
independent organizations can operate without increasing the above problems.

5.4

Operators and service providers (SP)

Operators or carrier service providers (CSPs) are those who own basic
telecommunication devices or networks, such as base stations, wire lines or channels.
This market is relatively stable as most operators and CSPs have a strong market
power23 and are protected by governments. Telecommunication operators create
value by linking customers to their networks and services (Allee and Taug, 2006). In
the telecommunications sector, a particular operator usually has a strong presence
and market power, and influences the downstream part of that market. Operators
themselves also provide basic services, such as voice communication and short
message services (Communications Alliance, 2007). In this sense, they are also
23

Entry fees are very high and duplicate basic infrastructure which would represent a waste of
resources. Therefore, it is limited in most countries by licenses and regulation policies.

120

called service providers (SPs). Therefore, CSPs are combined with SPs in this market
structure.

Service providers include the Telephone Service Provider (TSP), Internet Service
Provider (ISP), and Telephone and Internet Service Provider (TISP) (TIO, 2007). In
some countries there are other categorises, such as Application Service Provider
(ASP), Managed Service Provider (MSP), and Managed Internet Service Provider
(MISP). The number of SPs has grown substantially in recent years (ACMA, 2007;
MII, 2007). They usually rent the broadband from operators and provide value-added
services to other companies and individuals (Communications Alliance, 2007).

SPs have a natural need to cooperate with CSPs to provide services for end users.
They also need to cooperate with content providers (CPs) as they have comparative
advantage in producing higher quality content. Some special information (such as
sports news or weather forecasts) is provided by special CPs. SPs sometimes need to
cooperate with DPs to get special information or support from their devices to
develop new services for their customers.

SPs need to adjust their services due to different mobile phone users and provide
various and imperative content to end users. CSPs also have incentives to collaborate
with each other to get more market power, share market information, reduce
operational costs, and reach overseas markets. Therefore, SPs and CSPs have a great
need to collaborate with all the other firms in the market to provide services to their
customers.

5.4.1

Major global operators and service providers

The major global operators (based upon number of subscribers) are China Mobile
(China), Vodafone Group Plc (UK), Telefónica, América Móvil, Airtel, and Orange
(France Telecom). Most industry reports adopt subscriber (user) numbers as ranking
criteria for mobile operators as revenues are difficult to measure (with different
currencies, changing exchange rate and different time of released annual report by
different operators).
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Figure 5.6 Worldwide top mobile operators (by subscribers) in 2011
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Figure 5.6 shows the number of subscribers of major global mobile operators
(service providers) in 2010 and 2011. With the largest population in the world, China
is one of the biggest telecommunication markets. China Mobile was the largest
operator in terms of subscribers, with 627.63 million in August 2011 (China Mobile,
2011). In second place is Vodafone Group Plc. It had 370.9 million subscribers in
2011. In terms of mobile network subscribers, China Mobile and China Unicom
ranked one and two of all the mobile network operators (Mobithinking, 2011).

As some local mobile operators (e.g. Telstra and China Mobile) have a strong market
power (due to first entry and high fixed costs for building all the base stations) in its
domestic market, they usually dominate their own market (Vodafone, 2011).
Therefore, the number of subscribers is influenced by the population of different
countries. For example, although they have high numbers of users both China Mobile
and China Unicom only operate in the Chinese market, which is already enough to
make them the top mobile operators in the world but restricts their global market
influence. As China Mobile and China Unicom are studied in Chapter 6, Vodafone
and Orange (France Telecom) will be discussed as representatives of global mobile
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operators. They are not only in the top six mobile operators in the global market but
also operate in different countries and regions, which gives them great influence in
the global market.

5.4.2

Business collaborating case - Vodafone (UK)

1. Background
Located in Europe, the Vodafone Group is one of the world’s biggest mobile
telecommunications companies. Vodafone provides voice and data mobile
telecommunications services and other services to its customers.

Vodafone has mobile subsidiaries and joint ventures in Germany, Spain, UK,
Albania, Australia, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Malta Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Fiji, Italy, and South Africa. Its partner markets include:
Austria, Bahrain, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hong Kong, Iceland,
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Singapore, Slovenia, and Sweden (Vodafone, 2006). On this
measure it is the second largest mobile telecom group in the world behind China
Mobile (Vodafone, 2007).
As shown in Figure 5.7 below Vodafone’s major markets are based in the Asia
Pacific region, with 36 per cent of its customers coming from the Indian market.
Therefore, Vodafone has a very open and global strategy in terms of inter-firm
collaboration, which will be discussed further below.
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Figure 5.7 Customers by markets – Vodafone 2011 (percentage)
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2. Current status and R&D
The revenue of Vodafone was £45.9 billion (about US$75 billion) for the financial
year 2011 (Vodafone, 2011) with 370.9 million customers (most of the 14.5%
increase in customers from 2010 was contributed to by increasing numbers from
India). As shown in Figure 5.7 below, its customers were separated into different
countries and regions. Vodafone is very active in global markets with investments in
different countries (e.g. Verizon Wireless in U.S., China Mobile in China, SoftBank
in Japan, and SFR in France) (Vodafone, 2011).

As discussed in the previous section, DPs focus on R&D related to new products and
new technology using mobile devices. CSPs, on the other hand, focus on new
technology to improve the speed and quality of basic network infrastructure and
standards (such as 4G, which was mentioned 16 times in Vodafone’s 2011 annual
report). Vodafone spent £287 million (about 1% of its revenue) on R&D in 2010-11.
CSPs invested less in R&D compared with DPs because R&D will not generate
direct profit for them. They focus more on customer service and satisfaction.

3. Inter-firm collaboration with other firms
Located in Europe, Vodafone targets and operates in global markets. It operates in
Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia-Pacific and the United States through
subsidiary undertakings, joint ventures, and investments. As shown in Figure 5.8,
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Vodafone collaborates with other CSPs, SPs, CPs, and DPs to keep its leading global
position. These collaborations are categorized into three groups and discussed in
more detail below.
Figure
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Vodafone has many joint-research laboratories with other CPs and TPs (e.g.
Softbank Corporation) in different countries. It is usually aimed at developing new
mobile technology, applications, and services. Investments in these laboratories are
usually for long-run business strategies (Sinocase, 2008). CSPs usually have
negotiating power when collaborating with CPs and TPs as they usually have strong
market power in each country.

On the other hand, Vodafone collaborates with DPs to provide specialized packages
of products and services (e.g. combined service for phone call, internet download
quota, and short message) for its customers. For example, the post-paid package of
iPhone, calling services, and broadband download services package in the Australian
market (Vodafone, 2011). As most DPs involved in collaboration are top firms in the
global market, CSPs and DPs are usually in a peer collaboration position.

Vodafone collaborates with other operators or CSPs to access new markets or
increase its market share. For example, to create a stronger and more competitive
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company, Vodafone and Hutchison (3) merged in 2009 in Australia. This merger
made Vodafone the third largest mobile operator in the Australian market, which will
be further discussed in a later chapter. However, collaboration between operators in
the same competitive market usually carries with it higher risks. Therefore, the type
of collaboration between big operators usually focuses on mergers (e.g. Vodafone
and Hutchison) or share holdings (e.g. Vodafone in China mobile). Vodafone also
collaborates with some small local service providers (SPs) as these SPs know better
local customers’ requirements and can provide better services to its customers.
Vodafone has to pay rental fees to Telstra as it provides services to its customers via
Telstra’s basic network facilities. Telstra has a much higher service price in Australia
than for all the other CSPs (Vodafone, 2011), which supports its market power in the
Australian market.

The developing strategy of Vodafone is focused on the global market and global
collaborations, which also increase its global competitiveness. To access different
markets in different countries it usually collaborates with local firms to reduce
transaction costs and access complementary resources. As one of the largest
operators or CSPs, Vodafone is inclined to cooperate with large global firms (e.g.
Apple, China Mobile and Verizon) to keep its leading position. Another global
mobile operator that has a presence in many countries and interests in international
inter-firm collaboration is France Telecom (Orange is the mobile service brand of
France Telecom in many countries). The results from both Vodafone and Orange will
be summarized and discussed in section 5.5.4.

5.4.3

Business collaborating case - France Telecom (Orange)
1. Background

The France Telecom group offers fixed-line and mobile services as well as value
adding

services

in

Europe

and

other

countries.

Orange

is

a

mobile

telecommunication brand of France Telecom. Started in 1994, Orange initially
served only business customers, and in 2011 it served 217 million customers (France
Telecom, 2011). It provided access to an IP VPN network in 220 countries,
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converged voice, data and mobile services as well as IT expertise and managed
services (Orange, 2007).

2. Current status
By the end of June 2011, France Telecom Orange Group had approximately 217
million customers (of which 158 million are mobile customers) around the world
(France Telecom, 2011). The 7 per cent increase in customers compared with 2010
was led by a 25 per cent growth in mobile customers in Africa and the Middle East
(France Telecom, 2011). It had €45.5 billion in sales at the end of 2010 and €22.57
billion at the end of June, 2011 (France Telecom, 2011). Figure 5.9 shows the mobile
customer distribution of Orange in 2011. Its biggest market was in Africa and the
Middle East, which had changed dramatically from 2006 when 83 per cent of its
customers came from Europe (Orange, 2007).
Figure 5.9 Customer by regions – Orange 2011
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3. Inter-firm collaborations with other firms
In order to offer third-generation services, France Telecom participated in several
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) licensing award procedures
in Europe. France Telecom has focused on third generation technologies (Orange,
2007). The collaborations involving Orange can be categorized into three groups for
analysis as shown in Figure 5.10 below.
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Figure 5.10 Inter-firm collaborations - Orange
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Orange has many inter-firm collaborations with different DPs. For example,
collaboration on location based services, maps, mobile advertising with Nokia (PR
Newswire1, 2008), collaboration on new products with HP, collaboration on cloud
computing with EMC, VMware, SITA, and Cisco (Orange, 2010; France Telecom,
2011), and collaboration on m2o city, a smart metering operator, with Veolia Water.
These collaborations include co-production, joint research, information sharing, and
management services. In accord with the Vodafone case, Orange usually collaborates
with DPs to share their markets and services/products. Therefore, they are in a peer
collaborating position.

To provide better and more services for its customers, Orange also collaborates with
CPs and TPs, for example news services with NewACT and Wikimedia (PR
Newswire4, 2008) and Orange Cinema Series TV package with CANAL+ in July
2011 (France Telecom, 2011). The collaboration between Orange and these firms
included information sharing, co-research, technical training, and patent licensing.
As discussed in the previous section, CSPs usually have negotiating power when
they collaborate with CPs.

Orange also collaborated with other SPs to provide special or booked services for its
customers. For example, it collaborated with Partner Communications on 'Orange
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forever', which allows subscribers to synchronize their contacts, pictures, videos,
calendars, and messages (as of December 31, 2007) and formed joint venture firms
with Deutsche Telekom (France Telecom, 2011). Same as for DPs, CSPs are very
cautious when they collaborate with another CSP (a potential competitor). They
usually collaborate with another CSP in a different country on international services
to lower the cost or overcome political barriers (as discussed in Chapter 3 as a motive
for inter-firm collaboration).

With less global market power, France Telecom has focused more on its local or near
markets. With a geographic and cultural background in France, most of its
collaborators are in the EU. From the Vodafone and Orange cases (Orange is also
selected as a case study in Chapter six), CSPs have a strong incentive to collaborate
with most DPs and some high technology TPs to access new products and
technologies to keep their leading position. However, they usually collaborate with
other CSPs only by share holdings or mergers to access a new market or increase
their global market share or influence.

5.4.4

Collaboration strategies for CSPs and SPs

From the annual reports of Orange and Vodafone, the markets for global mobile
operators have changed from developed countries to fast growth developing
countries (e.g. India and Africa). This is also supported by an ITU statistics report,
which indicated that global mobile subscribers in the developing countries increased
from 1.2 billion in 2005 to 4 billion in 2010, and global mobile subscribers in
developed countries only increased from 0.99 billion to 1.4 billion for the same
period (ITU, 2011). Another notable figure is the percentage of mobile subscribers
for all inhabitants which was 114.2 per cent (101 per cent in Australia) in developed
countries but only 70.1 per cent (only 64 per cent in China) in developing countries
(ITU, 2011), which makes the mobile telecommunication markets in developing
countries a potentially much faster growth market. That could be one of the reasons
why most of the top global mobile operators have moved their core markets to the
emerging and developing economies.
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As most mobile telecommunication markets are protected by national governments
(through entry requirements, regulations, licences or high tax rates), it is difficult to
compete with a local telecommunication firm that owns the basic network
infrastructure (e.g. Telstra in Australia and China Mobile in China). CSPs have to
collaborate with other firms to access new markets or reduce their communication
costs (e.g. for international short messages or calls).

As discussed above, CSPs are also inclined to collaborate with CPs and TPs on new
mobile network technology and products. The aim of such collaborations with CPs is
to keep their leading position with a new generation of technology change, and
increase their customer satisfaction levels by providing various new products and
services.

On the other hand, services and products provided by different service providers also
help CSPs attract new customers and maintain current customers. SPs have to
collaborate with CSPs to access the end-users and share the revenues from end-users.
Therefore, CSPs and SPs have a natural collaborating relationship in the market.
However, CSPs usually collaborate with other CSPs only on international services
(such as international calls) or as joint venture firms.

5.5

Content Providers and Technical Providers (CP/TP)

Content providers (CPs) are firms that develop new content for mobile phones or
own special content, such as sports news, TV programs, music resources, mobile
games, etc. Technical providers (TP) are firms who provide technology for hardware
or software solutions for mobile phones, such as MontaVista (provides a mobile
operating system), new video accelerating chip providers, or new mobile engine
providers. TPs provide core technologies or patent products (e.g. the engine,
operating system, or chips) to other companies. They are the most important
components in this market to add value and drive the high growth rate requirement
for new services and content.

Content providers that offer famous or popular content (e.g. TV programs or weather
forecasts) can easily cooperate with CSPs, SPs, or DPs. Mobile service
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advertisements were rare several years ago, but can be found almost everywhere in
TV programs, radio programs and even newspapers now. The other content on
mobile phones, such as sports news, electronic tickets, mobile movie download,
mobile e-mail, mobile games, etc., have grown dramatically in the global market
(Communications Alliance, 2007).

5.5.1

Major global content providers and technical providers

There are many content providers and technical providers in the world. However,
most of them are small and medium sized firms or big firms in other industries (such
as Time Warner or the BBC). They usually have unique resources (e.g. news or
weather forecasts) or irreplaceable new technology advantages. These scarce
resources make them very important in the telecommunication market. This market
is very dynamic with new entry firms and free exit. As there is no leading firm in this
market, Gameloft (the famous mobile games provider) and MontaVista Software,
Inc. (one of the famous TPs in the global mobile device market) will be discussed as
examples of this sector.

5.5.2

Business collaborating case - Gameloft

1. Background
Founded in 1999, Gameloft is an international mobile games developer.
Headquartered in France, Gameloft also operates in New York, San Francisco,
Kansas City, Seattle, Montreal, Mexico, Buenos Aires, Paris, London, Düsseldorf,
Copenhagen, Milan, Madrid, New Delhi, Seoul, Hong Kong, Beijing, Tokyo and
Sydney. The company creates games for mobile handsets with different technologies
(Gameloft, 2010).

2. Current status and R&D
Figure 5.11 displays the growth of revenue, net profit and R&D cost of Gameloft
from 2010 to 2011. Compared with DPs and CSPs, CPs invest heavily into R&D,
which is vital for their competitiveness in the market. For example, the R&D
investment of Gameloft was above 30% of its revenue in 2010 and 2011.

131

Millions €

Figure 5.10 Revenue, R&D expenditure and net profit of Gameloft in 2010-2011
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Gameloft had €76.8 million (about US$112.4 million) revenues in 2011, which had
increased by 15.3 per cent compared with 2010. Its net profit remained stable from
2010 to 2011. R&D expenditure occupied a large proportion of its revenue, which
was €37 million (nearly half of its total revenue) in 2011 (Gameloft, 2011). For a
content provider such as Gameloft, R&D is vital for its competitiveness and
development. Its intangible assets far outweigh its tangible assets (Gameloft, 2011).
Therefore, the proportion of its R&D expenditure to its total revenue is far more than
that of operators and service providers. This also influenced its collaboration
strategies, which are also focused on R&D and high technology adoption.

3. Inter-firm collaborations with other firms
As a game development company, Gameloft focuses on its new products (games)
and research and development. Therefore, it had established R&D centres in many
countries to develop new products, conduct research on leading technology, and
access local markets. More importantly, it also increased the extension of its
collaboration with other firms in that country.
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Figure 5.11 Inter-firm collaborations – Gameloft
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Gameloft collaborates with other CPs and TPs on new product development, sharing
information, and engaging in joint research and development. For example, it
collaborates with DreamWorks on animation and movies (Wireless News, 2007) and
Amp’d Mobile on 3G technologies (Business Wire, 2005).

Gameloft is very active in collaborating with DPs on pre-installed mobile games and
special booked applications. For example, its collaboration with Nokia (PR
Newswire, 2006), Apple, Samsung, Sony, and Ericsson (Gameloft, 2011) on its new
games for different devices. These relationships will ensure timely support for new
handsets and the distribution of games. This type of collaboration usually involves
sharing markets or information.
Mobile games are available for download in every CSP’s website or online shop, and
the collaboration between CPs and CSPs are usually via packages. CSPs will
distribute revenues to SPs and CPs afterward. However, this business model has been
changed by the Apple Application Store (Apple, 2010), which increased the revenue
share for CPs. The Apple Store provides a direct sale and buy channel for consumers
and content providers, which reduces the role of service providers and operators but
increases the revenue share of content providers and Apple. Therefore, it was
initially difficult to be introduced into the market (e.g. in Europe and China). Apple
had a long-run discussion with China Mobile and China Unicom before it entered the
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Chinese market (Apple, 2010) because of the new benefit from this distribution
model.

As one of the biggest mobile game providers, Gameloft seeks collaborating
opportunities with other DPs, CPs, and operators. It also collaborates with other CPs
on sharing content, net technologies, and information. Another case of CPs is Monta
Vista, one of the mobile operating system providers.

5.5.3

Business collaborating case - MontaVista

1. Background and current development
MontaVista Software, Inc. invented embedded Linux commercialization in 1999. It
is a typical TP that provides a core embedded mobile system, developing
environment and tools for developers. Because of the free price advantage,
embedded Linux has become the most frequently selected platform for mobile
devices (Montavista, 2008). However, as an open source (freely used) platform
provider, it is relatively small and can only provide limited support for its customers.
There is no annual report or financial status for an open sourced company (such as
MontaVista) because most of its revenues are obtained by donation and there is no
formal paid employee in that company. After the release of new products by Nokia,
Apple, Motorola, the market share of the Linux system on mobile devices declined
dramatically from 2009 to 2011.

2. Inter-firm collaborations with other firms
MontaVista collaborates with P.A semi (a U.S. semiconductor company which was
invented by Apple in 2008) to provide energy saving equipment (Montavista, 2008).
This type of collaboration is in terms of co-production and joint research. The
incentive for this collaboration is to increase performance and competitiveness,
reduce research costs and achieve greater market share. It also provides support for
other companies. As an open source platform, MontaVista is widely used in many
mobile devices. Many users have benefited from it.
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5.5.4

Collaborating strategies for CPs and TPs

Gameloft and MontaVista cannot represent the majority of TPs or CPs as the
products and services vary greatly among different TPs or CPs. However, most TPs
and CPs are relatively small firms compared with CSPs and DPs. Based on high
technologies or special resources, CPs and TPs play a very important role in the
mobile telecommunication market. They usually collaborate with other CPs or TPs
on new technologies. They also collaborate with DPs and CSPs on special content or
information.

TPs are the most important partner for the operators as well as the DPs. With the
growth of globalisation, most operators and DPs are facing pressure from global
competition. To avoid being driven out of the market, they need to keep up with the
growth of the new technologies. However, investment in R&D is huge and usually
associated with high risk (the new generation of the technical cycle is hard to
predict). The best way to keep a leading position is to cooperate with some technical
providers that have comparative advantages in this field.

Content providers need to develop suitable content for each mobile device system
and time to make sure they can run them properly and get real time customer’s
requirement from service providers. Therefore, CPs and TPs have a great need to
collaborate with all the other firms in this market to generate better content for end
users.

In conclusion, in a mature telecommunications market, different sectors have
different responsibilities. Each mobile usage or service includes many inter-firm
collaborations that are unseen but experienced by the end-users. New technologies
and innovations are vital for this market. The incentives that are more likely to
encourage collaboration in the telecommunications market are technology changes
(more dynamic market), increased global competitiveness, exploration of new
markets, reducing costs, increasing R&D, and achieving more global market power.
Location is still important for most firms (Barro, 1976). Most firms prefer to
collaborate with partners from other sectors as they usually have different resources
and customer bases, so that they complement each other.
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5.6

Conclusions

The telecommunications mobile industry has experienced rapid growth in recent
years. It is characterised by strong market power, government influenced and a
technology driven industry. It has natural requirements for inter-firm collaboration as
each usage or service involves many inter-firm collaboration opportunities. It has
contributed directly and indirectly to both macroeconomic and microeconomic
growth. Telecommunications development has had a profound influence on
standards of living and economic welfare.

To study inter-firm collaboration between different firms, firms in the mobile sector
have been separated into three categories in this thesis: DP, CSP/SP, and CP/TP. To
survive global competition and increase market power, firms in each sector have to
collaborate with other firms. Firms tend to collaborate with partners from other
sectors who have different resources, markets and complementary skills and
capabilities, but are very cautious in collaborating with partners in the same sector,
who are potential competitors. The collaborating cases from the major companies in
the global telecommunication markets shows that collaborating strategies have been
vital for the development and growth of these leading companies. Successful
collaboration contributed directly and indirectly to these firms as well as the
development of the industry as a whole.

To address a gap in the literature, this study focuses on the Australian and Chinese
markets. Chapter 6 and 7 will analyse the histories, characteristics, development
processes, structures, major players, and inter-firm collaborations in and between the
Chinese and Australian mobile telecommunication markets. Qualitative study results
for both Australia and China are discussed, which will answer the first primary
research question in Chapter 4. The results from surveys of Australian and Chinese
firms are also compared and discussed at the end of Chapter 7.
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6 A CASE STUDY ON COLLABORATION IN THE CHINESE MOBILE
TELECOMMUNICATION MARKET
6.1

Introduction

Collaboration is influenced by many factors, some of which are country specific such
as

the

regulatory

system

and

industry

structure.

The

Chinese

mobile

telecommunication market is one of the most rapidly developing and dynamic
markets in the world, and is also the world’s largest telecom mobile market in terms
of subscribers. The potential growth in the near future is still large (ITU, 2011).

This chapter provides an overview of the Chinese mobile telecommunication
market’s history and development, industry structure, contributions to economic
growth, and government regulatory system. To study inter-firm collaboration types,
benefits, and barriers, a set of face-to-face interviews was adopted. The aim of this
case study is to answer the first primary research question proposed in chapter four.

The background and structure for the case study are discussed in section 6.2 to 6.3.
The results and implications from the case study are discussed in section 6.4.
6.2

History and development of the Chinese telecommunications market

The history and development of the Chinese telecommunications market is
associated with the development and reform of the Chinese economy. When the
People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, China had only 260,000
telephones with 310,000 lines of switchboard capacity in all of its cities (Qiu, 2005).
There was no mobile service in China until the 1990s. The industry has undertaken a
growth path from monopoly to competition and from government control to separate
autonomous enterprises (GOVCN, 2009).
6.2.1

Fiscal expansion in the Chinese telecommunication market

Figure 6.1 shows the telephone density change from 1949 to 2011 in the Chinese
telecommunication market. Telephone density (telephones per 100 persons) in the
Chinese telecommunication market was only 0.05 in 1949 and grew to 4.66 in 1995.
It then grew to 8.11 in 1998 and increased dramatically to 25.9 in 2001 (MII, 2011).
These fast growth periods are significantly influenced by policy and technology
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changes in the Chinese and global telecommunication markets. Each of the key
periods will be further discussed in the following section.
Figure 6.1 Major events and telephone density per 100 inhabitants in China
from 1949 to 2011

Source: Ministry of Information Industry (2011)

Figure 6.2 shows the growth of mobile subscribers in the Chinese telecommunication
market from only 20,000 in 1987 (the beginning of the mobile communication
service in China) to 0.89 billion in March, 2011 (which makes it the biggest mobile
market in the world). The significant increase of the Chinese mobile sector arose
from establishment of the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) in 1998, and from a
series of reforms that took place in the Chinese telecommunication market after that.
The surprising increase in the growth rate generated many new business and market
opportunities.

Another important result from Figures 6.1 and 6.2 is the replacement of fixed line
phones by mobile phones after 2001. From 2001 to 2007 the total revenue of the
Chinese telecom industry increased from 371.9 billion Yuan (approximately
US$46.5 billion) to 728 billion Yuan (approximately US$91 billion), with an overall
11 percent annual growth rate. The total number of subscribers also tripled
(GOVCN, 2009). However, there was a significant decrease in telephone density
(fixed line) from 2001 in the Chinese telecommunication market as shown in Figure
6.1. During the same period mobile subscribers increased dramatically in China as
shown in Figure 6.2. Therefore, there has been a substitution effect between mobile
phones and fixed line phones (MII, 2011) during this period. All of these changes are
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due to a set of policy and technology changes, which are discussed in the following
section.

Millions

Figure 6.2 Chinese mobile subscribers from 1987 to 2011
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6.2.2

Institutional and regulatory changes

1. 1949 – 1979: Monopoly market
In 1949 the central government set up the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
(MPT). The MPT was responsible for setting up networks, making policies,
developing technical standards, conducting research, providing services, and
manufacturing equipment (MII, 2011). All enterprises were affiliates under the
administration of MPT. The MPT also protected domestic telecom firms from
foreign competitors. During China’s First Five-Year Plan (1953 to 57), all private
telecom businesses became state-owned companies. From the 1950s to 1970s the
telecom sector grew slowly in China. One major reason was the low priority given to
the telecom industry by government (Qiu, 2005). Telecom services were used mainly
by the state administrative agencies and investment in the telecom sector grew very
slowly during this period.
2. 1979 – 1985: Open door policy
In 1979, China began its economic reforms and adopted an open door policy. The
prices and fees of most telecom services were very low before the reform to support
other industries. In 1979, MPT increased the rates for its many services. The salaries
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of the managers and employees in local post and telecom enterprises (PTEs) were
also linked to the firm’s sales revenue. These reforms raised local PTEs’
performance and revenues dramatically (Qiu, 2005). The MPT launched a new
accounting system in 1985 to provide incentives to local PTEs. All local PTAs were
put under the dual leadership of local governments and the MPT (Qiu, 2005).
3. 1987 – 1992: Separate functions and diversified services
In 1987, an analog mobile phone service was first introduced in Guangzhou and
Shanghai, which is regarded as the beginning of mobile telecommunications in China
(MII,

1999).

In

1988

MPT

established

the

Directorate

General

of

Telecommunications (DGT) and the Directorate General of Posts (DGP) (Qiu, 2005).
In

1992

MPT

allowed

domestic

companies

to

enter

the

value-added

telecommunications services (usually non-voice services and products provided by
SPs and CPs) market, which is regarded as the beginning of the new reform in the
Chinese telecommunications industry (Zhang and Dodgson, 2007).
4. 1994 – 1995: Introduction of competition
China Unicom was established in 1994 to provide competition into the Chinese
telecom market (GOVCN, 2009). The Chinese government found that competition
was

an

effective

method

to

achieve

sustainable

development

in

the

telecommunications industry. In 1995 DGT was registered as a corporate group
called China Telecom.
5. 1998 – 2001: Oligopoly and fast growth period
The Ministry of Information Industry of the People’s Republic of China (MII) was
established to replace MPT in 1998. MII is a ministry of the central government. It
manages all industries, industry policies, investments, network infrastructure,
wireless channels, and international cooperation. MII also supervises and guides
development of the telecommunication industry. In 1998, MII separated the role of
government and enterprises by reforming China Telecom into four groups. As a
result, six oligopoly telecom operators were formed: China Telecom, China Mobile,
China Unicom, China Netcom, China Railcom (China Railway Communications
Corp) and China Satcom (China Satellite Communications Corporation) (GOVCN,
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2009). In 1998, mobile subscribers reached 20 million, which made the national
Global System of Mobile Communications (GSM) network the biggest in the world
(MII, 1999).

By October 2001, the number of fixed line subscribers reached 173 million, and the
number of mobile phone users reached 136 million. Before China joined the WTO,
foreign firms were not allowed to operate in China's telecommunication services
market (Chen, 2000). In November 2001, China was formally admitted into the
WTO. Some of the major changes arising from its membership included lower tariffs
for imported IT products, elimination of non-tariff barriers, and the opening-up of the
service sector (Mobile phone services) (Nie and Zeng, 2003).
6. 2001 – 2007: Mobiles replace fixed line phones
As discussed before there was fast growth in the mobile phone market in China
during 2001 to 2007, and the development of mobile phones had a substitution effect
on fixed line density during the same period. In 2007, the domestic sales of cell
phones in China reached 190 million and sales volume reached US$23 billion.

In the regulatory system the China Communications Standards Association (CCSA)
was officially established in 2002. CCSA established an enterprise-based and
market-oriented working system that incorporated industry, universities and R&D
institutes. It also contributed to the development of the ICT industry and mobile
market in China (CCSA, 2007).
7. 2008 – 2009: Combine and reform
As a pre-requirement of releasing the 3rd generation (3G) license from the
government, the Chinese telecommunication market undertook further reform in
2008. China Telecom purchased the CDMA assets and subscribers of China Unicom.
China Unicom and China Netcom merged to become the new China Unicom. China
Telecom combined the basic telecom services of China Satcom, and China Railcom
merged into China Mobile (GOVCN, 2009). After successful combination of these
CSPs the Chinese government released three 3G licenses to the reformed operators
on 7th January, 2009. There are three 3G standards in the global telecom market: TD141

SCDMA, CDMA2000, and W-CDMA. China will support all of the three 3G
standards. A TD-SCDMA license was released to China Mobile. A W-CDMA
license was released to China Unicom, and a CDMA2000 license was released to
China Telecom (MII, 2011).
8. 2009 – 2011: Introduction of 3G and fast development of mobile services
The release of 3G licenses further pushed telecommunications and economic growth
in China. The fixed telephone density in the Chinese telecommunication market was
23.6 in 2009 but decreased to 22.1 in March 2011. However, mobile telephone
density increased from 56.3 in 2009 to 64.4 in 2011 (MII, 2011). Given the huge user
base, Chinese telephone subscribers reached 1.18 billion and mobile subscribers
reached 0.89 billion in March 2011 (MII, 2011). The rapidly developing network
infrastructure and services also benefited businesses and individuals. In 2011,
Beijing opened free wireless network access in six public regions to encourage the
usage of the wireless network (CNII, 2011).

The mobile telecommunication industry provided a direct contribution to China’s
GDP growth, employment, and tax revenue. It also provided an indirect contribution
to support the growth of other sectors and benefit the overall society, which is
discussed in detail in the following section.
6.2.3

Contribution of the Chinese telecommunication market to the economy

Over the past decade the Chinese mobile telecommunication industry experienced
rapid growth, which contributed to the high growth rate of the Chinese economy. Qiu
(2005) examined the relationship of the Chinese telecommunication growth and GDP
growth rate from 1992 to 2002, and found there is a strong positive relationship
between the two.

Total telecommunication market revenue in March, 2011 was 265 billion Yuan
(approximately US$38 billion). As shown in Figure 6.3 below, more than 70 per cent
of total telecommunication revenue was generated by the mobile sector and less than
30 per cent of it was generated by the fixed phone sector (MII, 2011). The highly
developed value-added services available for mobile devices in China greatly
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contributed to the high growth in the mobile sector. Value-added services have
helped promote innovation, employment and income.
Figure 6.3 Major revenue components of China’s telecom services in Mar, 2011

Fixed Phone
Mobile

Source: from MII (2011)

The total number of mobile subscribers in China reached 940 million in August
2011, with 94 million 3G users (MII, 2011). Both the total number of subscribers and
revenue of the Chinese telecom market increased dramatically from 2001 to 2011
(MII, 2011), contributing directly to China’s annual GDP growth rate.

The great number of mobile subscribers also represented the considerable demand
for mobile phone devices and services. With lower cost labour and rapid
development in technologies, China has also become the biggest mobile phone
producing base. The total number of exported mobile phones reached 1 billion in
2010, accounting for 71% of the total global shipment (MII, 2011). Export revenue
generated by mobile phones and devices reached US$46.7 billion in 2010 (NBSC,
2011).

On the other hand telecommunication prices decreased dramatically in 2007 (MII,
2007). It greatly reduced business operating costs and communication costs, which
increased business profits, access to information, inter-firm collaboration, and
regional development. It also helped information transfer in all the other industries
and markets. In terms of social aspects, it also helped reduce the crime rate (such as
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new applications in Apple Store24: Police Scanner, Scanner 911 Australia and 5-0
Radio Pro Police Scanner, which provide real-time information share on the police
and fire radios); increased emergency rescue efficiency (such as new applications in
Apple Store: First Aid, Drugs and Medications, Pregnancy and Symptoms Checker
by Medibank, which provide self-check or rescue techniques and one-button call to
emergency rescue); increase working efficiency (such as new applications in Apple
Store: Australia Post Mobile, JotNot Scanner and CareerOne, which provide useful
functions and information more efficiently; and increased community and family
communications (such as famous applications in Apple Store: Skype, Facebook,
Twitter, Bump and Heytell, which provide free international calls and video calls).
All of these applications and products help increase social welfare and happiness.
Furthermore, new applications are developed and released every day, bringing
invaluable benefits to all individuals and firms.

The next section analyses the structure of the Chinese mobile telecommunication
market, different sectors in this market and their characteristics, the major firms in
each sector, and inter-firm collaborations between them.
6.3
6.3.1

Current structure of the Chinese mobile telecommunication market
Overview

As discussed in chapter five, the majority of firms are separated into three groups:
Device providers (including network infrastructure producers and mobile handset
producers), Service Providers, and Content Providers. However, operators (carrier
service providers) in the Chinese mobile market play a very special role in the
Chinese telecommunications market.

Firstly, because of historical reasons, operators in China were separated from
government departments, with all the high level managers assigned by government.
Secondly, operator licenses are strictly controlled and managed by the government
due to its development strategies and policies. Thirdly, the operators in China have
strong market power in the telecommunication market so that all the device

24

Apple Store is an application store for Apple mobile devices. The applications used in this study
were listed in Apple Store by 27th March 2012.
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producers, service providers, and content providers have to collaborate with them to
provide services to end users. The revenues are usually initially collected by
operators before it is distributed to other service providers and content providers.
Therefore, the operators group is separated from service providers in China, and
there are four components making up the structure of the Chinese mobile
telecommunication market (See Figure 6.4). Inter-firm collaborations are close
between them. Each of these components is discussed in detail later.
Figure 6.4 Chinese mobile market collaboration
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6.3.2

Device producers

Device producers provide the basic infrastructure for telecom services: base station,
optical fiber, exchange centre, server, handset device, and so on. All the software,
data, information, and services are installed, maintained, and transferred through the
hardware. A detailed analysis of the characteristics and major global producers of
this sector were discussed in chapter 5.

As shown in Figure 6.5, by 2010 65% of the mobile equipment market was lead by:
Nokia, Research in Motion (Blackberry), and Apple (IDC, 2011). However, Apple,
TCL, and HTC dramatically increased their market share during 2010 with growth
margins of over 100%. The sales of iPhone increased by 6 times from September
2010 to September 2011, reaching US$8.8 billion and was an “unexpected” and
“amazing” growth to Apple (Apple, 2011).
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Figure 6.5 Global mobile handset market shares in 2010
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The mobile device market is a highly competitive market with rapidly changing
companies in the top positions. Technological development and innovations are keys
to rapid development and market share. To keep their top ranking, these firms need
to keep up with the latest technology and collaborate with each other to capture new
information and innovations in this dynamic market. Therefore, the requirement for
inter-firm collaboration is extremely high in this sector. Some Chinese domestic
equipment manufacturers also grew and developed steadily, such as Da Tang, Jin
Peng, Zhong Xin and Hua Wei, which produced 47.5 per cent of total global mobile
handsets in 2008 (RIC, 2006).

On the other hand, China has developed its own mobile standard (TD-SCDMA).
ITU’s (International Telecommunications Union) telecom division also approved
TD-SCDMA as one of the international 3G standards (Steinbock, 2006). In 2008,
China Mobile released 3G connect licenses to eight domestic mobile phone
providers, including Ku Pai, Panda, Hua Wei, Zhong Xing, Lenovo, Hai Xin, Xin
You Tong, and Hua Li (MII, 2011).

As shown in Figure 6.4, device producers need to collaborate with operators to
access the end users as no mobile phones can be used without a licensed SIM card
and operators in China. They either developed special mobile phones for each
operator or provided special packages (mobile phone and services) with operators to
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sell their products in China. They collaborate with content providers and service
providers to embed some pre-installed applications, games, wall paper, music, or
web links or advertisements of special services in their devices. Users get access to
these contents or links when they purchase the devices. They also collaborate with
technical producers on the operating system (platform), managing software, and
research and development. They usually collaborate with other device producers on
research, information share, and new patent licensing.
6.3.3

Operators

Operators are the companies that own the basic telecommunication infrastructure or
hardware, such as optical lines, base station, data centre, and channels. They link
customers and provide basic services. In most countries, like Australia, operators are
also service providers. As discussed before, operators are separated from service
providers in China because of their special roles. In 2009, the Chinese government
further reformed the operators in China and released three 3G licenses to new China
Mobile, new China Unicom, and new China Telecom, thereby forming oligopoly
competition in China’s operators’ market. To register as a telecommunication
operator covering all provinces in China, the required registered capital is one
trillion RMB (approximately US$143 billion), and for a local operator in one
province the required registered capital is 100 million RMB (approximately US$14
million) (MII, 2011). However, without huge initial investments in basic mobile
networks (e.g. base stations) or a 3G license, it is not possible for other competitors
to compete with the current operators in the market.

As shown in Figure 6.6, China Mobile has the largest share (69%), with total 616.79
million mobile subscribers in June 2011 (China Mobile, 2011). China Unicom and
China Telecom have 181 million and 108 million mobile subscribers separately in
June 2011 (China Telecom, 2011; China Unicom, 2011). The total revenue of China
Mobile in 2010 reached 485 billion RMB (approximately US$69 billion) (China
Mobile, 2010), which is more than twice25 the total revenue of China Unicom (101.4
billion RMB in 2011, approximately US$14 billion) and China Telecom (120.2
25

The annual report of China Mobile was released at the end of 2010, which is in a different period to
the data collected for China Unicom and China Telecom in June 2011. However, the number of
mobile subscribers and revenues are expected to be higher in 2011.
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billion RMB in 2011, approximately US$17 billion) (China Telecom, 2011; China
Unicom, 2011). The 3G subscribers were 32 million for China Mobile, 22 million for
China Unicom, and 20 million for China Telecom at the end of May, 2011 (MII,
2011).
Figure 6.6 Operator’s market shares in the first quarter of 2011 (subscribers)
China Telecom ,
120.2

China Unicom ,
101

China Mobile ,
485.23

Source: China Mobile (2011), China Unicom (2011), and China Telecom (2011)

Operators have market power in the Chinese telecommunication market as there
were only three licensed operators in China in 2010 (there were more operators from
1998 to 2008 as discussed in an earlier section). Therefore, all the device producers,
service providers, and some content providers need to collaborate with these three
operators to access the end users. Unlike other countries, device providers usually
provide a special type of mobile device for each operator in China. The special
ordered or booked device cannot be used in another operator’s network or in another
country. The services and content also need to be produced separately with each type
of mobile device, which has increased development costs dramatically.

However, the introduction of iPhone (by Apple) in the Chinese market broke this
situation. China Mobile failed to reach a collaboration agreement with Apple after
two years of discussion (Apple, 2011), which significantly influenced its market
share in the 3G market after China Unicom signed a collaboration agreement with
Apple to first introduce the iPhone into the Chinese market in 2009. As discussed in
Chapter 5 the reason for the long-run discussion with Apple was the new business
model brought by Apple Store, which reduced the profit share of operators and
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service providers. China Unicom and China Telecom had higher growth in mobile
subscriber (15.7% and 19.7% respectively) compared with China Mobile (11.8%)
from 2010 to 2011 (China Mobile, 2011; China Telecom, 2011; China Unicom,
2011). One of the major drivers for this high increase for China Unicom and China
Telecom was the collaboration with Apple on iPhone. China Mobile is now
discussing with Apple a potential collaboration opportunity on 4G products
(Spforum, 2011).
6.3.4

Service providers

Until the 1990s mobile services were driven by text messaging and voice services.
New technologies and broadband has enabled new services and opportunities. The
new mobile services can be represented in four groups: “rich voice and data
(associated with other electronic contents such as pictures and music), the Internet
(mobile Internet, mobile intranet/ extranet), messaging (location-based services,
people communications, such as SMS, MMS), and personalized content (including
information, entertainment, transactions, and data bases)” (Steinbock, 2006).

As of December 2007 there were total 22,240 service providers in China, including
95% none-state owned firms (MII, 2007). Most of the service providers do not have
their own mobile hardware infrastructure (base stations or lines). They provide
services to users via operator mobile networks and share profits with operators and
content providers.

Figure 6.7 summarizes the market share of Chinese mobile service providers in 2006.
The top seven service providers had 67% of the market share (Iresearch, 2007).
Before 2008, CPs had to collaborate with operators through SPs in China. This
business model has changed since operators started to collaborate directly with CPs
from 2008. As a consequence, the role of SPs in this market had been reduced and
many SPs acquired or merged with CPs after 2008. The introduction of Apple Store
further reformed the market by including new business models for the market.
Therefore, many SPs and CPs focused on producing mobile applications and games
for Apple Store as it brought more revenues than collaborating with the operators,
and helped them reach global mobile subscribers directly (Spforum, 2011).
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Figure 6.7 Chinese service providers market share in 2006

Source: IResearch (2007)

A license for service providers is a barrier to entry. To apply for a SP license for all
provinces, a firm must have more than 100 million RMB (approximately US$14
million) registered capital (including 1/3 in cash), more than 10 technical staff
(which excludes micro firms), the personal details and contacts of the management
and related staff, a list of firm locations and equipment, and many other registered
and certified documents (MII, 2011). The requirement for a local region value added
SP license is that the firm must have more than 10 million RMB registered capital
(MII, 2011). If the firm is jointly owned by a foreign parent (outside China), the
foreign investor must have less than a 50 per cent share in the joint venture SP firm.
In other words, foreign firms must collaborate with local firms to access the Chinese
telecommunication market.

To get a telecommunication licence, it takes 60 days for value-added services and
180 days for basic telecommunication services (MII, 2011). Nevertheless, to
collaborate with different operators (e.g. China Mobile or China Unicom), a SP
needs to apply and sign agreements with different operators and local operators.
From interviews with some managers from SPs in this study, the costs of maintaining
a business relationship with different operators is very high in China. Therefore, SPs
in China are usually medium and large sized firms.
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Service providers must collaborate with operators to provide services to end users in
China. They also collaborate with content providers to provide special content (e.g.
games or music) to users. Some service providers buy content from content providers
and ask for technical support during testing by operators on different mobile devices.
The small service providers prefer collaborating with content providers and then
share revenue afterwards. They sometimes collaborate with device providers to
embed their service link or special advertisement in the pre-installed mobile devices.
Service providers have less bargaining power when collaborating with operators.
Therefore, a lower revenue share and a lag in payment are common problems facing
most service providers in China. The mobile service market is largely unregulated
and has many problems in China (e.g. phishing26 messages and forced service
packages). These have been seen from the monthly penalty announcement of China
Mobile on its website (China Mobile, 2011).
6.3.5

Content providers

Content providers (e.g. software developers, music creators, and arts designers) are
the companies that develop all the content for end-users. They provide mobile
games, mobile software, mobile music, mobile pictures, video, news, weather
forecasts, real-time sports information, and all the other mobile applications. They
sell or share the products and revenues with operators and service providers. A (ICP)
license for content providers acts as a barrier to entry. To apply for an ICP license,
firms must have more than 10 million RMB (approximately US$1.4 million)
registered capital and more than 5 technical staff (MII, 2011). As a consequence,
many micro and small sized CPs remain informal in this market.

There are numerous content providers in China. Most of the biggest content
providers are also service providers themselves, such as SOHU and SINA. Keane
(2009) has identified five characteristics of the Chinese animation industry (which
consist of mostly small CPs): low-cost production, imitation, co-production and

26

Phishing is a cheating method through electronic communication (such as emails or phone calls) to
obtain their usernames, password or personal information.
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formatting, focused on East Asian markets, and based on industrial clusters. He has
argued that the Chinese market is driven by government policies.

As shown in Figure 6.8 the general business model among Operators, SPs, and CPs
can be shown in the form of a flowchart. This model came from the author’s
observations during 5 years industry experience and the qualitative interview results
obtained from this study. Usually operators test the content before they accept and
release it to the end users. These tests are very subjective in China and the criteria are
normally unclear. It largely depends on the industry reputation level of the CP or
relationships of the SP with the operator. If the content is rejected by the examiners
the content will have to be given up by the SP or be revised by the CP. Therefore,
most development costs and risks are allocated to the CP.
Figure 6.8 Flowchart of inter-firm collaboration among CP, SP and
operators in the Chinese telecom market
Costs & risks

Contents

CP

Share (delay)

Revise

SP
Reject

Test

Share

Accept

Operators
Revenue

Users
Source: Derived by the author

However, the revenue share for CPs in this model is the smallest. In the Chinese
mobile games market the revenue share of SPs is 47.1%, operators 35.7%, and CPs
only receive 13.3% (Iresearch, 2007). Keane (2009) found that even the high
performing animation companies in China receive less than 15% of total revenue (of
the production budget) obtained from selling animation within China. The gaps are
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usually offset by local government incentive bonuses. Results from the interviews
showed that the small CPs suffer more from the unfair benefit distribution. Unfair
benefit distribution is very common in every case study in China for CPs. One CP
did not receive its share for more than two years, and another CP was told that their
content generated only a small revenue (without showing the real revenue evidence)
and, therefore, their part was “negligible”. Besides the low share in revenue, delay in
payment is a problem facing most small content providers in the mobile market. As
operators have strong market power in deciding services and content (e.g. games) for
users, it also increases collusion and opaque processes in the evaluation process.

This situation and the benefit distribution model in China changed when China
Mobile announced a new collaboration strategy in 2008 to collaborate directly with
CPs. Many SPs merged or acquired CPs after 2008 to increase their competitiveness.
Another change was the introduction of the iPhone into the Chinese market in 2009.
Apple collaborates directly with CPs in its Apple stores and iTune shop. CPs that
produced iPhone applications in China admitted that the collaboration with Apple
and revenue generated in Apple stores was much easier and greater than through
operators or SPs in China (Spforum, 2011). However, Apple also experienced two
years of discussion with the operators before iPhone was formally introduced into the
Chinese market (Apple, 2011), as this business model significantly reduced the
operators’ benefits. It failed to reach an agreement with China Mobile (China
Unicom, 2011) and turned to the second largest operator in China, China Unicom. In
September 2009, iPhone was finally released into the Chinese market by China
Unicom (China Unicom, 2011). Although it brought many new 3G subscribers, the
release of iPhone did not bring significant profits to China Unicom (China Unicom,
2011) because of several concessions in its discussion with Apple. The direct
collaboration with operators and DPs helped CPs and TPs to increase their revenue
share in this market. However, without proper intellectual property rights protection
(IPP), CPs and TPs are still in an unfavourable position in China. A good example
from our interviews is that one of the top download games in the China Mobile
games box, was copied and put on internet for free downloading just two days after it
was released.
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To study further the Chinese market, face-to-face interviews were conducted in
China in late 2008 to answer the key research questions identified in Chapters 3 and
4. The data and results are explained in detail in the next section.
6.4

Case study

The selection of Chinese sample firms was from the mobile telecommunication
market, supplemented by the researcher’s previous business networks from five years
working in this industry. This strategy was aimed at increasing the response rate to
interview invitations. The results supported this strategy as all of the invited firms
agreed to be interviewed and provide feedback, including 7 firms who introduced
their business partners to participate in this interview. As a consequence 24 firms
were interviewed. Among the 24 interviewed firms, 12 firms provided 1
collaborating case, 5 firms provided 2 collaborating cases, 3 firms provided 3
collaborating cases, 2 firms provided 4 collaborating cases, and 2 firms provided 5
collaborating cases. As a result, a total of 45 collaborating cases were collected
during the interviews. The average interview time for each interview was 1 hour
(which was much longer than expected).
6.4.1

Descriptive statistics

Table 6.1 showed the basic descriptive results of the interviewed firms in China. The
selected firms included micro, small, medium, and large sized firms. They also
included local firms, foreign firms, and multinational firms. To study in detail cases
of inter-firm collaboration between DPs, operators, SPs and CPs in the Chinese
mobile market, face to face interviews were conducted in China in 2008. As a result,
24 interviews (involving 45 cases of collaboration) were completed from 4th August
2008 to October 17th 2008 in China. The interviewed firms included China Telecom,
China Unicom, China Mobile, France Telecom (Beijing), Motorola, and many other
small and medium sized firms in the Chinese mobile telecom sector.
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Table 6-1 Basic descriptive statistics of firms interviewed in China
Basic Descriptive results
(China)
Type

Total interviews:
24

Total collaborating cases:
45

Firm type

public

private

(* based on firm)

6

18

Nationality

China

Foreign

(* based on firm)

15

9

Sectors

DP

Operator

SP

CP/TP

(* Multiple selections)

6

5

15

17

Firm Size

small

medium

large

(* based on firm)

9

5

10

Size difference

Smaller partner

Peer partner Larger partner

Size

(* based on case)
5
Source: Interview results from this study

13

27

Studied firms
As shown in Table 6.1 above, the Chinese cases included firms from all sectors: DPs
(device providers), operators, SPs (service providers), ISPs (internet service
providers), CPs (content providers), and TPs (technical providers, include consulting
firms, outsourcing development firms, platform providers, and data service
providers). However, the sector question in the questionnaire was a multiple-choice
question. For example, one company could be a 70 per cent device provider and 30
per cent service provider, which contributed to both DPs and SPs. As shown in Table
6.1, the interviews included 6 DPs, 5 Operators, 15 SPs and ISPs, 17 CPs and TPs.
The interviewed firms also vary in nationality. The study contains 15 Chinese firms,
4 U.S.A firms, 1 Hong Kong firm, 2 French firms, 1 Spanish firm, and 1 Japanese
firm. In this study, 6 interviewed firms are from the public sector and 18 interviewed
firms are from the private sector.

Size of studied firms
In China, firm size was generally measured by the number of employees. The
definition for small and micro enterprises was less than 100 employees. The
definition for medium sized enterprises was between 100 and 500 employees. Large
enterprises were defined as enterprises with more than 500 employees (Harvie and
Lee, 2003).
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In general, all operators in China were large firms. All of the 3 Chinese operators
were large firms. The other 2 foreign operators (without an operator’s license in
China) were small and medium sized firms. Most DPs in China were large firms.
Half of the DPs in the studied cases were large firms, and the two small DPs were
also TPs in this study. The size of SPs varied. Most (8 out of 15) CPs and/or TPs in
China were small firms. The 7 large CPs and/or TPs in this study included 5 foreign
firms (that are also CSPs or TPs in other countries). The other 2 large local CPs
and/or TPs were also SPs, ISPs, or DPs.

Figure 6.9 showed the sizes of the studied firms based upon number of employees.
Due to the official definition, 45.8 per cent (in the 3 white pie slices) of the
interviewed firms were small and micro sized enterprises, 12.5 per cent (in the 3 grey
pie slices) of the interviewed firms are medium sized enterprises, and 41.7 per cent
(in the black pie slice) of the interviewed firms were large enterprises. Different
sized firms were separated in this research to study the importance of firm size in
terms of their strategies and behaviour in inter-firm collaboration.
Figure 6.9 Size of interviewed firms based on employees (by no. of firms)
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5
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4
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Source: Interview results from this study

6.4.2

Is cultural difference still important for collaboration?

The results answered the first sub-question in Chapter 4: Is cultural difference still
important when firms choose business collaborators in the telecommunication
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market? Results from the interviews are consistent with findings from the previous
literature (Das and Rahman, 2009; Vilana and Monroy, 2010) and suggests that
cultural difference between collaborating firms still matter in the Chinese
telecommunication market27.

Although the number is very small, the partners of foreign firms in China show a
trend in their selection criteria. The top collaborators of the interviewed American
firms (3 firms) came 42.9 per cent from North America, 28.6 per cent from Europe,
14.3 per cent from Asia, and 14.3 per cent from the Middle East. American mobile
firms find it easier to collaborate with partners from North America as it requires
lower transaction and communication costs and reduces risk. The collaborators of
French firms (2 firms) came 40 per cent from Europe, 40 per cent from Asia, and 20
per cent from North America. The collaborators of the Spanish firm came 100 per
cent from South America. Cultural similarities contributed to this collaboration in the
studied cases, which will be further examined in a quantitative study in Chapter 8.
The collaborators of Japanese firms came 100 per cent from Asia. The collaborators
of the Hong Kong firm came 14.3 per cent from Australia, 14.3 per cent from North
America, 14.3 per cent from South America, 14.3 per cent from Europe, 14.3 per
cent from Africa, 14.3 per cent from Asia, and 14.3 per cent from the Middle East.
Hong Kong has a traditional Chinese culture and is located very close to mainland
China. However, the management structure and business system were inherited from
Europe, which makes it more open and easier to connect with all the other countries
of the world. Hong Kong’s special historical and political background contributed
greatly to these successful and diversified inter-firm collaborations. These cases
show a trend of business partner selection – similar cultural backgrounds or closer
geographic distance (local firms dominated). The results will be examined in the
Australian cases and further verified in a quantitative study.

From the cases studied, geographical and cultural reasons are still important when
foreign firms choose business collaborators. Reasonable economic explanations for
these barriers are transaction costs and risk (Ronen and Shenkar, 1985). Country

27

This is from a descriptive qualitative analysis, which is consistent with the findings from previous
management and business studies.
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distance increase business costs in terms of transportation, communication, and
information updating (Hofstede, 1980; Park and Ungson, 1997; Felzensztein and
Gimmon, 2007). Cultural difference also adds to communication costs and may
increase the risks of misunderstanding, which may lead to failure in the inter-firm
collaboration. However, as these interviews were conducted in China, all of the
interviewed foreign firms have a subsidiary or department in China which may
introduce bias to this results.
6.4.3

Does size matter when firms choose business collaborators?

The outcome of the study answered the second part of the first primary research
question in Chapter 4: size still matters when firms choose business collaborators.
The interviewed managers were asked to select their top five important business
partners and answer part two of the questionnaire for each collaboration case. This is
supported by an interviewed manager: “…size is still a problem. Who is bigger, who
has more resources and power in the market.” A peer-sized or larger-sized partner is
usually preferred. Firms choose peer-sized or larger-sized firms to keep their
position, market share, and competitiveness. This is also supported by an interviewed
manager: “We only select the top 10 firms in each field to collaborate with to keep
our leading position in the world (interviewee).”

As shown in Figure 6.10, 60 per cent of our studied collaborating cases (in the white
pie slice) selected larger-sized firms as their top 5 important28 collaborators, and 28.8
per cent of the studied collaboration cases (in the grey pie slice) selected peer-sized
firms as their top 5 collaborators. Only 11.1 per cent (5 cases) of the studied
collaborating cases (in the black pie slice) selected smaller sized firms as their top 5
collaborator, including 60% international collaborations. In all of these 5 cases the
partners are content providers who have unique or original resources, technology, or
products. Bigger firms usually have more resources, assets, research investment,
business networks, and bargaining power.

28

The measurement of the top important collaborator is based on the subjective views from the
interviewed managers.
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Figure 6.10 Size of top collaborators (by collaborating cases)

Source: Interview results from this study

When separated by sector, 67 per cent of DPs, 60 per cent of Operators, 82 per cent
of SPs, and 68 per cent of CP/TPs chose large firms as their top five partners. When
separated by firm size, 54 per cent of small sized firms, 88 per cent of medium sized
firms, and 78 per cent of large firms chose large firms as their top five partners,
which also contributed to the average positive size difference in this study.

The results show that firms prefer larger or peer sized collaborators. They only
choose smaller partners when the partners have specific advanced technology, unique
resources, or products that are hard to copy. Therefore, in this research, the only
smaller partners selected by the interviewed firms are that of CPs and TPs. A
possible reason for this result is that bigger firms possess more resources, capital, and
experience. Firms usually obtain more revenues by collaborating with large firms.
However, it can also be argued that more profits are usually associated with more
risk.

To study the different selections of collaborations by local and foreign firms, the
results are separated into two groups: local and foreign firms. Figure 6.11 shows the
difference in choosing collaborators by Chinese firms and foreign firms. All of the
studied foreign firms (firms coming from outside Mainland China) chose
international collaborators as their most important partners. From the 45 cases of
collaboration, 27 cases (60 per cent of total) were international collaboration cases.
However, only 9 cases (33.3 per cent) involved Chinese firms.
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Figure 6.11 International and local collaboration (by collaboration cases)

Source: Interview results from this study

In other words, all the foreign firms from the U.S.A, France, Spain, Japan, and Hong
Kong collaborated with global partners, which also made them more competitive in
the global market (no failures were reported from these cases as Chinese interviewed
firms tend to tell only the positive aspect of a story). There is no clear evidence that
international collaboration is related to the size or sector of the interviewed firm
when results are separated into size/sector groups. Chinese firms usually choose local
partners because of language requirements and the cultural need for understanding to
collaborate with foreign partners increased costs, which is a barrier to some micro
and small firms.
6.4.4

Do firms prefer deep collaboration and can traditional forms of collaboration
be applied in the Chinese mobile telecommunication market?

The results from the survey answer the third question of the first primary research
question. Firms prefer deep and long-term collaboration (e.g. co-production) in the
mobile telecommunication market. This result is also supported by one interviewed
manager:
“We prefer long-term collaboration than short-term ones because it
saves time and cost of searching and rebuilding business relationships
with others.”
To find a suitable collaborator, firms need to justify the technology, employees,
structure, history, financial status, research capability, strategies, and market share of
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its potential collaborators. An evaluation of the partner is usually conducted by large
firms (e.g. Motorola) before the collaboration.

Long-term collaboration can reduce transaction costs and strengthen the relationship
and understanding between the collaborating firms as time goes by. On the other
hand, risks are also generated with collaboration. Our case study showed that a failed
inter-firm collaboration may threaten the development or even existence of a firm.
Long-term collaboration can provide more stable support for both firms and greatly
reduce the risks accompanied with collaboration.

The research results also answer the fourth part of the first primary research question.
Previous collaboration types are not applied in new industries. Franchising did not
appear in the sample of China mobile collaboration cases. On the other hand, the
interviewees proposed new collaboration types in this market. Results show that coproduction is the most usual collaboration type in the Chinese telecom sector. The
second collaboration type in the Chinese market is management and service
agreements, which indicate that value-added services have developed rapidly in
China. However, joint R&D and joint ventures are not in the top three types. The
business and product life cycle for Chinese firms is much shorter than that of foreign
firms.

This result is also supported by an interviewed manager:
“The survival of the firm in a developed country may be dependent on the
strategy or plan for the next year or next 3 years. But for Chinese firms, it is
dependent on next week or even tomorrow.”
Even one of the world’s biggest firms during the interview indicated:
“No firm will invest in a project that will payback after more than 10 years
even if it can produce great amount of returns.”

Within the broad array of theoretical collaboration types used to study inter-firm
collaboration (Contractor and Lorange, 1988), co-production service (68.9 per cent in
all collaboration cases), management and service agreements (46.7 per cent) and
market share service (44.4 per cent) have tended to dominate, alongside know how
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licensing (24.4 per cent), joint R&D service (22.2 per cent), joint venture service
(15.6 per cent), technical training and start-up assistance service (11.1 per cent),
production, assembly, and buy-back agreement (8.9 per cent), and patent licensing
(8.9 per cent) (see Figure 6.12). Franchising did not appear in the studied Chinese
collaboration cases. High selection of the co-production type is contributed to by
operators (25%), SPs (32%) and CP/TPs (25%). However, the top selected
collaboration type for DPs is joint R&D (30%), followed by co-production (25%)
and market share (20%)29. The types of collaboration are obtained by means of a
multiple choice question that allowed for more than one response to the question. In
other words, there could be more than one type of collaboration in one collaboration
case.
Figure 6.12 Types of inter-firm collaboration (by collaborating cases)

Source: Interview results from this study

Another notable result is that a joint venture is usually adopted by SPs (23%),
CP/TPs (18%), and DPs (15%) in their inter-firm collaboration. Only 3% of
operators had joint venture collaboration with their partners. Soft policy barriers (e.g.
regional protection laws, different registration fees or application processes to
foreign firms) added barriers to this kind of collaboration in many countries.

29

There is no evidence that different sectors of firms (e.g. SPs) have an influence on the selection of
types of inter-firm collaboration in the Chinese mobile telecommunication market.
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6.4.5

What are the major benefits from collaboration?

This result answers the fifth question of the first primary research question. What are
the major benefits from inter-firm collaboration? As shown in Figure 6.13 the top
three perceived benefits coming from inter-firm collaboration are increasing market
share (80 per cent), increasing profitability, and increasing innovation (77.8 per
cent). Improved productivity (68.9 per cent), improved product quality (66.7 per
cent), access to new technology (62.2 per cent), greater participation in the global
market (62.2 per cent), assisting research and development (60 per cent), improved
global competitiveness/ market influence (55.6 per cent each), saving in costs (53.3
per cent) and access to government programs (31.1 per cent) are the remaining
benefits received by firms.
Figure 6.13 Benefits from inter-firm collaboration (by collaborating cases)

Source: Interview results from this study

Because of the different histories, experience, environments, cultural backgrounds,
social environment, technologies, and relationships of firms, they have very different
needs and benefits from collaboration. The benefits brought by different
collaboration, even for the same firm, are different. However, the benefits are not
significantly related to the size or sector of the interviewed firm. When focusing only
upon foreign firms, the top benefits are improved global competitiveness and
increased market share (88.9 per cent). Hence, for both international firms and
domestic firms, increasing market share, increasing profit, and increasing innovation
are the most important benefits from mobile inter-firm collaboration.
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6.4.6

What are the major risks from inter-firm collaboration?

The results answer the sixth and seventh questions of the first primary research
question. What are the major risks towards inter-firm collaboration in China? The
results also supported previous empirical studies (Lewis, 1990; Roos, 1994; Parker,
2000). Benefit distribution is vital to inter-firm collaboration, which is agreed by
interviewed managers:
“no firm will enter a win-lose or lose-lose cooperation with others.”
As shown in Figure 6.14 the first risk threatening inter-firm collaboration in the
Chinese mobile market is unfair benefit distribution, which was selected by 58.3 per
cent of interviewed firms (in 14 collaborating cases). The second barrier is lack of
trust, which was selected by 50 per cent of firms. Technology complexity, societallevel dynamics, historical, political, or cultural barriers are the key remaining barriers
towards inter-firm collaboration.
Figure 6.14 Barriers for inter-firm collaboration (by no. of firms)
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The dominant barriers for SPs and CPs in China are unfair benefit distribution and
trust problems. They are also dominant barriers for inter-firm collaboration for
SMEs. However, there is no dominant barrier for DPs and operators as they usually
have strong market power in the market. This is influenced by the regulatory system
in China as discussed in a previous section of this chapter. Furthermore, the results
show that large firms have fewer barriers in inter-firm collaboration compared with
SMEs. This is because large firms are more likely to possess more specialized assets,
business networks, patents, and skilled labour (Teece, 1986).
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As for the seventh question in Chapter 4, risk is different when international
collaboration is involved (Eiteman, 1990; Jia and Rutherford, 2010; Vilana and
Monroy, 2010). As shown in Figure 6.15 the first barrier to international
collaboration (in 13 out of 24 international collaboration cases) is language, cultural,
or communication barriers. The second is lack of international business experience
(in 12 cases). The third risk is not enough access to finance and lack of trust in
international business (in 5 cases each). Regulatory or government constraint is the
fifth risk (in 4 cases). The sixth risk is lack of global competitiveness (in 3 cases).
The last is lack of access to advanced technology (in 1 case).
Figure 6.15 Barriers to international collaboration (by no. of firms)
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Source: Interview results from this study (by no. of firms)

Language and cultural differences are still the biggest barriers for most Chinese
firms. They do not feel confident when communicating with foreign firms. Possible
misunderstandings due to poor language or cultural differences also increase risks
from inter-firm collaboration. The experiences of the general manager or business
manager are also important for a firm to engage in international collaboration. If the
manager has studied or lived abroad, it is more likely that the firm will engage in
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international collaboration. However, international firms have fewer barriers than
Chinese firms when they engage in international collaboration (Kuada, 2002).
Copyright and intellectual property protection is also pointed out by foreign
companies as the issue of most concern when collaborating in China. Firms are
reluctant to transfer their technology and knowledge to less protected countries (Lin
et al., 2011).
6.4.7

Key determinants of a successful collaboration

To collect data to support the quantitative study, one probe question was added to the
questionnaire for the interviewees as follows “what do you think are the key
determinants for a successful collaboration”. Table 6.2 showed the answers from the
Chinese interviewees.
Table 6-2 Proposed key determinants for successful inter-firm collaboration in
China
Proposed key determinants

No. of Times proposed by interviewees

Profit distribution

3

Copyright protection

3

Effective communication

2

Fast information transfer

2

Same objective

1

Good understanding

1

Working process

1

Clear requirement

1

Policy support

1

Good understanding

1

Source: Interview results from this study

Most of the managers highlighted the importance of understanding each other in
terms of (i) the goals and requirements of collaboration; (ii) compliance with each
other on negotiated process and policy; (iii) keeping effective communications; and
(iv) having a fast and open information exchange. The social environment or policy
risk was also mentioned by one interviewee. Several managers indicated that the
contact person is vital for inter-firm collaboration. One of the interviewed managers
said:
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“When the contact person changed the collaboration results could be
totally different.”
Interviewees focused on their real business experience rather than theoretical
knowledge when proposing the key determinants of a successful collaboration.
Therefore, the answers are different from those identified from literature review in
Chapter 3.
6.4.8

Role of government

To collect suggestions on good policies and supporting services from the
government, another question “the role of government” was asked at the end of the
interviews. Some interviewees expected that some general government policies will
help with business or industry development. Ensuring a level playing field was
emphasized four times during the interviews. Openness of the market was
emphasized three times, and was proposed by both foreign and international firms.
Table 6.3 shows the expected government roles in supporting inter-firm collaboration
by Chinese interviewees.
Table 6-3 Expected government roles in inter-firm collaboration
Expected roles
Provide fair playing field
Fast and simple services
Openness of market
Provide funds support
Reduce monopoly
Access to land
Adopt global standard
Source: Interview results from this study

No. of Times proposed by interviewees
4
3
3
2
2
1
1

Foreign firms usually have a higher expectation of government policy. They believe
that new policies will help them engage in inter-firm collaboration as well as
business development. Domestic firms, especially SMEs, have lower expectations of
policy support. Most of them believe that policies will benefit more large firms and
SOEs, and have a lesser impact on small private firms. It is more important to adopt
a good business strategy or find good collaborators by themselves.

This is supported by the following comments from the interviewees:
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“…government should provide an equal and open environment for all
firms in the telecommunications market.”
“We need more support from the government for both funds and
regulation.”
“The government should simplify its working process.”
“…policy should be flexible and change with market change.”
“It is impossible for a small company like ours to get a subsidy from the
government, even if I know when and how to apply for it.”
“The playing field in the Chinese telecom market is not even. One
operator has most of the government policy support than all the others,
which makes for an uneven revenue structure.”

In summary, the interview results answered all seven questions of the first primary
research question, and the comments from the interviewees provided ample and
useful information for the following study. The research results were organized and
compiled into a report. Some interviewees also showed interest in participating in
further research.
6.5

Conclusions

China’s telecommunications industry was a typical socially planned one, which has
undergone many reforms. The domestic industry had been highly protected before
the 1990s. China Telecom was the monopolist in this market for a long time. The
Chinese mobile market was controlled by China Mobile and China Unicom.

The rapid development of the Chinese mobile market brought many opportunities for
new investment and attracted global telecom firms. The most important component
of telecom revenue during that period was mobile telephony. An open policy,
telecom reform, and international collaborations greatly contributed to the entire
telecom industry in China. The mobile sector has significantly contributed to Chinese
economic growth.

The Chinese telecom market is composed of four sectors as highlighted in this thesis.
They are DPs, operators, SPs and CPs/TPs. Inter-firm collaborations among them
brought high-technology, advanced management systems, and matured products and
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more value added services, which have contributed greatly to rapid mobile
development in China. With further international collaborations, the development of
the Chinese mobile market is expected to lead and push the growth of the global
telecom market.

Results from the case studies in China have answered all questions related to the first
primary research question in chapter four. Size, country, and cultural similarity are
important when firms select collaborators. Firms prefer larger-sized or peer-sized
(same-sized) firms as their collaborators. Foreign firms tend to search for
collaborators in the global market and have fewer barriers than domestic firms when
engaging in international collaboration.

The major types of inter-firm collaboration in China are co-production, market
sharing and management and service collaboration. Franchising does not appear in
the Chinese mobile market and there are new types of inter-firm collaboration in the
Chinese mobile market. For all the interviewed firms the most important benefits of
collaboration are increasing market share, increasing profit, and increasing
innovation. The benefits generated from inter-firm collaborations show great variety.

The main risks towards local inter-firm collaboration in the Chinese mobile markets
are benefit distribution and lack of trust. The main barriers for international
collaborations are language, cultural, or communication barriers and lack of
experience in international business.

Most of the interviewees took understanding, communication, and fast information
exchange as the most important key to a successful inter-firm collaboration. Most
interviewees agreed that the government should provide an open and fair playing
field for all competitors.

The study of Chinese mobile cases shows, in this dynamic developing market, firms
are very active in inter-firm collaboration. However, size, country, and cultural
differences are still important in inter-firm collaboration. International firms have
fewer barriers in global collaboration than domestic firms. Most interviewed firms
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emphasized that trust and benefit distribution are key determinants for successful
collaboration. This result will be compared to the Australian case study in the next
chapter and the qualitative research results will be further examined in the
quantitative study.
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7 A CASE STUDY ON COLLABORATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN MOBILE
TELECOMMUNICATION MARKET
7.1

Introduction

The Australian mobile telecommunications market is a mature market in terms of
industry structure and content integration. The Australian mobile telecommunication
market, like most mobile telecommunicate markets in the world, has moved from
monopoly to limited competition, from state owned to market driven and from
monopoly to competitive. This chapter provides an overview of the Australian
mobile telecommunication market in terms of its development, industry structure,
contribution to the economy, major firms by market share in each sector and
government agencies involved in its regulation and supervision.
To answer the first primary research question in chapter four ‘What are the major
types of collaboration, benefits and risks associated with inter-firm collaboration
in the Australian and Chinese mobile telecommunication markets?’ a qualitative
interview was conducted to collect real industry data from different sectors. The
background and structure for the case study are discussed in sections 7.2 to 7.3. The
results and implications from the case study are discussed in section 7.4. At the end
of this chapter the results from the Australian cases are also compared with the
Chinese research results, to provide a better understanding of the key issues towards
inter-firm collaboration in these countries.

7.2

History and development of the Australian telecommunications market

For the financial year 2006-07 the total number of mobile phone subscribers reached
21.1 million in Australia (Access Economics, 2008). However, development of the
Australian mobile telecom market is uneven in terms of geographic coverage. Figure
7.1 shows the uneven mobile telecommunications coverage by different states in
Australia. NSW had 34.4% of total mobile subscriptions in Australia in 2011. The
top three states (NSW, VIC and QLD) had 80% of total mobile subscriptions and the
other five states had only 20%. This is caused by the uneven population, economic
growth and demand in the different states.
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Figure 7.1 Percentage of total mobile subscriptions by state in Australia

Source: IBIS (2011)

7.2.1

Development of the Australian telecommunications market

Figure 7.2 shows the development of various mobile telecommunications networks
in Australia since 1981 (AMTA, 2007). Australia’s first mobile phone system
commenced operation in Melbourne in August 1981. In 1987 the first Analogue
Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) was launched. However, the majority of the analogue
network (about 80 per cent) closed on December 31, 2000. The remaining analogue
network was progressively closed during 2000. The digital global system for mobile
communication (GSM) networks was launched in 1993. It developed very rapidly
and is still widely adopted in mobile networks today. Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) technologies were introduced in Australia in 1999. Telstra and Hutchison
were the first operators for CDMA services (Access Economics, 2007). Then, 3G
networks were offered by Hutchison in April 2003. The new technology was adopted
quickly globally and many mobile device providers started to produce 3G devices for
operators in the global market. It is now offered by all mobile network carriers in
Australia.
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Figure 7.2 Development of mobile telecommunications networks in Australia
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Source: AMTA (2007), Australian mobile telecom industry, statistics link file.1

Like most other countries, the history of the Australian telecommunications market
involves development from monopoly to competition, from state-owned to private,
from simple services to multiple diversified services. The key characteristics and
events for each development period are now discussed.
7.2.2

Institutional and regulatory changes

1. 1901 – 1988: Monopoly period
The Australian telecommunication market was initially a state monopoly. In 1901,
the Postmaster-General's Department was established to manage all domestic
telephone, telegraph and postal services. In 1946, the Overseas Telecommunications
Commission (OTC) was established to manage telecommunications services with
other countries (DCITA, 1997).

Australian Telecom was named the Australian Telecommunications Commission in
July 1975 and the Australian Telecommunications Corporation in January 1989
(which later became Telstra). Until the late 1980s the Australian telecom market was
a monopoly controlled by state owned enterprises only.
2. 1989 – 1996: Beginning of competition
To introduce competition into the Australian telecom market the first regulatory
reform began in 1989. The Australian Telecommunications Authority (AUSTEL)
was established in 1989 to regulate the industry. The Telecommunications Act 1989
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was a remarkable milestone for this period. It was the start of the introduction of
private competition in telecommunication services (Farago, 2001), and also the end
of monopoly in the telecommunications market.

The government further reformed the market by announcing the Telecommunications
Act 1991. Telecom Australia and the OTC were merged and became the Australian
and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation Limited in February 1992, and the
name was further changed to Telstra Corporation Limited in April 1993. At the same
time, Optus and Vodafone started to operate in the Australian telecom market in
1992 and 1993 respectively.

On the other hand, the new second generation (2G) digital global system for mobile
communications (GSM) networks was launched in 1993. Three carriers, Telstra,
Optus and Vodafone launched GSM services in that year.

The Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) was established in 1993 by the
Australian government. It is independent of industry, government and consumer
organisations. The TIO is authorized to investigate complaints about the provision or
supply of telephone or Internet services. The role and powers of the TIO are included
in the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999
(ACMA, 2007). The objective of TIO is to establish a fair, objective and nonbureaucratic telecom market (TIO, 2012).

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) was established in
1995 (ACMA, 2007). The objective of ACCC is to promote competition and fair
trade in the market place (ACCC, 2009). ACCC also help the market to develop and
grow into a more competitive one.
3. 1997 – 2002: Open competition and privatization
The Australian telecommunications market was opened to full competition on July 1,
1997 (DCITA, 1997). The release of the Telecommunications Act 1997 and related
legislation package are remarkable for this period. They eliminated the limit on the
number of carriers that own transmission infrastructure and that are able to enter the
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Australian market. Under the new reform scheme Telstra became partially privatized
in 1997, with one third of its shares sold to the public. In September 1999, the
Commonwealth government sold a further 16.6 per cent of its shares to the global
market (Telstra, 2009). In August 2001 Optus became a 100 per cent owned
subsidiary of SingTel (Optus, 2009). Hutchison also entered the Australian
telecommunications market in 2002 (Access Economics, 2007).

In 1999, Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technologies were introduced in
Australia. Telstra and Hutchison operate CDMA services (Access Economics, 2007)
In 2001-02, 93 per cent of Australian mobile telecommunications services were
provided on GSM networks (Access Economics, 2007). The carriers also developed
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) (‘2.5G’) networks that deliver multimedia
services.

From 1997 to 2002 the average price of mobile telephony fell by approximately 27%
in Australia (Access Economics, 2007). The fall in price created economic benefits
for consumers, which increased consumer surplus. Aside from the consumption of
mobile services, mobile phones also exert a positive impact on productivity in other
industries (Access Economics, 2007), by increasing their work and production
efficiency, information sharing and off-work contacts. As a consequence of the new
reform and policies attracting investment, new investment in this sector reached
AUD $19.7 billion in 2002 and more than 80 new carriers and over 850 service
providers had entered the market (DBCDE, 2002).
4. 2003 – 2006: Self regulation
3G networks were introduced to Australia first by Hutchison in April 2003. They are
now offered by all mobile network carriers in Australia. Initial 3G networks were
primarily in urban areas. To build the new 3G networks the big four carrier service
providers collaborated with each other to share the high hardware costs and reduce
potential risks (e.g. Hutchison with Telstra and Vodafone with Optus).

The Australian Communications Authority (ACA) and the Australian Broadcasting
Authority (ABA) merged and became known as the Australian Communications and
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Media Authority (ACMA) on 1 July 2005. ACMA is responsible for issuing carrier
licenses, regulation of service providers, registration of industry codes, and other
supervisions. ACMA also supervises international activities and contributes to the
whole society on anti-spam, child protection, and spectrum usage (ACMA, 2007).

Communications Alliance (CA) was formed in 2006 from the merger of the
Australian Communications Industry Forum (ACIF) and the Service Providers
Association Inc (SPAN). The objective of CA is to promote the growth of the
Australian communications industry and the protection of consumer interests through
industry self governance (Communications Alliance, 2007).

In November 2006 the Commonwealth government sold its remaining stake in
Telstra and its residual 17 per cent shareholding was transferred to the Future Fund
in February 2007 (Telstra, 2009). Therefore, Telstra, Optus, Vodafone, and
Hutchison became the four biggest carrier service providers, together having a 99.7%
market share in Australia in 2007 (Access Economics, 2008).
5. 2007 – Current: New generation technologies
The Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE)
was established by the government to govern all policies and regulations in 2007
(DBCDE, 2009). The responsibility was transferred from the Department of
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA).

3G networks developed very fast in Australia from 2007. As shown in Figure 7.3,
from 2006 to 2010 the 3G density (as measured by subscriptions per capita)
increased dramatically from nearly 0.1 to over 0.6 per capita and the forecast
subscriptions per capita is 0.9 by 2014 (Access Economics, 2010). The faster and
more data transferring abilities provide the possibility for more advanced mobile
applications (e.g. video conference and online shopping), which are expected to
bring more tangible and intangible benefits to firms and individuals.
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Figure 7.3 Forecast data subscriptions per head of population

Source: Access Economics(2010) based on data from AMTA members, p.ii

According to ACMA the number of 3G services in operation was 4.56 million at 30
June 2007 (Access Economics, 2007). Surveys conducted by Telstra have shown that
the Next G network has had a positive influence on its commercial users’ business
productivity (Telstra, 2009). It has been suggested that so-called 4G technology will
further boost mobile services and economic growth in the telecommunications
mobile market (AMTA, 2007). The advantages and new applications of 4G
technology was discussed in chapter five.

New technologies have also changed mobile handsets and services for users. More
than eight million mobile phone handsets were sold in 2005 in Australia, highlighting
the continued growth of the industry (AMTA, 2007). Based upon industry statistics
(AMTA, 2007) the shipment of CDMA mobile handsets became zero from April
2007. Table 7.1 shows the change of handset shipments into Australia. It clearly
shows that CDMA mobile handsets were replaced by 3G mobile handsets gradually,
which was first introduced to Australia from 2004.
Table 7-1 Handset shipment into Australia from 2002 to 2010 (in units)

CDMA
GSM
3G

2002
(from Jul)

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

443,927

529,688

784,075

1,133,490

369,819

19,757

3,554,191

5,437,596
7,237,649

6,874,929

8,365,271

9,263,245

Source: Data collected from AMTA (2011)
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2008

8,832,755

2010
2009 (by Oct)

9,086,162

6,610,687

Development of the mobile telecommunications industry has contributed directly and
indirectly to Australian economic growth. These contributions will be discussed in
detail in the following section.
7.2.3

Contributions of the Australian telecommunication market to the economy

The telecommunications industry has made both tangible and intangible
contributions to the Australian economy (Access Economics, 2010), and the mobile
telecommunications industry is one of the fastest growing telecommunications
markets in Australia (AMTA, 2007). It contributes directly to employment, GDP,
industry revenue, and industry value added. Mobile telecommunications also impact
the business and economy indirectly through its influence on labour productivity and
price declines (Access Economics, 2007). The fast development of mobile
technologies leads to lower prices of telecommunications services and higher
efficiency in production. Therefore, the mobile industry can also help increase
productivity in other industries (Access Economics, 2010).

As shown in Figure 7.4, the Australian mobile telecommunications industry made a
direct contribution of AUD 17.4 billion to total GDP in 2008-9. The direct
contribution to the overall economy was measured by industry value added or
Industry Gross Product (IGP). In 2008-09, the mobile telecommunications sector
increased Australian real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by AUD 6.7 billion and
increased employment (Access Economics, 2010). The indirect contribution, or spillover effect, on the Australian economy was estimated at AUD 10.7 billion in 2008-9,
which is far more than its direct contribution to the total economy (Access
Economics, 2010).
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Figure 7.4 Total economic contributions of mobile telecommunications, 2008-09

Source: Access Economics (2010)

Direct contributions
Table 7.2 shows the latest key statistics of the direct contribution of the mobile
telecommunications sector in Australia. In 2008-09 the mobile industry employed
20,790 full-time equivalents (FTE) and paid $1.4 billion (nominal) in wages (Access
Economics, 2010). This number decreased a little compared with the previous year
2007-08. This may have been caused by the substitution effect of new technologies
and the merger of Vodafone and Hutchison in 2009. However, IBISWorld estimated
that telecommunications will achieve an average revenue growth of 4.6% over the
next five years through 2016-17 in Australia based on the current growth rate of
mobile phones (IBIS, 2011).
Table 7-2 Industry revenue and value added 2004-05 to 2008-0930
2004‐05
14,322.0

2005‐06
14,654.5

2006‐07
15,518.7

2007‐08
16,391.9

Industry revenue (millions
AUD)
Industry value added
6,503.7
5,986.8
6,476.0
6,753.6
(millions AUD)
Gross operating surplus
4,785.5
4,351.6
4,944.1
5,284.3
(millions AUD)
Earnings to employees
1,718.2
1,635.2
1,531.9
1,469.3
(millions AUD)
Employment (No)
23,893
22,117
21,964
21,170
Source: Access Economics (2010), Australian Mobile Telecommunication Industry, p.ii

30

These are the latest key statistics released by April 2012.
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2008‐09
17,788.3
6,702.5
5,257.7
1,437.0
20,790

On the other hand, industry revenue was AUD 17.8 billion and industry value added
was over AUD 6.7 billion in 2008-09. Industry output grew stably in 2008-09 and
increased by 24.2% from 2003-04 (Access Economics, 2010). This was driven
substantially by mobile telecommunication subscriptions. Total mobile subscriptions
in Australia were worth AUD 24.22 million at 30 June, 2009, and were only AUD
18.4 million at the end of 2004-05 (AMTA, 2010). However, employment and
earnings to employees decreased from 2004-05 to 2008-09. As the mobile
telecommunication industry is capital intensive, more than three quarters of value
added flows as earnings to capital rather than earnings to employees (Access
Economics, 2010). On the other hand, the new technologies and equipment have a
significant substitution effect on the demand for labour in this industry.

Figure 7.5 shows the growth of industry value added of mobile carriers and resellers
in Australia from 2004-05 to 2008-09. The combined industry value added of mobile
network carriers and resellers was under 1% of total communications GDP from
2004-2009 in Australia. The majority of value added was contributed by carriers,
similar to that for China. There was a decline in the contribution to GDP from 2004
to 2006, with most of the decline attributable to lower earnings to employees than
returns to capital. The share of total communications in GDP increased from 2005 to
2009.
Figure 7.5 Mobile carriers sector, real and expected share of GDP from 2004-09

Source: Access Economics (2010), p.30
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Indirect contributions
The indirect contribution of the mobile telecommunications sector to the economy
has been measured in terms of its impact on lowering communication prices and in
improving productivity. ACMA (2010) data indicated that the costs of average
mobile voice calls fell by 4.8 percent in 2008-09. With an increasing average price
level for all goods and services, the new technology helped decrease the price of
communications and costs for business. Consumers got more benefits from the
decline of service prices. Decreasing mobile communication prices also added
pressure to fixed-line prices in Australia, as mobile phones have become a substitute
for fixed phones in recent years (Access Economics, 2010).

Besides the contribution of price declines, the development of mobile
telecommunication technologies also benefited many other sectors and industries in
the economy via productivity improvements, as discussed in previous chapters and
sections. Mobile technologies can improve workers’ ability to remain productive
through the use of voice or data applications when they are away from the work
place (Access Economics, 2010).

However, laptop and M2M applications were excluded in the aggregate results for
mobile contributions from the Access Economics report (Access Economics, 2010),
which is expected to have large value adding services. Other spill-over effects (e.g.
increased community connections, increased happiness and mental health by
connecting family members anytime and anywhere and decreased business failure
rates due to misunderstanding and a lack of communication) were not included in the
model. Therefore, the calculated contribution can be expected to be undervalued.

With the development of new technologies and products in the telecommunications
industry, the Australian mobile industry is expected to contribute more to economic
growth in the future. The robust and stable growth of the Australian mobile industry
was based on its mature industry structure, which will be further discussed in the
following section.
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7.3
7.3.1

Current structure of the Australian mobile telecommunications market
Overview

The mobile telecommunications industry comprises the hardware sector, carriage
service providers, retailers, as well as content providers, content aggregators and
program developers. Figure 7.6 provides an overview of the Australian mobile
telecommunications industry. The current industry involves a number of sectors:
hardware providers (including network infrastructure producers and mobile handset
producers), service providers (including internet service providers and mobile service
providers), content providers (including aggregators, content producers, and
technical providers), and retailers (including mobile phone retailers, card retailers,
and end-user service providers).
Figure 7.6 Australian mobile telecommunications industry

Source: Access Economics (2008), Australian Mobile Telecommunication Industry, p.8

The hardware sector is responsible for building and maintaining the network
infrastructure and providing end-user handsets. Carrier service providers provide
carrier network infrastructure to other resellers and service providers (AMTA, 2007).
Resellers in the Australian telecom market are similar to service providers in the
Chinese market. However, as carriers also provide services to end users and service
providers can apply to become carriers, these components are combined in service
providers. Therefore, the sectors are changed into four major components in the
structure of the Australian mobile market.
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As shown in Figure 7.7, the structure of the Australian mobile market is divided into
four components: hardware producers, service providers (including carrier service
providers, mobile service providers, internet service providers, resellers, and mobile
virtual operators), content providers, and retailers. Figure 7.7 also shows the
collaborations between different sectors. Each of these sectors is discussed in more
detail and will be discussed in the interview case study in later sections.
Figure 7.7 Structure of Australian mobile collaboration
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Compared with the Chinese market competition in the Australian mobile
telecommunications market is high amongst established firms, both in terms of price
and service. Resellers are limited in their ability to compete on price due to the price
they have to pay in order to procure network services from the four major carriers.
There is also some scope for those firms which offer other telecommunications to
provide price advantages through bundling, including Telstra and Optus, as well as
some resellers such as AAPT (Access Economics, 2007).
7.3.2

Device producers

The mobile telecommunications hardware sector includes “infrastructure facilities
that support the volume of mobile telecommunications services and the end-users’
hardware that provides individuals with usage of mobile telecommunications
services” (AMTA, 2007).
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It requires the use of a substantial amount of infrastructure to make or receive a
mobile call. The infrastructure hardware includes: base stations, antennas, switching
equipment, and towers. Installing the network requires substantial investment, which
is an entry barrier for small firms. The mobile network operators own the
infrastructure and usually rent the broadband to other service providers. In Australia
the major infrastructure hardware producers are Ericsson Australia, Alcatel-Lucent,
Huawei and Nokia (IBIS, 2011).

The end-user hardware includes motor vehicle hands-free kits, earpieces and other
mobile handsets. In Australia the majority of end-user handsets are imported and
supplied by Nokia, Apple, Motorola, Samsung, LG, SonyEricsson, i-Mate, HTC,
ZTE, and RIM (IBIS, 2011). As most of these handsets are produced overseas and
shipped to Australia for sale, the device producers for the Australian market are the
same global competitors as discussed in chapter six.
7.3.3

Service providers

Carriage Service Providers (CSPs) are defined as suppliers of mobile services to
households and businesses using carrier network infrastructure. Carriers are
generally required to hold a carrier license. This includes three mobile network
carriers Telstra, Optus, and Vodafone & Hutchison (merged in 2009), who operate
their own mobile networks, and nine resellers (e.g. AAPT, Austar, B, Boost and
Primus). Virtual Mobile Network Operators (VMNOs) are also regarded as CSPs and
offer mobile services to customers using a third party’s network (ACMA, 2007).

Figure 7.8 shows the market share of Australian mobile network carriers by revenue
in 2007. Similar to the Chinese market the biggest three carriers: Telstra, Optus,
Vodafone and Hutchison together occupied nearly 99.7% of the total Australian
market (IBIS, 2011).
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Figure 7.8 Market shares of mobile network carriers by revenue
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Source: IBIS (2011), J7122

Resellers and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) are also considered CSPs.
Examples of resellers in Australia include AAPT, AUSTAR, B, Boost and Primus.
There is no dominant firm in the resellers market in Australia in 2011. MVNOs offer
mobile services to customers using a third party’s network (ACMA, 2007). Examples
of MVNOs in Australia include B Digital, Revolution, Boost Mobile, Primus
Telecom, People Telecom, and Macquarie Telecom (IBIS, 2011).
7.3.4

Retailers

Retailers offer mobile services to end-users on behalf of CSPs. Customers can
purchase mobile telecommunications hardware and services. Most CSPs have their
own retail shops where customers can purchase the hardware and access services.
The exclusive retail outlets of mobile network carriers are: Hutchison - ‘3’ Shops;
Telstra - Telstra Shops; Optus - Optus World; and Vodafone - Vodafone (AMTA,
2007). Other retail outlets, such as convenience stores, petrol stations, supermarkets,
Australia Post, and online stores, also offer hardware and services to end-users.
7.3.5

Content providers and technical providers

Content providers deliver information and entertainment content. Mobile premium
content

can

include: sports

wallpaper; games

and

scores; music

other

clips; sports

highlights; mobile

downloads; age-restricted

content; chat

services; news; financial data; weather information; horoscopes; and mobile ring
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tones (SPAN, 2007). Program developers, who create new and innovative
applications on mobile handsets, are also regarded as content providers.

Content aggregators manage multiple content providers and provide services through
content linked to these providers’ products. Aggregators also add value by
negotiating complex and time-consuming distribution deals with the individual
network carriers, resulting in wider content distribution. Examples of Australian
content aggregators are Legion Interactive, Infospace and iTouch (Access
Economics, 2007).

Value is added to the mobile entertainment value chain through the delivery of useful
content. The advent of 3G mobile services has increased the importance of the role
played by content providers. The Australian mobile content market experienced rapid
growth, driven by increasing consumer requirements and new technologies.

The Australian mobile market maintained a stable and robust growth from 1981 to
2010. Market size is not very large due to a limited total population. Collaboration
between different telecom sectors has greatly contributed to its stable development.
To further study Australian inter-firm collaboration in the mobile telecommunication
market, face-to-face interviews were conducted in Australia in early 2009 to answer
the key research questions identified in chapter three and four. The data and results
are explained in detail in the next section.
7.4

Case study

A qualitative case study was conducted in Australia to answer the first primary
research question in chapter four: What are the reasons, types, benefits, and risks
from inter-firm collaboration? During this case study, face to face interviews were
employed. A questionnaire was used to collect data on inter-firm collaboration in the
Australian telecom market. A difference from the Chinese case study is that only 2
firms from the 19 selected Australian firms replied to email invitations. Therefore, to
further this study, the Chinese case study strategy was adopted and firms were
contacted through the business networks of the author. The selected firms are DP,
CSP, SP, and retailers in the Australian mobile telecommunication market located in
Sydney or Wollongong. As a result, 7 firms attended the interview. Each firm
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provided only one collaboration case and the average interview time was 15 minutes
for each firm (exactly as expected). The results are very different from the Chinese
cases, indicating that Australian firms are very reluctant to take risks (by attending an
interview and changing their working plan) and are very punctual (understanding the
opportunity cost involved in participating in the interview). Table 7.3 shows the
basic descriptive results from the interviews.
7.4.1

Descriptive statistics

Table 7-3 Qualitative interviews in Australia
Total
interviews: 7

Total collaborating cases: 8

Firm type

public

private

(* number of firms)

0

7

Nationality

Australian

Foreign

(* number of firms)

4

3

Sectors

DP

CSP/SP

CP/TP

Retailer

(* multiple choice *)

2

5

4

1

Firm Size *

small

medium

large

(* number of firms)

1

2

Size difference

Smaller partner Peer partner

4
Larger
partner

Basic Descriptive results (Australia)
Type

Size

(* number of collaboration
cases)
Source: Interview results from this study

0

5

3

* Note: Sectors are multiple choices for firms as one firm could be partly DP and SP at the same time.
Firm size is as defined by Australian Bureau of Statistics, a small sized firm is a firm with
less than 20 employees, a medium sized firm is a firm with 20-199 employees, and a large sized firm
is a firm with 200 and above employees.

Studied firms
As shown in Table 7.3 above, seven interviews were conducted and eight
collaborating cases were collected (one interviewed firm answered two
questionnaires on inter-firm collaborations with different partners) during January
2009. The case studies include all sectors in the telecommunication market: device
providers (mobile handset providers, base station and network device providers),
CSP/SP (service providers), retailer, and CP/TP (content providers). As in the
Chinese cases, a multiple-choice questionnaire was used.
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The interviewees include CEOs and senior managers who have a good knowledge of
the firm’s collaboration and development strategies. The study included 3 overseas
owned firms (from New Zealand, Sweden, and the U.S.A.) and 4 Australian firms.
The reason why fewer interviews were conducted in Australia is the smaller market
size and lower response rate. The number of registered service providers in the
Australian telecom market is only about 3 per cent of that in China.

Size of studied firms
Figure 7.9 shows the sizes of the interviewed firms. In Australia, firm size is usually
measured by the number of employees. The definition of small sized enterprises is
below 20 employees (micro sized enterprises are defined as employing less than 5
employees). The definition of medium sized enterprises is between 20 and 199
employees (for the telecommunication and services industry). Large enterprises are
defined as those with 200 or more employees (Harvie and Lee, 2003). In this
research, one interviewed firm (14.29%) is small sized (and also a micro sized firm
with less than 5 employees), two firms (28.57%) are medium sized enterprises (had
20 to 99 employees), and the other four firms (57.14%) are large enterprises (had
more than 500 employees).
Figure 7.9 Size of interviewed firms (as a % of total firms interviewed)
small size
14.29%

large size
57.14%

medium size
28.57%

Source: Interview results from this study

7.4.2

Is cultural difference still important?

The results from the data analysis answer the first question of the primary research
question in chapter four: Is cultural difference still important when firms choose
business collaborators in the telecommunication market? The results support the
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previous literature in chapter three (Das and Rahman, 2009; Vilana and Monroy,
2010) and is in accord with that for China. Australia has a similar culture and
background with that of Europe, New Zealand, and North America. Most of the
interviewed firms chose their top collaborators to be from Australia and North
America, indicating that culture similarity is important for firms in choosing their
collaborators.

As shown in the following Table 7.4, in the seven collaborations six firms chose
Australian and U.S. partners. Only one firm (from U.S.A.) chose an Asian firm as
one of their top collaborators.
Table 7-4 Nationality of the collaborating firms and their partners
Interviewed
firm

Firm 1

Firm 2

Firm 3

Firm 4

Firm 5

Firm 6

Firm 7

Nationality

Sweden

New
Zealand

Australia

Australia

Australia

Australia

Partner
North
firm
Australia
Australia
America
Source: Interview results from this study

Australia

Australia

Australia

USA
Asia and
North
America

Weber (1909) argued that the location of a firm is important for collaboration as it
helps minimise production and transport costs. However, Brakman and Garretsen
(2005) argued that new technologies have reduced the importance of transportation
cost, which makes location less essential. The result of this study supports the
position that location is still important for businesses in choosing their partners.
Besides transportation costs, cultural differences also increased communication cost
and risks arising from misunderstanding. Therefore, the country and cultural
background of the firm remain important for the selection of business partners.
7.4.3

Does size matter when firms choose business collaborators?

The interviewed managers were asked to select their top five important business
partners and provide up to five collaboration cases in part two of the questionnaire.
The results are used to answer question two of the first primary research question in
chapter four: Does size matters when firms choose their business collaborators? In
accord with the results for China, the results from the qualitative interviews in
Australia also gave a positive answer to this question.
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As shown in Figure 7.10, nearly 38 per cent of the interviewed firms chose largersized firms as their top collaborator, 62 per cent of firms chose peer-sized firms as
their top collaborator, and none of the firms chose smaller-sized firms as their top
collaborator in the Australian collaborating cases. All of the studied collaborating
cases selected peer or larger sized firms as their most important collaborator. The
results suggest that firms prefer peer-sized or larger-sized firms as their top
collaborators to keep their position and market share as indicated by interviewees.
These results will be further tested in the quantitative study in chapter 8.
Figure 7.10 Size of top collaborating partners (as a % of all collaboration cases)
Smaller Size
0%

Larger Size
38%

Peer Size
62%

Source: Interview results from this study

As shown in Figure 7.11, 50 per cent of all the collaboration cases are international
collaborations (as one of the interviewed firms provided two collaboration cases,
there are 8 cases in this study). In this study, most local firms only conducted
business with Australian firms. A manager from one of the biggest multinational
carrier service providers said: “We only focus on the local market and partners
within Australia, the international market and collaboration is the responsibility of
the head office (located in another country) of the company.” Compared with
Australian firms, Chinese firms have more positive views in seeking international
collaborators and taking risks. However, they face barriers such as language and
cultural differences.
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Figure 7.11 International & local collaboration (by collaboration cases)
International collaboration
5
4
Local
collaboration
International
collbaoration

3
2
1
0
Australian owned firms Foreign owned firms
Source: Interview results from this study

7.4.4

Do firms prefer deep collaboration and is there any new collaboration type
evolving in the mobile telecommunication market?

The results from the interviews answer the third question of the first primary research
question “Do firms prefer deep collaboration?” Although focused on different
aspects, both Australian and Chinese firms prefer long-term and deep collaborating
relationships. This is also supported by the interviewed managers:
“We seek long term relationships (Swedish firm manager).”
As shown in Figure 7.12, management and service agreements (in 3 cases), coproduction service (in 2 cases), and know-how licensing (in 2 cases) have tended to
dominate collaboration, alongside joint R&D service, joint venture service, technical
training and start-up assistance service, production, assembly, and buy-back
agreement, and market share. Franchising did not appear as a type of collaboration in
the sample of Australian telecommunication collaborating cases.
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Figure 7.12 Types of collaboration (by collaborating cases)
Cooperate on product test
presale
Patent licensing
Joint Venture
Management and service
Know how licensing
Production, assembly, and buy-back
Technical training and start-up
Market share
Joint R&D
Co-production

0

1

2

3

Source: Interview results from this study

The results also answer question four of the first primary research question in chapter
4 “Is there any new collaborating type in the mobile telecommunication market?”
Previous collaborating types in the literature cannot be applied in the
telecommunication industry. The results show that franchising is not a collaboration
type in the telecommunication market, which accords with the results for China. On
the other hand, two new collaboration types were raised by the interviewees. The
first one is providing a test device to make sure new products work (cooperation in
product testing). The second one is presale service. These will be explained further
below.

New type: Providing a test device
One Australian manager indicated that mobile device providers sometimes provide
test and demonstration machines to operators, content providers, or technical
providers to develop new supported software, get user feedback or test new
networks. Device providers also provide some sub-products for mobile phone
providers to implement integration and system tests. On the other hand, operators
sometimes cooperate with service providers to get customers’ feedback on new
programs or services before releasing a new function. This kind of collaboration is
very common in the mobile telecommunication sector. However, it is not similar to
any collaborating type in the previous literature as discussed in chapter three.
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New type: Presale service
Presale service includes all services provided before sales to increase the sales
amount, such as consulting, customer relationship building, market and customers’
requirement analysis. Presales support help both firms understand better each other’s
requirements, which will save on cost, increase efficiency, reduce risks, and, as a
result, bring higher profits in the future (as indicated by the interviewed managers in
this study).

The results support that collaborating types change in different industries and new
collaborating types are generated from the adoption of new technologies, new
business models and new market requirements. Previous empirical results are not
suitable for some dynamic and fast growth industries such as the telecommunication
market. The quantitative research of this study will expand the interviewed industry
to include manufacturing and services industries that are related to the
telecommunication industry.
7.4.5

What are the major benefits from collaboration?

Results obtained from the interviews answer the fifth question of the first primary
research question “What are the major benefits from inter-firm collaboration?” As
shown in Figure 7.13, no single benefit from inter-firm collaboration dominates in
the Australian market. The top three benefits coming through inter-firm collaboration
are: increasing market share, increasing profit, and reduced costs. As the number of
case studies is very small, it did not show a strong relationship between firm size and
type of benefit.
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Figure 7.13 Benefits from collaboration (by collaborating cases)
Enter global market
Increase innovation
Increase product quality
Increase productivity
Increase profit
Increase market influence
Reduce costs
Increase market share
Increase competitiveness
Access to new technology
0

1

2

3

4

5

Source: Interview results from this study

The collaboration benefits are very similar to the results obtained from the Chinese
market study, which answers question five of the first primary research question
‘What are the major benefits from collaboration?’ However, no firm selected access
to government programs as a benefit from inter-firm collaboration in Australia. In
China, nearly one third of collaborating firms chose this option, which shows a
stronger requirement for government relationships in the Chinese market.
7.4.6

What are the major risks from inter-firm collaboration?

The results answer the sixth and seventh questions of the first primary research
question ‘What are the major risks towards local and international inter-firm
collaborations in Australia?’ The results are in accord with the results from the
Chinese case study. Figure 7.14 shows the barriers facing inter-firm collaboration in
the Australian samples. The first barrier chosen by 5 interviewed firms is benefit
distribution. The second barrier chosen by 3 interviewed firms is lack of trust. The
results are in accord with the Chinese results, which answers question six of the first
primary research question: “What are the major risks towards inter-firm
collaboration?” Benefit distribution and lack of trust problems are the top barriers for
inter-firm collaboration in the mobile telecom sector in both Australia and China.
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Figure 7.14 Barriers towards collaboration (by number of responses)
6

benefit distribution

5
4

lack of trust

3

Technology complexity

2

societal-level dynamics

1

Previous collaboration history

0

Source: Interview results from this study

In regard to international collaboration, five Australian firms think there are no
barriers, while only two firms selected lack of trust and language or culture as
barriers towards international collaboration. Compared with the results from the
Chinese cases, Australian firms have more confidence and ability to engage in
international collaboration. A possible reason for these differences is that Australia,
with its large immigrant population, has a combination of cultures, languages and
groups of people, which provide more opportunities for Australian firms to
collaborate with firms and individuals from all different backgrounds.
7.4.7

Key determinants of a successful collaboration

Most interviewees indicated that trust and/or profits distribution are the most
important determinants for a successful collaboration. The interview results are in
accord with the literature (Williamson, 1985; Kay, 1993; Gulati, 1998; Lewis, 2000;
Parker, 2000; Kuada, 2002; Lui and Ngo, 2005; Narteh, 2008). One interviewee
pointed out that the contact person is vital to the success of inter-firm collaboration.
Other managers also agreed that the contact person sometimes is vital to a successful
collaboration. These factors are emphasized by the interviewees as below:

Firms prefer deep and long-term collaboration in the telecommunications market. As
one interviewed manager said:
“We need to create an environment of trust between partners through
long term alignment of goals.”
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Three managers indicated that trust plays a very important role in inter-firm
collaboration. They also mentioned that trust can only be built and tested over time in
response to the probe questions.

This is supported by the following comments from the interviewees:
“The benefit or value perceived as mutually beneficially is very
important in collaborations.”
“It is important the collaboration can help in increasing revenue or our
customer base.”
“It is important to create an environment of trust between partners
through long term alignment of goals.”
“The key points for inter-firm collaboration are trust, open discussion,
and forming a good relationship.”
“People sometimes select collaborators because of the contact person
and not how good your product is.”

Table 7.5 shows the proposed key determinants by Australian interviewees for
successful inter-firm collaboration. The results show that benefit and trust are still the
most important factors for a successful collaboration between firms.
Table 7-5 Proposed key determinants for successful inter-firm collaboration in
Australia
Proposed key
No. of times proposed by interviewees
determinants
3
Trust relationship
2
Benefit distribution
2
Price of products
2
Increase profits
1
Contact person
1
Communication
1
Information share
Source: Interview results from this study

7.4.8

Role of government

When discussing the role of government in promoting or supporting inter-firm
collaboration, most firms suggest that it should assist in helping to form and provide
a better environment, build a better (next generation) network infrastructure, and
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adopt international standards for inter-firm collaboration. One interviewed manager
also pointed out that government should encourage more skilled employee
movement or immigration to help in new technology development and inter-firm
collaboration. This is also supported by the fact that lack of skilled labour is a barrier
for business development (Chung et al., 2006). Therefore, a tight migration policy
could be a barrier to foreign investment and global inter-firm collaboration.

All of the firms have high expectations of government policies to support their
business development and inter-firm collaboration. They believe that government
policies

and

support

will

help

to

improve

the

environment

for

the

telecommunications market and the development of individual firms. Table 7.6
shows expected government roles in supporting inter-firm collaboration by the
Australian interviewees.

Table 7-6 Expected government roles in inter-firm collaboration
Expected roles
No. of times proposed by interviewees
4
Upgrade the networks
2
Provide funds /reduce tax
2
Help in developing a partnership
1
Provide a level playing field
1
Better services (training)
1
Visa for skilled persons
1
Regulations on price
1
Help access global markets
1
Adopt global standard
Source: Interview results from this study

Compared with the results from the Australian interviews, Chinese firms have little
expectations regarding government policies, especially for small and medium-sized
private enterprises. Most managers prefer to rely on the capability of the firm itself.
One possible reason is the long period of time it takes to generate a policy change
and for the policy to take effect in China. The other possible reason is the unclear
rules and ambiguous regulations in the Chinese market.

Results from the Australian case study show that inter-firm collaboration is important
in the mobile telecom market. Australian firms prefer partners from Australia, New
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Zealand, Europe, and the U.S.A. Size, country, and culture similarities still matters
when firms choose their collaborators. The results are similar to the Chinese case
study. Collaborating with foreign firms, local firms can obtain support in terms of
capital, technology, management or exporting knowledge.

7.5

A comparison of the Chinese and Australian markets

According to the case studies conducted in this study, there are many differences in
the Australian and Chinese telecom markets. The main differences include: market
structure, mobile services, government policies and attitudes to collaboration. These
differences in terms of China and Australia are discussed below. In China, ‘Guan
Xi’31 plays a vital role in business relationships (Gomez and Hsiao, 2004; Lu et al.,
2006; Sahakijpicharn, 2007; Vipraio and Pauluzzo, 2007), which has influenced its
market structure and inter-firm collaborations. Table 7.7 compares differences in the
Australian and Chinese mobile telecommunications markets.
Table 7-7 A summary of the differences in the mobile telecommunications
market in Australia and China
Differences
Australia
China
Market structure

Open competition

Mobile services
Driven by customer needs
Regulations and laws
Self-regulation
Attitudes to collaboration
Reluctant to change
Source: Interview results from this study

7.5.1

Half way on its reform to an
open competitive market
Driven by price of services
Unclear and ambiguous
Very active and positive

Differences in market structure

The first difference between the Chinese and Australian markets is structure. The
Australian market is a very competitive market with most firms privately owned.
Entrance into the Australian telecom market (for example, applying for a carrier
license) is much easier. However, in China all operators are still state-owned
enterprises. The operators’ licenses are released and managed by government with a
requirement of high entry barriers (as discussed in chapter six). Therefore, it is very
difficult for small sized firms or foreign firms to become an operator in China. The
market is still under the oligopoly power of the three operators and more reforms are
31

Guan Xi is one of the major resources in Chinese business, which has a positive influence on
business performance (Lu et al., 2006) (e.g. reducing cost, enhancing networks or forming new
collaborations).
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needed for it to become an open competitive market. The density of mobile
subscribers per 100 inhabitants is still low compared with the Australian market.
Therefore, more reforms such as access to open operator licences for foreign firms
and lowering entry barriers are expected in the Chinese market.

Because of the special position of all operators in the Chinese market, operators are
separated from common service providers. On the other hand, retailers are included
in the Australian mobile telecommunications market. However, most shops and
supermarkets play the role of retailers in China. As shown in Figure 6.4 the Chinese
telecom market is composed of device providers, operators, service providers, and
content providers. However, the Australian telecom market is composed of device
providers, service providers, content providers and retailers, as shown in Figure 7.7.

On the other hand the market size is larger and growth rates are relatively high in
China. The Chinese telecom market is regarded as one of the fastest developing
markets in the world. The costs and prices of new content and services are higher in
Australia because of higher labour and operating costs. However, the quality of
content and services are also higher in Australia. These differences provide potential
collaboration possibilities for firms from both countries.
7.5.2

Mobile services

The second difference between the Chinese and Australian market is the preference
for mobile services. Mobile services are divided into two kinds: basic and valueadded services. Basic services include local or long distance calls, data transfer and
reselling services. Customer preferences for price and quality of service are different
in Australia and China, but popular services and content in each country are identical
although the quality of these is different.

Figure 7.15 shows the market share of Chinese mobile value-added services in 2008.
Short Message Service (SMS) was still the dominant service in the Chinese market.
This was followed by CRBT (colourful ring back tone), WAP (Wireless Application
Protocol), MMS (Multimedia Message Service), IVR (Interactive Voice Response)
and Java/brew content (e.g. Java games). SMS is the most popular mobile service in
199

the Chinese market because of its low cost, efficiency and recordable function. This
is a very special characteristic of the Chinese mobile service market as price is still
the driver for mobile content and services. Most of the Java applications and IVR
services are higher cost services in China and, therefore, the selections of these
services are lower. Therefore, the usage of value-added mobile services in China is
driven by price.
Figure 7.15 Chinese mobile value-added services market share in 2009
MMS, 4.1%

IVR, 1.9%

Java/brew,
0.9%

WAP, 7.3%

CRBT, 12.8%

SMS, 73.0%

Source: Data collected from IResearch (2009)

The costs and prices of new content and services are still relatively high in Australia
compared with China. The services Australians identified as the top three most
interesting were positioning services, like GPS, followed by email and browsing the
Internet (Access Economics, 2007). On the other hand, there has been a move
towards post-paid mobile contracts from pre-paid services in Australia in the past
two years (IBIS, 2011) as customers can have better control over their total
expenditures (AMTA, 2010).

Figure 7.16 shows the Australian mobile products and services in 2011. Voice
services are dominant in the products and services segmentation, which was 42% of
the market share. This was followed by non-messaging data services (e.g. game
download), SMS/MMS services (which was the biggest share in the Chinese market),
handsets and equipment, interconnection services, international roaming and others.
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Voice service is more expensive in Australia than in other countries (such as China).
Therefore, mobile services usage in Australia is driven by market requirements.
Figure 7.16 Australian products and services segmentation in 2011
Interconnection
services, 5.0%

International
roaming, 3.5%

Others, 0.5%

Handsets and
equipment,
11.0%
Voice services,
42.0%

SMS/MMS
services, 16.0%
Non-messaging
data services,
22.0%
Source: Data collected from IBIS (2011)

Compared with the Chinese market Australian mobile content and services are driven
by market needs. As the adoption of new technologies in Australia is relatively slow,
the content and services on mobile devices are mainly limited by the turnover of new
devices and handsets. Kelly Services (2009) found that more than 80 per cent of
Australians believe that mobile communications technology has increased their
personal productivity. The Chinese market, on the other hand, is oriented or
significantly influenced by policies and regulations (Keane, 2009).

From the interview results (in chapter six) the life cycle of mobile content in China is
relatively short. Usually it can only exist for several weeks in the Chinese market.
Compared with China, Australian mobile products and content have higher quality
and longer life cycles. The rapid development of the Chinese market is good for
business development. However, the short product life cycle and fierce competition
have limited any long-run research and development plans. Therefore, most of the
mature mobile products and content in China are imported from other countries.
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Another notable change in both Australia and China is the high growth rate of 3G
technology in the mobile market. This has increased the capacity of data transferring
and processing dramatically, which provide opportunities for more mobile services
and content in the market. As described in chapter six and previous sections of this
chapter, 3G mobile phones have increased dramatically in both Australia and China
in the last three years.

Complementary resources (low development cost and a huge customer base in China
and high quality products and high price of mobile contents in Australia) in different
countries will encourage inter-firm collaboration (Deakins and Freel, 2003). It also
provides more opportunities for inter-firm collaboration between both countries.
Content providers in China, during our interviews, showed great interest in providing
content for the Australian mobile market. However, they are facing language and
translation (culture and regulatory difference) problems, which are barriers for them
to enter the Australian market. If the government provides suitable support services
and programs targeting these problems, it may increase inter-firm collaboration and
international transactions between both countries.
7.5.3

Regulations and laws

A key difference between the Australian and Chinese market is that market entry in
the Australian telecom sector is free to all foreign competitors. However, Telstra,
Optus, and Vodafone & Hutchison still have significant market power in the carriers
sector. They together occupied more than 99% of the total Australian market in 2010.
The Australian mobile market is also regulated by industry associations and private
enterprises. The Australian government has provided strong policy support to the
telecom industry to form a fair market for all firms and customers.

Compared with the Australian telecommunications market the Chinese market is
relatively closed. Government policies are inclined to protect the industry instead.
All operators in the Chinese telecom market are governed and protected by the
Chinese government. There are no clear criteria on the application procedure and
time for review, and, therefore, there is no guarantee of licenses being granted even if
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a company satisfies all requirements (Qiu, 2005). Therefore, most foreign firms
choose to cooperate with Chinese telecom firms to enter this market.

Intellectual property protection is also a problem in China. The IPP problem has also
affected most content providers in China. Chinese content providers suffer from low
revenue share as discussed in chapter 6. Three interviewed managers in Australia and
all of the managers from foreign firms in China pointed out the intellectual protection
concern when talking about potential collaboration with Chinese firms. Foreign firms
agreed that the poor intellectual protection status in China is a barrier for them to
collaborate with Chinese firms. The problem is vital for most high technology
industries where the products are easy to copy. Inter-firm collaboration can be
greatly encouraged in China if the IPP problem is improved.
7.5.4

Attitudes to collaboration

Although facing more barriers in international inter-firm collaboration (e.g. language
and cultural barriers), Chinese firms are more active and positive in seeking
international collaborations. However, Australian firms are reluctant to change or are
usually more cautious in forming a new collaboration. This is in accord with
previous empirical studies (Kuada, 2002). The response rate of the interviews in this
study from Australia (below 10%) and China (100%) also provide evidence to this
result. The advantage of Australian firms’ collaborating strategy is stability. It
reduces most risks that may influence their development. However, the disadvantage
of Australian firms’ collaborating strategy is that a complex and long process in
choosing a partner reduces business opportunities and potential profits. This is
extremely important for high technology industries and products, where time and
efficiency are vital.

7.6

Conclusions

Australian mobile markets have experienced remarkable growth over the past twenty
years. The indirect contribution has overtaken the direct contribution of the mobile
telecommunications industry to the Australian economy from 2006 to 2009 (Access
Economics, 2010). It is a competitive market, which is open to foreign competitors.
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Most of the Australian telecom firms are private firms. However, there is still
oligopoly power in the carriers (CSP) sector.

The results from both the Australian and Chinese case studies have answered the
primary research question in chapter 4 ‘What are the major types of collaboration,
benefits and risks associated with inter-firm collaboration in the Australian and
Chinese mobile telecommunication markets?’ Although the history and
development of the mobile telecommunication markets are similar in Australia and
China, there are still many remarkable differences between them. Some of these
differences provide opportunities for inter-firm collaboration between both countries.
For example, differences in price and the quality of mobile content. Other differences
may be an obstacle to inter-firm collaboration (e.g. the IPP problem). Inter-firm
collaboration could be significantly increased between both countries if the
Australian and Chinese governments can provide suitable supporting services and
programs.

To study the general problems facing inter-firm collaboration in a wider industrial
range, a quantitative survey is conducted in the next chapter for both Australia and
China covering the telecommunications, manufacturing and related services
industries. The results provided in this chapter will be further examined in the
quantitative study in chapter 8.
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8 A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF COLLABORATION
8.1

Introduction

Results from the qualitative study in chapters six and seven provided valuable
insights and data for the study of inter-firm collaboration in the Australian and
Chinese Mobile Telecom market. However, the qualitative case study is limited by
number of cases and location of the interviewed firms. To complement the findings
from the qualitative study, a quantitative analysis is carried out based on primary
data from an online survey.
To answer the second primary research question proposed in chapter 4 “What are the
key determinants of successful inter-firm collaboration?” this chapter provides a
quantitative analysis of online survey data collected for China and Australia. As
discussed in chapter three, a conceptual framework was structured from the previous
literature and empirical studies. This framework is adopted in this chapter and linked
with the data collected through the survey designed in chapter four. The reliability
and validity of the data is discussed in this chapter. Statistical tests are conducted to
test the hypotheses presented in chapter four. Data are then separated into subgroups
for Australia and China for separate regression analyses. The implications from the
quantitative results are discussed at the end of this chapter.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the framework and variables are
defined and discussed. Second, the econometric collaboration models are defined.
Third, data sources and statistics of the collected data are described. Fourth, the
results of data analysis and implications are discussed. At the end of this chapter, the
results from the quantitative study are summarized and linked to the next and
concluding chapter.
8.2

Framework and variables

Most of the existing research has focused on only the objective returns and benefits
from inter-firm collaboration. However, Heide and Minor (1992) indicated that both
subjective assessments and objective performance are significant in measuring a
collaboration’s outcomes and results. Therefore, the outcomes of a collaboration is
measured by both subjective assessments and objective performance in this study,
which includes a combination of 12 objective benefits and the participants’
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subjective assessment on the success level and fulfilling-expectations level of the
collaboration (Reinig, 2003; Hartono, 2004). As discussed in chapter four, the
variables are designed in an ordinal format (Groot and Brink, 2003; Wes et al.,
2005). The measurement of each variable is also discussed in the following section.

As discussed in chapter 3, a framework of key determinants for successful inter-firm
collaboration was derived from the literature and adopted in this chapter as a
collaboration model. Figure 8.1 shows the key determinants for successful inter-firm
collaboration, which are trust (Granovetter, 1985; Borch, 1994; Brunetto and Rod,
2007), firm size (Berg et al., 1982; Harrigan, 1988; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad,
1994), previous experience (Anand and Khanna, 2000), communication (Heide and
Miner, 1992; Kay, 1993; Gulati, 1998) and culture similarity or difference (Kuada,
2002). All of them are expected to have a positive influence on the performance or
outcomes of inter-firm collaboration. Each of these independent variables is
explained in the following section.
Figure
Framework
of keyofdeterminants
for successful
Figure8.18.1
Framework
key determinants
for inter-firm
successfulcollaboration
inter-firm
collaboration

Communication

Trust

+
+
Outcome/ performance of
inter-firm collaboration

+
+
Culture

+
Experienc
Firm size

similarity
Source: Derived by the author

8.2.1

Outcomes/performance – (a) objective returns or benefits

The objective performances are measured using 12 benefits as discussed in chapter 3
(Burt, 1983; Williamson, 1991; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Zacharia et al., 2011). The
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objective success rate - OBSi (i = 1-12) is based upon the following 12 objective
benefits32:
1) OBSTEC -access to new technology,
2) OBSCMP - improved global competitiveness,
3) OBSMSH - increased market share,
4) OBSCOS - cost-saving,
5) OBSRND - assist R&D,
6) OBSMIF - increased market influence,
7) OBSPFT - improved profitability,
8) OBSPDT - improved productivity,
9) OBSQLT - improved product quality,
10) OBSINO - increased innovation,
11) OBSGOV - access to government programs and
12) OBSPGM - allow participation in the global market.
These variables are obtained from questionnaire question 4.1 as in Table 8.1 below.
For a more detailed discussion see chapter 4. The last item in the question is to
record new benefits generated from telecommunication industry’ inter-firm
collaborations, which is to verify the results from the qualitative study in this thesis
“results from previous empirical studies may not be applied to new and dynamic
industries, such as the telecommunication industry”. Each of the 12 variables are
valued from 0 – 5. As indicated in the questionnaire attached in the appendix C to
this thesis, the number ‘0’ (blank) is assumed as no benefits for this objective return
from this inter-firm collaboration. Number ‘1’ is a small increase, ‘2’ is a medium
increase, ‘3’ is a large increase, ‘4’ is a substantial increase and ‘5’ is a very
substantial increase in this objective return. Each of these objective returns is used as
an objective independent variable in the quantitative model in the following sections.

32

The 12 Objective benefits are used in separate regression models.
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Table 8-1 Objective benefits and returns in the questionnaire
Benefits
Question 4.1 What benefits has this collaboration brought (Please
leave blank if there is no influence.)
OBSTEC

Access to new technology

OBSCMP

Improved global competitiveness

OBSMSH

Increased market share

OBSCOS

Saving in costs

OBSRND

Assist research and development

OBSMIF

Increased market influence

OBSPFT

Improve profitability

OBSPDT

Improve productivity

OBSQLT

Improve product quality

OBSINO

Increase innovations

OBSGOV

Access to government programs

OBSPGM

Allowed participating in the global market

Source: questionnaire designed in this thesis

8.2.2

Outcomes/performance – (b) subjective success rates

As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, both subjective assessment and fulfilling
expectations are important in measuring the success rate of inter-firm collaboration
(Reinig, 2003; Hartono, 2004). Therefore, they are obtained from questions 4.2 and
4.3 as in Table 8.2 below. For a more detailed discussion see chapter 4. The
SUBSUC (subjective overall success rate) and EXPECTED (fulfil expectations
level) are measured by a five point Likert-type scale based upon the manager’s
opinion. The number ‘5’ is strongly disagree, ‘4’ is disagree, ‘3’ is neutral, ‘2’ is
agree and ‘1’ is strongly agree with the fulfil expectations or succeed in this interfirm collaboration. Each of them is used as a subjective independent variable in the
quantitative model in the following sections.
Table 8-2 Subjective success rate in the questionnaire
Success rate
Questions
SUBSUC
EXPECTED

4.2. To what extent do you agree this collaboration has fulfilled
expectations?
4.3. Would you regard this collaboration as successful?

Source: Questionnaire designed in this thesis

8.2.3

Independent variables - firm size

Firm size is usually measured by annual sales or turnover, total assets, capital
returns, and/or worldwide employee numbers of the firm in previous research.
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However, the definition of firm size is different in each country and even in different
industries (Harvie and Lee, 2003). Some of the previous empirical studies focus on
developed countries (such as U.S.A. or Japan) and some only adopt financial data
from annual reports which exclude the majority of micro and small sized firms. As
this study has focused on Australia and China, the official definition used for firm
size in both Australia and China is adopted. Firm size is generally measured by the
number of employees in both Australia and China. The definitions are described in
Table 8.3 below.
Table 8-3 Definitions of firm size used in Australia and China
Firm Size (employees) Micro firm Small firm Medium firm
China 33
<5
<99
100-500
Australia
<5
<19
20-199

Large firm
500 or more
200 or more

Source: from Harvie and Lee (2003), National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011) and ABS (2004)

Therefore, firm size is put into six categories in this study: (1) less than 5 employees;
(2) 5-19 employees; (3) 20 – 99 employees; (4) 100-199 employees; (5) 200-499
employees; and (6) 500 or more employees. Firms in category 1 are micro sized
firms in both Australia and China, firms in categories 1, 2 and 3 are small sized firms
in China; categories 1 and 2 are small sized firms in Australia; categories 4 and 5 are
medium sized firms in China; categories 3 and 4 are medium sized firms in
Australia; category 6 are large sized firms in China; and categories 5 and 6 are large
sized firms in Australia. Therefore, firm size is defined using official definitions in
Australia and China in this thesis. Two dummy variables are used in the model to
verify the influence of firm size on performance or outcomes of inter-firm
collaboration. LARGESIZE is the first dummy variable, in which ‘1’ is more than
500 employees in China or 200 employees in Australia and ‘0’ is less than those
numbers in two countries. SMEs is a reference variable as a reverse of LARGESIZE
firm, which is less than 500 employees in China or 200 employees in Australia.

To examine the influence of size difference on inter-firm collaboration a dummy
variable based on size difference (SIZEDIF) is used in this study, calculated as the
33

The definitions of SMEs in China had been changed from 2011, which was based on 16 different
industries and included the annual revenue and total asset value as measurement for SMEs. However,
as this research was conducted during 2007 and 2009, the definitions of Chinese SMEs used in this
thesis follow the previous Chinese official definitions for SMEs.
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difference between the size of the surveyed firm and the size (in terms of employee
numbers) of its partner. If size difference is ‘0’ it means that the interviewed firm
collaborated with a smaller partner. If the size difference is ‘1’ it means that the
surveyed firm collaborated with a peer or larger sized firm. If the partner firm size is
unknown to the surveyed firm, it is assumed that the surveyed firm size is larger
(because a larger firm usually has less information on its smaller partners). Size
difference is used to examine the results from the previous qualitative study: firms
prefer larger partners in inter-firm collaborations, and hypothesis six of the second
primary research question in chapter 4 “Size difference can be used to replace firm
size in collaboration model”. Therefore, SIZEDIF is used to replace absolute firm
size in the quantitative models. These variables are obtained from questionnaire
questions 1.2 and 2.2 as in Table 8.4 below. For a detailed discussion see chapter 4.
Table 8-4 Firm size and size difference in the questionnaire
Firm size
Questions
Firm size
Part 1: Information of your company
(LARGESIZE
1.2. Full-time employee numbers
and SIZEDIF)
Partner size
Part 2: Information of your partner
(SIZEDIF)
2.2. Full-time employee numbers
Source: questionnaire designed in this thesis

8.2.4

Control variables – trust

As discussed in chapter three the previous literature has defined trust based upon two
principle concepts: reliance and risk (Currall and Judge, 1995). Trust is an expression
of confidence in inter-firm collaboration (Friedman, 1991; Barney and Hansen, 1994;
Gulati, 1998). Factors such as honest dealing (Das and Teng, 1998) voracity,
industry reputation (Barney, 1986; Grant, 1996; Saxton, 1997; Lui and Ngo, 2005),
business networks (Saxton, 1997), previous experience (Gulati, 1995b; Nooteboom
et al., 1997), business and process (Creed and Miles, 1996; Lui and Ngo, 2005),
quality of communication, openness on information (Zaheer et al., 1998; Elg, 2007),
and risk (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Adobor, 2005) have been used to study trust
among collaborating partners. A contact person is vital to business trust, which is an
omission in the previous literature (Adobor, 2006a). Managers from the qualitative
interviews also indicated that a contact person and similar goals are vital to the
performance and outcomes of inter-firm collaboration in both Australia and China.
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Drawing from the literature and suggestions from the interviewed managers, this
study used a composite index for trust calculated from seven questions as designed in
chapter four. As for the measurement, a five point Likert-type scale is adopted to
indicate the interviewee subjective judgment on the trust level (SUBTRUST), risk
level (RISK), structure similarity (SIMSTRUC), working process similarity
(SIMPROCE), similar goal (SIMGOAL), industry reputation level of the partner
firm (PREPUT), and reliability level of the contact person (CONTRELIA). As the
risk level is negatively related to the trust level (Garvis, 2000), the sign for the risk
level is expected to be negative. The business network participation (NETWORK) is
measured by five scales: 5-business network organizer; 4-very active in networks; 3often attend business networks; 2-rarely attend networks; and 1-never attend business
networks. Information share (INFOSHARE) is an objective value calculated from the
interviewee’s information openness (from 12 questions on the partner’s information
as listed in Table 8.5 below). The bigger the number the more information is known
about its business partner. Therefore, ‘0’ means no information about the business
partner was obtained and a larger number means more information about the
business partner (e.g. partner firm size, partner’s previous experience, business
structure and working process) was obtained. TRUST is an index calculated from all
these related variables. Each of these variables is obtained from questionnaire
questions as in Table 8.5 below. For a detailed discussion see chapter 4. The formula
for TRUST is as below:
TRUST = SUBTRUST – RISK + SIMGOAL + SIMSTRUC + SIMPROCE +
CONTRELIA + PREPUT + NETWORK + INFOSHARE34

34

It is assumed that each of these variables has an equal weighting in the formula for TRUST.
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Table 8-5 Trust variables in the questionnaire
Trust
Questions
SUBTRUST
RISK
SIMGOAL
SIMSTRUC
SIMPROCE

3.3. What is the trust level for this collaboration?
3.4. What is the risk level for this collaboration?
3.1 How similar are you and your business partner? (Please leave it blank if not sure)
Expectations and Goals
Business Structures
Working processes
CONTRELIA 2.5. The reliability level of the manager or contact person of your partner
PREPUT
2.6. How do you perceive the reputation level of your partner in its industry?
NETWORK
1.4. What role do you usually play in business networks?
INFOSHARE Part 2: Information on your partner
2.1. Country of ownership
2.2. Full-time employee numbers
2.3. Has your partner had similar collaboration experience within the last 10 years?
2.4. What role does your partner usually play in its business networks?
2.6. How do you perceive the reputation level of your partner in its industry?
Part 3: Collaboration
3.1 How similar are you and your business partner? (Please leave it blank if not sure)
Expectations and Goals
Culture backgrounds (include all ownership, contact manager and chief officers)
Languages (include all contact employees)
Religions (include all contact persons)
Technological developments
Business Structures
Working processes
Source: Questionnaire designed for this thesis

8.2.5

Control variables – communication

Communication is examined through three aspects: efficiency, understanding, and
proper frequency of communication during inter-firm collaborations (Olkkonen et
al., 2000; Elg, 2007; Zacharia et al., 2011). These characteristics have been
suggested and examined by the interviewed managers in the first round of the pilot
interviews. The formula for COMMU is as below:
COMMU = COMMEFF + COMMUND + COMMFRE35

The quality of communication is calculated by summing the efficiency of
communication (COMMEFF), understanding of communication (COMMUND), and
frequency of communication (COMMFRE). A five point Likert-type scale, from ‘1’
(less quality in communication) to ‘5’ (better quality in communication), is adopted
to measure each of these communication variables. Each of these variables is

35

It is assumed that each of these variables has an equal weighting in the formula for COMMU.

212

obtained from questionnaire question 3.2 as in Table 8.6 below. For a detailed
discussion see chapter 4.
Table 8-6 Communication variables in the questionnaire
Firm size
Questions 3.2. To what extent do you agree about the following
communication quality involved in this collaboration?
COMMEFF
Efficiency of communication
COMMUND
Understanding of communication
COMMFRE
Frequency of communication
Source: Questionnaire designed for this thesis

8.2.6

Control variables – previous experience

There is debate in the literature on the contribution of previous experience to the
performance of inter-firm collaboration. As discussed in chapter three and four, some
researchers have found that experience plays a significant role in collaboration
results and performance (Harrigan, 1986; Parkhe, 1993b; Saxton, 1997; Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Kay, 1999; Hagedoorn et al., 2003). Others have argued that experience
only contributes to certain types (same partner, same type, or within a short period)
of collaboration (Saxton, 1997; Winter and Zollo, 1999). The formula for
EXPERIENCE is as below:
EXPERIENCE = EXPERI + PEXP36

The qualitative case study for both Australia and China showed that the experiences
of a firm did not contribute significantly to inter-firm collaboration in the
telecommunications industry. Therefore, it will be further examined in the
quantitative analysis in this chapter. Collaboration experience in this chapter is the
sum of the experience of the interviewed firm (EXPERI) and the experience of its
partner firm (PEXP). A five point Likert-type scale is adopted to measure each of
them. These two variables are obtained from questionnaire questions 1.3 and 2.3 as
in Table 8.7 below. For a detailed discussion see chapter 4.

36

It is assumed that each of these variables has an equal weighting in the formula for EXPERIENCE.
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Table 8-7 Previous experience in the questionnaire
Experience Questions
EXPERI

Part 1: Information about your company
1.3. Do you have similar collaboration experience within the last 10 years?
PEXP
Part 2: Information on your partner
2.3. Does your partner have similar collaboration experience within the last 10 years?
Source: Questionnaire designed for this thesis

8.2.7

Control variables – cultural similarity (cultural difference)

An empirical cross-national study conducted by Kuada (2002) showed that partners
in different nations had limited knowledge about each other’s culture, which affected
the trust level during collaborations but had limited influence on the overall
performance and results of the inter-firm collaboration. Vilana and Monroy (2010)
argue that cultural similarity is also influenced by the external business environments
(e.g. the stability of financial market or political environment). The framework
proposed by Ronen and Shenkar (1985) included four dimensions of cultural
difference: culture, language, religion, and technology similarities, which was based
on comprehensive cultural literature. This framework was superior in identify the
different attitudes and values in different cultural cluster groups and was adopted by
many empirical studies. Therefore, it is also adopted in this thesis.

Therefore, culture similarity (CULTURE) in this thesis is examined using five
different dimensions. The dimensions include culture similarity (SIMCULT),
language similarity (SIMLANG), religion similarity (SIMREIG), and technological
similarity (SIMTECH) (Park and Ungson, 1997). LOCNAT (location and nationality
difference) is a composite measure calculated from the location distance (whether
located in the same continent) and nationality difference (measured by whether the
collaborating firms have the same nationality, including multinational firms) of the
collaborating firms. The formula for CULTURE is as below:
CULTURE = SIMCULT + SIMLANG + SIMREIG +SIMTECH + LOCNAT37
LOCNAT is calculated from questions 1.1 and 2.1 as in Table 8.8, in which ‘1’
means the nationalities are different and located continents are different (e.g. one

37

It is assumed that each of these variables has an equal weighting in the formula for CULTURE.
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firm is from Australia and the partner is from Africa), ‘2’ means either nationalities
or locations are different (e.g. one firm is from Australia and the partner is from New
Zealand) and ‘3’ means both firms have the same nationality and are located in the
same continent (e.g. both firms are from Australia or have departments in Australia).
The other four subjective measurements are obtained through a five point Likert-type
scale question 3.1, in which ‘1’ is not similar, ‘2’ is quite dissimilar, ‘3’ is neutral,
‘4’ is quite similar and ‘5’ is very similar. These variables are obtained from
questions as in Table 8.8 below. For a detailed discussion see chapter 4.
Table 8-8 Culture similarity in the questionnaire
Trust
Questions
SIMCULT
SIMLANG
SIMREIG
SIMTECH

Part 3: Collaboration
3.1 How similar are you and your business partner? (Please leave it blank if not sure)
Culture backgrounds (include all ownership, contact manager and chief officers)
Languages (include all contact employees)
Religions (include all contact persons)
Technological developments
LOCNAT
Part 1: Information on your company
1.1. Country of ownership (Please select multiple options if joint ownership)
Part 2: Information on your partner
2.1. Country of ownership (Please select multiple options if joint ownership)
Source: Questionnaire designed for this thesis

8.3

Econometric model

The second primary research question in chapter four focuses on the key
determinants of successful inter-firm collaboration. This thesis adopts a definition of
inter-firm collaboration which includes a broader range of business transactions.
Therefore, the general framework from Kale (1999) is adopted and expanded to
include some new variables that are important to inter-firm collaboration which were
identified during the qualitative case studies of Australia and China.

As discussed above, five key determinants: trust (TRUST), size (LARGESIZE as a
dummy variable for large sized firm as ‘1’ and SMEs as ‘0’), communication
(COMMU), experience (EXPERIENCE), and culture similarity (CULTURE) are
identified in this collaboration model. Three dependent variables: objective
collaboration performance (OBSUCi, i=1-12), subjective success rate (SUBSUC),
and fulfil expectations level (EXPECTED), are used in collaboration model 1 to 3.
To study the different influences of each factor on the success rate and performance
of inter-firm collaboration, an ordered probit method is adopted.
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OBSUCi = β1 LARGESIZE + β2 TRUST + β3 COMMU + β4 EXPERIENCE +
β5 CULTURE +ε

(i = 1 – 12)

(1)

SUBSUC = β1 LARGESIZE + β2 TRUST + β3 COMMU + β4 EXPERIENCE +
β5 CULTURE +ε

(2)

EXPECTED = β1 LARGESIZE + β2 TRUST + β3 COMMU + β4
EXPERIENCE + β5 CULTURE +ε

(3)

Where, OBSUCi (i = 1 – 12) are 12 objective performances or benefits brought by
inter-firm collaboration; SUBSUC is the subjective value of the final success rate by
the manager; EXPECTED is the subjective value of the fulfil expectation;
LARGESIZE is a dummy variable for large firm, “1” means large sized firm and “0”
means small or medium sized firm; TRUST is an index calculated from 9 dimensions
as discussed in the following section; COMMUNICATION is the quality of
communication in terms of efficiency, understanding and frequency; EXPERIENCE
is firm experience and its partner’s experience before the collaboration; CULTURE
is the culture similarity between the interviewed firm and its partners; and ε is an
error term. As discussed in previous sections, each control variable is obtained
through different questions via a questionnaire.

Hypothesis one to five for the second primary research question in chapter four can
be explained in the following model via the sign for firm size, trust, communication,
experience, and culture similarity as in the following specification:

Performance/Outcome = f (Size (+), Trust (+), Communication (+), Experience
(+), Culture (+)) +ε

Hypothesis six will be examined by introducing size difference in the collaboration
models and comparing its influences on the performance and success rate of interfirm collaboration with firm size from collaboration models in both Australia and
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China. Hypothesis seven will be examined by comparing the results from the
Australian and Chinese datasets.
8.4
8.4.1

Data
Source of data

The data for this analysis was collected from 341 Australian and Chinese firms
through an online survey as described in chapter four. In the end, there were 339
valid surveys in this study including 100 samples from Australia and 239 samples
from China. To reduce the complexity of this study, all of the surveys are based on
collaboration cases, without separated parts for firms and cases as in the qualitative
study in this thesis. A test for normality was carried out by analyzing the graphics of
a single series and computing the skewness and kurtosis for each variable in
Australia and China.
8.4.2

Basic descriptive statistics

The basic descriptive statistics for the Chinese and Australian results are described in
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 below. Different sized firms (micro, small, medium, and large) are
included in this study. This study also included foreign owned firms and
multinational firms.
As shown in Table 8.9, there are a total of 239 samples in the Chinese database,
including 209 (87.5%) local firms and 30 (12.5%) foreign firms. There are 12
multinational firms in the 30 foreign firms. In terms of firm size, there are 79 micro
sized firms (less than 5 employees), 60 small sized firms (5-100 employees), 25
medium sized (100-500 employees) and 75 large sized firms (more than 500
employees) in the studied Chinese sample. The independent variables: trust,
communication, experience and culture similarity, follow a normal distribution. The
standard deviation for trust, communication, experience and culture are 4.17, 1.92,
2.32 and 4.76 respectively. The subjective success rate: SUBSUC (subjective success
rate) and EXPECTED (fulfil expectations level) follow a normal distribution with
mean values around 2.6. However, the objective performances have high skewness
towards ‘0’ (no benefits).
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Table 8-9 Quantitative survey of Chinese firms
Basic Descriptive Statistics - Total sample:
China
239
Type
Firm type
Local owned
209 (87.5%)
Size
(* defined by China)
Firm Size
micro
79 (33.1%)
Independent
Mean
32.23
Trust
Communication 7.70
6.19
Experience
17.08
Culture
Performance & Success
Mean
OBSTEC
2.22
OBSCMP
1.76
OBSMSH
1.66
OBSCOS
2.12
OBSRND
1.72
OBSMIF
2.44
OBSPFT
2.26
OBSPDT
1.59
OBSQLT
1.60
OBSINO
1.64
OBSGOV
1.46
OBSPGM
1.56
SUBSUC
3.41
EXPECTED
3.38

Foreign owned (Multinational)
30 (12.5%)
12 (5%)
small
60 (25.1%)
Std. Dev.
4.17
1.92
2.32
4.76
Std. Dev.
2.10
2.00
1.89
2.11
2.04
2.09
1.95
1.90
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.99
1.09
1.07

medium
25 (10.5%)
Min.
11
2
1
1
Min.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

large
75 (31.4%)
Max.
43
12
11
23
Max.
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Source: Data collected in this thesis

As shown in Table 8.10, there are a total of 100 samples in the Australian database,
including 96 (96%) local firms and 4 (4%) foreign firms. There is only 1
multinational firm of the 4 foreign firms. In terms of firm size, there are 91 micro
sized firms (less than 5 employees), 2 small sized firms (5-19 employees), 2 medium
sized (20-199 employees) and 5 large sized firms (more than 200 employees) in the
studied Australian samples. In 2011 SMEs accounted for 99.7% of all businesses in
Australia, and small businesses constituted 91% of all businesses (85.2% of total
businesses are micro sized) (ACCC, 2009).
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Table 8-10 Quantitative survey of Australian firms
Basic Descriptive Statistics - Total sample:
Australia
100
Type
Firm type

Local owned

96 (96%)
Size
(* defined by Australia)
Firm Size
micro
91 (91%)
Independent
Mean
32.11
Trust
Communication 8.10
5.43
Experience
14.90
Culture
Performance & Success
Mean
OBSTEC
1.42
OBSCMP
1.30
OBSMSH
0.37
OBSCOS
2.80
OBSRND
0.50
OBSMIF
1.89
OBSPFT
0.68
OBSPDT
0.47
OBSQLT
0.73
OBSINO
0.50
OBSGOV
0.39
OBSPGM
0.92
SUBSUC
3.73
EXPECTED
3.43

Foreign
owned
4 (4%)
small
2 (2%)
Std. Dev.
3.84
1.86
2.09
4.09
Std. Dev.
2.14
2.08
1.16
2.31
0.41
2.32
1.55
1.33
1.67
1.40
1.31
1.89
1.00
1.02

(Multinational)
1 (1%)
medium
2 (2%)
Min.
22
3
2
5
Min.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

large
5 (5%)
Max.
43
12
11
23
Max.
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Source: Data collected in this thesis

Compared with the Chinese dataset the percentages of local firms and micro firms
are higher in Australia. The subjective success measures are higher with lower
standard deviations in Australia than in China. However, the objective performances
are much lower in Australia than in China. The mean values for trust, experience and
culture similarity are lower in Australian inter-firm collaborations. However, the
mean values for communication are higher in Australia than in China.
8.4.3

Separated results for different sized firms

To examine the influence of firm size on different perspectives of collaboration
performance and the different returns for Australian and Chinese firms, a cross-
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tabulation method is adopted in both the Chinese and Australian different firm size
analysis. The results are shown in Tables 8.11 and 8.12:
Table 8-11 Chinese results for different sized firms
China

OBSTEC

Small 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
Medium 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
Large 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
All size +
China

OBSPDT

Small 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
Medium 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
Large 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal

62
3
7
16
16
35
139
5
2
4
4
4
6
75
33
2
3
11
13
13
25
139
83
4
7
12
19
14
139
7
0
5
6
6
1
75
40
1
7
7
13
7
25

%

45
2.2
5
12
12
25
100
20
8
16
16
16
24
100
44
2.7
4
15
17
17
100
%

60
2.9
5
8.6
14
10
100
28
0
20
24
24
4
100
53
1.3
9.3
9.3
17
9.3
100

OBSCMP

77
1
7
17
14
23
139
6
0
4
2
10
3
75
43
1
9
6
7
9
25
114
OBSQLT

86
4
10
14
14
11
139
5
3
1
2
9
5
75
40
2
4
6
9
14
25

%

55
0.7
5
12
10
17
100
24
0
16
8
40
12
100
57
1.3
12
8
9.3
12
100
%

62
2.9
7.2
10
10
7.9
100
20
12
4
8
36
20
100
53
2.7
5.3
8
12
19
100

All size +
109
108
Source: Data collected in this thesis

OBSMSH

93
1
7
15
17
6
139
2
1
3
6
9
4
75
30
3
5
13
15
9
25
114
OBSINO

83
4
5
18
18
11
139
7
2
2
5
4
5
75
39
1
6
6
10
13
25

%

OBSCOS

67
0.7
5
11
12
4.3
100
8
4
12
24
36
16
100
40
4
6.7
17
20
12
100
%

69
3
6
14
16
31
139
9
0
0
5
8
3
75
30
0
3
10
18
14
25
131
OBSGOV

60
2.9
3.6
13
13
7.9
100
28
8
8
20
16
20
100
52
1.3
8
8
13
17
100

92
1
6
11
9
20
139
10
0
3
5
4
3
75
43
3
3
7
11
8
25

110

94
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%

50
2.2
4.3
10
12
22
100
36
0
0
20
32
12
100
40
0
4
13
24
19
100
%

66
0.7
4.3
7.9
6.5
14
100
40
0
12
20
16
12
100
57
4
4
9.3
15
11
100

OBSRND

86
1
7
13
18
14
139
8
0
3
2
6
6
75
37
1
4
9
6
18
25
108
OBSPGM

87
4
6
15
7
20
139
7
0
1
3
10
4
75
44
1
6
4
11
9
25
101

%

62
0.7
5
9.4
13
10
100
32
0
12
8
24
24
100
49
1.3
5.3
12
8
24
100
%

63
2.9
4.3
11
5
14
100
28
0
4
12
40
16
100
59
1.3
8
5.3
15
12
100

OBSMIF

58
3
7
16
15
39
139
3
1
1
7
8
5
75
26
4
5
10
13
17
25
151
EXPECTED

%

42
2.2
5.1
12
11
28
100
12
4
4
28
32
20
100
35
5.3
6.7
13
17
23
100
%

OBSPFT

71
4
11
16
19
18
139
1
0
4
10
6
3
75
17
2
3
16
22
15
25
150
SUBSUC

%

51
2.9
7.9
12
14
13
100
4.2
0
17
42
25
13
100
23
2.7
4
21
29
20
100
%

2 1.4
69 50
29 21
25 18
14 10
139 100

16 12
44 32
46 33
21 15
12 8.6
139 100

3 12
14 56
6 24
2 8
0 0
75 100

3 12
14 56
6 24
2 8
0 0
75 100

13 17
42 56
11 15
3 4
6 8
25 100

13 17
38 51
15 20
3 4
6 8
25 100
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Table 8-12 Australian results for different sized firms
Australia

OBSTEC

Small 0

67
1
0
1
2
22
93
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
1
1
1
2
0
5
33

1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
Medium 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
Large 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
All size +

OBSPDT
Small 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
Medium 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
Large 0
1
2
3
4
5
Subtotal
All size +

86
1
0
1
1
4
93
0
0
0
1
0
1
2
1
1
1
0
2
0
5
13

%

72
1.1
0
1.1
2.2
24
100
0
0
0
100
0
0
100
0
20
20
20
40
0
100
%

92
1.1
0
1.1
1.1
4.3
100
0
0
0
50
0
50
100
20
20
20
0
40
0
100

OBSCMP

70
0
0
1
4
18
93
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
1
0
3
0
5
29
OBSQLT

81
0
1
0
1
10
93
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
0
1
5
17

%

75
0
0
1.1
4.3
19
100
0
0
0
50
50
0
100
20
0
20
0
60
0
100
%

87
0
1.1
0
1.1
11
100
0
0
0
100
0
0
100
40
0
0
40
0
20
100

OBSMSH

89
0
1
0
1
2
93
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
1
0
3
0
5
10
OBSINO

86
0
1
0
1
5
93
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
2
0
0
0
3
0
5
12

%

96
0
1.1
0
1.1
2.2
100
0
0
0
50
50
0
100
20
0
20
0
60
0
100
%

92
0
1.1
0
1.1
5.4
100
0
0
0
50
50
0
100
40
0
0
0
60
0
100

OBSCOS

38
0
1
1
9
44
93
0
0
1
1
0
0
2
0
1
0
3
1
0
5
62
OBSGOV

89
0
0
0
0
4
93
0
0
0
1
0
1
2
2
1
0
0
0
2
5
9

%

41
0
1.1
1.1
9.7
47
100
0
0
50
50
0
0
100
0
20
0
60
20
0
100
%

96
0
0
0
0
4.3
100
0
0
0
50
0
50
100
40
20
0
0
0
40
100

OBSRND

86
0
0
0
2
5
93
0
0
1
0
0
1
2
2
0
1
0
2
0
5
12
OBSPGM

%

92
0
0
0
2.2
5.4
100
0
0
50
0
0
50
100
40
0
20
0
40
0
100
%

78 84
0 0
0 0
1 1.1
1 1.1
13 14
93 100
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 50
0 0
1 50
2 100
2 40
0 0
1 20
0 0
0 0
2 40
5 100
20

OBSMIF

%

59
0
0
1
4
29
93
0
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
1
4
0
5
41
EXPECTED

63
0
0
1.1
4.3
31
100
0
0
50
0
50
0
100
0
0
0
20
80
0
100
%

OBSPFT

80
0
2
1
3
7
93
0
0
1
0
1
0
2
2
1
0
1
1
0
5
18
SUBSUC

%

86
0
2.2
1.1
3.2
7.5
100
0
0
50
0
50
0
100
40
20
0
20
20
0
100
%

4 4.3
54 58
17 18
12 13
6 6.5
93 100

21 23
40 43
20 22
10 11
2 2.2
93 100

0 0
1 50
0 0
0 0
1 50
2 100

0 0
1 50
0 0
1 50
0 0
2 100

2 40
2 40
1 20
0 0
0 0
5 100
100

2 40
1 20
2 40
0 0
0 0
5 100
100

Source: Data collected in this thesis

As shown in Table 8.11, in China the top returns from inter-firm collaboration for
small sized firms are OBSTEC – access new technology, OBSCOS – cost saving and
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OBSMIF – increase market influence. The top returns for medium sized firms are
OBSMSH – increase market share and OBSMIF - increase market influence. The top
returns for large sized firms are OBSMIF – increase market influence and OBSPFT –
increase profitability. The top benefits for all sized firms in China are OBSMIF –
increase market influence and OBSPFT – increase profitability.

As shown in Table 8.12, in Australia the top returns from inter-firm collaboration for
small sized firms are OBSCOS – cost saving and OBSMIF – increase market
influence. As the number of medium sized firms is too small (only 2 cases), there are
no outstanding benefits for medium sized firms in Australia. The top return for large
sized firms is OBSMIF – increase market influence. The top benefit for all sized
firms in Australia is OBSCOS – cost saving, which is much higher than all the other
returns.

From these results there is a clear trend for inter-firm collaboration for different sized
firms. Small sized firms are more likely to collaborate on cost saving and increasing
market influence and large sized firms focus more on their market influence and
profitability in both Australia and China. Therefore, Chinese businesses target more
on increasing profits or market influence in their inter-firm collaborations. However,
for Australian businesses, decreasing production cost is more important in inter-firm
collaborations. Given the different results generated from Australian and Chinese
datasets, the benefits coming from inter-firm collaboration are very different in
different countries. Are the performances of collaborations also influenced by
different factors in different countries? To answer this question the results are
examined via a quantitative data analysis method in the following section.
8.5
8.5.1

Data analyses and results
Performance and objective returns

The objective returns in collaboration model (1) are conducted by an Ordered Probit
method38. The datasets for China and Australia are analysed separately.

38

Another Probit model has been tested for this study (using a dummy variable for OBSUCi in model
1). Although the adjusted R² is slightly higher than the Ordered Probit model, the significance levels
and signs of the coefficients are not significantly different.
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Table 8-13 Benefits from collaboration - China
VARIABLES

OBSTEC

OBSCMP

OBSMSH

OBSCOS

OBSRND

OBSMIF

LARGESIZE

-0.221
(0.169)
0.0400*
(0.0229)
–0.0921**
(0.0437)
0.0263
(0.0358)
-0.0540***
(0.0177)
OBSPFT

-0.372**
(0.179)
0.0851***
(0.0248)
0.0141
(0.0466)
-0.00643
(0.0381)
-0.132***
(0.0195)
OBSPDT

0.290*
(0.172)
0.0956***
(0.0246)
0.00217
(0.0464)
0.00881
(0.0376)
-0.140***
(0.0194)
OBSQLT

0.0222
(0.170)
-0.00204
(0.0225)
0.0773*
(0.0442)
0.0330
(0.0361)
-0.0440**
(0.0177)
OBSINO

0.244
(0.176)
0.0474*
(0.0247)
0.0115
(0.0470)
-0.0331
(0.0380)
-0.114***
(0.0192)
OBSGOV

-0.0263
(0.166)
0.0433*
(0.0226)
0.0041
(0.0433)
-0.0287
(0.0356)
-0.0435**
(0.0176)
OBSPGM

0.121
(0.175)
0.0739***
(0.0246)
0.0125
(0.0464)
-0.117***
(0.0382)
-0.113***
(0.0192)

0.104
(0.176)
0.0793***
(0.0245)
0.00784
(0.0467)
-0.0213
(0.0382)
-0.125***
(0.0193)

0.182
(0.174)
0.0633***
(0.0243)
0.0186
(0.0462)
-0.0660*
(0.0375)
-0.102***
(0.0189)

-0.119
(0.182)
0.0371
(0.0250)
0.0261
(0.0477)
0.0299
(0.0391)
-0.120***
(0.0197)

-0.150
(0.184)
0.0587**
(0.0258)
0.0731
(0.0485)
-0.0175
(0.0396)
-0.164***
(0.0207)

TRUST
COMMU
EXPERIENCE
CULTURE
VARIABLES
LARGESIZE

0.540***
(0.165)
TRUST
0.0815***
(0.0228)
COMMU
0.0136
(0.0434)
EXPERIENCE
-0.0587*
(0.0356)
CULTURE
-0.0659***
(0.0176)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Data collected in this thesis

As shown in Table 8.13, the objective performances of inter-firm collaboration are
influenced by different factors in terms of different returns. However, in general,
TRUST plays a significant positive role in most of the objective returns (except
OBSCOS - cost saving and OBSGOV – access to government programs) in China.
CULTURE plays a significant negative role in all objective returns in China, which
is the opposite of what might be expected. COMMU has a significant negative
influence on OBSTEC – access to new technology and a significant positive
influence (at the 10% level) on OBSCOS – cost saving in China. LARGESIZE has a
significant negative influence on OBSCMP – increase global competitiveness and
significant positive influence on OBSMSH – increase market share and OBSPFT increase profitability in China. On the other hand, EXPERIENCE has a significant
negative influence on OBSPFT – increase profitability, OBSPDT – increase

223

productivity and OBSINO – increase innovation in China. These results compare
with the Australian results in Table 8.14:
Table 8-14 Benefits from collaboration - Australia
VARIABLES

OBSTEC

LARGESIZE

1.029*
(0.567)
0.0829*
(0.0440)
0.339***
(0.0966)
-0.162*
(0.0856)
-0.0618
(0.0390)
OBSPFT

TRUST
COMMU
EXPERIENCE
CULTURE
VARIABLES
LARGESIZE

OBSCMP
0.964*
(0.572)
-0.0828*
(0.0441)
0.115
(0.0876)
-0.138*
(0.0803)
0.0511
(0.0381)
OBSPDT

1.045*
1.107*
(0.596)
(0.604)
TRUST
0.0429
-0.00835
(0.0464)
(0.0506)
COMMU
0.062
0.16
(0.0943)
(0.112)
EXPERIENCE
-0.101
0.0402
(0.0851)
(0.103)
CULTURE
-0.0240
0.0459
(0.0416)
(0.0509)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Data collected in this thesis

OBSMSH

OBSCOS

OBSRND

OBSMIF

1.110*
(0.598)
-0.115*
(0.0660)
-0.0256
(0.110)
0.228**
(0.113)
0.0860
(0.0625)
OBSQLT

-0.501
(0.533)
0.0305
(0.0387)
0.165**
(0.0770)
0.0393
(0.0710)
0.0603*
(0.0347)
OBSINO

1.120*
(0.607)
-0.00953
(0.0519)
0.0181
(0.102)
-0.0286
(0.0927)
-0.00581
(0.0451)
OBSGOV

1.112**
(0.545)
0.0223
(0.0413)
–0.163**
(0.0769)
-0.132*
(0.0738)
-0.0263
(0.0352)
OBSPGM

0.672
(0.595)
0.0395
(0.0481)
0.0179
(0.0939)
0.103
(0.0897)
-0.0106
(0.0433)

1.315**
(0.652)
0.0373
(0.0526)
0.154
(0.114)
-0.0848
(0.110)
0.0632
(0.0523)

2.103***
(0.814)
-0.223**
(0.110)
0.167
(0.160)
0.0333
(0.152)
0.325**
(0.146)

1.283**
(0.633)
-0.0880*
(0.0502)
-0.0452
(0.0917)
-0.0662
(0.0858)
0.0494
(0.0420)

As shown in Table 8.14, the Australian results are different from the Chinese ones.
In general, LARGESIZE plays a significant positive role in most of the objective
returns (except OBSCOS - cost saving and OBSQLT – increase product quality) in
Australia. CULTURE plays a significant positive role on OBSCOS – cost saving and
OBSGOV - access to government programs in Australia. TRUST plays a significant
positive role on OBSTEC – access new technology but a significant negative role on
OBSCMP – increase global competitiveness, OBSMSH – increase market share,
OBSGOV – access to government program and OBSPGM – participate in the global
market in Australia. COMMU has a significant positive influence on OBSTEC –
access new technology and OBSCOS – cost saving and has a significant negative
influence on OBSMIF – increase market influence in Australia. EXPERIENCE has a
significant negative influence on OBSTEC – access new technology, OBSCMP –
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increase global competitiveness and OBSMIF – increase market influence but has a
significant positive influence on OBSMSH - increase market share in Australia. On
the other hand, culture similarity has a positive influence on OBSCOS – cost saving
and OBSGOV – access to government programs in Australia.

Compared with the Chinese results, TRUST plays a less important role in Australian
inter-firm collaborations in terms of objective performance or returns. It even has a
significant negative influence on most of the objective performances in Australia.
However, LARGESIZE plays a more important role in Australia than in China in
terms of collaboration performance. CULTURE plays a more positive role in
collaboration performance in Australia than in China. The objective performance in
Australia and China has been influenced by very different factors. Is there any
difference between the subjective success rate and fulfilling expectation levels in
Australia and China (as in collaboration models 2 and 3)? To answer this question
the subjective results from both Australia and China are tested and compared in
collaboration model (2) and (3), in the following section.
8.5.2

Subjective success rate and fulfilling expectations

The subjective success rate and fulfilling expectation levels for both Australia and
China in collaboration models (2) and (3) are examined via an ordered probit
method. The Chinese and Australian results are compared in the following tables.

As shown in Table 8.15 the subjective success rate (collaboration model 2) for interfirm collaboration in Australia and China are influenced by similar factors. TRUST
and COMMU play a significant positive role on the subjective success rate in both
Australia and China. CULTURE plays a significant negative role on the subjective
success rate in both Australia and China. EXPERIENCE has no significant influence
on the subjective success rate of collaboration in either Australia or China. However,
LARGESIZE plays a significant positive role (at the 5% level) only in China but not
in Australia. These results are different from the objective performances, in which
LARGESIZE plays a more important role in business performance in Australia than
in China.
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Table 8-15 Subjective success rates – Australia and China
VARIABLES
LARGESIZE
TRUST
COMMU
EXPERIENCE
CULTURE

CHINA
SUBSUC

AUSTRALIA
SUBSUC

0.371**
(0.169)
0.130***
(0.0231)
0.278***
(0.0456)
-0.0281
(0.0352)
-0.0330*
(0.0173)

0.105
(0.562)
0.137***
(0.0384)
0.311***
(0.0737)
-0.00809
(0.0641)
-0.0786**
(0.0321)

Observations
239
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Data collected in this thesis

100

Table 8.16 shows the results of fulfilling expectation levels (collaboration model 3)
for inter-firm collaboration in Australia and China. LARGESIZE, TRUST and
COMMU play a significant and positive role in fulfilling expectation levels in both
Australia and China. CULTURE plays a significant negative role in fulfilling
expectation levels in both Australia and China. The coefficient for EXPERIENCE is
not significant at all levels in models (2) and (3) in Australia or China. This result
accords with the subjective success rate.
Table 8-16 Fulfilling expectation levels – Australia and China
VARIABLES
LARGESIZE
TRUST
COMMU
EXPERIENCE
CULTURE

CHINA
EXPECTED

AUSTRALIA
EXPECTED

0.580***
(0.178)
0.121***
(0.0233)
0.217***
(0.0456)
-0.000887
(0.0361)
-0.0387**
(0.0177)

1.338**
(0.610)
0.160***
(0.0406)
0.257***
(0.0764)
-0.0384
(0.0679)
-0.0736**
(0.0336)

Observations
239
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Data collected in this thesis

100
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As the results for both the subjective success rate and fulfilling expectation levels are
very similar, the two variables are assumed to be replaceable with each other.
Therefore, a sign test is conducted to verify the H0: median of EXPECTED –
SUBSUC = 0.

As shown in Table 8.17 the binomial for a two-sided test is 0.6488. Therefore, the
H0 cannot be rejected. As shown in Tables 8.15 and 8.16, the coefficients of the
independent variables for fulfilling expectations in collaboration model (3) are more
significant than the results for the subjective success rate in collaboration model (2)
for both Australia and China.
Table 8-17 Sign test for subjective variables
Sign test
sign
observed
expected
positive
36
38.5
negative
41
38.5
zero
162
162
Two-sided test:
Ho: median of EXPECTED – SUBSUC = 0 vs.
Ha: median of EXPECTED – SUBSUC != 0 (<>)
Pr(#positive >= 41 or #negative >= 41) =
min(1, 2*Binomial(n = 77, x >= 41, p = 0.5))

=

0.6488

Source: Data collected in this thesis

8.5.3

Residual test

As shown in Figure 8.2 the residual test shows an estimated normal distribution with
a bell shaped curve. The skewness and kurtosis of the residuals are --0.39 and 1.81
for the Chinese samples. This meets the assumption of normally distributed error
terms.
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Figure 8.2 Residuals test for normality - China

Source: Data collected in this thesis

As shown in Figure 8.3 the residual test shows an estimated normal distribution with
a bell shaped curve. The skewness and kurtosis of the residuals are -0.72 and 2.17 for
the Australian samples. It meets the assumption of normally distributed error terms.
Figure 8.3 Residuals test for normality - Australia

Source: Data collected in this thesis

8.5.4

Stability and specification test

No economic model can avoid the omitted variable problem. The adjusted goodness
of fit index in this model is only 0.16, which shows that there may be omitted
variables for this model. As inter-firm collaboration involves a very complex
interaction between firms it is related to almost all the departments, individuals, and
backgrounds of a firm, and it is different in any specific case. Therefore, the designed
questionnaire would be large if all the related stories are included. As a result, the
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response rate would likely be low. There are always tradeoffs in such survey
research.

Furthermore, some variables are not available or are unable to be published (e.g.
financial data from a micro firm or the maintaining fees for Guan Xi in Chinese
collaborations). As this study includes most micro and small firms, some of these
factors are excluded from this thesis although they could be important to inter-firm
collaboration. Therefore, the questionnaire used in this study has focused only on the
most important factors39.
8.5.5

Replace size with size difference

To examine hypothesis six for the second primary research question “Size difference
has a positive influence on inter-firm collaboration. It can be used to replace size in
collaboration model”, SIZEDIF (size difference) is used to replace the independent
variable LARGESIZE in the collaboration model (1) – (3). The results are shown in
Table 8.18 for the Chinese dataset and Table 8.19 for the Australian dataset.

As shown in Table 8.18, SIZEDIF is negatively related to the subjective success rate
and fulfilling expectation levels of inter-firm collaboration in the Chinese samples.
The signs and significance levels of the remaining coefficients are the same as those
for models with LARGESIZE (as in the upper table). Although the significance
levels of some of the coefficients for objective performance are slightly different,
there is no big change. Therefore, the results support hypothesis 6 “it is possible to
replace size with size difference in the collaboration models”. The results for the
Australian samples are examined and compared in Table 8.19.

39

The correlation between the independent variables in the collaboration model is expected to be high
because of the 5 point-Likert scale measurement. However, if the index for each independent variable
is changed into a continuous form (divided by a constant value), the correlation has been solved and
the significance level of each variable has no significant change.
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Table 8-18 Using size difference to replace size - China
China
OBSTEC
OBSCMP
OBSMSH
OBSCOS
OBSRND
OBSMIF
OBSPFT
OBSPDT
OBSQLT
OBSINO
OBSGOV
OBSPGM
subsuc
expected
China
OBSTEC
OBSCMP
OBSMSH
OBSCOS
OBSRND
OBSMIF
OBSPFT
OBSPDT
OBSQLT
OBSINO
OBSGOV
OBSPGM
subsuc
expected

LARGESIZE TRUST COMMU
(+)*
(-)**
(-)**
(+)***
(+)*
(+)***
(+)*
(+)*
(+)*
(+)***
(+)***
(+)***
(+)***
(+)***

(+)**
(+)***
SIZEDIF
(+)**

(+)*
(-)***

(-)**
(-)***

EXPERIENCE CULTURE
(-)***
(-)***
(-)***
(-)**
(-)***
(-)**
(-)*
(-)***
(-)***
(-)***
(-)***
(-)*
(-)***
(-)***
(+)**
(-)***
(+)*** (+)***
(-)*
(+)*** (+)***
(-)**
TRUST COMMU EXPERIENCE CULTURE
(-)**
(-)***
(+)**
(-)***
(+)***
(-)***
(+)*
(-)***
(+)*
(-)***
(+)*
(-)**
(+)***
(-)***
(+)**
(-)**
(-)***
(+)**
(-)***
(+)*
(-)***
(-)***
(-)**
(-)***
(+)*** (+)***
(-)**
(+)*** (+)***
(-)***

Source: Data collected in this thesis

As shown in Table 8.19, SIZEDIF has no significant role in the subjective success
rate and fulfilling expectation levels of inter-firm collaboration in the Australian
samples. However, the signs and significance levels of the remaining coefficients are
the same as those for models with LARGESIZE (as in the upper table). Although
some coefficients for size difference are different in the objective performances,
there is no big change in the other coefficients. Therefore, the results also support
hypothesis 6. It is possible to replace size with size difference in collaboration
models. Another result is that the sign of the coefficient for SIZEDIF is negative (the
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sign of LARGESIZE is positive), which implies that collaborations with smaller
partners are easier to achieve success.
Table 8-19 Using size difference to replace size - Australia
Australia
OBSTEC
OBSCMP
OBSMSH
OBSCOS
OBSRND
OBSMIF
OBSPFT
OBSPDT
OBSQLT
OBSINO
OBSGOV
OBSPGM
subsuc
expected
Australia
OBSTEC
OBSCMP
OBSMSH
OBSCOS
OBSRND
OBSMIF
OBSPFT
OBSPDT
OBSQLT
OBSINO
OBSGOV
OBSPGM
subsuc
expected

LARGESIZE
(+)*
(+)*
(+)*

TRUST COMMU EXPERIENCE CULTURE
(+)*
(+)***
(-)*
(-)*
(-)*
(-)*
(+)**
(+)**
(+)*

(+)*
(+)**
(+)*
(+)*
(+)**
(+)***
(+)**
(+)**
SIZEDIF
(-)*
(-)***

(-)**

(-)*

(-)**
(+)**
(-)*
(+)*** (+)***
(-)**
(+)*** (+)***
(-)**
TRUST COMMU EXPERIENCE CULTURE
(+)***
(-)**
(+)**
(-)**
(+)***
(+)**

(+)*
(-)*
(-)*
(-)**
(+)***
(+)***

(+)**
(+)***
(+)***
(+)***

(-)**
(-)**

Source: Data collected in this thesis

8.6

Discussion of results

The second primary research question proposed the question “What are the key
determinants of successful inter-firm collaboration?” with seven hypotheses. This
question has been answered through the previous data analysis. The answers to the
seven hypotheses and their implications are now discussed.

(1) Trust
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The data analysis suggests that trust is significantly related with the subjective
success rate and fulfilling expectation levels. The results are consistent with findings
from the alliances and collaboration literature (Granovetter, 1985; Borch, 1994;
Brunetto and Rod, 2007). Trust was also mentioned as a key determinant of
successful inter-firm collaboration by managers during interviews in both Australia
and China. The results accord with the qualitative results in chapters 6 and 7. Trust
plays a vital role in inter-firm collaboration in both Australia and China.

On the other hand trust also influences or is influenced by, other variables.
Communication, previous experience, and culture similarity may have a positive
influence on the trust level. A higher trust level also has a positive influence on the
quality of communication and the accumulation of experience.

However, separate regressions on objective returns and subjective views on the
success rate in this study showed that trust is less significant to the objective
performance than to the subjective success rate. The regressions supported that trust
plays a more important role in Chinese inter-firm collaborations than that for
Australian inter-firm collaborations. Trust is especially important in the selection and
formation of inter-firm collaboration. It also plays an important role in long-term
consistent collaboration.

(2) Communication
Communication is believed to play an important role in inter-firm collaboration.
Many research results support this view (Heide and Miner, 1992; Kay, 1993; Gulati,
1998). Data analysis in this thesis also supports the view that communication is
positively related with the business collaborating success rate and the fulfilment of
expectation levels. It plays a more important role in the subjective success rate than
in the objective performance in inter-firm collaboration. It is significant to inter-firm
collaboration in both Australia and China. The results are in accord with the
qualitative results reported in chapters 6 and 7. Proper communication plays an
important role in inter-firm collaboration in both Australia and China.

In inter-firm collaboration communication is important to build and maintain a trust
relationship, reduce risks and control uncertainties, accumulate good experience, and
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increase the possibility of further collaboration. It is vital to not only inter-firm
collaborations, but also business performance and growth in the long run.

(3) Previous experience
Previous literature on alliances suggests that one of the most important factors in an
alliance success is previous alliance experience (Anand and Khanna, 2000).
However, Anand and Khanna (2000) and Kale (1999; 1999) also observe that,
although significant, experience contributed only a limited proportion to inter-firm
collaboration. The research results presented in this study suggests that previous
experience is not significant or even has a negative relationship with the objective
returns. It has no significant influence on the subjective success rate and the
fulfilment of expectation levels in either Australia or China. The qualitative results
from the interviewed managers (as reported in chapters 6 and 7) also suggested that
the previous experience from neither the interviewed firm nor its partner is important
for current inter-firm collaboration.

One possible explanation for this result is the sample selection. This study focused
on telecommunications and related industries, which are highly dynamic and newly
developed industries. Firms in these industries are mostly newly established firms
with less experience than firms in other traditional industries. Furthermore, they need
to change their strategies and products with high frequency to suit the newly
emerging technology and customer requirements. Therefore, previous experience
may play a less important role or even negative role in these inter-firm
collaborations. The results also underscore the fact that collaboration research should
be designed specifically for different industries. Previous research results may not be
applicable for new industries.

(4) Size
The contribution of firm size to business collaborating performance and outcomes
are intensely debated. Some believe that firm size is important to the performance of
inter-firm collaborations (Berg et al., 1982; Harrigan, 1988; Hagedoorn and
Schakenraad, 1994), others argue that firm size makes a limited contribution to
collaboration outcomes (Oxley, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997). Another problem
with previous research on firm size is the different definitions of firm size. Previous
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definitions of firm size usually use assets, sales amount, exchange market returns,
turnover, and global employee numbers of a firm. As discussed in chapter 4, some of
these definitions have drawbacks as they exclude most micro and small firms.
Therefore, this thesis categorised firm size into different size categories by the
official definition of firm size in Australia and China.

The research results from this thesis support the view that size plays a significant role
in inter-firm collaboration. Large sized firms are more likely to achieve a higher
collaboration performance and success rate. However, the separate regressions for
the different countries showed that size only plays an important role in the subjective
success measures but not for the objective returns in China. However, size plays a
more important role in objective returns than the subjective success rate in Australia.
One possible explanation is the different views on firm size in different cultures. In
China, bigger firms usually have higher profits and industry reputation. Firms usually
grow bigger as soon as they have enough funds. However, more than 99% of firms
are SMEs in Australia (ACCC, 2009). Firms prefer keeping their small or micro sizes
and some smaller firms have higher profits compared to that of big firms in
Australia. Firms only grow bigger when they need to expand (e.g. access new
markets or are jointly invested by another venture).

(5) Culture similarity
Empirical research by Kuada (2002) suggested that expectations for inter-firm
collaboration may differ in developed and developing countries. Vilana and Monroy
(2010) found that collaborators with similar firm cultures reach high assessments of
satisfaction, learning and collaboration efficiency. However, Reus and Rotting
(2009) found the objective measures of cultural distance show a weak positive effect
and subjective measures show a negative effect on collaborating performance in
China. Kim and Park (2002) also found in their empirical study that cultural
similarity has a weak negative relationship with value creation in inter-firm
collaboration.

Data analysis in this thesis supported some of these literature results. In terms of the
subjective measure, culture similarity has significant negative influences on the
collaboration success rate and the fulfilment of expectation levels in both Australia
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and China. In other words the more different the cultural backgrounds of the
collaborating firms, the more successful is likely to be the inter-firm collaboration.
However, for objective performances culture similarity plays a different role in
Australia and China. It has a significant negative influence on all the objective
performances of Chinese inter-firm collaborations. However, it plays a significant
positive role in some of the Australian collaboration performances.

One possible explanation for the different results is that Australia and China have
different culture backgrounds. Managers in Australia and China also have different
views on the cultural difference. Australia has a mixed culture background with the
majority of immigrants from different cultural backgrounds. Australian firms usually
have better knowledge and understanding of different cultures and how to
communicate with different people. On the other hand China has a strong and
traditional culture, which is different from most other countries. However, Chinese
firms usually have a positive view and good respect of foreign cultures. When
collaborating with foreign partners, Chinese firms usually follow the working
process and customs of its foreign partner. They also put more commitment into such
collaboration in comparison to local collaborations, because collaborations with
foreign partners usually bring higher profits. Therefore, more resources and effort are
usually put in such collaborations, which, as a result, usually increase the
performance and success rate of those collaborations.

Another possible explanation is, theoretically, that culture is a kind of resource of the
firm. Therefore, different cultural backgrounds may represent complementary
resources of the collaborating firms, which may increase the possibility of successful
collaboration. This is also supported by the resource based view (Richardson, 1972;
Jiang and Tao, 2010).

(6) Size difference
Size difference also affected the performance and success of collaboration (Chandler,
1962; Rumelt, 1974; Berg et al., 1982; Porter, 1987; Shan and Hamilton, 1991;
Burgers et al., 1993). Therefore, SIZEDIF is used to replace LARGESIZE in
collaboration models (1) – (3). The results in Tables 8.18 and 8.19 show that size
difference plays a negative role in inter-firm collaboration. Therefore, collaborations
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with larger or peer sized firms are more likely to fail or have lower performances.
The qualitative results in chapters 6 and 7 show that firms prefer peer sized or larger
sized partners in their inter-firm collaborations because large firms possess more
resources and assets. However, the quantitative results suggest that business should
consider collaborations with smaller partners to achieve a higher performance and
success rate. A possible explanation is that similar sized firms usually contribute
equally into the collaboration, which helps establish stable relationships. The
adoption of a large firm’s strategies may have negative influences on its smaller
partners. On the other hand the results also suggest that it is possible to use size
difference as an independent variable in these models.

(7) Country difference
The separate regressions conducted for the two countries suggested that firm size,
trust, communication, previous experience and culture similarity play very different
roles in inter-firm collaborations in Australia and China. The results also underscore
the fact that collaboration research should be conducted separately for different
countries. A factor that proved to be vital to inter-firm collaboration in one country is
not necessarily important in another country (Kuada, 2002). The results are also in
accord with the qualitative results in chapters 6 and 7. A factor that proved to be vital
to inter-firm collaboration in one country is not necessarily important in another
country.

The results of the quantitative study shed light on how to conduct and improve interfirm collaborations in Australia and China. Compared with the qualitative results,
this chapter provided more support for previous hypotheses and the literature. It also
answered the second primary research question on the key determinants for interfirm collaboration in Australia and China.
8.7

Conclusions

The quantitative study makes several important contributions to the collaboration
research literature. First, it verifies the contribution of each independent variable to
objective returns and the subjective success rate of inter-firm collaboration. Trust
makes a lesser contribution to objective performance than to subjective results in
inter-firm collaboration. On the other hand, trust plays a more important role in
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China than in Australia. However, an increase in the trust level can reduce risk and
increase the quality of communication, which will increase the final collaborating
success rate and increase the possibility of further long-term collaboration.

Second, the research results suggest that new collaborating types and benefits are
developed during inter-firm collaboration in newly developed industries. As one of
the most dynamic industries in the world, the telecommunications industry has some
special characteristics. Consequently, previous research results may not be applicable
to this industry.

Third, size difference plays a negative role in inter-firm collaboration. It suggests
that although firms prefer peer or larger sized partners, managers should consider
collaborating with smaller partners to achieve a higher performance and success rate
in their inter-firm collaborations.

Fourth, research on different countries suggests that different factors may make very
different contributions to collaboration results in different countries. Trust, firm size,
and culture background contributed to different aspect of collaboration in Australia
and China. As discussed in chapter 7 the different market structure, products and
services and regulatory systems contributed to the different results from both the
qualitative and quantitative studies. The results underscore the fact that collaboration
research should be conducted separately for different countries. To collaborate with
Chinese partners it is better to target bringing more profits or increasing their market
influence. However, to collaborate with Australian partners it is better to target cost
saving.

The quantitative study also verified some results from the qualitative study in
chapters 6 and 7. In general, trust, communication and firm size play significant
positive roles in inter-firm collaboration. However, previous experience plays less of
an important role in telecommunications industry in Australian and Chinese interfirm collaborations. Cultural similarity plays a significant negative role in both
Australian and Chinese inter-firm collaborations. The contributions of this study and
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recommendations for business managers, government decision makers, and future
researchers are discussed further in chapter 9.
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9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1

Introduction

Inter-firm collaboration plays a very important role in business development and
economic growth. Focusing on inter-firm collaboration in Australia and China, this
study has made several important contributions to inter-firm collaboration research.
Results from both the qualitative and a quantitative study have provided some useful
data and implications for researchers, managers, as well as policy makers. This
chapter provides a summary of these results and contributions. This chapter will also
discuss some of the limitations of this study and directions for future research.
9.2

Summary of results and contributions

This thesis makes the following important contributions to the literature on
collaboration research. First, the definition of inter-firm collaboration has been
expanded in this study. The term “collaboration” is generally not used consistently in
the literature. Many terms have been used in the previous literature to refer to interfirm collaboration, for example, cooperation, alliance, or joint activities (Kogut,
1988; Williamson, 1991; Burgers et al., 1993; Culpan, 1993; Hagedoorn, 1993;
Parkhe, 1993b; Osborn et al., 1998; Austin, 2000). This study has expanded the
definition to “inter-firm activities that are aimed at generating tangible and/or
intangible benefits for each firm involved” and to include some informal inter-firm
collaborations, which play an important role in inter-firm collaboration among micro
and small sized businesses or in emerging economies. This study has focused on the
Chinese and Australian telecommunication industries, which also addresses a gap in
previous research.

Second, this study has addressed one of the most important questions related to interfirm collaboration – what are the key determinants for successful inter-firm
collaboration in Australia and China. To verify the factors that influence the
objective benefits and subjective success rate in inter-firm collaboration, primary
data was collected for this study. Both face-to-face qualitative interviews and an
online quantitative survey were adopted as complementary methods in this study
(Newman and Benz, 1998). The interview results provided evidence and explanation
for the quantitative study and the regressions tested the hypothesis of the
relationships between different factors and the performance of inter-firm
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collaboration. The combination of a qualitative and quantitative study provided more
reliable results for this thesis.
The results also answered the primary research questions “What are the major types
of collaboration, benefits and risks associated with inter-firm collaboration in the
Australian and Chinese mobile telecommunication markets?” and “What are the
key determinants of successful inter-firm collaboration?” The results are discussed
in more detail below.

First, firm size plays a significant role in business partner selection and performance.
Both the qualitative study and quantitative results support this view. Hypothesis five
has been upheld. Larger firms are easier to have successful collaborations with as
they possess more resources, capital, and usually possess more experience. The
quantitative study results showed that size plays a significant role in both objective
returns and the subjective success rate of inter-firm collaboration. However, research
on Australia and China shows that firm size contributed more to the objective returns
in Australia but more to the subjective success rate in China. A possible explanation
for this difference could be due to the fact that the majority of firms in Australia are
micro and small sized firms (ACCC, 2009). Half of Australian small businesses are
sole proprietorships (Schaper and Volery, 2004). According to the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, by 20 June 1999 only 20.9% of its short-term loans were
to the non-state sector with most going to collective and foreign-owned enterprises
and only 0.5% went to private and individual enterprises (Garnaut et al., 2001). The
ambiguous regulations, lack of transparency, high market entry requirements,
discriminatory taxes and fees, and weak intellectual property protection are also
obstacles facing most small businesses in China (Naughton, 2006). Chinese
businesses differ from Australian businesses with respect to the separation of
ownership and control (Schaper and Volery, 2004). In sum, services and the
environment for small business growth are better in Australia than in China. Previous
experience showed that the rapid growth of private business in China over the past
20 years has contributed significantly to the fast economic growth in China (Harvie
and Lee, 2003). The Chinese government should provide more business assistance
services and a more level playing field for small business.
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Second, size difference plays a negative role in the performance and results from
inter-firm collaboration. Hypothesis six is not upheld due to its unexpected negative
sign. Firms prefer bigger partners in their inter-firm collaboration in both Australia
and China. The results are in accord with the literature which suggests that large
firms usually possess more resources (Teece, 1986). However, size difference is
negatively related with collaborating performance. In other words the bigger the size
of the partner firm compared with the interviewed firm, the lower the performance
and success rate of the inter-firm collaboration. A possible explanation for this result
could be the different business structures, working processes, collaborating goals and
changes of strategies between large firms and small firms. These differences may
increase the risk level and conflicts with inter-firm collaboration, which leads to
failure from the collaboration. Therefore, to reach a higher performance or success
rate, business should consider a smaller sized partner to start with. Inter-firm
collaboration among small business and industry clusters are important engines for
innovation (Carr, 1989; Stimson et al., 2006). Therefore, government should also
encourage business clusters and collaboration among small and micro firms to
increase the performances and outcomes from inter-firm collaborations.

Third, new collaborating types and benefits/returns were found in the qualitative and
quantitative studies in this thesis. The results indicate new types of inter-firm
collaborations are generated in the telecommunications industry. The possible causes
of these new types and benefits are new technology; a new business model or new
market opportunities are generated in high technology and fast developing industries.
Inter-firm collaboration is a dynamic phenomenon that may not always be explained
using previous literature or empirical studies. It can be argued that studies on interfirm collaboration should take into account these changes. Continuous study of interfirm relationships is essential to develop a robust understanding of changing business
strategy (Singh and Mitchell, 2005), and primary data collected through interviews
may provide richer information for such a study.

Fourth, the concerns and obstacles to inter-firm collaboration are different in
different countries, which support hypothesis seven. This argument is supported by
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the interviewed managers. Most of the Australian interviewed managers indicated
that they have no problem with international inter-firm collaborations. Chinese
managers, on the other hand, showed that they have less confidence when
considering international collaboration. More than half of the Chinese managers
chose language, cultural or communication problems and lack of experience of
international business as their major obstacles with international inter-firm
collaboration. One possible explanation of this difference could be the multicultural
and multi-language background of Australian firms, which have increased
confidence and experiences of cross-country inter-firm collaboration. The Australian
economy has been “open” to inter-firm collaboration for a longer period of time than
that of China. On the other hand managers from different cultural or language
backgrounds are a good “bridge” or natural contact person for inter-firm
collaboration, able to identify the different needs and problems during inter-firm
collaboration. Therefore, to collaborate with Chinese firms, a good understanding of
the culture and language is essential to begin with.

Fifth, trust plays a vital role in inter-firm collaboration but it plays a different role for
different aspects of inter-firm collaboration in different countries. Hypothesis one
can be upheld. Trust was also mentioned as a key determinant of successful interfirm collaboration by managers during interviews in both Australia and China. In the
quantitative study, regressions for two different countries show that trust plays a
negative role in objective returns but a positive role in the subjective success rate in
Australia. However, it plays a significant positive role in both objective returns and
the subjective result in China. As discussed in chapter three the differences between
developed and developing countries are good explanations for this result. Due to
different laws and social systems, different variables play very different roles in
different countries. Managers are usually risk-averse in Australia (Kuada, 2002).
Therefore, trust plays a limited role in Australian inter-firm collaborations. A higher
trust level does not mean higher performance in inter-firm collaboration in Australia.
On the other hand the legal system in China does not provide enough protection for
private property (Naughton, 2006) and the credit system is still under development.
The preference for personal relationships and connections is therefore important in
China (Boisot and Child, 1999; Vipraio and Pauluzzo, 2007). In this environment the
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trust relationship between firms plays a more important role in inter-firm
collaboration. Therefore, to collaborate with Chinese partners, establishing a trusted
personal relationship is important from the beginning of inter-firm collaboration, as
indicated by one interviewed manager in China who said: “You need to be our friend
first if you want to do business with us.”

Sixth, communication plays a vital role in inter-firm collaboration in both Australia
and China. Hypothesis three can be upheld. The quantitative study in this thesis
supports the position that the quality of communication (in terms of frequency,
understanding and efficiency) is significantly related with the subjective
collaborating outcomes. In terms of objective performance, communication provides
mixed contribution (positively and negatively) to different aspects in both Australia
and China. The qualitative interviews also supported this result. Most managers from
both Australia and China agreed that communication is one of the key determinants
of successful inter-firm collaboration. How to increase the quality of communication
should be the target of collaborators to enhance the performance of current inter-firm
collaborations. Another important factor that should be considered by business
managers and government policy makers are the different online communication
methods adopted in different countries. Some of the common communicating tools
or platforms in Australia are blocked (in special regions or periods) in China.
Therefore, businesses in China usually communicate via very different tools from
Australian businesses, for example the MSN in Australia and QQ in China, Facebook
in Australia and Kaixinweb in China, Twitter in Australia and Weibo in China, E-bay
in Australia and Alibaba in China. To collaborate with a business in China or
Australia, it is very important to understand the common communicating methods
and tools before the start of the collaboration. However, all of these methods require
a huge amount of investment on basic infrastructure and networks from the
government, and plenty of training and educational programs provided to the
managers. A well developed and stable human resource market and finance market
are also important to implement these strategies.

Seventh, previous experience does not play a significant role in the performance of
inter-firm collaboration in the sample data. Hypothesis two cannot be upheld in both
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countries. Research results for the quantitative analysis suggest that previous
experience has no significant influence on the subjective results in both Australia and
China. It has very little negative influence on some of the objective returns. These
results are different from previous empirical studies (Harrigan, 1986; Parkhe, 1993b;
Saxton, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kay, 1999; Hagedoorn et al., 2003). A possible
explanation for this result is the range of studied firms. This thesis focuses on
telecommunications industry. With rapidly changing technologies and emerging new
opportunities for inter-firm collaboration the previous experiences in inter-firm
collaboration may play a less important role or even negative influence on current
inter-firm collaboration in such dynamic and rapidly developing industries. The
results also underscore the fact that inter-firm collaboration is a complex
phenomenon, which may be influenced by many different factors in different
environments and periods.

Eighth, culture similarity plays a significant negative role in inter-firm collaboration
in China. Hypothesis four cannot be upheld due to its unexpected negative sign.
However, it only plays a significant negative role in the subjective success rate in
Australia but plays a positive role for objective returns in Australia. The result is
different from most empirical studies in the literature (Das and Rahman, 2009;
Vilana and Monroy, 2010). However, some empirical studies also found weak
negative relationships between culture similarity and the performance of a inter-firm
collaboration (Kim and Park, 2002; Reus and Rotting, 2009). One possible
explanation for this result is the research focus. As discussed above, the multicultural
background of Australia is a special characteristic of its businesses or managers.
China, on the other hand, has a strong unique cultural background and environment
for inter-firm collaborations. Managers and policy makers should notice differences
in the cultural background and include some programs (such as cross-cultural
activities and learning groups) in their collaborating strategies.

Ninth, the factors that influence inter-firm collaboration are different in different
countries. Hypothesis seven can be upheld. As discussed in chapters 6 and 7 the
managers from China and Australia have different views on successful collaboration,
risks towards international collaboration and the role of government. The quantitative
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results suggest that different factors play very different roles in inter-firm
collaboration in China and Australia. The different social structures, business
environments, legal systems, roles of government, recognitions, cultural and
language backgrounds, histories, and technology adoption levels could be the key
explanations of this result. There are also many other factors that influence inter-firm
collaboration in different countries.
Table 9-1 Comparative results from China and Australia
Key determinants

Hypotheses

China

Australia

Modified

Firm Size
Trust
Communication
Experience
Culture difference

+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+

+
+
+

+
+
+

-

-

-

Source: Data collected in this thesis

Table 9.1 summarises the key determinants for successful inter-firm collaboration in
China and Australia. The key determinants for subjective outcomes (valued as the
subjective success rate and fulfilling expectation levels) are similar in China and
Australia. Trust, firm size and communication contributed significantly and
positively to the results. Culture similarity, however, has a negative influence on
subjective outcomes in both Australia and China. In terms of objective returns, the
results vary in Australia and China. Most factors have a mixed contribution (both
negative and positive) to different aspects of returns. In general, trust plays a
significant positive role in objective returns in China. Culture similarity plays a
negative role in objective returns in China, and only firm size has a positive influence
on the overall objective returns in Australia. The results also support that studies of
inter-firm collaboration in different countries should take into account the special
situation of the environment, culture background, regulations, recognitions and
industry characteristics in each country.

9.3

Implications

The findings of this research may help provide insight for business managers in
choosing business partners and understanding the factors that enhance current
collaborating relationships with their partners. To select the “best” partner, the results
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of this thesis suggest that managers should consider the size difference between both
firms. Firm-level trust plays a vital role in business collaboration in both Australia
and China. However, trust plays a more important role in the subjective success rate
rather than objective returns from collaboration. Trust plays a more important role
compared to both the objective and subjective result of business collaboration in
China than in Australia. The trustworthy contact person contributed significantly to a
successful collaboration. The contact person plays a more important role in the
Chinese market. Finding a “right” person is vital for the business to achieve
successful collaboration in China. Communication, especially suitable frequency and
understanding of communication, plays a vital role in business collaboration.
Managers also need to consider the cultural difference between both firms when
collaborating with others. The results show that the greater the difference in cultural
backgrounds, the more effort may be put into the collaboration, and the higher level
will be the success rate.

The results from this study also provide useful policy implications for the
government. To improve the business collaboration environment, especially
international collaboration, efforts need to be undertaken to encourage information
sharing, a reduction in the barriers of entry, providing a level playing field for every
firm, reducing the visa restrictions, and enhancing government services and support
(such as consultation). Industry associations and business networks can also assist in
developing a trust relationship, facilitating matching of business collaborators and
information sharing. Adopting new technologies and global standards will help
businesses, industry associations, and government departments enhance the success
rate of both international and local inter-firm collaborations.
9.4

Limitations and future research

There are always limitations in any economic research. It is necessary to take these
limitations into account as they may impact the robustness of the results from the
research. This study is limited by the range of sample size, studied countries and
questions in the survey. First, the study focused on the telecommunications and
related service and manufacturing industries, which are mostly high-technology and
newly developed industries. Second, this study was only conducted in Australia and
China to fill a gap in previous empirical studies. Third, the interview questions
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initially proposed were adjusted to take into account suggestions and feedback by
managers from the qualitative face-to-face interviews. Therefore, they are influenced
by the industrial and cultural experiences of these managers. Cultural bias is always
inevitable in cross-culture studies. The differences in cognition and understanding of
the questions, scales and answers may increase the bias of the results from this study.

This research makes a useful contribution to on-going work in the study of inter-firm
collaboration via complementary primary data from both qualitative interview and
quantitative online surveys. Results from this study suggest that collaboration is a
complex and dynamic phenomenon. Factors that influence the performance of interfirm collaboration are also different in different countries, industries and periods.
Therefore, future research could focus on other countries and industries that are
expected to provide different results and implications. A combination of qualitative
and quantitative methods can provide complementary support and evidence, which
may generate more reliable results. Therefore, future research may take into account
different research methods from different disciplinary areas (such as adopting
computer intelligence methods in collaboration studies), which may bring more
reliable and interesting results (Zhang, 2011).

247

REFERENCES
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2004). Definition of small business,
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2012). Stories from the 2011 Census,
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) (2009). "What we do."
Retrieved
March
8,
2009,
from
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/54137.
Access Economics (2007). Australian Mobile Telecommunications Industry:
Economic Significance & State of the Industry
Access Economics (2008). Australian Mobile Telecommunications Industry:
Economic Significance and contribution Access Economics Pty Limited.
Access Economics (2010). Economic Contribution of Mobile Telecommunications in
Australia.
Achrol, R. S. a. G., G. T. (1999). "Legal and social safeguards against opportunism
in exchange." Journal of Retailing 75(1): 107-119.
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) (2007).
Telecommunications, The Australian Communications and Media Authority.
Adler, P. (2001). "Market, hierarchy, and trust: the knowledge economy and the
future of capitalism." Organization Science 12(2): 214-234.
Adobor, H. (2005). "Optimal trust? Uncertainty as a determinant and limit to trust in
inter-firm alliance." Leadership & Organization Development Journal 27(7): 537553.
Adobor, H. (2006a). "The role of personal relationships in inter-firm alliances:
Benefits, dysfunctions, and some suggestions " Business Horizons 49 473-486.
Adobor, H. (2006b). "Inter-firm collaboration: configurations and dynamics."
Competitiveness Review 16(2): 122.
Agarwal, S. a. R., S.N. (1992). Choice of organizational form in foreign markets: A
transaction cost perspective. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy
of International Business. Brussels.
Ahuja, G. (1996). Collaboration and innovation: A longitudinal study of interfirm
linkages and firm patenting performance in the global advanced material industry,
University of Michigan Business School. PhD

248

Aiken, M. and Hage, J. (1968). "Organizational interdependence
intraorganizational structure." American Sociological Review 33: 912-930.

and

Al-Rasheed, A. M. and Al-Qwasmeh, F. M. (2003). "The role of the strategic partner
in the management development process: Jordan telecom as a case study."
International Journal of Commerce & Management 13(2).
Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. (1972). "Production information costs, and
economic organization." American Economic Association 62(5): 777-795.
Allee, V. and Taug, J. (2006). "Collaboration, innovation, and value creation in a
global telecom." The learning Organization 13(6): 569-578.
Allen, G. and Jarman, R. (1999). Collaborative R&D. U.S., John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Amburgey, T. L. and Miner, A. S. (1992). "Strategic momentum: The effects of
repetitive, positional, and contextual momentum on merger activity." Strategic
Management Journal 13: 335-348.
Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA) (2007). Australia’s
Mobile Telecommunications Industry, Australian Mobile Telecommunications
Association.
Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA) (2010). "Industry
reports."
Retrieved
13/08/2010,
from
http://www.amta.org.au/pages/State.of.the.Industry.Reports.
Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA) (2011). "Industry
data." Retrieved 30 Aug, 2011, from http://www.amta.org.au/pages/2010.
Anand, B. N. and Khanna, T. (1997) Do Firms Learn to Create Value?
Anand, B. N. and Khanna, T. (2000). "Do firms lean to create value? The case of
alliances." Strategic Management Journal 21 (Special issue): 295-316.
Andersen, P. H. and Sorensen, H. B. (1999). "Reputational information: Its role in
inter-organizational collaboration." Corporate reputation review 2(3): 215-230.
Andersen, P. H. and Strandskov, J. (1998). "International Market Selection: A
Cognitive Mapping Perspective." Journal of Global Marketing 11(3): 223-243.
Anderson, E. (1990). "Two firms, one frontier: On assessing joint venture
performance." Sloan Management Review 31(2): 19-30.
Anderson, E. and Gatignon, H. (1986). "Modes of foreign entry: A transaction cost
analysis and propositions." Journal of International Business Studies 17: 1-26.
Anderson, J. and Narus, J. (1990). "A model of distributor firm and manufacturer
firm working partnerships." Journal of Marketing 54(1): 42-58.
249

Anderson, P. and Tushman, M. L. (1990). "Technological Discontinuities and
Dominant Designs: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change." Administrative
Science Quarterly 35(4): 604-633.
Anderson, R. E. (2008). Large Scale Quantitative Research on New Technology in
Teaching and Learning. Handbook of Research on New Literacies. M. K. J. Coiro, C.
Lankshear & D. J. Leu. New York, Lawrence Erlbaum: 67-102.
Apple (2010). Annual report 2010, Apple
Apple (2011). "Apple
http://www.apple.com/pr/.

Press

Info."

Retrieved

30

Aug,

2011,

from

Arora, A. and Gambardella, A. (1990). "Complementarity and external linkages: the
strategics of the large firms in biotechnology." Journal of Industrial Economics 38:
361-379.
Arrighetti, A., Bachmann, R. and Deakin, S. (1997). "Contract law, social norms and
inter-firm cooperation." Cambridge Journal of Economics 21(2): 171-195.
Arrow, K. J. (1969). The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the
Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation. U.S. Joint Economic Committee,
91st Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Arrow, K. J. (1985). "Informational Structure of the Firm." the American Economic
Review 75(2): 303-307.
Arrow, K. J., , (1974). The limits of organization. New York, Norton.
Arrow, K. J. and Debrew, G. (1954). "Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive
economy." Econometrica 22(3): 265-290.
Ashiho, L. S. (2003). Mobile technology: evolution from 1G to 4G,
Communications.
Augier, M. and Teece, D. J. (2006). "Understanding complex organization: the role
of know-how, internal structure, and human behavior in the evolution of
capabilities." Industrial and Corporate Change 15(2): 395–416.
Aulakh, P. S., Kotabe, M. and Sahay, A. (1996). "Trust and performance in crossborder marketing partnerships: behavioural approach." Journal of International
Business Studies 27(5): 1005-1032.
Auster, E. R. (1987). "International corporate linkage: Dynamic forms in changing
environments." Columbia Journal of World Business 22: 3-13.
Auster, E. R. (1992). "The relationship of industry evolution to patterns of
technological linkages, joint ventures, and direct investment between U.S. and
Japan." Management Science 17(3): 1-25.
250

Austin, J. E. (2000). The Collaboration Challenge. U.S
Jossey-bass.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York, Basic Books.
Ayres, I. and Gertner, R. (1992). "Strategic contractual inefficiency and the optimal
choice of legal rules." Yale Law Journal 101: 729-733.
Badaraco, J. L., Jr. (1991). The knowledge link. Boston, Harvard Business School
Press.
Baird, I. and Lyles, M. (1993). Measuring joint venture performance. Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Atlanta.
Balakrishnan, S. and Koza, M. P. (1993). "Information Asymmetry, Adverse
Selection and Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence." Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 20: 99-171.
Barkema, H. G., Bell, J. H. J. and Pennings, J. M. (1996). "Foreign entry, culture
barriers, and learning." Strategic Management Journal 17: 151-166.
Barkema, H. G., Shenkar, O., Vermeulen, F. and Bell, J. H. J. (1997). "Working
abroad, working with others: how firms learn to operate international joint venture."
Academy of Management Journal 40: 426-442.
Barley, S. R., Freeman, J. and Hybels, R. (1992). Strategic alliances in commercial
biotechnology. Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form and Action. N. a. E.
Nohra, R. Boston, Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form and Action, Harvard
Business School Press: 311-347.
Barnard, C. T. f. o. t. e., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1938). The
functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Barney, J. B. (1986). "Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck and business
strategy." Management Science 42: 1231-1241.
Barney, J. B. (1991). "Firms resources and sustained competitive advantage."
Journal of Management 17: 99-120.
Barney, J. B. (2001). "Is the resource-based ‘view’ a useful perspective for strategic
management research? Yes." Academy of Management Review 26(1): 41-56.
Barney, J. B. and Hansen, M. H. (1994). "Trustworthiness as a source of competitive
advantage." Strategic Management Journal 15(Winter Special Issue): 175-190.
Barney, J. B. and Ouchi, W. G. E. (1986). Organizational economics: A new
paradigm for understanding and studying organizations. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass.
Barro, R. J. (1976). Money, employment and inflation. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
251

Barzel, Y. (1989). An economic analysis of property rights, Cambridge. Cambridge,
UK, Cambridge University Press
Baum, J., Calabrese, T. and Silverman, B. B. (2000). "Don’t go it alone: alliance
network composition and startup’s performance in Canadian biotechnology."
Strategic Management Journal 21(Special Issue 3): 267-294

Baum, J. and Oliver, C. (1991). "Institutional Linkages and Organizational
Mortality." Administrative Science Quarterly 36: 187-218.
Baum, J. and Oliver, C. (1992). "Institutional embededness and the dynamics of
organizational populations." American Sociological Review 57: 540-559.
Bazerman, M. H. (2006). Judgment in Managerial Decision Making. New York,
John Wiley & Sons.
Beamish, P. W. (1985). "The characteristics of joint ventures in developed and
developing countries." Columbia Journal of World Business 20: 13-19.
Beamish, P. W. and Delios, A. (1997). Incidence and propensity of alliance
formation. Cooperative strategies; Asian Pacific Perspectives. P. W. a. K. Beamish,
J.P. San Francisco, CA, New Lexington Press.
Becerra, M., Lunnan, R. and Huemer, L. (2008). "Trustworthiness, risk, and the
transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge between alliance partners." Journal of
Management Studies 45(5): 1024.
Beckett, R. C. and Jones, M. (2010). The Variable Nature of Trust in Sustainable
Collaborative Ventures. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing.
Bellon, B. and Niosi, J. (2001). "Institutionalist Theories and Inter-Firm Alliances:
The Transaction Cost, Competence and Evolutionary Debate Revisited." Current
Sociology 49(67).
Bendor, J. (1987). "In good times and bad: Reciprocity in an uncertain world."
American Journal of Political Science 31: 351-358.
Berg, I. and Zald, M. (1978). Business and society. Annual review of sociology. R. H.
Turner. Palo Alto, CA, Annual Reviews.
Berg, S. V., Duncan, J. and Friedman, P. (1982). Joint Venture Strategies and
Corporate Innovation. Cambridge, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain.
Berg, S. V. and Friedman, P. (1981). "Impacts of domestic joint ventures on
industrial rates of return: A pooled cross section analysis." Review of Economics and
Statistics 63: 293-298.
252

Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property.
New York, Macmillan.
Bian, Y. J. (1994). Work and Inequality in Urban China, State University of New
York Press.
Bidault, F. and Salgado, M. (2001). "Stability and complexity of inter-firm cooperation: The case of multi-point alliances." European Management Journal 19(6):
619-628.
Blair, R. (1976). Reciprocity in an uncertain environment. Sprint, The Antitrust
Bulletin.
Bleeke, J. and Ernst, D. (1991). "The way to win in cross border alliances." Harvard
Business Review 69(6): 127-135.
Bleeke, J. and Ernst, D. (1993). Collaborating to compete. New York, Wiley.
Bleeke, J. and Ernst, D. (1995). "Is your strategic alliance really a sale?" Harvard
Business Review 73(1): 97-105.
Blodgett, L. L. (1992). "Factors in the instability of international joint ventures: An
event history analysis." Strategic Management Journal 13: 475-481.
Blois, K. (1998). "Don’t all firms have relationships?" Journal of Business and
Industrial Marketing 13(3): 256-270.
Boisot, M. and Child, J. (1988). "The Iron Law of Fiefs: Bureaucratic Failure and the
Problem of Governance in the Chinese Economic Reforms." Administrative Science
Quarterly 33: 507-527.
Boisot, M. and Child, J. (1999). "Organizations as adaptive systems in complex
environments: The case of China." Organization Sciencey 10(3): 237.
Borch, O. J. (1994). "The process of relational contracting: Developing trust-based
strategic alliances among small business enterprises." Advances in Strategic
Management: 113-135.
Borys, B. and Jemison, D. B. (1989). "Hybrid arrangements as strategic alliances:
theoretical issues in organizational combinations." Academy of Management Journal
14(2): 234-249.
Bradach, J. L. and Eccles, R. G. (1989). "Price, authority, and trust: From ideal types
to plural forms." Annual Review of Sociology 15: 97-118.
Brakman, S. and Garretsen, H. (2005). Location and Competition. USA and Canada,
Routledge.

253

Brunetto, Y. and Rod, F. W. (2007). "The Moderating Role of Trust in SME
Owner/Managers, Decision-Making about Collaboration." Journal of Small Business
Management 45(3): 362.
Buckley, P. F. and Casson, M. (1988). A Theory of Cooperation in International
Business. Cooperative Strategies in International Business. F. J. a. L. Contractor, P.
U.S.A, Canada, Lexington Books.
Buckley, P. J. and Casson, M. (1976). The future of the multinational enterprise.
London, MacMillan.
Buono, A. F. and Bowditch, J. L. (1989). The human side of mergers and
acquisitions. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass.
Burchell, B. and Wilkinson, F. (1997). "Trust, business relationships and the
contractual environment." Cambridge Journal of Economics 21(2): 217-237.
Burgers, W. P., Hill, C. and Kim, W. C. (1993). "A theory of global strategic
alliances: The case of the global auto industry." Strategic Management Journal 14:
419-432.
Burgess, L. and Jones, M. (2010). The mechanics of eCollaboration and why it
works - an empirical assessment of Australian SMEs. The SInet 2010 eBook. H.
Yeatman. Wollongong, University of Wollongong.
Burt, R. S. (1983). Corporate Profits and Cooperation. New York, Academic.
Business Wire (2005). "Amp'd Mobile and Gameloft Partner to Create Exclusive 3D
Games for 3G Mobile Devices with Console-Like Experience; Amp'd to Create
Exclusive Titles in Multi-Year Deal Plus Access to Key 2D and 3D Gameloft Titles."
Business Wire: 1.
Carr, G. W. (1989). Telecommunication's contribution to economic development.
Conference record, World Prosperity Through Communications, IEEE International
Conference.
Casson, M. (1995a). Entrepreneurship and Business Culture: Studies in the
Economics of Trust. Aldershot, Edward Elgar.
Casson, M. (1995b). The Organization of International Business: Studies in the
Economics of Trust. Aldershot, Edward Elgar.
Castanias, R. P. and Helfat, C. E. (1991). "Managerial resources and rents." Journal
of Management 17: 155-171.
China Communication Standards Association (CCSA) (2007). "Communications
standards and news." Retrieved December 12, 2007, from http://www.ccsa.org.cn/.
Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and structure: Chapters in the history of the
industrial enterprise. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
254

Chen, C. H. and Shih, H. T. (2005). High-Tech Industries in China. UK, USA,
Edward Elgar.
Chen, J. (2000). "Overview of mobile telephone services and tariff of China
Telecom." World Telecommunications: 44-48.
Chen, M. (1996). "Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: toward a theoretical
integration." Academy of Management Review 21(1): 100-134.
Chesnais, F. (1988). Multinational enterprises and the international diffusion of
technology. Technical Change and Economic Theory. G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R.
Nelson, G. Silverberg and L. Soete. London: 496-528.
Child, J. (1987). "Information technology, organization, and the response to strategic
challenges." California Management Review(1): 33-50.
Child, J., Markoczy, L. and Cheung, T. (1992). "Managerial adaptation in Chinese
and Hungarian strategic alliances with culturally distinct foreign partners." Working
paper.
China Mobile (2010). Annual Report 2010, China Mobile Limited, Beijing.
China Mobile (2011). China Mobile and news, China Mobile Limited, Beijing.
China Telecom (2011). Mid-year report 2011, China Mobile Limited.
China Unicom (2011). Mid-year report 2011.
Chowdhury, J. (1992). "Performance of international joint ventures and wholly
owned foregn subsidiaries: A comparative perspective." Management International
Review 32: 115-133.
Chung, Q. B., Luo, W. and Wagner, W. P. (2006). "Strategic alliance of small firms
in knowledge industries A management consulting perspective." Business Process
Management Journal 12(3): 206-233.
Chung, S., Singh, H. and Lee, K. (2000). "Complementarity, status similarity and
social capital as drivers of alliance formation." Strategic Management Journal 21: 122.
Clegg, J. (1990). "The determinants of aggregate international licensing behavior:
Evidence from five countries." Management International Review 30(3): 231-251.
China Network Information Industry (CNII) (2011). "Beijing free wireless regions."
Retrieved 15 Dec, 2011, from http://www.cnii.com.cn/3g/content/201112/15/content_942530.htm.
Coase, R. H. (1937). "The Nature of the Firm." Economics 4: 386-405.
255

Coase, R. H. (1988). The firm, the market and the law, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Cohen, W. M. and Levinthal, D. A. (1989). "Innovation and learning: the two faces
of R&D." The Economic Journal 99: 569-596.
Cohen, W. M. and Levinthal, D. A. (1990). "Absorptive capacity: A new perspective
on learning and innovation." Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 128-152.
Commons, J. (1932). "The problem of correlating law, economics, and ethics."
Wisconsin Law Review 8: 3-26.
Commons, J. (1950). The economics of collective action. Madison, University of
Wisconsin Press.
Communications Alliance (CA) (2007). "Mobile Premium services." Retrieved
December
4,
2007,
from
http://commsalliance.com.au/Activities/Mobile_Premium_Services/customer_inform
ation
http://commsalliance.com.au/Activities/Mobile_Premium_Services/information_for_
industry_members
Conner, K. R. and Prahalad, C. K. (1996). "A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm:
Knowledge versus Opportunism." Organization Science 7(5): 477–501.
Contractor, F. J. (1983). "Technology Licensing Practices in U.S. Companies:
Corporate and Public Policy Implications of an Empirical Study." Columbia Journal
of World Business Fall.
Contractor, F. J. and Lorange, P. (1988). Cooperative Strategies in International
Business San Francisco, Lexington Books
Contractor, F. J. and Lorange, P. (2002). The growth of alliances in the knowledgebased economy. Cooperative Strategies and Alliances, Amsterdam. F. J. Contractor
and P. Lorange. Pergamon: 3–22.
Creed, W. E. D. and Miles, R. E. (1996). Trust in Organizations. Trust in
Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research. R. M. Kramer and T. R. Tyler.
New Delhi, Sage Publications.
Cricelli, L. and Grimaldi, M. (2009). "Knowledge-based inter-organizational
collaborations." Journal of Knowledge Management 14(3): 348-358.
Culpan, R. (1993). Multinational competition and cooperation: Theory and practice.
Multinational strategic alliances. R. Culpan. International Business Press,
Binghamton, NY: 3-24.
Cummings, L. L. and Bromiley, P. (1996). The Organizational Trust Inventory
(OTI): development and validation. Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and
Research. R. M. Kramer and T. R. Tyler. New Delhi, Sage Publications: 302-330.
256

Currall, S. C. and Judge, T. A. (1995). "Measuring Trust between Organizational
Boundary Role Persons." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
64(2): 151-170.
Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.
Daft, R. and Lengl, R. (1986). "Organizational information requirements, media
richness and structural design." Management Science 32: 554-571.
Das, T. K. and Rahman, N. (2009). "Determinants of Partner Opportunism in
Strategic Alliances: A Conceptual Framework." Journal of Business and Psychology
25(1): 55-74.
Das, T. K. and Teng, B. S. (1998). "Between trust and control: developing
confidence in partner cooperation in alliances." Academy of Management Review
23(3): 491-512.
Datta, D. K. (1988). "International joint ventures: a framework for analysis." Journal
of General Management 14(2): 78-91.
Davis, G. B. and Parker, C. A. (1997). Writing the Doctoral Dissertation – A
Systematic Approach. New York, Barron’s Educational Series, Inc.
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE)
(2002). Australian_Telecommunications_2002, Department of Broadband,
Communications and the Digital Economy.
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE)
(2009). "Home." Retrieved March 8, 2009, from http://www.dbcde.gov.au/
Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA)
(1997). Liberalisation of the telecommunications sector Australias experience,
Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts.
Deakin, S., Lane, C. and Wilkinson, F. (1994). "”Trust” or law? Towards an
integrated theory of contractual relations between firms." Journal of Law and Society
21(3): 329-349.
Deakins, D. and Freel, M. (2003). Entrepreneurship and small firms. London,
McGraw-Hill Education.
Demsetz, H. (1973). "Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy." Journal
of Law and Economics 16: 1-9.
Devlin, G. and Bleakley, M. (1988). "Strategic alliances: guidelines for success."
Long Range Planning 21(5): 18-23.

257

Dixit, A. (1996). The making of economic policy: A transaction cost politics
perspective. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Dixit, A. (2004). Lawlessness and economics: Alternative modes of governance
(Gorman Lectures in Economics, University College London). . Princeton, NJ,
Princeton Universtiy Press.
Doz, I. and Prahalad, C. K. (1991). "Managing DMNCs: A search for a new
paradigm." Strategic Management Journal 12(Special Issue): 145-164.
Doz, Y. L. and Hamel, G. (1998). Alliance Advantage. Boston, MA, Harvard
Business School Press.
Durlauf, S.N. and Yong, H.P. (2001). Social Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dussauge, P. and Garrette, B. (1995). "Determinants of success in international
strategic alliances: evidence from the global aerospace industry." Journal of
International Business Studies 26(3): 505-530.
Dussauge, P., Garrette, B. and Mitchell, W. (2000). "Learning from competing
partners: outcomes and durations of scale and link alliances in Europe." Strategic
Management Journal 21(2): 99-126.
Duysters, G. and Hagedoorn, J. (1995). "Strategic groups and inter-firm networks in
international ight-tech industries." Journal of Management Studies 32: 361-381.
Dyer, J. H. (1996a). "Specialized supplier networks as a source of competitive
advantage: Evidence from the auto industry." Strategic Management Journal 17:
271-292.
Dyer, J. H. (1996b). "Does governance matter? Keiretsu alliances and asset
specificity as sources of Japanese competitive advantage." Organization Science 7:
649-666.
Dyer, J. H. (1997). "Effective interfirm collaboration: How firms minimize
transaction costs and maximize transaction value." Strategic management Journal
(1986-1998) 18(7): 535.
Dyer, J. H. and Singh, H. (1998). "The relational review: cooperative strategy and
sources of interorganizational competitive advantage." Academy of Management
Review 23: 660-679.
Eccles, R. G. and Crane, D. B. (1987). "Managing through Networks in Investment
Banking." California management review 30(1): 176.
Eggertsson, T. (1990). Economic behavior and institutions. Cambridge, UK,
Cambridge University Press.

258

Eisenhardt, K. and Schoonhoven, C. B. (1996). "Resource-based view of strategic
alliance formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms."
Organization Science 7(2): 136-150.
Eiteman, D. K. (1990). "American executives’ perceptions of negotiating joint
ventures with the People’s Republic of China: lessons learned." Columbia Journal of
World Business: 59-66.
Elg, U. (2007). "Market Orientation as Inter-firm Cooperation: An International
Study of the Grocery Sector." European Management Journal 25(4): 283-297.
Farago, S. (2001). The Evolution of Telecommunications Regulation and
Competition in Australia. Presented in the Third Workshop of the APEC-OECD Cooperative Initiative on Regulatory Reform.
Faulkner, D. O. and Rond, M. D. (2000). Cooperative Strategy. New York, Oxford
University Press.
Fehr, E. and Gachter, S. (2000). Do incentive contracts crowd out voluntary
cooperation? Working paper, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics,
University of Zurich. 34.
Felzensztein, C. and Gimmon, E. (2007). "The influence of culture and size upon
inter-firm marketing cooperation A case study of the salmon farming industry."
Marketing Intelligence & Planning 25(4): 377-393.
Ferguson, R. J., Paulin, M., Moslein, K. and Muller, C. (2005). "Relational
governance, communication and the performance of biotechnology partnership."
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 12(3): 395.
Fichman, M. and Levinthal, D. A. (1991). "Honeymoon and the liability of
adolescence: a new perspective on duration and dependence in social and
organisational relationships." Academy of Management Review 16: 442-468.
Fiol, C. M. and Huff, A. S. (1992). "Maps for Managers: Where Are We? Where Do
We Go From Here?" Journal of Management Studies 29(3): 267-285.
Firestone, W. A. (1987). "Meaning in method: the rhetoric of quantitative and
qualitative research." Educational Researcher 16(7): 16-21.
Fitzek, F. H. P. and Katz, M. D. (2006). Cooperation in Wireless Networks:
Principles and Applications - real egoistic behavior is to cooperate! Netherlands,
Springer.
Foray, D. and Freeman, C. (1993). Technology and the wealth of nations. London
and New York, Pinter publishers.
Foss, N. J. E. (1997). Resources, firms and strategies: A reader in the resourcebased perspective. New York, Oxford University Press.
259

France Telecom (2006). Annual report 2006.
France Telecom (2011). "Group and Annual report 2011." Retrieved 12nd Oct, 2011,
from http://www.francetelecom.com/en_EN/group/
Franchising Forum (2008). "Thomson Corporation." Retrieved 2008-4-7, from
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/For-Gol/Franchising.html.
Francis, A., Turk, J. and Willman, P. (1983 ). Power, efficiency, and institutions: a
critical appraisal of the markets and hierarchies paradigm, Heinemann Educational
Books.
Freeman, C. and Soete, L. (1990). New Explorations in the Economics of Technical
Change. London and New York, Pinter Publisher.
Friedlander, M. J. and Gurney, G. (1981). Handbook of Successful Franchising. New
York, Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Friedman, R. A. (1991). Trust, understanding, and control: Factors affecting support
for mutual gains bargaining in labor negotiations. A paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Academy of Management. Miami, FL.
Friedman, S. (2007). "Mobile Marketing - All Over the World." electronicretailer.
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New
York, NY, The Free Press.
Funk, J. L. and Methe, D. T. (2000). "Market- and committee-based mechanisms in
the creation and diffusion of global industry standards: the case of mobile
communication." Research Policy 30(2001): 589-610.
Gameloft (2010). Financial report. Retrieved 15 Dec, 2011, from
http://media01.gameloft.com/web_mkt/corporate/pdf/en/Results%20FY%20'11.pdf
Gameloft (2011). Corporation and half year annual reports. Retrieved 15 Dec, 2011,
from
http://media01.gameloft.com/web_mkt/corporate/pdf/en/Gameloft%20%20Rapport%20semestriel%20au%2030%20juin%202011.pdf
Garnaut, R., Song, L., Yao, Y. and Wang, X. (2001). Private Enterprise in China.
Australia, Asia Pacific Press.
Gartner (2007). "Motorola declined in mobile market in 07 Q2." Retrieved August
30, 2007, from http://www.spforum.net/zhizhao/Content.asp?iID=96778
Gartner (2011). "Mobile devices in second quarter of 2011." Retrieved 8th Oct,
2011, from http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1764714
Garvis, D. M. (2000). Characteristics and outcomes of entrepreneurial collaborations:
the effect of trust on partnership success, partner satisfaction, and financial
performance. Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University. PhD.
260

Geringer, M. J. (1991). "Strategic determinants of partner selection criteria in
international joint ventures." Journal of International Business Studies 22(1): 41-61.
Geringer, M. J. and Hebert, L. (1991). "Measuring performance of international joint
ventures." Journal of International Business Studies 22: 249-263.
Ghemawat, P., Porter, M. E. and Rawlinson, R. A. (1986). Patterns of international
coalition activity' in 'Competition in Global Industries. M. E. Porter. Boston (MA),
Harvard Business School Press,: 345-365.
Ghoshal, S. (1987). "Global strategy: An organizing framework." Strategic
Management Journal 8: 425-440.
Ghoshal, S. and Moran, P. (1996). "Bad for practice: a critique of the transaction cost
theory." Academy of Management Review 21(13-47).
Gomes-Casseres, B. (1987). "Joint venture instability: Is it a problem?" Columbia
Journal of World Business 22(2): 97-102.
Gomes-Casseres, B. (1994). "Group versus group: How alliance networks compete."
Harvard Business Review 4(JulyAugust): 4-11.
Gomez, E. T. and Hsiao, H. H. M. (2004). Chinese Enterprise, Transnationalism,
and Identity. London, RoutledgeCurzon.
Google (2011). "Google to Acquire Motorola Mobility." Retrieved 1st Nov, 2011,
from http://investor.google.com/releases/2011/0815.html.
The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (GOVCN)
(2009). Telecom reform announcement, The Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China.
Grandori, A. (1995). A comparative assessment of inter-firm coordination modes.
Paper presented at the conference “European Management and Organization in
Transition”. Jouy-en-Josas.
Granovetter, M. (1985). "Economic Action and Social Structures: The Problem of
Embeddedness." American Journal of Sociology 3: 481-510.
Grant, R. M. (1996). "Toward a Knowledge-based Theory of the Firm." Strategic
Management Journal 17: 109-122.
Grant, R. M. (2005). Contemporary Strategy Analysis. Oxford, Blackwell.
Gray, B. (1985). "Conditions facilitating interorganizational collaboration." Human
Relations 38(10): 911-936.
Gray, B. (1989). Collaborating - finding common ground for multiparty problems.
San Francisco, London, Jossey-Bass publishers.
261

Groot, W. and Brink, H. M. (2003). "Firm-related training tracks: a random effects
ordered probit model." Economics of Education Review 22: 581-589.
Gulati, R. (1995a). "Social structure and alliance formation patterns: a longitudinal
analysis." Administrative Science Quarterly 40: 619-652.
Gulati, R. (1995b). "Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties
for contractual choice in alliances." Academy of Management Journal 38: 85-112.
Gulati, R. (1998). "Alliances and networks." Strategic Management Journal 19(4):
293–317.
Gulati, R., Khanna, T. and Nohria, N. (1994). "Unilateral commitments and the
importance of process in alliances." Sloan Management Review 35: 61-69.
Gulati, R. and Zajac, E. J. (2000). Reflections on the Study of Strategic Alliances.
Cooperative Strategy. D. O. a. R. Faulkner, M.D. New York, Oxford University
Press.
Gundlach, G. T. and Achrol, R. S. (1993). "Governance in exchange – contract law
and its alternatives." Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 12(2): 141-155.
Hadfield, G. (1990). "Problematic relations: Franchising and the law of incomplete
contracts." Stanford Law Review 42: 927-992.
Hagedoorn, J. (1990). "Organisational modes of inter-firm cooperation and
technology transfer." Technovation 10(1): 17–31.
Hagedoorn, J. (1993). "Understanding the rationale of strategic technology
partnering: inter-organizational modes of cooperation and sectoral differences."
Strategic Management Journal 14: 371-385.
Hagedoorn, J. (1995a). "Research notes and communications a note on international
market." Strategic Management Journal 16(3): 241.
Hagedoorn, J. (1995b). "A note on international market leaders and networks of
strategic technology partnering." Strategic Management Journal 16: 241-250.
Hagedoorn, J. (1996). "Trends and patterns in strategic technology partnering since
the early seventies." Review of Industrial Organization 11: 601-616.
Hagedoorn, J. (2006). "Understanding the cross-level embededness of interfirm
partnership formation." Academy of Management Review 31(3): 670-680.
Hagedoorn, J., Cloodt, D. and Kranenburg, H. V. (2005). "Intellectual property rights
and the governance of international R&D partnerships." Journal of International
Business Studies 36: 175–186.

262

Hagedoorn, J. and Duysters, G. (2002). "External sources of innovative capabilities:
the preference for strategic alliances or mergers and acquisitions." Journal of
Management Studies 39(2): 167–188.
Hagedoorn, J. and Hesen, G. (2007). "Contract law and the governance of inter-firm
technology partnerships - an analysis of different modes of partnering and their
contractual implications." Journal of management studies 44(3): 0022-2380.
Hagedoorn, J., Kranenburg, H. and Osborn, R. N. (2003). "Joint patenting amongst
companies - exploring the effects of inter-firm R&D partnering and experience."
Managerial and decision economics: the international journal of research and
progress in management economics 24(2-3): 71-84.
Hagedoorn, J. and Schakenraad, J. (1994). "The effect of strategic technology
alliances in information technologies." Strategic Management Journal 15(4): 291309.
Hakansson, H. and Johanson, J. (1998). Formal and informal cooperation strategies
in international industrial networks. Cooperative Strategies in International
Business. F. a. L. Contractor, P. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books: 369-379.
Hakansson, H. and Snehota, I. (1995). Developing Relaionships in Business
Networks. London, Routledge.
Hall, R. H., Clark, J. P., Giordano, P. C., Johnson, P. V. and Van Roekel, M. (1977).
"Patterns in interorganizational relationships." Administrative Science Quarterly 22:
457-474.
Hallberg, K. (2000). A Market-Oriented Strategy for Small and Medium-Scale
Enterprises, International Finance Corporation, The World Bank.
Hamel, G. (1991). "Competition for competence and inter-partner learning within
international strategic alliances." Strategic Management Journal 12: 83-103.
Hamel, G., Doz, Y. and Prahalad, C. K. (1986). Strategic partnerships: Success or
surrender? – The challenge of competitive collaboration, INSEAD.
Hamel, G., Doz, Y. and Prahalad, C. K. (1989). "Collaborate with your competitors
and win." Harvard Business Review 67(1): 133-139.
Harrigan, K. R. (1985a). Strategies for Joint Ventures. Lexington, MA, Lexington
Books.
Harrigan, K. R. (1985b). "An application of clustering for strategic group analysis."
Strategic Management Journal 6: 55-73.
Harrigan, K. R. (1986). Managing for Joint Ventures Success. Lexington, MA,
Lexington Books.

263

Harrigan, K. R. (1988). "Joint ventures and competitive strategy." Strategic
Management Journal 9(2): 141–158.
Harrison, D. (2004). "Is a long-term business relationship an implied contract? Two
views of relationship disengagement." Journal of M`anagement Studies 41(1): 00222380.
Hart, O. (1995). Firms, contracts, and financial structure. Oxford, UK, Clarendon
Press.
Hartono, E. (2004). Knowledge, technology, and inter-firm collaboration: A model
and empirical study of collaborative commerce. dissertation, University of Kentucky.
Harvey, S. J. J. (2005). New ideas in contracting and organizational economics
research. New York, Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Harvie, C. (2000). Contemporary Developments and Issues in China's Economic
Transition. Britain, Macmillan.
Harvie, C. and Lee, B. C. (2003). Public Policy and SME Development. Economics
Working Paper Series 2003, University of Wollongong.
Hayek, F. A. (1945). "The use of knowledge in society." American Economic Review
35(4): 519-530.
Hebert, L. and Beamish, P. (1997). Characteristics of Canada-based International
Joint Ventures. Cooperative Strategies. P. Beamish and P. Killing. Lexington, MA,
Lexington.
Heide, J. and John, G. (1990). "Alliances in industrial purchasing: the determinants
of joint action in buyer-supplier relationships." Journal of Marketing Research 27:
24-36.
Heide, J. and John, G. (1992). "Do norms matter in marketing relationships?"
Journal of Marketing 56: 32-44.
Heide, J. B. and Miner, A. S. (1992). "The Shadow of the Future: Effects of
Anticipated Interaction and Frequency of Contact on Buyer-Seller Cooperation."
Academy of Management Journal, 35(2): 265.
Heidl, R. (2010). The stability of Multi-partner alliances: a resource dependence and
social embeddedness perspective. Business administration, University of
Washington. PhD.
Hennart, J. F. (1988). "A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures." Strategic
Management Journal 9: 361-374.
Hill, C. L. (1990). "Cooperation, opportunism, and the invisible hand: Implications
for transaction cost theory." Academy of Management Review 15: 500-514.
264

Hill, R. C. and Hellriegel, D. (1994). "Critical contingencies injoint venture
management: Some lessons from managers." Organization Science 5: 593-607.
Hoepfl, M. C. (1997). "Choosing qualitative research: a primer for technology
education researchers." Journal of Technology Education 9(1): 47-63.
Hofstede, G. H. (1980). Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in WorkRelated Values. Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications.
Hofstede, G. H. (1994). Uncommon sense about organizations: Case studies and
field observation. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage.
Howe, K. and Eisenhart, M. (1990). "Standards for qualitative (and quantitative)
research: A prolegomenon." Educational Researcher 19(4): 2-9.
Howells, J. (2006). "Intermediation and the role of intermediaries in innovation."
Research Policy 35(5): 715-728.
Humphrey, J. and Schmitz, H. (1998). "Trust and interfirm relations in developing
and transition economies." The Journal of Development Studies 34(4): 32-61.
Husted, K. and Michailova, S. (2009). "Dual Allegiance and Knowledge Sharing in
Inter-firm R&D Collaboration." Organizational Dynamics 39(1): 37-47.
IBIS (2011). Industry report. J7122, J7123.
IDC (2011). "Android Rises, Symbian^3 and Windows Phone 7 Launch." Retrieved
May
12,
2011,
from
http://www.idc.com/about/viewpressrelease.jsp?containerId=prUS22689111&sectio
nId=null&elementId=null&pageType=SYNOPSIS.
IFA (2008). "Franchising." Retrieved 2008-4-7, from www.franchise.org.
Indro, D. C. and Richards, M. (2007). "The determinants of foreign partner’s equity
ownership in Southeast Asian joint ventures." International Business Review 16:
177-206.
Inkpen, A. C. (1997). An Examination of knowledge management in International
Joing Venture. Cooperative Strategies. P. Beamish and P. Killing. Lexington,MA,
Lexington.
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M. A. and Vaidyanath, D. (2002). "Alliance management as a
source of competitive advantage." Journal of Management 28(3): 413-446.
Iresearch (2007). Mobile china market reports, Iresearch.
Iresearch (2009). 2009Q1 China WAP Market Share Remained Stable Growth,
Iresearch.

265

Itami, H. and Roehl, T. (1987). Mobilizing invisible assets. Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press.
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (2011). "Mobile Statistics." Retrieved
11st Oct, 2011, from http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/definitions/regions/index.html.
James, B. G. (1985). "Alliance, the new strategic focus." Long Range Planning 18:
76-81.
Jaouen, A. and Gundolf, K. (2007). "Strategic alliance between microfirms specific
patterns in the French context." International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour
& Research 15(1): 48-70.
Jarillo, J. C. (1988). "On strategic networks." Strategic Management Journal 9: 3141.
Jennejohn, M. C. (2008). "Collaboration, innovation, and contract design." Stanford
Journal of Law, Business & Finance 14(1): 83.
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976). "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs, and capital structure." Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
Jia, F. and Rutherford, C. (2010). "Mitigation of supply chain relational risk caused
by cultural differences between China and the West." The International Journal of
Logistics management 21(2): 251-270.
Jiang, R. J. and Tao, Q. T. S., M.D. (2010). "Research notes and commentaries
alliance portfolio diversity and firm performance." Strategic Management Journal
31: 1136-1144.
Jones, G. R. and George, J. M. (1998). "The experience and evolution of trust:
implications for cooperation and teamwork." Academy of Management Review 23(3):
531-546.
Jones, M. and Burgess, L. (2010). "Encouraging SME eCollaboration - the role of the
champion facilitator." Interdisciplinary Journal of E-Learning and Learning Objects
6: 137-152.
Kale, P. (1999). Alliance capability & success: a knowledge-based approach. a
dissertation in management, University of Pennsylvania.
Karim, M. (2009). "What partnership considerations and other factors are important
for small- and medium-sized medical device companies entering China?" Journal of
Medical Marketing 9(3): 201-211.
Kashlak, R. J., Chandran, R. and Benedetto, C. A. D. (1998). "Reciprocity in
international business: A study of telecommunications alliances and contracts."
Journal of International Business Studies 29(2): 281.
Kay, J. (1993). Foundations of Corporate Success. U.S, Oxford University Press.
266

Kay, N. M. (1999). The boundaries of the firm - Critiques, Strategies and Policies,
Macmillan Press Ltd.
Keane, M. (2009). "Between the tangible and the intangible: China’s new
development dilemma." Chinese Journal of Communication 2(1): 77-91.
Kendall, L. (2008). The Conduct of Qualitative Interviews: Research Questions,
Methodological
Issues, and Researching Online. Handbook of Research on New Literacies. M. K. J.
Coiro, C. Lankshear & D. J. Leu. New York, Lawrence Erlbaum: 133-150.
Kent, D. H. (1991). "Research Notes and Communications." Strategic management
Journal (1986-1998) 12(1991): 387-387.
Khamseh, H. M. and Jolly, D. R. (2008). "Knowledge transfer in alliances:
determinant factors." Journal of Knowledge Management 12(1): 37-50.
Khanna, T., Gulati, R. and Nohria, N. (1998). "The dynamics of learning alliances:
competition, cooperation and relative scope." Strategic Management Journal 19:
193-210.
Killing, J. P. (1983). Strategies for joint venture success. New York, Praeger.
Killing, J. P. (1988). Understanding alliances: the role of task and organizational
complexity. Cooperative Strategies in International Business. F. J. Contractor and P.
Lorange. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books: 55–67.
Kim, K. and Park, J. (2002). "The determinants of value creation for partner firms in
the global alliance context." Management International Review 42(4): 361-384.
Klein, B. (1980). "Transaction cost determinants of ‘unfair’ contractual
arrangements." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4: 95-117.
Kogut, B. (1988). "Joint venture: Theoretical and empirical perspectives." Strategic
Management Journal 9: 319-332.
Kogut, B. (1989). "The stability of joint ventures: Reciprocity and competitive
rivalry." Journal of Industrial Economics 38: 183-119.
Kogut, B. (1991). "Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire."
Management Science 37(1): 19-33.
Kogut, B., Shan, W. and Walker, G. (1992). The make-or-cooperate decision in the
context of an industry network. Networks and Organizations. N. a. E. Nohria, R. .
Cambridge, MA, Harvard Business School Press: 248-265.
Kogut, B. and Singh, H. (1988). "The effect of national culture on the choice of entry
mode." Journal of International Business Studies 19(3): 411-432.
267

Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (1992). "Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities,
and the replication of technology." Organization Science 3: 383-397.
Koh, J. and Venkatraman, N. (1991). "Joint Venture Formations and Stock Market
Reactions: An Assessment in the Information Technology Sector." Academy of
Management Journal 34(4): 869-892.
Krogt, V. D., Nilsson, J. and Host, V. (2007). "The impact of cooperatives’ risk
aversion and equity capital constraints on their inter-firm consolidation and
collaboration strategies – with an empirical study of the European dairy industry."
Agribusiness 23(4): 453-472.
KS (2009). "Mobile technology lifts productivity but lengthens working hours for
Australian
employees."
Retrieved
7
July,
2010,,
from
http://www.kellyservices.com.au/web/au/services/en/pages/about_us_media_release_
mobile_technology_lifts_pr
Kuada, J. (2002). "Collaboration between developed and developing country-based
firms: Danish-Ghanaian experience." The journal of Business and Industrial
marketing 17(6): 538.
Kuada, J. and Sorensen, J. (2005). "Facilitated inter-firm collaboration in Ghana: the
case of Danida’s private-sector development projects." Development in Practice
15(3&4).
Kumar, A., Liu, Y. and Divya, J. S. (2010). "Evolution of mobile wireless
communication networks: 1G to 4G." 1 1.
Kurokawa, S. (1994). Technological Alliance Strategies in Japanese Manufacturing
Firms. Academy of Management Meetings. Dallas.
Landsburg, S. E. (2005). Price Theory and Applications. Canada, Thomason.
Lane, C. and Bachmann, R. (1995). Vertical inter-firm relations in Britain and
Germany: the role of trade associations and legal regulation. Working Paper Series of
the ESRC Centre for Business Research. Cambridge, University of Cambridge: 1-42.
Lane, H. W. and Beamish, P. W. (1990). "Cross-cultural cooperative behavior in
joint ventures." LDCs, Management International Review(30 (special issue)): 87102.
Lange, O. (1938). On the Theory of Economic Socialism. On the economic theory of
socialism. B. Lippincott. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 55-143.
Langlois, R. N. and Robertson, P. L. (1995). Firms, markets, and economic change.
London, Routledge.
Lank, E. (2006). Collaborative advantage how organizations win by working
together. London, Palgrave Macmillan.
268

Larson, A. (1992). "Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: a study of governance
of exchange relationships." Administrative Science Quarterly 37: 76-104.
Lau, E. and Rowlinson, S. (2009). "Interpersonal trust and inter-firm trust in
construction projects." Construction Management and Economics 27: 539-554.
Laumann, E. O., Galaskiewicz, J. and Marsden, P. V. (1978). "Community structure
as inter-organizational linkages." Annual Review of Sociology 4(455-84).
Lavie, D. (2007). "Alliance portfolios and firm performance: a study of value
creation and appropriation in the U.S. software industry." Strategic Management
Journal 28: 1187-1212.
Lee, C. W. (2007). "Strategic alliances influence on small and medium firm
performance." Journal of Business Research 60: 731-741.
Lee, J. R., Chen, W. R. and Kao, C. (2003a). "Determinants and performance impact
of asymmetric governance structures in international joint ventures: an empirical
investigation." Journal of Business Research 25(10): 815-828.
Lee, S. C., Pak, B. Y. and Lee, H. G. (2003b). "Business value of B2B electronic
commerce: the critical role of inter-firm collaboration." Electronic Commerce
Research and Applications 2: 350-361.
Levine, J. B. and Byrne, J. A. (1986). "Corporate odd couples." Business Week: 100105.
Levinthal, D. (1988). "A survey of agency models of organizations." Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 9: 153-185.
Levinthal, D. A. and Fichman, M. (1988). "Dynamics of Interorganizational
Attachments Auditor-Client." Administrative Science Quarterly 33(3): 345.
Lewis, J. D. (1990). Partnerships for profit - structuring and managing strategic
alliances. U.S, The Free Press.
Lewis, J. D. (2000). Trusted partners - How companies build mutual trust and win
together. The Free Press, U.S.
Li, Y., Liu, Y., Li, M. and Wu, H. (2007). "Transformational offshore outsourcing:
Empirical evidence from alliances in China." Journal of Operations Management 26:
257-274.
Libecap, G. D. (1989). "DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES IN CONTRACTING FOR
PROPERTY-RIGHTS." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsZeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 145(1): 6-24.
Lin, Y., Wu, C., Wang, W. Y. C. and Lan, L. X. (2011). Intellectual Property in
Inter-firm R&D Collaboration, An Examination on the Role of IP management Core
components. 2011 International Joint Conference on Service Sciences: 208-212.
269

Lin, Z., Yang, H. and Arya, B. (2009). "Alliance partners and firm performance:
resource complementarity and status association." Strategic Management Journal 30:
921-940.
Lincoln, J. R. (1990). Japanese organization and organization theory. Research in
Organizational Behavior. L. L. Cummings and B. Staw. 12: 255-294.
Link, A. N. and Bauer, L. L. (1989). Cooperative Research in U.S. Manufacturing:
Assessing Policy Initiatives and Corporate Strategies. Lexington, MA, Lexington
Books.
Lohrke, F. T., Kreiser, P. M. and Weaver, K. M. (2006). "The influence of current
firm performance on future SME alliance formation intentions: A six-country study."
Journal of Business Research 59: 19-27.
Lorange, P. and Roos, J. (1992). Strategic Alliances. USA and UK, Blackwell.
Lu, H., Trienekens, J. H. and Omata, S. W. F. (2006). Does guanxi matter for
vegetable chains in China? A case study approach. International agri-food chains
and networks Management and organization. J. Bijman, S. W. F. Omata, J. H.
Trienekens, J. H. M. Wijnands and E. F. M. Wubben. The Netherlands, Wageningen
Academic Publishers.
Luechaikajohnpan, P. (2008). Collaboration and International Trade. dissertation,
The University of New South Wales.
Lui, S. S. and Ngo, H. Y. (2005). "An Action Pattern Model of Inter-firm
Cooperation." Journal of Management Studies 42(6): 0022-2380.
Luostarinen, R. (1980). Internationalization of the firm. Helsinki, Helsinki school of
Economics.
Lyles, M. (1987). Learning among joint venture-sophisticate firms. Cooperative
Strategies in International Business. F. J. Contractor and P. Lorange. Lexington,
MA: 301-316.
Macaulay, S. (1963). "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study."
American Sociological Review 28: 55-69.
MacCrimmon, R., K. and Wehrung, D. A. (1986). Taking Risks: The Management of
Uncertainty. New York, Free Press.
Macneil, I. R. (1978). "Contracts: adjustment of long-term economic relations under
classical, neoclassical and relational contract law." Northwestern University Law
Review 72: 854-905.
Madhok, A. (1997). "Cost, value and foreign market entry mode: The transaction and
the firm." Strategic Management Journal 18: 39-61.
270

Mahoney, J. T. (1995). "The management of resources and the resources of
management." Journal of Business Research 33: 91-101.
March, J. G. and Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York, John Wiley &
Sons.
Mariotti, S. and Ricotta, E. (1986). Diversification, agreements among firms and
innovative behaviour.
Mariti, P. and Smiley, R. H. (1983). "Co-operative agreements and the organization
of industry." Journal of Industrial Economics 31: 437-451.
Marsden, P. V. (1990). "Network data and measurement." Annual Review of
Sociology 16: 435-463.
Marsh, L. A. (2010). A strategic view of alliance strategy: the impact of alliance type
on firm profitability. Business Administration, University of Utah. PhD.
Mazzola, E., Perrone, G. and Diega, S. N. L. (2008). "Shaping inter-firm
collaboration in new product development in the automobile industry: A trade-off
between a transaction and relational-based approach." CIRP Annals – Manufacturing
Technology 57: 485-488.
McGee, J. and Dowling, M. (1992). Using R&D Cooperative Arrangements to
Leverage Managerial Experience: A study of Technology Intensive New Venture.
Working Paper, University of Nebraska.
McMaster, R. and Sawkins, J. W. (1996). "The Contract State, Trust Distortion and
Efficiency." Review of Social Economy 54(2): 145-167.
MII (1999). Annual report, Ministry of Information Industry.
MII (2007). "Telecommunication industry news." Retrieved December 12,2007,
from http://www.mii.gov.cn/ (Chinese).
MII (2011). "Telecommunication reports." Retrieved 14th Oct, 2011, from
http://www.mii.gov.cn/ (Chinese).
Miller, D. and Friesen, P. H. (1980). "Momentum and revolution in organizational
adaptation." Academy of Management Journal: 591-614.
Mitchell, W. (1994). "The dynamics of evolving markets: the effects of business
sales and age dissolutions and divestitures." Administrative Science quarterly 39:
575-602.
Mitchell, W., Shaver, J. M. and Yeung, B. (1994). "Foreign entrant survival and
foreign market share: Canadian companies." United States medical sector markets’,
Strategic Management Journal: 555-567.

271

Mitchell, W. and Singh, K. (1996). "Precarious Collaboration: Business Survival
after Partner Shut Down or Form New Partnerships." Strategic Management Journal
17: 99-115.
Mobithinking (2011, 11st Oct, 2011). "Global mobile statistics 2011: all quality
mobile marketing research, mobile Web stats, subscribers, ad revenue, usage,
trends." from http://mobithinking.com/mobile-marketing-tools/latest-mobile-stats.
Mohr, J. and Spekman, R. (1994). "Characteristics of partnership success:
partnership attributes, communication behavior, and conflict resolution techniques."
Strategic Management Journal 15(2): 135-142.
Montavista (2008). "about Montavista." Retrieved June 29, 2008, from
http://www.mvista.com/about.php.
Monteverde, K. and Teece, D. J. (1982). "Supplier switching costs and vertical
integration in the automobile industry." Bell Journal of Economics 13: 206-213.
More, E. and McGrath, M. (1999). "Working cooperatively in an age of deregulation
strategic alliances in Australia's telecommunications sector." The Journal of
Management Development,Bradford 18(3).
Motorola (2006). Annual report 2006.
Motorola (2007). "history."
http://www.motorola.com.

Retrieved

September

18,

2007,

from

Motorola (2010). "Annual report 2010." Retrieved 7th Apr, 2011, from
https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/620097/20110311/AR_82265/images/Mo
torola_Mobility-AR2010.pdf
Mowery, D. C. (1988a). International Collaborative Ventures in US Manufacturing.
Cambridge, Ballinger.
Mowery, D. C. (1988b). Joint ventures in the U.S. commercial aircraft industry.
International Collaborative Ventres in U.S. Manufacturing. D. C. Mowery.
Cambridge, MA, Ballinger.
Mytelka, L. K. (1991). Strategic Partnerships and the World Economy. London,
Pinter.
Mytelka, L. K. and Delapierre, M. (1987). "The alliance strategies of European firms
in the information technology industry and the role of Esprit." Journal of Common
Market Studies 26: 231-253.
Narteh, B. (2008). "Knowledge transfer in developed-developing country interfirm
collaborations: a conceptual framework." Journal of Knowledge Management 12(1):
78-91.

272

Narula, R. (2001). "Choosing between modes of non-internal technological activities
by firms: some technological and economic factors." Technology Analysis and
Strategic Management 13: 365–388.
Naughton, B. (2006). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, The MIT
Press.
NBSC (2011). "National Bureau of Statistics of China annual report." Retrieved May
12, 2011, from http://www.stats.gov.cn/ (Chinese).
NBSC (2012). "The GDP of China in 2010." Retrieved 19 Jan, 2012, from
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjdt/zygg/gjtjjgg/t20120110_402778329.htm.
Nelson, R. R. (1991). "Why do firms differ, and how does it matter?" Strategic
Management Journal 12: 61-74.
Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change. Cambridge, MA, Belknap, Harvard University Press.
Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. G. (2002). "Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics."
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(2): 23-46.
Newman, I. and Benz, C. R. (1998). Qualitative-quantitative research methodology:
exploring the interactive continuum. Southern Illinois University, U.S.A, Board of
Trustees.
Nickerson, J. A. and Silverman, B. S. (1997). Integrating competitive strategy and
transaction cost economics: An operationalization of fit in the interstate trucking
industry, Washington University in St. Louis.
Nie, W. and Zeng, H. (2003). "The impact of China's WTO accession on its mobile
communications market." Journal of Business and Management: 151.
Nokia (2006). Financial report 2006 and 2007.
Nokia (2007). history and quarter report.
Nokia (2010). "Nokia in 2010." Retrieved 4th Apr, 2011, from
http://www.nokia.com/NOKIA_COM_1/About_Nokia/Financials/form20-f_10.pdf.
Nokia (2011). "Nokia Press release."
http://press.nokia.com/press-release/

Retrieved

8th

Oct,

2011,

from

Nooteboom, B. (2004). Inter-firm Collaboration, Learning and Networks - An
integrated approach. London, Routledge.
Nooteboom, B. (2010). The dynamics of Trust: communication, action and third
parties, Tilburg University the Netherlands.

273

Nooteboom, B., Berger, H. and Noorderhaven, N. G. (1997). "Effects of trust and
governance on relational risk." Academy of Management Journal, Briarcliff Manor
40(2): 308.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
Nyberg, K. (1997). "Interaktion i Dyader - en studie av affarssamtal inom europeisk
travaruhandel." Forskningsrapport 97(13).
Nyberg, K. and Strandvik, T. (1999). Business discussions in business dyads. 15th
NFEK Conference on Interorganizational Relations, Helsinki, Swedish School of
Economics.
O'Dwyer, M. G., A. and Carson, D. (2011). "Strategic alliances as an element of
innovative marketing in SMEs." Journal of Strategic Marketing 19(1): 91-104.
OECD (2000). Enhancing the competitiveness of SMEs in Transition economies in
the global economy and their partnership with SMEs of OECD countries. Conference
for Ministers responsible for SMEs and Industry Ministers Bologna. Italy.
OECD (2003). Working Party on Telecommunication and Information Services
Policies. Head of Publications Service. France, OECD.
OECD (2004). Promoting entrepreneurship and innovative SMEs in a global
economy: towards a more responsible and inclusive globalization. Istanbul, Turkey,
OECD.
Ohmae, K. (1989). "The global logic of strategic alliances." Harvard Business
Review 67(2): 143-154.
Oliver, C. (1990). "Determinants of interorganizational relationships: integration and
future directions." Academy of Management Review 15: 241-265.
Olkkonen, R., Tikkanen, H. and Alajoutsijärvi, K. (2000). "The Role of
Communication in Business Relationships and Networks." Management Decision
38(6): 403-409.
Orange (2007). "Brand and about." Retrieved September 19, 2007, from
http://www.orange.com/english/index.php.
Orange (2010). Annual report, Orange.
Osborn, R. N. and Baughn, C. C. (1990). "Forms of interorganizational governance
for multinational alliances." Academy of Management Journal 33: 503-519.
Osborn, R. N., Hagedoorn, J., Denekamp, J. G., Duysters, G. and Baughn, C. C.
(1998). "Embedded patterns of international alliance formation: an institutional
perspective." Organization Studies 19: 617-638.
274

Oster, S. M. (1992). Modern Competitive Analysis. New York, Oxford University
Press.
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). "Markets, bureaucracies, and clans." Administrative Science
Quarterly 25: 129-142.
Ouchi, W. G. and Bolton, M. K. (1988). "The logic of joint research and
development." California Management Review 30: 9-33.
Oviatt, B. M. and McDougall, P. P. (1994). "Towards a Theory of International
Ventures." Journal of International Business Studies 69: 45-64.
Oxley, J. E. (1997). "Appropriability hazards and governance in strategic alliances: a
transaction cost approach." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13(3):
387–409.
Papadopoulos, A., Cimon, Y. and Hebert, L. (2008). "Asymmetry, heterogeneity and
inter-firm relationships Organizing the theoretical landscape." International Journal
of Organizational Analysis 16(1/2): 152-165.
Park, S. H. (1996). "The interfirm collaboration in global competition."
Multinational Business Review 4(1): 94.
Park, S. H. and Russo, M. V. (1996). "When competition eclipses cooperation: An
event history analysis of alliance failure." Management Science 42: 875-890.
Park, S. H. and Ungson, G. R. (1997). "The effect of national culture, organizational
complementarity and economic motivation on joint venture dissolution." Academy of
Management Journal 40: 279-307.
Parker, H. (2000). "Interfirm collaboration and the new product development
process." Industrial Management + Data Systems,Wembley 100(6): 255.
Parkhe, A. (1991). "Interfirm diversity, organizational learning, and longevity in
global strategic alliances." Journal of International Business Studies 22: 579-601.
Parkhe, A. (1993a). ""Messy" research, methodological predispositions and theory
development in international joint ventures." Academy of Management Review 18:
227-268.
Parkhe, A. (1993b). "Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction
cost examination of inter-firm cooperation." Academy of Management Journal 36:
794-829.
Pate, J. L. (1969). "Joint venture activity, 1960-1968." Economic Review: 16-23.
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Newbury Park,
CA, Sage.

275

Peng, S. (2007). "Trade in Telecommunications Services: Doha and Beyond."
Journal of World Trade 41(2): 293.
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. New York, John Wiley &
Sons.
Perlmutter, H. V. and Hennan, D. A. (1986). "Cooperate to compete globally."
Harvard Business Review 64(2): 136-152.
Perry, C. (1998). "Processes of a case study methodology for postgraduate research
in marketing." European Journal of Marketing 32(9/10): 785-802.
Perry, M. K. (1989). Vertical integration. Ricerche Economiche. R. Schmalensee and
R. Willig. 45: 449-474.
Pfeffer, J. and Nowak, P. (1976). "Joint Ventures and Interorganizational
Interdependence." Administrative Science Quarterly 21: 398-418.
Pisano, G. P. (1989). "Using equity participation to support exchange: evidence from
the biotechnology industry." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5(1):
109–126.
Pisano, G. P., Russo, M. V. and Teece, D. J. (1988). Joint ventures and collaborative
arrangements in the telecommunications equipment industry. International
Collaborative Ventures in U.S. Manufacturing. D. C. Mowery. Cambridge, MA,
Ballinger: 23-70.
Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. (2002). "Do formal contracts and relational governance
function as substitutes or complements?" Strategic Management Journal 23(8): 707.
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive strategy. New York, Free Press.
Porter, M. E. (1985). "Technology and competitive advantage." Journal of Business
Strategy (pre-1986) 5(3): 60.
Porter, M. E. (1987). "From competitive strategy to cooperative strategy." Harvard
Business Review 65(3): 43-59.
Porter, M. E. (1990). "New Global Strategies for Competitive Advantage." Planning
Review 18(3): 4.
Porter, M. E. (2007). Towards a dynamic theory of strategy. Boston, Massachusetts,
U.S.A, John Wiley & Sons.
Porter, M. E. and Fuller, M. B. (1986). Coalitions and global strategy. Competition in
Global Industries. M. E. Porter. Boston, Harvard Business School Press: 315-344.
Postan, M., et al. (1952). The Cambridge economic history of Europe. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
276

Powell, W. W. (1990). "Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of
organization." Research in Organizational Behavior 12: 295-336.
Powell, W. W., Koput, K. W. and Smith-Doerr, L. (1996). "Interorganizational
collaboration and the locus of innovation: networks of learning in biotechnology."
Administrative Science Quarterly 41: 116-145.
PR Newswire1 (2008). Orange and Nokia Sign MOU on Value Added Mobile
Services; Cooperation in the Areas of Location Based Services. Mobile Advertising
and Gaming. New York, PR Newswire.
PR Newswire4 (2008). Orange Israel Launches NewACT's Mobile Data
Synchronization and Collaboration Service. Europe Including UK Disclose, PR
Newswire.
PR Newswire (2006). Nokia and Gameloft Announce Expanded Mobile Gaming
Collaboration. New York, PR Newswire.
Prahalad, C. K. and Hamel, G. (1990). "The core competence of the corporation."
Harvard Business Review(May-June): 79-91.
Pratt, J. W. and Zeckhauser, R. J. (1985). Principals and agents: An overview.
Principals and agents: The structure of business J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zeckhauser.
Cambridge, MA, Harvard Business School Press: 1-35.
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2007). Outsourcing comes of age: The rise of
collaborative partnering, Global Outsourcing Survey.
Qiu, L. D. (2005). China’s Telecommunication Industry. Telecom, HKUST.
Ragatz, G., Handfield, R. and Scannell, T. (1997). "Success factors for integrating
suppliers into new product development." Journal of Product Innovation
Management 14: 190-202.
Rao, P. K. (2003). The Economics of Transaction Costs. New York, Palgrave
Macmillan.
Reinig, B. A. (2003). "Toward an understanding of satisfaction with the process and
outcomes of teamwork." Journal of Management Information System 19: 65-83.
Remenyi, D., Williams, B., Money, A. and Swartz, E. (1998). Doing Research in
Business and Management: An Introduction to Process and Method. London, Sage
Publication.
Reus, T. H. and Rotting, D. (2009). "Meta-analyses of International Joint Venture
Performance Determinants Evidence for Theory, Methodological Artifacts and the
Unique Context of China." Management International Review 49: 607-640.
RIC (2006). Asia Telecom Market Report, 2005-2006, Research In China.
277

Richards, K. (1993). Qualitative Inquiry in TESOL. Basingstoke, Palgrave
Macmillan.
Richards, M. and Yang, Y. (2007). "Determinants of foreign ownership in
international R&D joint venture: Transaction costs and national culture." Journal of
International Management 13: 110-130.
Richardson, G. B. (1972). "The organization of industry." Economic Journal 82:
883-897.
Rindfleisch, A. and Heide, J. B. (1997). "Transaction cost analysis: Past, present, and
future applications." Journal of Marketing 61(4): 30-54.
Ring, P. and Van de Ven, A. (1989). Formal and informal dimensions of
transactions. Research on the Management of Innovation: The Minnesota Studies. V.
d. Ven, A. A., H. and M. S. Poole, Ballinger/Harper & Row: 171-192.
Ring, P. and Van de Ven, A. (1992). "Structuring cooperative relationships between
organizations." Strategic Management Journal 13(7): 483–498.
Ring, P. and Van de Ven, A. (1994). "Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships." Academy of Management Review 19(1): 90-118.
Ronen, S. and Shenkar, O. (1985). "Clustering countries on attitudinal dimensions: A
review and synthesis." Academy of Management Review 10: 435-454.
Roos, J. (1994). Cooperative Strategies. UK, Prentice Hall.
Root, F. (1988). Some taxonomies of international cooperative arrangements.
Cooperative strategies in international business. F. J. Contractor and P. Lorange.
Boston, Lexington Books.
Rumelt, R. P. (1974). Strategy, structure, and economic performance. Cambridge,
MA, Harvard university Press.
Rumelt, R. P. (1984). Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm. New Jersey,
Englewood Cliffs.
Rumelt, R. P. (1991). "How Much does Industry Matter?" Strategic Management
Journal 12: 167-185.
Sadowski, B. M., Dittrich, K. and Duysters, G. M. (2003). "Collaborative strategies
in the event of technological discontinuities: The case of Nokia in the mobile
telecommunication industry." Small Business Economics 21(2): 173.
Sahakijpicharn, K. (2007). Guanxi Network and Business Performance of Sino-Thai
SMEs. School of Economics, University of Wollongong.
Salvatore, D. (2005). Introduction to International Economics, John Wiley & Sons.
278

Saxton, T. (1997). "The effects of partner and relationship characteristics on alliance
outcomes." Academy of Management Journal 40: 443-461.
Schaper, M. and Volery, T. (2004). Entrepreneurship and small business: A pacific
rim perspective. Australia, Jone Wiley & Sons.
Schneider, G. P. (2007). Electronic Commerce. Beijing, Thomson Learning Asia Pte
Ltd and China Machine Press.
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1990). "Strategy, complexity and economic rent."
Management Science 36: 1178-1192.
Shan, W. and Hamilton, W. (1991). "Country-specific advantage and international
cooperation." Strategic Management Journal 12: 419-432.
Shane, S. (1994). "The effect of national culture on the choice between licensing and
direct foreign investment." Strategic Management Journal 15: 627-642.
Sharma, D. D. (1998). "A model of governance in international strategic alliances."
Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing 13(6): 1-17.
Sheng, Y. and Song, L. (2008). "Comparative advantage and Australia-China
bilateral trade." Economic Papers 27(1): 41-56.
Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative behavior. New York, McMillan.
Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality: Behavioral economics and
business organization. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Singh, K. and Mitchell, W. (2005). "Growth dynamics: The bidirectional relationship
between interfirm collaboration and business sales in entrant and incumbent
alliances." Strategic Management Journal 26: 497-521.
Sinocase (2008). China Mobile, Softbank, Vodafone to Set Up Laboratory. SinoCast
China Business Daily News.
Slocum, J. W. and Lei, D. (1993). Cultural and economic factors in global alliances.
Organizational change and redesign. G. a. G. Huber, W. New York, Oxford
University Press: 295-322.
Smith, A. (1776). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.
London, London, W. Strahan and T. Cadell.
SPAN (2007). Telecommunications Service Provider (Mobile Premium Services)
Determination 2005 (No. 1), Service Provider’s Action Network.
Spforum (2011). "News and information." Retrieved 14th Oct, 2011, from
http://www.spforum.net/ (Chinese).

279

Stallkamp, T. T. (2005). Score! A better way to do business: moving from conflict to
collaboration. Wharton, U.S.
Steinbock, D. (2006). "The mobile revolution and China." China Communications
April 2006, USA.
Stimson, R. J., Stough, R. R. and Roberts, B. H. (2006). Regional Economic
Development Analysis and Planning Strategy. New York, Springer.
Stopford, J. M. and Wells, L. T., Jr. (1972). Managing the multinational enterprise:
Organization of the firm and ownership of the subsidiaries. New York, Basic books.
Strauss, A. L. and Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded
Theory Procedures and Techniques. Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publications, Inc.
Su, Z., Xie, E. and Li, Y. (2009). "Alliance motivations, control mechanisms and
alliance performance: Evidence from China." Frontier Business Research China
3(1): 103-119.
Swaminathan, V. M., C. (2009). "Marketing alliances, firm networks, and firm value
creation." Journal of Marketing 73(5): 52-69.
Tallman, S. (2000). Forming and Managing Shared Organization Ventures –
Resources and Transaction costs. Cooperative Strategy. D. O. Faulkner and M. D.
Rond. New York, Oxford University Press.
Taylor, S. and Osland, J. S. (2003). The impact of intercultural communication on
global organisational learning. Handbook of Organisational Learning and
Knowledge Management. M. Esterby-Smith and A. L. Majorie. Oxford, Blackwell.
Teece, D. J. (1982). "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm." Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 39-63.
Teece, D. J. (1986). "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for
integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy." Research Policy 15: 285305.
Teece, D. J. (1992). "Competition, cooperation, and innovation." Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 18: 1-25.
Teece, D. J. (1994). "The dynamic capabilities of firms: An introduction." Industrial
and Corporate Change 3(3): 537-556.
Teece, D. J. (2000). Managing intellectual capital: Organizational, strategic and
policy dimensions. New York, Oxford University Press.
Teece, D. J. (2005). "Technological know-how, property rights, and enterprise
boundaries: the contribution of Arora and Merges." Industrial and Corporate
Change 14(6): 1237–1240.
280

Teece, D. J. (2008). The transfer and licensing of know-how and intellectual
property. Singapore, World Scientific.
Telecom Worldwire1 (2008). "Nokia Siemens Networks to cooperate with Pirelli
Broadband Solutions." Retrieved May 7, 2008.
Telecom Worldwire2 (2008). "Avail collaborates with Motorola on MWAVE."
Retrieved Mar 18, 2008.
Telstra
(2009).
"History."
Retrieved
http://telstra.com/index.jsp?SMIDENTITY=NO.

March

5,

2009,

from

TIO (2007). TIO Annual report and member list, Australian Telecommunications
Industry Ombudsman.
TIO (2012).
"About
TIO."
http://www.tio.com.au/about-us.

Retrieved

January

12,

2012,

from

Tuchi, C. (1995). Firm Heterogeneity and Performance of Strategic Alliances, MIT
Sloan School of Management.
Tung, R. (1984). "How to negotiate with the Japanese." California Management
Review 26(3): 62-77.
Uzzi, B. (1997). "Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: the paradox
of embeddedness." Administrative Science Quarterly 42: 35-67.
Vachani, S. (1991). "Distinguishing between related and unrelated international
geographic diversification: A comprehensive measure of global diversification."
Journal of International Business Studies 22(307-22).
Van de Ven, A. H. and Walker, G. (1984). "The dynamics of interorganizational
coordination." Administrative Science Quarterly 29: 598-621.
Vilana, J. R. and Monroy, C. R. (2010). "Invluence of cultural mechanisms on
horizontal inter-firm collaborations." Journal of Industrial Engineering and
Management 3(1): 138-175.
Vipraio, T. P. and Pauluzzo, R. (2007). An evolutionary interpretation of ethnic
networks: the Chinese example. The 10th International Conference of the Society for
Global Business & Economic Development - Creativity & Innovation: Imperatives
for Global Business and Development, Kyoto, Japan.
Vodafone (2006). Annual report 2006.
Vodafone (2007). "About Vodafone." Retrieved September 19, 2007, from
http://www.vodafone.com/
Vodafone (2010). Annual report 2010, Vodafone.
281

Vodafone (2011). Media Releases and Annual report 2011, Vodafone.
Walker, G., Kogut, B. and Shan, W. (1997). "Social capital, structural holes and the
formation of an industry network." Organization Science 8: 109-125.
Walker, G. and Weber, D. (1984). "A transaction cost approach to make-or-buy."
Administrative Science Quarterly 29: 373-391.
Weber, A. (1909). Theory of the Location of Industries. Chicago, University of
Chicago Press.
Weick, K. E. (1979). The social Psychology of Organizing. Reading, MA, AddisonWesley.
Weiss, L. (1971). Quantitative studies of industrial organization. Frontiers of
Quantitative Economics. M. D. Intrilligator. North-Holland, Amsterdam: 362-411.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). "A Resource-Based View of the Firm." Strategic Management
Journal 5: 171-180.
Wernerfelt, B. (1995). "The Resource-Based View of the Firm: ten years after."
Strategic Management Journal 16: 171-174.
Wes, H. R., Jeffrey, G. and Deacue, F. (2005). "Analysis of Cardinal and Ordinal
Assumptions in Conjoint Analysis." Agriculture and Resource Economics Review
34(2): 238-252.
Westney, D. E. (1988). Domestic and foreign learning curves in managing
international cooperative strategies. Cooperative strategies in international business.
F. J. a. L. Contractor, P. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books: 339-346.
Whitford, J. and Zeitlin, J. (2004). "Governing decentralized production institutions,
public policy, and the prospects for inter-firm collaboration in US manufacturing."
Industry and Innovation 11(1-2): 11-44.
Williamson, O. E. (1971). "The vertical integration of production: Market failure
considerations." American Economic Review 61: 112-123.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust
Implications. New York, The Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1979). "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations." Journal of Law and Economics 22(2): 233-261.
Williamson, O. E. (1983). "Credible commitments: Using hostages to support
exchange." American Economic Review 73(4): 519-535.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York, The
Free Press.
282

Williamson, O. E. (1988). "The logic of Economic Organization." Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 4(1): 65-93.
Williamson, O. E. (1991). "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of
Discrete Structural Alternatives." Administrative Science Quarterly 36(2): 269-296.
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York, Oxford
University Press.
Williamson, O. E. (2002). "The theory of the firm as governance structure: From
choice to contract." The Journal of Economic Perspectives Summer 2002, 16(3):
171.
Williamson, O. E. (2005). "The economics of governance." The American Economic
Review 95(2).
Williamson, O. E. and Winter, S. G. (1993). The nature of the firm - origins,
evolution, and development. New York, Oxford, Oxford university press.
Wilson, C. (2007). "THE COST OF NOT COLLABORATING." Telephony 248(13):
25.
Winter, S. G. and Zollo, M. (1999). From organizational routines to dynamic
capabilities. The Academy of Management Proceedings, Chicago, IL.
Wireless News (2007). Gameloft and DreamWorks Animation Team for Shrek the
Third. Wireless News, Coventry: 1.
Withered, J. (1980). "Reciprocity, monopsony, power and Section 7." The Antitrust
Bulletin(Spring): 217-232.
Wolf, R. C. (1995). A guide to international joint ventures with sample clauses, The
Hague.
Womack, J. P. (1988). Multinational joint ventures in motor vehicles. International
Collaborative Ventures in U.S. Manufacturing. D. C. Mowery. Ballinger,
Cambridge, MA: 301-348.
Woodcock, C. P. and Geringer, M. J. (1991). An exploratory study of agency costs
related to the control structure of multi-partner, international joint venture. Academy
of Management Best Papers Proceedings.
Woolthuis, R. K., Nooteboom, B. and Jong, G. D. (2010). Roles of third parties in
trust repair: an empirical test in high tech alliances, Free University Amsterdam.
World Bank (2012). How we classify countries, accessed by 11/09/2012,
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications
Worldwide Telecom (2008). MOTORALA SDP ENHANCES SHANGHAI
UNICOM MOBILE DATA SERVICE. Boynton Beach, Worldwide Telecom. 20.
283

WRG (2006). Top Ten Telecommunications Market Opportunities, Strategies, and
Forecasts, 2006 to 2012, Wintergreen Research Group.
Wu, Z. (2001). 10 China's Industrial Restructuring in the Twenty-First Century.
Industrial Restructuring in East Asia, towards the 21st century. S. Masuyama,
Vandenbrink, Donna., and Yue C. . Tokyo, NRI & ISEAS.
Yelle, L. E. (1979). "The learning curve: Historical review and comprehensive
survey." Decision Sciences 10: 302-328.
Yin, R. K. (1982). "Studying Phenomenon and Context Across Sites." The American
Behavioral 26(1): 84.
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. California, Sage
Publication Inc.
Yip, G. (1992). Total global strategy. NJ, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Yoshino, M. Y. and Rangan, U. S. (1995). "An Entrepreneurial Approach to
Globalization." Strategic Alliances.
Zacharia, Z. G., Nix, N. W. and Lusch, R. F. (2011). "Capabilities that enhance
outcomes of an episodic supply chain collaboration." Journal of Operations
Management 29: 591-603.
Zagare, F. C. (1984). Game Theory. London, Sage.
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B. and Perrone, V. (1998). "Does trust matter? Exploring the
effects of interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance." Organization
Science 9: 141-159.
Zaheer, A. and Venkatraman, N. (1995). "Relational governance as an
interorganizational strategy: an empirical test of the role of trust in economic
exchange." Strategic Management Journal 16(5): 373-392.
Zaheer, A. and Zaheer, S. (1997). "Catching the wave: Alertness, responsiveness and
market influence in global electronic networks." Management Science 43(11): 14931509.
Zajac, E. J. and Olsen, C. P. (1993). "Form transaction cost to transactional value
analysis: Implications for the study of interorganizational strategies." Journal of
Management Studies 30(1): 131-145.
Zander, U. and Kogut, B. (1995). "Knowledge and the speed of the transfer and
imitation of organizational capabilities: An empirical text." Organization Science
6(1): 76-92.

284

Zhang, M. Y. and Dodgson, M. (2007). High-Tech Entrepreneurship in Asia Innovation, industry and institutional dynamics in mobile payments. UK, USA,
Edward Elgar.
Zhang, Y. (2011). Trust in business collaboration. The 8th SMEs in a global
economy conference. Thailand.
Zhang, Y. and Harvie, C. (2010a). Inter-firm Collaboration in Australian Telecom
Market. The 7th SMEs in a global economy conference. Malaysia.
Zhang, Y., Hodgkinson, A. and Harvie, C. (2009). Inter-firm Collaboration in
Chinese Telecom Market. The 6th SMEs in a global economy conference. China.
Zucker, L. G. (1986). Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure.
Research in Organizational Behavior. B. M. a. C. Staw, L. L. 8: 53-112.

285

APPENDIX A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INTERVIEWS

Aim of the research:
The aim of this research is to establish a global communicating and commercial
channel for all mobile device providers, service providers, content providers, and
technical providers. To understand better the main determinates of a successful interfirm collaboration and the obstacles threats international collaboration, the questions
are based on experiences on telecommunicating collaboration. It will take 10 to 20
minutes to complete this questionnaire.

Disclosed agreement
The questionnaire is anonymous for you and your partner. All the data will be
retained securely at the University of Wollongong by the researcher for purpose of
analysis during this research. You are free to refuse to participate or withdraw your
data at any time. If you have any question about this research, you can contact the
researcher named below.

Results offer
If you would like to have one copy of the final report for this project, please mark at
the end of the questionnaire. Thank you.

Aimee Zhang
Research student of Economics
University of Wollongong
E-mail:

yz917@uow.edu.au
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Part 1: General Questions (Please mark at the appropriate box)
1.1. Identify business sectors (Multiple choice) and please add the proportional of
each part of business in your company (for example 60%).
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

Mobile Device Provider
Operator/ Carrier Service Provider
Mobile Service Provider
Internet Service Provider
Mobile Content Provider
Technical Provider
Other (Please specify:

)

1.2. Which sector is your business in?
□
□
□

Private sector
Public sector
Other (Please specify:

)

1.3. Type of ownership
□
□
□

Australian
Foreign (Please specify:
Joint Ventured (Please specify:

)
)

1.4. Employee numbers
□
□
□

□
□
□

Less than 5
20 – 49
200 – 499

5–9
50 – 99
500 or more

□
□

10 – 19
100 – 199

1.5. Do you or did you have collaboration with other firms?
□
□

No (Please go to part 3)
Yes (Please complete part 2 for each inter-firm collaboration)

Part 2: Collaboration part (Please finish this part for each collaboration, it is free to
choose the important ones for you.)

2.1. What are your partner’s business sectors? (Multiple choice) Please add the
proportional of each part of business in your company (for example 60%).
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

Mobile Device Provider
Operator/ Carrier Service Provider
Mobile Service Provider
Internet Service Provider
Mobile Content Provider
Technical Provider
Other (Please specify:

)

2.2. Business size of your partner
□
□
□

□
□
□

Less than 5
20 – 49
200 – 499

287

5–9
50 – 99
500 or more

□
□

10 – 19
100 – 199

2.3. Collaborating type (Multiple choice)
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

Co-production service
Market share service
Joint R&D service
Joint Venture service
Technical training and start-up assistant service
Production, assembly, and buy-back agreement
Patent licensing
Franchising
Know how licensing
Management and service agreement
Other (Please specify:
)

2.4. What are the benefits brought by this collaboration (Please mark at the
appropriate box. Leave the boxes blank if there is no influence.)
Access to new technology Insignificant □

□

□

□

□ Substantial

Improved global competitiveness Insignificant □

□

□

□

□ Substantial

Increased market share Insignificant

□

□

□

□

Saving in costs Insignificant

□

□

□

□

□ Substantial

Assist R&D Insignificant

□

□

□

□

□ Substantial

□

□

□

□

Increased market influence Insignificant

□Substantial

□Substantial

Improve profitability

Insignificant

□

□

□

□

□ Substantial

Improve productivity

Insignificant

□

□

□

□

□ Substantial

Improve product quality Insignificant

□

□

□

□

□ Substantial

Increase innovations Insignificant

□

□

□

□

□ Substantial

Access to government programs Insignificant □ □

□

□

□ Substantial

Allowed participating global market Insignificant □ □

□

□

□ Substantial

2.5. Is this an international collaboration?
□
□

No (Please go to part 3)
Yes (Please continue)

2.6. Where is your business partner located?
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

Australia and New Zealand
Asia
North America
South America
Europe
Middle East
Africa
Other (Please specify:

)
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2.7. Would you regard this collaboration as successful?
□
□

No
Yes

Part 3: Main concern or barriers on inter-firm collaboration and international
collaboration (Please mark at the appropriate box)

3.1. What do you think are the main concerns or barriers affects your
company to be involved in inter-firm collaboration? (Multiple choice)
□
□
□
□
□
□

Lack of trust (e.g. less known of each other)
Technology complexity (e.g. new technology complexity increase risks)
Benefit distribution (e.g. not consistent with each other)
Societal-level dynamics (e.g. economic trends and socio-economic policies)
Historical, political, or cultural barriers (e.g. different culture or language)
Other (Please specify:
)

3.2. What do you think are the main concerns or barriers for international
collaboration? (Multiple choice)
□ Limited access to Finance
□
Lack of trust on international business
□
Lack of experience on international business
□
Lack of global competitiveness
□
Language, cultural, or communication barriers
□
Lack of access to advanced technology (i.e Internet)
□
Regulatory or government constraints
□
Other (Please specify:
)

Part 4: Suggestions
4.1. In your opinion, what is the most important determinate to your
collaboration? What impressed you the most during these
collaborations?

4.2. In your opinion, what types of government policies or services
should be implemented to assist telecommunication firms for their
future development in local and global markets?
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4.3. Are there any other issues that should be considered?

Would you like to receive a copy of the final report for this project?
□

□

Yes

By e-mail:
Or by mail:
Or by fax:

Others:
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No

APPENDIX B QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INTERVIEWS (CHINESE)

研究目标：
此研究针对当前移动通信领域的企业间合作进行全面系统地研究，并借助现有的经验
和知识建立一个全球移动领域交流平台。此调查问卷大概需要10到20分钟完成。希望
您能够认真并如实地填写。谢谢！

保密协议
此调查的所有数据都将被匿名并妥善的保管在Wollongong大学，仅用于此项研究。您
可以在任何时间拒绝或者撤销贵公司相关的全部数据。如果有任何其他问题，请与下
列的研究人员联系。谢谢！

研究报告
如果您需要一份此研究的最终报告，请在问卷最后选择希望接收的方式。谢谢！

张愈 (Aimee)

经济研究学院
Wollongong大学
电子邮件： yz917@uow.edu.au
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第一部分：普通问题部分 （请选择相应选项框）

1.1. 运营范围和每种业务所占比例 （例如60%）
□
手机制造商
□
手机运营商
□
手机服务提供商
□
网络服务提供商
□
手机内容提供商
□
技术提供商
□
其他
（请指明：
1.2. 公司性质
□
□
□

私有企业
国有企业
其他
（请指明

1.3. 公司所有权
□
中国独资
□
外商独资
□
合资企业

）

(请指明国家
(请指明国家及比例

1.3. 公司规模，全职员工数量：
□
少于 5
□
20 – 49
□

）

200 – 499

)
)

□
□

5–9
50 – 99

□
□

□

超过500

10 – 19
100 – 199

1.5. 请问您是否有合作伙伴？ （非买卖关系的合作公司，例如研发，市场，股份）
□
否（请直接前进至第三部分）
□
是（请继续）

第二部分：合作伙伴 （请对每一个合作伙伴填写一份，您可以选择对贵公司最重要的五个
合作伙伴来填写）
2.1. 贵公司合作伙伴的运营范围和每种业务所占比例 （例如60%）
□
手机制造商
□
手机运营商
□
手机服务提供商
□
网络服务提供商
□
手机内容提供商
□
技术提供商
□
其他
（请指明：
）
2.2. 公司规模，全职员工数量：
□
少于 5
□
□
20 – 49
□
□

200 – 499

□

5–9
50 – 99

□
□

10 – 19
100 –

□

合作科研

199

超过500

2.3. 合作类型 (可以多选)
□
产品合作
□
市场合作
资融资
□
技术培训和新公司辅助项目
□
□
专利合作
□
特许经营
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产品集成，装配，返销
□
知识共享授权

□

合

□

□

管理及服务提供

其他 （请指明

）

2.4. 合作给公司带来的影响 （请选择相应选项框，若没有影响，请留空）
接触最新技术
增加企业国际竞争力
增加市场份额
成本节约
科研改进
增加市场影响力
增加利润
增加产量
增加产品质量
增加创新和应用
增进政府关系
有助于进入国际市场

不明显
不明显
不明显
不明显
不明显
不明显
不明显
不明显
不明显
不明显
不明显
不明显

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

2.5. 此合作是否国际合作
□
否（请直接前进至第三部分）
2.6. 贵公司合作伙伴来自：
□
亚洲
□
□
南美洲
□
洲
□
其他
（请指明：

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

明显提升
明显提升
明显提升
明显提升
明显提升
明显提升
明显提升
明显提升
明显提升
明显提升
明显提升
明显提升

□

北美洲
□
非

是（请继续）

澳大利亚及新西兰地区
欧洲
□
中东
）

2.7. 您是否认为此合作可以成为是成功的？
□
否

□

是

第三部分：国际合作的主要障碍和考虑因素（请选择相应选项框）
3.3. 您认为对贵公司而言，企业合作的障碍或者主要考虑的问题有哪些？（可多选）
□
缺乏信任 （例如缺乏对对方的了解）
□
技术复杂度过高 （使合作风险上升）
□
利益分配 （例如很难达成一致）
□
社会性风险（例如经济走势，政策变化）
□
历史，政策，文化障碍 （例如不同地区的语言文化差异）
□
其他
（请指明：
）
3.2. 您认为对贵公司而言，与国际企业合作的障碍或问题有哪些？（可多选）
□ 资金短缺
□
对国际商务的信任度问题
□
缺乏国际合作经验
□
缺乏国际竞争力
□
语言和交流障碍
□
文化习俗障碍
□
技术水平障碍（例如互联网的应用）
□
政策法规的限制
□
其他
（请指明：
）

第四部分：意见建议
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4.1. 在您看来，影响贵公司合作成败的最重要因素是什么？在跟其它企业合作的过程
中，给您留下印象最深的因素是什么？

4.2. 在您看来，什么样的政府政策可以有助于帮助通讯信息科技公司实现国际化并且
参与到国际市场中竞争？

4.3. 您是否还有其它考虑或建议？

请问您是否希望接收本研究的最终报告？
□
是（请选择并记录您的接收方式）
电子邮件：
邮件：
传真：
其他方式：
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□

否

APPENDIX C QUESTIONNAIRE FOR QUANTITATIVE STUDY

Please finish the following questions for each of your previous inter-firm
collaborations (Please mark at the appropriate box)
Part 1: Information of your company
1.1. Country of ownership (Please select multiple options if joint ownership)

□Australia □New Zealand □East Asia □South Asia □North America
□South America □UK □Other Europe □Middle East □Africa
1.2. Full-time employee numbers

□Less than 5 □5 – 19 □20 – 99

□100 – 199

□200 – 499

□500 or more

1.3. Do you have similar collaboration experience within last 10 years?

□ No

□ Less □ Some□ Many □ Plenty experience

1.4. What role do you usually play in business networks?

□Organizer □Very active

□Often attend □Rarely attend □Never attend

Part 2: Information of your partner
2.1. Country of ownership (Please select multiple options if joint ownership)

□Australia □New Zealand □East Asia □South Asia □North America
□South America □UK □Other Europe □Middle East □Africa
2.2. Full-time employee numbers

□Less than 5 □5 – 19 □20 – 99
□Not sure

□100 – 199

□200 – 499

□500

or

more

2.3. Does your partner have similar collaboration experience within last 10
years?

□ Unknown □ No □ Less □ Some□ Many □ Plenty
2.4. What role does your partner usually play in its business networks?

□Unknown

□Organizer

□Very active

□Often attend □Rarely attend □Never

attend

2.5. The reliable level of the manager or contact person of your partner

□ Not reliable □ Quite unreliable □ Neural

□ Quite reliable □ Very reliable

2.6. How do you perceive the reputation level of your partner in its industry?

□Unknown

□ Very low

□ Low □ Neural

Part 3: Collaboration
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□ High □ Very high

3.1 How similar is your and your business partner in the following? (Please leave it
blank if not sure)
Similarity
Not
Quite
Neural
Quite
Very
similar
unsimilar
Similar Similar





Expectation and Goal





Culture background (include all ownership,
contact manager and chief officers)





Language (include all contact employees)





Religions (include all contact persons)





Technological development





Business Structure





Working process
3.2. To what extent do you agree the communicate quality in this collaboration?
Satisfactory
Strongly
Agree
Neural
Disagree Strongly
agree
disagree





Frequency of communication





Understanding of communication





Efficiency of communication
3.3. What trust level would regard this collaboration in?

□ Very low □ Low □ Neural

□ High □ Very high

3.4. What risk level would regard this collaboration in?

□ Very low □ Low □ Neural

□ High □ Very high

Part 4: Performance and result
4.1. What benefits does this collaboration brought (Please leave blank if there is no
influence.)
Benefits
Very
Substanti
Large
Medium
Small
substantial
al large
increase
increase
increase





Access to new technology





Improved global competitiveness





Increased market share





Saving in costs





Assist research and development





Increased market influence





Improve profitability





Improve productivity





Improve product quality





Increase innovations





Access to government programs





Allowed participating global market





Other (please specify)
4.2. To what extent do you agree this collaboration has fulfilled the expectation?

□ Strongly agree □ Agree

□ Neural

□ Disagree □ Strongly disagree

4.3. Would you regard this collaboration as successful?

□ Strongly agree □ Agree

□ Neural

□ Disagree □ Strongly disagree
st

The final result report will be available after 1 Dec, 2010 through the following link:
www.wemosoft.com/gccp/survey.html
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APPENDIX D QUESTIONNAIRE FOR QUANTITATIVE STUDY
(CHINESE)

此研究是面向如何提高企业间合作成功率的研究项目。请根据贵公司以往的每个合作案例填
写下面的问题（在选框中点击即可）

第一部分：贵公司相关
1.1. 公司所有者的国籍（如果是合资公司可多选）
□中国 □其他东亚国家 □东南亚国家
□澳大利亚及新西兰
□北美洲国家
□南美洲国家
□英国 □其他欧洲国家 □中东国家
□非洲国家
1.2. 全职员工数量
□少于5 □5 – 19 □20 – 99
□100 – 199
□200 – 499
□500及以上
1.3. 贵公司在此次合作之前是否有过类似的合作经验？
□ 没有
□ 很少 □ 有一些
□ 很多 □ 非常多
1.4. 贵公司在公司商务网络活动中的角色是？
□组织者
□积极参与者
□有时参与
□很少参与
□从不参与

第二部分：此次合作中合作伙伴相关
2.1. 合作伙伴所属国籍（如果是合资公司可多选）
□中国 □其他东亚国家 □东南亚国家
□澳大利亚及新西兰
□北美洲国家
□南美洲国家
□英国 □其他欧洲国家 □中东国家
□非洲国家
2.2. 合作伙伴的全职员工数量
□不清楚
□少于5 □5 – 19 □20 – 99
□100 – 199
□200
–
499
□500及以上
2.3. 合作伙伴在此次合作之前是否有过类似的合作经验？
□ 不清楚
□ 没有 □ 很少 □ 有一些
□ 很多 □ 非常多
2.4. 合作伙伴在其公司商务网络活动中的角色是？
□不清楚
□组织者
□积极参与者
□有时参与
□很少参与
□从不参与
2.5. 您认为合作伙伴派出的项目经理或者联系人的诚信程度如何？
□ 不可信
□ 不是很可信 □ 中等 □ 很可信 □ 非常可信
2.6. 您对合作伙伴公司在行业中的声誉的评价是？
□不清楚
□ 很低 □较低 □ 中等 □ 较高 □ 很高

第三部分：此次合作相关
3.1 您认为贵公司及合作伙伴在下列选项中的相似度有多高（如果不确定请保留空白）
相似程度
完全不
很不同
有些相
很相似
同
似




对于合作的目标及期望




文化背景（包含公司所有者，联系
人和经理）




语言背景（包含所有接触的员工）




信仰背景（包含所有接触的员工）




技术背景




公司结构或部门划分




工作流程及方式
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非常相
似








3.2. 在此次合作中，您对于双方交流沟通的满意度如何？
满意度
很满意




交流的频率（是否适中）
双方的相互理解程度
每次沟通的效率
3.3. 您如何评价此次合作的信任程度？
□ 很低 □ 低
□ 中等 □ 高 □ 很高
3.4. 您如何评价此次合作的风险程度？
□ 很低 □ 低
□ 中等 □ 高 □ 很高

满意

中等

不满意













很不满
意




第四部分：合作成果及收益
4.1. 此次合作给贵公司带来的收益有哪些（如果对下列某项没有影响，请保留空白）
收益
非常显著
很显著提
显著提高
中等提高
的提高
高




接触最新或先进技术




增加了公司（国际）竞争力




增加了公司市场份额




节约了成本




增加了科研成果




增加了公司的市场影响力




增加了公司利润




增加了公司的产量




增加了产品质量




增加了创新能力




使公司拓展政府渠道




使公司能够进入国际市场




其他（请指明）
---------------------------------------4.2. 您是否认为此次合作达到了您期望的结果？
□ 完全达到预期 □ 基本达到预期 □部分达到预期 □ 基本未达预期 □ 没有达到预期
4.3. 您认为此次合作对贵公司来说是否成功？
□ 非常成功
□ 成功 □ 中等 □ 不成功 □ 非常不成功

此次研究的最后结果会在2010年12月1号之后更新到此链接，欢迎查看：
www.wemosoft.com/gccp/survey.html
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很少提高














